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Reforming the UK’s corporation tax code is becoming more of a widespread political 
concern than the preoccupation of specialists. This functionalist study offers an 
interpretation, and assesses the arguments. It views the corporation tax code as public law, 
energised by political values whose meaning and prioritisation are shaped by the prudential 
logic of effectiveness. The institutions that generate the code, and the challenges of 
globalisation to the nation state, have highlighted historic tensions between Crown and 
Parliament, and the latter’s scrutiny of the managerialist governance style that the code’s 
reform involves. This style is apparent in the ideology of the public interest that reform is 
designed to promote, a process that involves the skilful balancing of efficiency and fairness. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, there is little in the conduct of reform that violates the traditions of the 
UK’s representative democracy. The result is a code that, given its public law status, is a pre-
eminent example of political jurisprudence. Its values, their prioritisation, and their change 
and complexity, are inevitably contentious, because they are the products of representative 
institutions. Criticism of the code generally understates these points. What are presented as 
impartial legal arguments are often simply rival views of the public interest.      
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CORPORATION TAX REFORM 
 
United Kingdom law, in common with that of many other countries,1 requires a company 
resident within its territory to pay corporate income tax – ‘corporation tax’ – ‘on all its 
profits’.2 It does not matter, for the purposes of this ‘worldwide profits rule’, whether the 
profits are made at home or abroad.3 Such is one of the axioms of corporation tax. To it may 
be added another fundamental proposition, i.e. that a company not resident in the UK is 
liable to pay corporation tax on its profits ‘if, and only if, it carries on a trade in the United 
Kingdom through a permanent establishment4 in the United Kingdom’.5 Where the latter 
rule applies, the company’s profits liable to tax are those which are ‘attributable to’ the 
permanent establishment in question.6 The two rules together, it is contended, contain the 
foundational ideas of corporation tax. Whilst they are not the only way of taxing companies, 
they nonetheless encapsulate the approach that the UK has so far taken.  
                                                 
1  See the lists in Roy Rohatgi, Basic International Taxation, 2nd edn, vol. 1 (Richmond: Richmond 
Law and Tax, 2005), pp. 197-199. 
2  See ICTA 1988, s. 8(1). On residence, see FA 1988, s. 66 and Sched. 7 and SP 1/90 (9 January 
1990). ‘Profits’ include, not only income profits, but also chargeable gains (see ICTA 1988, s. 
6(4)(a)). 
3  See ICTA 1988, s. 8(1). 
4  See FA 2003, s. 148. 
5 See ICTA 1988, s. 11(1) (as substituted by FA 2003, s. 149(1), for accounting periods beginning 
after 31 December 2002). See ICTA 1988, s. 834(1) for the definition of an ‘accounting period’. 
6  See ICTA 1988, s. 11(2). 
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 The two statutory formulations just recited, the former embodying the so-called ‘residence 
jurisdiction’, the latter the ‘source jurisdiction’,7 have practical, or technical, as well as 
theoretical dimensions. Thus, as the last rays of winter sunlight glance off the buildings on 
the City skyline, the weary corporate tax lawyer might wonder about the practical effect of 
the residence jurisdiction or the source jurisdiction on the contents of the file open on the 
desk before her. So, too, at his desk in the gracious surroundings of Whitehall, might the 
senior civil servant agonise over the theoretical compatibility of certain aspects of the 
worldwide profits rule with the principles of the European Treaty.8 Indeed, even when there 
is no European or international aspect to a company’s activities, the question of how its 
profits should be measured has important theoretical, no less than practical, aspects. Profits 
are no more, and, significantly, no less than, the ‘base’ of corporation tax, the ‘thing … 
which is liable to the tax’.9 No profits, no tax. And telescopically brief though the statement 
may be, the process of working through some of its more detailed implications, under 
conditions of unprecedented and rapid change in global financial markets,10 has been one of 
the major UK tax law reform projects of the last 15 years or so. But this is not all. The 
ongoing, and incremental, process of reform has itself coincided with a radical shift in 
governmental approaches to the development of public policy, not least tax policy, in part 
attributable to ‘New Right’ theories about the respective roles of Government and special 
                                                 
7  For a brief overview of the ‘jurisdiction to tax’, see Brian J. Arnold and Michael J. McIntyre, 
International Tax Primer, 2nd edn (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), ch. 2; for the origins and history of 
the residence jurisdiction and source jurisdiction, see Sol Picciotto, International Business 
Taxation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), ch. 1.  
8  See Houlder, Financial Times, 6 December 2004, 3; Sanger, Financial Times, 21 September 2006, 
14; H.M. Treasury and HMRC, Taxation of the foreign profits of companies: a discussion 
document (London: H.M. Treasury, 2007); Houlder, Financial Times, 22 June 2007, 2; Houlder, 
Financial Times, 20 July 2007, 3. 
9  See Davies: Principles of Tax Law, ed. by Geoffrey Morse and David Williams, 5th edn (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 2004), para. 1-09.   
10  See, e.g., Mike Buckle and John Thompson, The UK Financial System: Theory and Practice, 4th 
edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 51-54. 
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 interest groups in the policy-making process,11 and in part attributable to some high-profile 
failures12 of the Departments responsible for Government policy on taxation.    
The remodelling of various aspects of the corporation tax base can perhaps be 
characterised in terms of four main themes. The first of these has been an increasingly close 
alignment of profits measurement for corporation tax purposes and their measurement for the 
purposes of generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP).13 We shall be calling this first 
theme ‘the accounting theme’. The Finance Act (FA) of 1993 introduced a new corporation 
tax code for the tax treatment of profits and losses arising on a company’s foreign exchange 
(FOREX) transactions.14 This was followed, in 1994, with new rules for the taxation of 
financial instruments15 and, in FA 1996, with new rules on the tax treatment of a company’s 
‘loan relationships’.16 Rather more was happening, with all three developments, than may 
have been apparent to the casual observer. Although the tenor of these ‘distinct but 
overlapping, independent but interdependent’, separate but integrated,17 codes was largely to 
assimilate corporation tax and GAAP, they also removed, in the areas to which they applied, 
the time-honoured corporation tax distinction between income and capital. Not even the use 
of GAAP in computing trading profits under Schedule D, Case I,18 an area in which recent 
                                                 
11  For an overview, see David Richards and Martin J. Smith, Governance and Public Policy in the 
UK (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
12  Including the handling of some high-profile prosecutions and the involvement of two of the 
Departments in a PFI-related offshore tax avoidance scheme (see n. 78 below). 
13  A surprisingly loose term: see Allister Wilson, Mike Davies, Matthew Curtis and Gregory 
Wilkinson-Riddle, UK and International GAAP: Generally Accepted Accounting Practice in the 
United Kingdom and under International Accounting Standards, 7th edn (London: Butterworths 
Tolley, 2001), pp. 66-70; GAAP 2004: UK Financial Reporting and Accounting, ed. by Chris 
Harrison and others (Kingston upon Thames: Croner CCH, 2004), pp. 2-3.  
14  See FA 1993, ss. 60, 92-96, 125-170, Scheds 15-18; S.I. 1994 Nos 3226-3232. 
15  See FA 1994, ss. 147-177 and Sched. 18; S.I. 1994 No. 3233. 
16  See FA 1996, ss. 80-105; Scheds 8-15. 
17  David Southern, Taxation of Corporate Debt, Foreign Exchange and Derivative Contracts, 7th 
edn (London: Lexis Nexis, 2004), p. 2. 
18  See ICTA 1988, s. 18(3). 
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 years have seen some notable case and statute law,19 has had so radical an effect. The full 
significance of this point will be explored in a later chapter.20 For the present, however, it is 
sufficient to note - as does David Southern - that the three ‘special codes’ on corporate 
finance have fundamentally altered the nature of the corporation tax base, or at least of a 
substantial part of it.21 Deemed a success, if a qualified one, by members of the practising 
legal and accounting professions,22 in 2002, the special codes were nonetheless significantly 
remodelled, becoming, in the process, two, rather than three.23 As Ruth Kelly, MP,24 the 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, explained, at the Committee Stage of the 2002 Finance 
Bill, ‘[a]lthough all three regimes were thought radical in their time, they have suffered from 
two main problems: complexity and lack of fairness’.25 Remodelled though the special codes 
were, the basic idea of the alignment of tax law with GAAP remained; consistent with this, 
FA 2002 also saw the broad assimilation of the corporation tax treatment of intellectual 
property and other intangibles with their accounting treatment.26  
If lack of simplicity had implications for efficiency, then the other reason advanced for 
refashioning the special codes in 2002, ‘lack of fairness’, provided the impetus for 
combating tax avoidance. ‘The Government’, explained the Economic Secretary in the 
                                                 
19  See, e.g., Herbert Smith (A Firm) v. Honour (Inspector of Taxes) (1999) 72 TC 130 (Lloyd J.), 
[11]-[32], where the case law is reviewed; also Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. William 
Grant and Sons Distillers Ltd; Small (Inspector of Taxes) v. Mars UK Ltd [2007] UKHL 15; 
[2007] STC 680; also the articles in British Tax Review – Special Issue – Accounting Standards 
and Taxable Profits [1995] BTR 433-510. See also FA 1998, s. 42, requiring the use of GAAP to 
calculate trading profits, ‘subject to any adjustment required or authorised by law’. 
20  See Chapter 4 below. 
21  See Southern, n. 17 above, p. 2. 
22  See the (qualified) admiration accorded by Julian Ghosh and Ian Johnson, in their loose-leaf, 
Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivatives (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 1999), p. vii, 
a comment which first appeared in Issue 8, in December 2002. 
23  See FA 2002, ss. 69-79 and Sched. 23; FA 2002, s. 80 and Sched. 24; FA 2002, s. 81; FA 2002, s. 
82 and Sched. 25; FA 2002, s. 83 and Scheds 26-28; FA 2002, s. 104.  
24  Ruth Kelly was Economic Secretary to the Treasury from 2001 to 2002 and Financial Secretary 
from 2002 to 2004 (see www.dodonline.co.uk (accessed 12 September 2005)). She had been an 
economics writer for The Guardian newspaper from 1990 to 1994.  
25  See Hansard HC Standing Committee F, 11 June 2002, col. 318. 
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 speech already referred to, ‘are [sic] determined to remove avoidance opportunities as far as 
possible, so that all companies pay their fair share of tax and compete on a level playing 
field’.27 This leads on to the second theme in the ongoing process of reforming the 
corporation tax base: the progressive introduction of statutory anti-avoidance provisions. We 
shall be calling this ‘the anti-avoidance theme’. If the provisions discussed as part of the 
accounting theme are designed to ‘fine tune’ the way in which the corporation tax base is 
defined, then these anti-avoidance provisions are designed to prevent the tax base so defined 
from being manipulated in ways considered to be unacceptable. There are two important 
examples of such measures within the special codes themselves, i.e. a somewhat narrowly-
focussed transitional attack on attempts to gain a tax benefit by altering a company’s 
accounting date,28 plus a much broader ‘general anti-avoidance rule’,29 the well known 
‘paragraph 13’, which disallows deductions attributable to so-called ‘unallowable 
purposes’.30 However, of arguably much more general significance have been anti-avoidance 
provisions, in generally quite separate areas, introduced in 2003, 2004 and 2005. In 2003, 
measures were introduced which were designed to limit corporation tax deductions for 
contributions to employee trusts,31 and FA 2004 extended pre-existing legislation on transfer 
                                                                                                                                                       
26  See FA 2002, s. 84; Sched. 29. 
27  See Hansard HC Standing Committee F, 11 June 2002, col. 319. 
28  See FA 2002, Sched. 23, para. 25, which replaced FA 1993, s. 166 (repealed by FA 2002, s. 
79(1)(b)). 
29  i.e. in the sense of a provision designed to prevent abuse of a particular statutory regime (see 
Morse and Williams, n. 9 above, para. 2-15). The much wider notion of a ‘GAAR’ along the lines 
of Commonwealth examples, and floated in 1998, was originally dropped in favour of the 
disclosure rules introduced by FA 2004, ss. 306-319 and S.I. 2004 No. 1865. However, in 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, in June 2006, Dave 
Hartnett, Director General, Compliance Strategy and Business, HMRC, indicated that the earlier 
decision could be revisited (see House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 6th 
Report. The Finance Bill 2006, Volume II: Evidence (House of Lords Papers, Session 2005-2006, 
204) (London: TSO, 2006), pp. 105-106).  
30  See FA 1996, Sched. 9, para. 13 (as amended by FA 2002, ss. 79 (Sched. 23), 82 (Sched. 25), 141 
(Sched. 40)). 
31  See FA 2003, s. 143 and Sched. 24, enacted in response to the taxpayer’s success before the 
Special Commissioners in Macdonald (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dextra Accessories Ltd and 
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 pricing to transactions entered into between UK resident companies.32 The essence of the 
transfer pricing provisions, which take in provisions on thin capitalisation,33 is to require 
UK-resident companies to enter into transactions with connected UK companies on an 
‘arm’s length’ basis.34 Sections 306 to 319, FA 2004, also famously imposed mandatory 
notification requirements on the promoters of ‘tax avoidance schemes’,35 the results of which 
led directly to the introduction in FA 2006 of four targeted anti-avoidance rules (TAARs) 
designed to prevent corporation tax avoidance through the unacceptable ‘creation and use of 
corporate capital losses’, measures that were further strengthened in FA 2007.36 
In a project the evident purpose of which is to strengthen the corporation tax base, the 
third theme has an almost inevitable quality. There would be no point in defining the tax 
base and preventing its unacceptable manipulation without ensuring that tax due and payable 
is collected and enforced. The third theme, much more lightly sketched in what follows, is 
therefore compliance and enforcement. The main innovation here has been the introduction, 
‘in relation to accounting periods ending on or after [1 July 1999]’,37 of corporation tax self-
assessment (CTSA). We shall be calling this third theme ‘the compliance and enforcement 
theme’. It is necessary to take account of it, but CTSA is not a major theme of the study, not 
least because it has proved relatively uncontroversial. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Others [2002] STC (SCD) 413 (ultimately reversed by the House of Lords on 7 July 2005, see 
[2005] UKHL 47; [2005] STC 1111; also Levy, Tax Journal, 25 July 2005, 9-11). 
32  See FA 2004, ss. 30-37 and Sched. 5, amending ICTA 1988, Sched. 28AA. 
33  See FA 2004, s. 34. 
34  Subject to exceptions for small- and medium-sized enterprises (see FA 2004, s. 31). 
35  See n. 29 above. 
36  See FA 2006, ss. 69-72 (as amended by FA 2007, ss. 27 and 32), adding TCGA 1992, ss. 16A and 
184A-184I; also H.M. Revenue and Customs, HMRC Guidance: Avoidance through the creation 
and use of capital losses by companies, 27 July 2006 (available from www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 
28 July 2006)); also H.M. Revenue and Customs, HMRC Guidance: Capital Gains Tax - 
Avoidance through the creation and use of capital losses, 19 July 2007 (available from 
www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 17 February 2008)); also David F. Williams, ‘Avoidance through the 
creation and use of capital losses by companies’ [2006] BTR 23-33, on the original FA 2006 
provisions. 
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 When picking out the three themes just identified, it is tempting to assume that, given the 
general taxation context, H.M. Government (HMG) has had a free hand in policy 
development. However, the UK’s status as a Member State of the EU, as well as its 
membership - along with the EU itself - of the World Trade Organization (WTO), means that 
this is not so. Both of these, but especially the latter, have, until recently, been somewhat 
understated influences on UK tax policy. And whilst the effect of the latter has perhaps yet to 
be felt, the impact of the fundamental freedoms conferred by the European Treaty on 
corporation tax law has been growing ever more acute. A fourth theme, therefore, is the 
possible impact of the EU (particularly through the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ)) and the WTO on the UK’s freedom of action in delineating the 
corporation tax base. We shall be calling this fourth theme ‘the European and international 
theme’. The attention that had once focussed on the apparent inability of the Commission to 
move beyond a handful of legislative measures on corporate tax38 has shifted to the role of 
the ECJ in holding certain long-standing elements of corporation tax law to fall foul of 
various Treaty provisions, most often those on freedom of establishment.39 There is a 
winding path of ECJ jurisprudence, four milestones on which include: in 1998, a ruling as 
contrary to Arts 43 and 48, European Treaty (ex 52 and 58) domestic legislation restricting 
entitlement to consortium relief to holding companies whose business consisted wholly or 
                                                                                                                                                       
37  See FA 1998, s. 117(4), (5) and Sched. 18; S.I. 1998 No 3175. 
38  See the Assessment Assistance Directive (Council Directive 77/799/EEC [1977] OJ L336 15); the 
Merger Directive (Council Directive 90/434/EEC [1990] OJ L225 1); the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive (Council Directive 90/435/EEC [1990] OJ L225 6); the Arbitration Convention 
(Convention 90/463/EEC [1990] OJ L225 10); the Savings Interest Directive (Council Directive 
03/48/EC [2003] OJ L157 38); and the Interest and Royalty Directive (Council Directive 
03/49/EC [2003] OJ L157 49). See Ben J.M. Terra and Peter J. Wattel, European Tax Law, 4th edn 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2005), chs 16, 10, 9, 11, 14 and 13.  
39  See, e.g., Troup, Financial Times, 5 February 2003, 17. This does not, of course, only affect the 
UK (see Case C-168/01, Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2003] 3 CMLR 22 - 
Dutch law provision preventing relief for interest on loans to purchase shares in companies 
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 mainly in the holding of shares in 90 per cent. UK-resident subsidiaries;40 in 2001, the 
striking-down, for the same reason, of the disqualification of a UK-resident subsidiary of a 
non-resident holding company from making a group income election;41 in 2005, a decision 
that Arts 43 and 48 rule out the restriction of group relief to UK-resident groups;42 and, in 
2006, a decision that Arts 43 and 48 also preclude the maintenance in its then form of the 
UK’s controlled foreign company (CFC) regime.43 When not overtaken by separate 
developments, each of these rulings has required HMG to make appropriate changes to UK 
law.44 Moreover, although the European and international theme assumes the restrictive 
influence of supranational – or international – organisations (in this case the EU and the 
WTO), it should also be recognised that at least one other international organisation, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD) can be regarded as 
having a ‘positive’ influence, i.e. in diffusing tax policy ideas, not only at the national level, 
                                                                                                                                                       
resident in other Member States held to be against the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Council 
Directive 90/435/EEC [1990] OJ L225 6)). 
40  See Case C-264/96, Imperial Chemical Industries plc. v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (H.M. Inspector of 
Taxes) [1998] 3 CMLR 293;  (see now ICTA 1988, s. 403D, 403E, inserted by FA 2000, s. 97, 
Sched. 27). 
41  See Case C-397/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others v. C.I.R. and A.-G. [2001] ECR I-1727 
(‘the Hoechst case’). Group income elections were abolished when advance corporation tax 
(ACT) was abolished by FA 1998 (see below); also Pirelli Cable Holdings N.V. and Others v. 
Customs and Revenue Commissioners [2006] UKHL 4; [2006] STC 548; also Foster, Tax Journal, 
27 February 2006, 9-12 and Tait, Financial Times, 9 February 2006, 4.  
42  See Case C-446/03, Marks and Spencer plc. v. Halsey (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) [2006] 1 CMLR 
18; [2006] EWHC 811; [2006] STC 1235 (Park J.); affirmed [2007] EWCA Civ 117; [2007] 2 
CMLR 21.    
43  See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc. and another v. Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[2007] 1 CMLR 2. Consequential amendments appear in FA 2007, s. 48 and Sched. 15. 
44  See Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt [2003] STC 607. Note also 
the comments of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap 
Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] 2 CMLR 31, para. AG84, on 
whether it had actually been necessary for H.M. Government to amend the pre-FA 2004 UK thin 
capitalisation legislation (see nn. 32 and 33 above and Lagerberg [2004] 1 CLSA 12-55-12-56).  
 8
 but also at the European and international level, through ‘voluntary co-operation’.45 This 
‘policy transfer’ is a topic that we shall touch on again in Chapter 3.     
If corporation tax reforms can be seen in terms of the four themes just discussed, then 
changes in the approach of the relevant Government Departments to the development of 
corporation tax policy can possibly be viewed in terms of three further themes. One of these, 
which we shall be designating ‘the consultation theme’, has been the increased and ever 
more detailed - although not necessarily more timely - use of consultation. True, there had 
been consultation processes46 - even before the FA 1993 introduction of the FOREX 
legislation – but, as Malcolm Gammie, a prominent tax lawyer and author on tax law,47 
pointed out in an influential 1988 lecture, ‘draft legislation ... [had] not [been] produced, 
often because the timetable for change ... [was] too short’.48 The FOREX legislation marked 
something of a departure in this respect; consultation on the way in which FOREX gains and 
losses should be treated for tax purposes, the result of which was the FA 1993 rules, had 
begun four years before, in 1989,49 within a year of Gammie’s lecture calling for a new 
approach to the enactment of tax legislation. The evolution of the first three themes in the 
remodelling of the corporation tax base, as elaborated above, can be traced by reading a 
succession of ‘consultative documents’ and ‘technical notes’. Take as one example the three 
                                                 
45  See Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, ed. by Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, 5th edn 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), para. 6-029. 
46  See the exhaustive analysis in Malcolm Gammie, The Enactment of Tax Legislation: An Analysis 
of the Consultative Process and the Finance Acts 1979 to 1987 (London: Law Society of England 
and Wales, 1988). 
47  Gammie, now a barrister, became a Queen’s Counsel in 2002. In 1988, he was a partner in what 
was then Linklaters and Paines, a leading City law firm; he had previously been Deputy Head of 
the Confederation of British Industry’s (the CBI’s) tax department from 1978 to 1979 and, from 
1979 to 1984, director of the national tax office of what was then Thomson, McLintock and Co., 
the City accountancy firm (see WW).  
48  See Malcolm Gammie, ‘The Process of Fiscal Reform in the United Kingdom’ [1989] BTR 252-
264, 256. See the Opposition complaints at lack of consultation prior to the introduction of 
corporation tax in 1965 (see Hansard HC, 8 December 1964, cols 1322-1324). 
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 (subsequently two) special codes on the tax treatment of loan relationships, FOREX and 
financial instruments. Consultation on the tax treatment of ‘swap’ fees began in 1989;50 1991 
saw the publication of a consultative document on financial instruments,51 the result of 
which were the provisions included in FA 1994; and, on a brisk morning in November 
1995,52 practitioners (or, more accurately, one suspects, their trainees and ‘outdoor clerks’) 
had waited outside Somerset House for the distribution of copies of The Taxation of Gilts 
and Bonds: A Consultative Document,53 the deliberations on which led in turn to the ‘loan 
relationships’ provisions of FA 1996. Even the 2002 remodelling of the special codes 
discussed above was preceded by at least four separate discussion documents.54 A second 
example of this more extensive approach might be the series of consultative documents 
which eventually led to the 2004 extension of the transfer pricing and thin capitalisation 
rules. The process began in August 2002, with a consultation document55 canvassing views 
on the corporation tax treatment of capital assets, both as to the possibility of assimilating 
capital and income gains (along the lines of the special codes) and abolishing the concept of 
capital allowances; the removal of the distinction between trading and investment 
                                                                                                                                                       
49  See Inland Revenue, Tax Treatment of Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses: A Consultative 
Document (London: Inland Revenue, 1989). 
50  See Inland Revenue, Tax Treatment of Swap Fees: A Consultative Document (London: Board of 
Inland Revenue, 1989). 
51  See Inland Revenue, Financial Instruments: The Tax Treatment of Financial Instruments for 
Managing Interest Rate Risk: a Consultative Document (London: Board of Inland Revenue, 
1991). 
52  See Ballard and Staveley, Tax Journal, 7 December 1995, 4-9.  
53  London: Board of Inland Revenue, 1995. 
54  See Inland Revenue, Corporate Debt, Financial Instruments and Foreign Exchange Gains and 
Losses (London: Board of Inland Revenue, 2000); Inland Revenue, Corporate Debt, Financial 
Instruments and Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses: a Consultative Document (London: Board 
of Inland Revenue, 2001); Inland Revenue, Loan Relationships, Derivative Contracts and Foreign 
Exchange Gains and Losses: a Technical Note (London: Board of Inland Revenue, July 2001); 
and Inland Revenue, Loan Relationships, Derivative Contracts and Foreign Exchange Gains and 
Losses: a Technical Note (London: Board of Inland Revenue, December 2001). 
55  H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, Reform of Corporation Tax: A Consultation Document 
(London: Inland Revenue, 2002). 
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 companies;56 and (even) the ‘rationalisation’ of the ‘Schedular’ system itself.57 Transfer 
pricing and thin capitalisation were not mentioned anywhere. The 2002 document, which, so 
HMG reported, had attracted in excess of 150 written replies,58 was followed by a further 
document almost exactly a year later.59 This requested further comments on a narrower 
range of issues than those in the paper of 2002, albeit in the same three areas.60 However, 
HMG also announced its intentions with regard to transfer pricing and thin capitalisation and 
requested views on those areas too.61 To this document, HMG received 147 ‘substantive 
written responses’,62 and, in a technical note of December 2003, published draft legislation 
on the two areas which it was at that time inclined to carry forward: transfer pricing and thin 
capitalisation, and changes to the rules for the deduction of management expenses. Drafted 
in ‘the modern style developed by the Tax Law Rewrite project’, these clauses became, 
without significant amendment, the FA 2004 provisions mentioned above.63 In relation to the 
other matters raised for consultation in the 2002 document, a December 2004 technical note 
brought forward draft clauses to replace the corporation tax Schedules with a single set of 
                                                 
56  See, e.g., Revenue Law - Principles and Practice, ed. by Natalie Lee, 24th edn (Haywards Heath: 
Tottel, 2006), paras [41.22], [41.47]-[41.49], ch. 48 and para. [41.71]. 
57  For the Schedular system, see, e.g., John Tiley, Revenue Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), pp. 135-137. See also Stephen Dowell, A History of Taxation and Taxes in England from 
the Earliest Times to the Present Day, 3rd edn, rev. by A. R. Ilersic, 6 vols (London: Frank Cass, 
1965), II, pp. 225-226, 230-231 (discussed in London County Council v. Attorney-General [1901] 
AC 26, at 37-40 (Lord Macnaghten)); and Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of 
Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 45, 183-193. 
The abolition of the Schedular system for corporation tax, already effected by the Income Tax 
(Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (ITTOIA 2005) for income tax purposes, has been the 
subject of consultation, although this seems to have been abandoned as too costly. 
58  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, Corporation Tax Reform: A Consultation Document 
(London: Inland Revenue, 2003), p. 1.  
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
61  Ibid., ch. 3. 
62  Inland Revenue, Corporation Tax Reform: The Next Steps – Inland Revenue Technical Note 
December 2003 (London: Inland Revenue, 2003), para. 1.2. 
63  See nn. 32 and 33 above. For the Tax Law Rewrite, see n. 88 below. 
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 rules for a company’s ‘operating business’.64 The third proposal made in 2002, i.e. reforming 
the corporation tax treatment of capital assets, was put on hold and, as matters turned out, the 
‘operating business’ concept did not make it to either of the FAs of 2005. Ironically, 
although capital allowances reform was taken up again in 2007, a significant part of this (the 
abolition of industrial buildings allowances) was effected without warning, consultation 
being confined to a set of proposals designed to reduce ‘the distortive impact’ of such 
allowances.65      
What we shall be calling ‘the technical theme’ in corporation tax reform has been an 
increase in the nature and scope of the technical material promulgated by the Government 
Departments responsible for corporation tax policy. Some of this is recognisably ‘law’ in a 
rather narrow formal sense, i.e. secondary legislation in the form of statutory instruments 
(S.I.s) (the sheer quantity of these being a striking feature of the 1993 FOREX regime). 
Other types of technical material, such as Statements of Practice (SPs) and Extra-Statutory 
Concessions (ESCs), not to mention Press Notices (PNs), are each well-established features 
of the system, even though they might not recognisably be ‘law’ in the sense that statutory 
instruments are. However, the corporation tax reforms of the 1990s have seen a range of 
other types of material, too. One is the phenomenon of the ‘explanatory notes’ that have 
accompanied new legislation since 1999.66 To take just one example at random, we might 
observe that the Exchange Gains and Losses (Bringing into Account Gains or Losses) 
Regulations 2002,67 which contained the detailed mechanics of turning the three special 
                                                 
64  See Inland Revenue, Corporation Tax Reform: Technical Note December 2004 (London: Inland 
Revenue, 2004), para. 1.2.  
65  See FA 2007, ss. 36-37; H.M. Treasury and HMRC, Business tax reform: capital allowances 
changes July 2007 (London: H.M. Treasury, 2007).   
66  See Michael Zander, The Law-Making Process, 6th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 179-182, citing Christopher Jenkins, ‘Helping the reader of Bills and Acts’, 149 NLJ 
798.  
67  S.I. 2002 No. 1970. 
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 codes into two, were accompanied by an ‘Explanatory Note’ summarising the instrument and 
explaining its effect.68 Although, as we shall see, the production of such explanatory notes is 
not without interest in the specific context of corporation tax, it is not unique, having become 
endemic in policy areas other than taxation.69 What is unique to the tax context, however, is 
the publication on the web, subject to certain reservations,70 of Inland Revenue, and latterly, 
H.M. Revenue and Customs (HMRC), staff instruction manuals. The company taxation 
section of the Government website includes manuals on CTSA (CT10000), loan 
relationships (CT12000), plus FOREX and financial instruments (CT13200).71     
Reference to HMRC instruction manuals has brought us to the seventh and final theme in 
our discussion of corporation tax reform, although it would also be relevant to any discussion 
of tax law reform in the UK in the last 15 years or so. This is the ongoing process of 
reorganisation in the Government Departments responsible for tax policy, especially the 
former Board of Inland Revenue, the Department that, with H.M. Treasury, has historically 
been responsible for all of the reforms and approaches discussed above. We shall be calling 
this ‘the Departmental theme’. The expression ‘ongoing’ process is accurate to the extent 
that it refers to a group of developments that is, in the nature of things, ever incomplete. The 
reference to the historical position is to the 2005 amalgamation of the Inland Revenue with 
H.M. Customs and Excise, to form HMRC. However, we should note that, especially as 
regards developments in the last three years or so, the ongoing reorganisation process has 
                                                 
68  The order was consequent on the remodelling of the special codes as two, rather than three, in 
2002 (see n. 23 above). 
69  See Callery v. Gray (No. 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1246; 4 All ER 1, paras 48-54 (‘collective 
conditional fees’ and the Explanatory Notes to the Access to Justice Bill 1999, Lord Phillips of 
Worth Matravers MR); Regina (Westminster City Council) v. National Asylum Support Service 
[2002] UKHL 38; 1 WLR 2956, paras 1-6 (Lord Steyn). 
70  See, e.g., the first page of the FOREX and financial instruments manual (CT13200), ‘ … [t]he text 
at this point has been withheld under the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information’ 
(see www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ct56manual/ct13000/ct13200.htm, accessed 14 September 2005). 
71  See www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ct123manual/index.htm (accessed 14 September 2005). 
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 been something of a reactive one. Responsibility for direct taxes, including corporation tax, 
was historically that of the Inland Revenue, while its ‘sister’ Department, H.M. Customs and 
Excise, was responsible for indirect tax policy. Although this is something of an over-
simplification, both Departments, each of which was subordinate to the Treasury, had, since 
the early 1980s, been reformed along lines suggested by the New Right ideologies that were 
gaining ground in the closing decades of the twentieth century, latterly by what is still, albeit 
somewhat quaintly, referred to as ‘the New Public Management’ (NPM).72 The key 
objective of these reforms might be described as the attainment of what Frampton 
characterises as the ‘administrative virtue’ of increased efficiency; to this end, public 
servants staffing the Inland Revenue, along with those in other Government Departments, 
were encouraged to have a ‘better business focus’.73 The process has been through a number 
of stages, including ‘Raynerism’,74 the Financial Management Initiative (FMI), ‘Next 
Steps’,75 and ‘Gershonisation’,76 the cumulative results of which will be assessed in 
subsequent chapters. Most importantly, for present purposes, by the early 1990s, the (then) 
63,000 staff of the Inland Revenue were being reorganised ‘on Next Steps lines’.77 It will be 
noted that this is almost exactly the period over which the reforms discussed above were 
taking shape. Whether, and to what extent, this market-oriented approach ultimately led to 
subsequent failures of management in the Inland Revenue,78 especially under its last 
                                                 
72  See, e.g., Owen E. Hughes, Public Management and Administration: An Introduction, 2nd edn 
(London: Macmillan, 1998), passim. 
73  See Dennis Frampton, Practical Tax Administration (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993), p. 58. 
74  Named after Sir Derek (later Lord) Rayner. 
75  See Richards and Smith, n. 11 above, pp. 104-111; also Frampton, n. 73 above, ch. 4. 
76  After Sir Peter Gershon (see Robert Peston, Brown’s Britain (London: Short Books, 2005), p. 
150). 
77  See Gavin Drewry, ‘The New Public Management’, in The Changing Constitution, ed. by Jeffrey 
Jowell and Dawn Oliver, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 167-189 (p. 177).  
78  See n. 12 above and House of Commons Treasury Committee, 10th Report. Inland Revenue 
Matters (House of Commons Papers, Session 2002-2003, 834) (London: TSO, 2003). 
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 permanent Chairman, Sir Nicholas Montagu,79 does not need to be examined here. What 
does need to be stressed, however, is that the Government’s reaction to these failures was the 
institution of a large-scale review of the ‘Revenue Departments’,80 chaired by Gus 
O’Donnell,81 and that its report, which appeared in March 2004,82 has resulted in the 
amalgamation of the two old Departments, in the new, hapless and (some would say) under-
fun
(ACT).85 Or again, one might stress the lowering of the full rate of corporation tax after 
                                                
ded HMRC.83   
Such then are what, for the purposes of the present study, are taken to be the seven main 
themes in the reform of corporation tax, and in the changes in the policy approach to the tax. 
It would be possible to highlight other, subsidiary elements, relative to each main theme. 
One might, for instance, in relation to both the accounting and the European and 
international themes, emphasise the effect on corporation tax legislation of the compulsory 
adoption of International Accounting Standards (IASs) for quoted companies after 31 
December 2004.84 Or one might emphasise the abolition, without consultation, after 
Labour’s landslide General Election victory in May 1997, of advance corporation tax 
 
79  Montagu retired in 2004. He had been a philosophy lecturer before becoming a Whitehall civil 
servant (see WW). 
80  See H.M. Treasury Press Release 78/03, Chancellor announces major review of Inland Revenue 
and Customs and Excise, 3 July 2003 (reprinted at [2003] SWTI 1202-1204). 
81  Currently (as Sir Gus O’Donnell), Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service. 
He was briefly an economics lecturer before becoming a Treasury civil servant in 1979. At the 
time of the O’Donnell report, he was Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (see WW). 
82  Financing Britain’s Future: Review of the Revenue Departments (Chair, Gus O’Donnell) (Cm 
6163) (London: TSO, 2004). 
83  See Houlder, Financial Times, 20 November 2007, 2; Houlder, Financial Times, 21 November 
2007, 2; Burns and Eaglesham, Financial Times, 14 December 2007, 2; also, generally, the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. 
84  See CA 1985, s. 227(2) and European Parliament and Council Regulation EC/1606/02 [2002] OJ 
L243 1, Art. 4; see H.M. Revenue and Customs, International Accounting Standards – The UK 
tax implications, 29 September 2005 (see www. hmrc.gov.uk/practitioners/int_accounting.htm, 
accessed 6 February 2006); also [2005] SWTI 1623. 
85  See FA 1998, s. 31 and Sched. 3. For the background, see William Keegan, The Prudence of Mr 
Gordon Brown (Chichester: John Wiley, 2003), pp. 140, 194-195 and 260; also Peston, n. 76 
above, pp. 101-104. 
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 1997.86 Yet again, one might choose to emphasise the drive for greater intelligibility in the 
drafting of tax legislation, in the shape of the Tax Law Rewrite project,87 even if its impact 
on corporation tax is only beginning to be felt.88 For the purpose of the study, however, we 
shall not be taking these ‘subsidiary’ changes, though important, as being characteristic of 
corporation tax reform in the way that the seven themes drawn out above are considered to 
be. Moreover, the references to ‘corporation tax reform’ should not be taken to imply a 
tightly unified reform process. Although the first four themes represent, as we shall see, the 
realisation of a ‘vision’ for the tax, they have been ‘incremental’, and often reactive, in 
nature. 
 
THEORISING CORPORATION TAX REFORM 
 
The first four themes just introduced have been distilled from a highly technical legal 
literature on corporation tax.89 The various works to which reference has been made have 
                                                 
86  Since April 2007, corporation tax rates have comprised a ‘small companies’ rate’ of 20 per cent., 
on profits under £300,000 (see ICTA 1988, s. 13; FA 2007, s. 3), and a full rate of 30 per cent. on 
profits over £1.5m (see FA 2006, s. 24). There is a progressive increase in the rate of tax on 
profits between £300,000 and £1.5m, using a ‘marginal relief’ fraction of 1/40 (see FA 2007, s. 
3(2)(a)). 
87  See Lee, n. 56 above, para. [1.22] (see www.hmrc.gov.uk/rewrite/index.htm (accessed 19 
September 2005)).  
88  To date, there have been four ‘rewrite’ Acts and one ‘rewrite’ S.I., i.e.: Capital Allowances Act 
2001 (CAA 2001); Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (ITEPA 2003); Income Tax 
(Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003 No. 2682); ITTOIA 2005 (see n. 57 above); and 
Income Tax Act 2007. Of these, only CAA 2001 relates to both corporation tax and income tax. 
The first corporation tax ‘rewrite’ Bill was published amid controversy in February 2008 (see 
Houlder, Financial Times, 25 February 2008, 4); the earliest rewritten clauses had appeared for 
consultation in May and June 2006 (see Papers CC/SC (06) 04-07, available from 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/rewrite/exposure/menu.htm (accessed 28 September 2006)); also Hansard HL, 
23 March 2005, col. 331 (Lord Howe of Aberavon)). 
89  See, e.g., Taxation of Companies and Company Reconstructions, ed. by Richard Bramwell, Alun 
James, Mike Hardwick and John Lindsay, 8th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2002); also 
Ghosh and Johnson, n. 22 above; also Judith Freedman, ‘Taxation Research as Legal Research’, in 
Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research, ed. by Margaret Lamb et al. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 13-34, esp. 19-20. 
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 largely, though not exclusively, been written by the practising lawyers and accountants 
whose business it is to advise clients on the practical implications of the legal developments 
to which the various themes refer. As Christopher Wales has written: ‘For lawyers and 
accountants, there are very few rewards to be earned from considering how … [things] 
should be or how to influence change’.90 For this reason, the technical literature does not 
always make very accessible reading, even to the well informed. Since much of it is of the 
highest quality, however, considerable reference will be made to it in what follows. 
Although the technical writing has a certain theoretical dimension (insofar, for instance, 
as it consists of detailed discussions of the relevance of accounting theory to tax law),91 what 
is conspicuous by its absence is a more generally theorised discussion of the implications of 
the interaction of the last three themes among those of the first four. The inspiration for this 
study, at the highest level of abstraction, was a perception that the critique of corporation tax 
reform has tended to concentrate on its practical, or technical, dimension, and has somehow 
failed to capture some important theoretical issues which might reasonably be expected to 
arise, not only from the reforms themselves, but also from the institutions involved in 
effecting them, and the processes by which the various reforms have been approached. This 
                                                 
90  See Christopher Wales, ‘The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the making of Tax Policy 
in the UK’ [2004] BTR 543-565, 559. Historically, technical writing has been the predominant 
approach to writing about tax law: see, e.g., Dowell’s Income Tax Laws, ed. by P.M. Smyth, 9th 
edn (London: Butterworth, 1926), an elaborately detailed and extremely long annotation of the 
relevant legislation; Edwin Max Konstam, The Law of Income Tax: A Treatise Designed for the 
Use of the Taxpayer and his Advisers, 12th edn (London: Stevens and Sons, 1952), an austere 
exposition of, in this case, the Income Tax Act, 1952; and G.S.A. Wheatcroft, The Law of Income 
Tax, Surtax and Profits Tax (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1962), which was ‘based on’ 
Konstam’s work, whilst much more readable, and which was itself the forerunner of Bramwell, n. 
89 above. 
91  See n. 19 above. See also Graeme Macdonald and David Martin, Tax and Accounting: A Response 
to the 2003 Consultation Document on Corporation Tax Reform (London: Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, 2004). 
 17
 situation, a characteristic of tax law writing, no less in the United States than in the UK,92 is 
hardly surprising, given the need for the practising professions to digest, and to work with, a 
considerable, ever-expanding body of material. A notable exception is the corporation tax 
section of Tiley’s well-known textbook,93 which refers extensively to what might be thought 
of as the ‘non-technical’, i.e. theoretical, literature on corporation tax reform. The 
compendious nature of his work, however, means that it can only suggest, rather than 
develop, the wider possibilities that the material might offer. 
If we cast the net wider, we find that the theoretical writing on corporation tax reform, as 
distinct from the technical literature, tends to present it an enterprise of classical political 
economy.94 We therefore find that discussions of corporation tax are indebted, to a greater or 
lesser extent, to the four ‘maxims’ of taxation – those of ‘equality’, ‘certainty’, convenience 
and cost-effectiveness - propounded in Book V, Chapter II,95 of Adam Smith’s The Wealth 
of Nations.96 The extent of this theoretical literature is such that, as Mintz reports, 
corporation tax is possibly the subject of more anxious scrutiny than any other tax.97 
‘Countless numbers of professionals’, he tells us, ‘study the impact of corporate tax law on 
                                                 
92  See Beverley I. Moran, ‘Taxation’, in The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, ed. by Peter Cane 
and Mark Tushnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 377-396; also Daniel M. 
Schneider, ‘Interpreting the Interpreters: Assessing Forty-Five Years of Tax Literature’ (1999) 4 
Fla. Tax Rev. 483-529. 
93  See Tiley, n. 57 above, chs 44-52. See the comments in Freedman, n. 89 above, pp. 18-19. 
94  See Simon James, ‘Taxation Research as Economic Research’, in Lamb et al., n. 89 above, pp. 
35-53, esp. 44. The term ‘political economy’ has been traced to a work by Antoyne de 
Montchrétien (c. 1576-1621), Traicté de l’oeconomie politique (see The economic limits to 
modern politics, ed. by John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. vii). See 
Montchrétien’s Traicté de l’œconomie politique (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970), pp. xxiii-xxiv.  
95  Book V is entitled, Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth, and Chapter II bears the 
heading ‘Of the Sources of the general or publick Revenue of the Society’. 
96  See Adam Smith (1723-1790), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
ed. by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (textual editor W.B. Todd), 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976), II, pp. 825-828. 
97  See Jack Mintz, ‘The Corporation Tax’, in The Economics of Tax Policy, ed. by Michael P. 
Devereux (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 137-187. 
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 the affairs of the corporation’.98 In the years since the introduction of corporation tax in 
1965,99 there have been possibly four critiques which still form important points of departure 
in discussions of the tax, and which, though diverse in origin and date, will be taken to typify 
the theoretical literature. The four consist of the theoretically pleasing, if somewhat 
unrealistic, discussion of corporation tax in the Meade Committee Report, of 1978;100 the 
much lauded, though inconclusive, 1982 Green Paper on corporation tax reform;101 the 
discussion of corporation tax in the latest (1990) edition of Kay and King’s widely-cited 
economics textbook on the tax system in Britain;102 and Mintz’s paper on corporation tax,103 
to which reference has just been made. In addition, there has been an important recent study, 
by Devereux, Griffith and Klemm,104 which seeks to account for the revenue-generating 
success of the tax, while casting doubt on its continuing ability to produce such 
comparatively high levels of revenue. This particular choice of four or five examples would 
not necessarily, of course, correspond to the choice that another might make. Its importance, 
however, is that it is able to illustrate certain key features of the way in which corporation tax 
reform has historically been presented.          
                                                 
98  Ibid., p. 137 
99  See FA 1965, ss. 46-89 (Part IV of the Act). For the background, see David Kynaston, The City of 
London, vol. IV: A Club No More, 1945-2000 (London: Chatto and Windus, 2001), pp. 300-301, 
304, 307, 311-312. 
100  See The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Professor 
J.E. Meade (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978). 
101  See Corporation Tax: Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Command 
of Her Majesty January 1982 (Cmnd 8456) (London: HMSO, 1982). 
102  See J.A. Kay and M.A. King, The British Tax System, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), chs 10 and 11. 
103  See Mintz, n. 97 above. 
104  See Michael P. Devereux, Rachel Griffith and Alexander Klemm, ‘Why Has the UK Corporation 
Tax Raised So Much Revenue?’ (2004) 25 FS 367-388. 
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 Given the wealth of technical and theoretical material, it is surprising that, despite 
occasional promptings,105 legal scholars have not embarked on a systematic analysis of the 
possible significance of the themes in corporation tax reform. What makes this even more 
intriguing is the widespread renewal of interest in constitutional and administrative law, i.e. 
in public law,106 during the 1990s. Tax is, after all, even in common law jurisdictions, 
‘indisputably part of public law’.107 Perhaps, to adopt an insight of Fisher’s, albeit from a 
different area of policy making, one reason for the neglect of the public law implications of 
corporation tax reform is that ‘[t]he law in … [the area of corporation tax] has always 
seemed too ad hoc, too shambolic and too much the product of pragmatic compromise to be 
easily theorised about – let alone linked to the broader field of public law’.108 Another reason 
might be that, with public law scholarship for long focussed on judicial review, corporation 
tax law and policy – with its historically rather limited scope for that procedure – has seemed 
rather unpromising territory.109 Whatever the reasons may be, at the next level of generality, 
the study has been inspired by the need to develop a public law conception of corporation 
tax. Insofar as this would enable an interpretation of the seven themes with which the study 
began, it might offer powerful insights into the political acceptability – the legitimacy – of an 
area of law and policy often assumed to be of only ‘technical’ or ‘economic’ significance.110 
                                                 
105  See Tiley (2003) 26 The Reporter 19-24, 21-22. See also the Introduction to Studies in the History 
of Tax Law, ed. by John Tiley (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p. vii. 
106  See Eric Barendt, ‘Constitutional Fundamentals’, in English Public Law, ed. by David Feldman 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), para. 1.08; also Council of Civil Service Unions and 
Others v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 407-410 (Lord Diplock) and 414-415 (Lord 
Roskill); also John F. McEldowney, Public Law, 3rd edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2002), 
para. 1-001. 
107  See Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2003), p. 60; see 
Ferrazzini v. Italy [2001] STC 1314, 1319c, 1320g-j. 
108  See Fisher (2001) 13 J. Env. L. 115-117, 115 (book review). 
109  See, e.g., H.W.R. Wade, ‘Procedure and Prerogative in Public Law’ (1985) 101 LQR 180-199. 
110  See Assaf Likhovski, ‘A Map of Society: Defining Income in British, British Colonial and 
American Tax Legislation’ [2005] BTR 158-179, 177-179, on the absence of an obvious link 
between payments and policies (unlike with personal taxes). 
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 This in turn might, for instance, illuminate the anti-avoidance theme and assist in mapping 
out the boundaries of the acceptable in tax avoidance. At the very least, the development of 
such a public law framework for corporation tax reform would provide a useful basis for 
further ‘empirical’ investigation.111 
In order to lay the foundations for the investigation in subsequent chapters, the discussion 
in the rest of the present chapter unfolds in three main stages. First, we need to clarify why it 
is that corporation tax reform should be regarded, not simply as a technical exercise, but as a 
‘political practice’ too. This is of some importance because, to the extent that the 
investigation uncovers the basis on which the state and corporations engage in the reform 
process, it also reveals the role to be assigned to public law in regulating the relationship 
between them.112 Further, however, it gives rise to questions surrounding the nature and 
scope of public law itself. To the limited extent that the public law nature of taxation has 
been scrutinised in the literature, such scrutiny has neglected to take account of 
developments in public law scholarship over the past couple of decades.113 The second part 
of the discussion therefore seeks to clarify both the nature and the scope of public law, as it 
is apprehended in these pages, and, in so doing, to stress that the approach to be taken to the 
material is an ‘interpretative’ and a ‘functionalist’ one.114 Relatively recent developments in 
public law scholarship figure prominently in the analysis as a whole. A powerful stimulus to 
                                                 
111  See, e.g., Tony Prosser, ‘Towards a Critical Public Law’ (1982) Jo. of Law & Soc. 1-19, 1. 
112  See Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Law: the Third Order of the Political’, in Public Law in a 
Multi-Layered Constitution, ed. by Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 27-51, 42. 
113  See, e.g., Malcolm Gammie, ‘Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law: a Perspective from the United 
Kingdom’, in Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law, ed. by Graeme S. Cooper (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications, 1997), pp. 181-218; also Philip Baker, ‘United Kingdom’, in The Principle of 
Equality in European Taxation, ed. by Gerard T.K. Meussen (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), pp. 165-167. See Chapter 4 below. 
114   See Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), esp. ch. 
10.  
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 the study was the insights that the work of the ‘Sheffield school’115 seemed to provide to 
those engaged in the theoretical analysis of public law. However, it is first necessary to place 
this and other approaches to public law in context, so the discussion of the nature and scope 
of public law begins with a survey of the main trends in public law writing. The key insight 
that the Sheffield school has suggested is that the UK’s unwritten constitution, in tax matters 
no less than in any other, could be regarded as a ‘structure of values’.116 What proved 
unsatisfactory to the present author was both the Sheffield school’s claim to elevate 
constitutional values to the status of ‘rule of law values’117 and its inability satisfactorily to 
explain either the provenance of those values or the relationship between them. Much more 
satisfactory seems to be Martin Loughlin’s conception of public law as ‘the third order of the 
political’.118 Without denying the significance of ‘values’, his theory of public law seems 
both to explain their provenance (as growing out of the ‘political realm’) and to suggest ways 
of analysing the relationship between them. It follows that, in conceiving of corporation tax 
as public law, the study seeks to investigate what light Loughlin’s conception of the subject 
can throw on the interpretation of corporation tax reform. Greatly as it is indebted to it, the 
study does not, however, attempt an unqualified application of Loughlin’s theory. For 
example, as we shall see, the traditional view of corporation tax as an enterprise of classical 
political economy requires us to place a greater emphasis on ‘values’ – or ‘maxims’ - than 
perhaps Loughlin would regard as ideal. Again, the study rejects another possible 
consequence of Loughlin’s theory, that corporation tax reform might be interpreted in terms 
                                                 
115  So called in reference to the group of public lawyers working at the University of Sheffield since 
the 1980s, especially, perhaps, Ian Harden and Norman Lewis, both of whose work is discussed 
below.  
116  See n. 227 below. 
117 Ibid. 
118  See Loughlin, n. 112 above, pp. 40-42. 
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 of systems theory.119 These two main differences are discussed further below.120 However, 
they do not detract from the overall usefulness of a version of Loughlin’s conception of 
public law to the interpretation of the themes under consideration.          
All of this brings us, in the final part of the chapter, to a drawing together of the seven 
themes outlined at the beginning, of the political element in corporation tax reform, and of 
the nature and scope of public law. In this final part, we seek to show the ways in which a 
public law approach can illuminate aspects of corporation tax reform. This last part begins 
by emphasising the centrality of tax law to public law, even where, as in the UK, 
constitutional arrangements do not take the form of ‘some slim constitutive document’.121 It 
does so by taking as its model the application of public law scholarship to regulation, 
something pioneered by Sheffield school writers, and, in so doing, seeks to explain the 
relationship between taxation – in this case corporate taxation – and other forms of 
regulation. This final part of the chapter also maps out the structure of the study in the light 
of this ‘regulatory’ model. 
The development of a public law conception of corporation tax reform should thus 
provide a context in which the technical and theoretical traditions of corporation tax 
scholarship can illuminate each other. It should also enable the utilisation of new types of 
source material, as well as the interpretation of established types of source material in new 
ways. To these ends, the study draws upon a range of material, including scholarship on the 
role of special interest groups in policy making,122 as well as on quantities of technical 
literature generally thought, perhaps, to be of merely transient significance. Although it has 
benefited from some discussion with public servants and with members of the practising 
                                                 
119  See n. 410 below. 
120  See nn. 410 and 415 below. 
121  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 241. 
122  In this case, accountants and lawyers. 
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 professions, the study’s empirical dimension, gathered around the seven themes outlined 
above, is drawn from vast amounts of under-theorised official and secondary published 
material. 
 
THE POLITICS OF CORPORATION TAX REFORM 
 
Crucially important to the study is the contention that the significance of corporation tax 
reform is not encapsulated in the devising of elegant solutions to intricate technical 
problems. This is, to be sure, one of its most important jobs. At a much deeper level, 
however, it is also an arena in which, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt, there is an ever-present 
potential for conflict.123 Moreover, when ministers, civil servants, lawyers, accountants, 
corporations, and economists, engage in the process of consultation and negotiation on 
corporation tax reform, they are engaged in the ‘practices of politics’.124 The reader with a 
background in political theory or political science will find both of these statements 
unexceptionable. It is suggested, however, that, judging by the writings referred to above, for 
the economist, for the accountant, and – possibly – even for the lawyer, these statements will 
be controversial. Even outside the two categories of writing referred to in the previous part, 
the process of corporation tax reform is often presented as a preoccupation of the specialist, 
                                                 
123  See Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), The Concept of the Political, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 29. Although the references are to this 1996 translation, 
The Concept of the Political was first published in 1932 (see Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 
1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1963)). See also 
Renato Cristi, ‘Carl Schmitt’, in Continental Political Thought, ed. by Terrell Carver and James 
Martin (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 120-135. The writer has thought extremely 
carefully about making reference to Schmitt’s work but, ultimately, has been satisfied with the 
rationalisation offered by, e.g., Paul Piccone and G.L. Ulmen, in their ‘Introduction to Carl 
Schmitt’ (1987) 72 Telos 3-14. 
124  This distinction between ‘the concept of the political’ and the ‘practices of politics’ follows 
Loughlin’s conception of the ‘first and second orders of the political’ (see Loughlin, n. 112 above, 
pp. 30-40). 
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 rather than the subject of a wider political discourse. Thus Peters, in his study of taxes and 
politics in OECD countries in the early nineties,125 devotes only a small part of his analysis 
to specific issues raised by corporate income taxation.126 The specialist nature of the subject 
matter means that, so far as the lawyer and the accountant are concerned, the arguments to 
which it gives rise are such as to seem to remove them from the arena of ‘the political’. 
There has been, as we shall see, some discussion of ‘the politics of corporate taxation’, 
notably by Radaelli;127 but even this, it is contended, radically underestimates what it is that 
is political about it. In arguing for a political status for corporation tax reform, the present 
study is not merely saying that it is a practice of ‘political economy’, since this is of course 
the case. Rather, its claim is that, despite the polished manners and well-tailored suits of its 
chief protagonists, corporation tax reform is characterised by the need to find ‘workable’ 
solutions to profound, but skilfully obfuscated, antagonisms.128 In order to sustain this 
argument, it is necessary to identify what is ‘political’ about corporation tax reform and to 
interrogate something of the nature of the politics involved.    
 
The technical and the political 
The first four of the seven themes delineated at the beginning of the study bear the traces 
both of the potential for conflict, but also of its careful management. Thus, the accounting 
theme can be seen in terms of a manifestation of the jostling interests, not simply of rival 
                                                 
125  See B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991). 
126  Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
127  See, e.g., Claudio M. Radaelli, The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European Union: 
Knowledge and International Policy Agendas (London: Routledge, 1997). See below in this 
chapter. 
128  See Schmitt, n. 123 above, loc. cit. 
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 groups of professionals – in this case, of lawyers and accountants129 – but also of the 
corporate sector and the state. And yet, as befits an ongoing process of carefully handled 
conflict, it is not always possible to develop a clear sense of who the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
are. What appears to be an ongoing assimilation of tax law to GAAP can, to the extent that 
only accountants are fully equipped to interpret its scope, be viewed as a something of a 
victory for the accountancy, as against the legal, profession. But it is nonetheless difficult to 
assess the significance of that victory, if such it be, because, as Southern has pointed out, one 
little-remarked effect of removing the distinction between income and capital within the loan 
relationships code was to broaden the corporation tax base.130 Even this does not enable us to 
declare a clear ‘winner’, however, because another consequence of introducing the loan 
relationships code was to enable companies to claim, for the first time, a tax deduction for 
the accruing discount on a zero-coupon bond.131 Similar signs of conflict averted, albeit 
temporarily, are to be detected in relation both to the anti-avoidance theme and the 
compliance and enforcement theme. Even more clearly than with the accounting theme, we 
can detect in these two areas a background of fundamentally opposed positions on what, so 
far as the state and the corporate sector are concerned, is the question of the ‘fair share’ of 
tax for the latter to bear.132 The clarity of these fundamentally opposed positions is starkly 
illustrated every time the UK courts have to rule on the latest anti-avoidance device, as well 
as each subsequent occasion on which, when successful, the device in question is met with 
                                                 
129  Or, as Sir Leonard Hoffmann (as he then was) once described them, ‘rival tribes’ (see Law and 
Accountancy – Conflict and Co-operation in the 1990s, ed. by Judith Freedman and Michael 
Power (London: Paul Chapman Publishing, 1992), p. v).  
130  See Southern, Tax Journal, 23 November 1995, 6-9. See also n. 17 above. 
131 See Southern, n. 17 above, pp. 44-45. 
132  Although we should note, as Kay has pointed out, that corporation tax should perhaps be viewed 
as a tax on all those associated with companies, rather than the companies themselves (see Kay, 
Financial Times, 25 October 2005, 19; also John Kay and Jadu Sen, ‘The Comparative Burden of 
Business Taxation’ (1983) 4:3 FS 23-28, 23); also Malcolm Gammie, ‘Reforming Corporate 
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 (sometimes retrospective) anti-avoidance legislation.133 As for the compliance and 
enforcement theme, the management of the corporate sector’s disquiet over proposals to 
synchronise the deadlines for submitting corporation tax returns to HMRC and corporate 
accounts to Companies House,134 also demonstrates how potential conflict has not become a 
reality.135 All of the foregoing may yet, however, pale into relative insignificance next to the 
potential for conflict arising out of the European and international theme. The issues at stake 
here illustrate the problems of thinking of the tax unit, in the corporation tax context, as 
being that of the individual – or ‘solus’ – company. What the unfolding of the European and 
international theme has illustrated more than anything else is the difficulty of managing the 
differing objectives and values, not merely of the state and the corporation, but of the state, 
the EU, and the multinational corporation (the MNC).136 
The initial contention that corporation tax reform is a political arena, its significance far 
from exhausted by its technical complexity, relies on the constant potential for conflict, 
express or implied, suggested by each of the above examples. This potential is not, as we 
shall see, diminished by the fairly refined and courteous way in which it is handled. And it 
presents us with the task of providing some interpretation of what has been happening in the 
reform process, especially over the period of the last 15 years or so. For this, we have to turn 
to politics or, to be more precise, to what political theory has to tell us about the ‘concept of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Taxation: An Evaluation of the United States Treasury Integration Proposals and other Corporate 
Tax Systems in an International Context: Part 1’ [1992] BTR 148-173, 149. 
133  See, e.g., Macdonald (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dextra Accessories Ltd and Others and FA 
2003, s. 143 and Sched. 24, n. 31 above. For the distinction between ‘retrospective’ and 
‘retroactive’ see Bobbett [2006] BTR 15-18. 
134  See Companies House and HMRC, Aligning Filing Dates for Companies: A Consultation 
Document, November 2005, available from www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 19 July 2006).  
135  See Scott, Tax Journal, 27 February 2006, 13-14; Houlder, Financial Times, 3 March 2006, 3; 
Houlder, Financial Times, 12 July 2006, 2. 
136  See Case C-446/03, Marks and Spencer plc. v. Halsey (H.M. Inspector of Taxes), n. 42 above, and 
the subsequent changes to UK legislation announced on 20 February 2006 (see HMRC 12/06, 
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 the political’.137 This ‘first order of the political’ is not, as Loughlin points out, the same as 
‘the practices of politics’,138 to which, in the corporation tax context, we shall return in a 
moment. This is the ‘essential character’ of the political, what Schmitt bleakly calls the ‘ever 
present possibility of conflict’,139 capable of existing to varying degrees, and in differing 
contexts, until the point at which it results in the identification of ‘the friend’ and the 
(political) ‘enemy’,140 the foe that must be defeated.141 In relations between states, ‘the 
political’ holds out the uttermost possibility of ‘armed combat’.142 Within its own territory, 
however, it is the power of the stable state that manages ‘domestic antagonisms’, so that they 
remain ‘below the level of intensity of friend versus enemy’.143 It is important to stress that 
what is being described here is the ‘possibility of conflict’, not necessarily the actual 
practices of, in this case, the corporate sector or of the state. As for ‘lower level’ 
antagonisms, these are the potential clash of the ruling ideology with the values of the 
corporate sector, but they are not necessarily translated into practice. One financial journalist 
has characterised the potential for conflict with a telling example: ‘[A] quoted company audit 
committee that puts its tax advice out to tender [,he says,] is likely to be asked by competing 
                                                                                                                                                       
reproduced at [2006] SWTI 453). On the special tax problems presented by MNCs, see Peter 
Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), ch. 8.  
137  See Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 30. 
138  Ibid., p. 31. 
139  See Schmitt, n. 123 above, p. 32; also Andrew Gamble, Politics and Fate (Cambridge: Polity, 
2000), pp. 8-9.  
140  See Schmitt, n. 123 above, p. 29. ‘The enemy is hostis, not inimicus in the broader sense … ’ 
(ibid., p. 28). See Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and the State 
in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz Neumann (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 217-223. 
141  See Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 32. 
142  See Schmitt, n. 123 above, p. 32. This is why Schmitt’s opening gambit is that ‘[t]he concept of 
the state presupposes the concept of the political’ (see Schmitt, n. 123 above, p. 19). The ability of 
the stable state to withstand other states depends on the ‘externalisation’ of the ‘friend-enemy 
grouping’ (ibid., p. 29, and Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 34). 
143 See Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 34; also Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 
2005), p. 16. 
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 firms where, on the spectrum of tax management from “caution” to “extreme aggression”, it 
wishes to be’.144 
So we might, it is suggested, quite fairly speak of the ‘antagonism’ of the collective 
wisdom of the corporate sector, to the ideology of the governing party.145 And, if 
‘antagonism’ seems too emotive a word, consider, for example, the threat implied by the 
reported comments of the chief executives of two UK listed groups in December 2003. 
According to one, his group’s ‘investment priorities were in other markets [i.e. outside the 
UK]’, because of the additions to his company’s ‘UK cost base’ of ‘”interventionist” 
government policies’.146 To another was attributed the elliptical claim that ‘it now 
“notionally” paid 53 per cent of its profits in taxation’, with, again, the threat implied in the 
comment that he ‘would not want to see that going up any further’.147 Examples of such 
language abound, and, like the one just quoted, they usually involve the more or less veiled 
threat of ‘capital flight’.148 ‘If you do not play ball with us’, these voices suggest, ‘we shall 
take the ball away’. And each example tends to support Schmitt’s claim that ‘[t]he political 
can derive its energy from the economic … [It] does not describe its own substance, but only 
the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be … 
                                                 
144  See Plender, Financial Times, 18 March 2004, 18; Parker, Financial Times, 4 May 2004, 4 (‘Ernst 
& Young are probably the most aggressive, creative, abusive provider of schemes and 
arrangements among the major accountancy firms.’ (Anonymous ‘Whitehall official’.) 
145  As to which, see Tiley, n. 57 above, pp. 8-9; also Parker, n. 144 above, reporting views of ‘left-of-
centre ministers’; also the comments of Ruth Kelly MP, n. 27 above.  
146  See Boxell and Jones, Financial Times, 5 December 2003, 1 (Philip Bowman, Allied Domecq). 
147  Ibid. (Anonymous, Tesco). 
148  See Parker, Financial Times, 24 February 2004, 1 (Jonathan Symonds, AstraZeneca); Houlder, 
Financial Times, 22 November 2004, 9 (Aidan O’Carroll, Ernst and Young); Houlder, Financial 
Times, 3 October 2005, 17; Editorial, Financial Times, 9 November 2005, 18; Eaglesham, 
Financial Times, 6 December 2005, 4 (Sir Digby Jones, CBI); Adams, Financial Times, 6 
December 2005, 5 (Malcolm Webb, UK Offshore Operators Association); Houlder, Financial 
Times, 23 December 2005, 4 (inter alia, Chris Spooner, HSBC Holdings); Seib, Times, 17 January 
2006, see http://business.timesonline.co.uk (accessed 22 February 2008) (Guy Brannan, 
Linklaters, and Patrick Mears, Allen and Overy); Houlder, Financial Times, 20 June 2006, 3; 
Houlder, Financial Times, 23 July 2007, 7. 
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 economic … and can effect at different times different coalitions and separations’.149 The 
idea that tax policy can energise the political can be illustrated, not only by reference to the 
clash between corporate values and the governing ideology, but by reference to the increased 
prominence which issues of fairness in corporation tax have gained in the public 
consciousness. In a striking comparison, the director of the OECD’s centre for tax policy and 
administration has been quoted as saying that ‘[t]ax is where the environment was 10 years 
ago’, thereby underlining the parallels between corporate social responsibility in taxation 
matters and in environmental matters.150 The idea of tax policy energising the political is 
also demonstrated by the establishment of new activist groups, recent years having seen the 
appearance of articulate and technically very well-informed bodies such as the Tax Justice 
Network (TJN),151 and, in the United States, Citizens for Tax Justice.152 Although Loughlin 
does not, in the present writer’s view, sufficiently underscore the problems with Schmitt’s 
work, he is surely correct to treat it as a modern version of ideas traceable back through 
Hobbes,153 and, ultimately, to Plato.154 It provides us with a useful basis for investigating the 
political practices of corporation tax reform.155                  
If, as is contended, the first four themes announced at the beginning bear all the signs of 
‘lower level’ antagonisms managed by the government of a stable state, the next question is 
                                                 
149  See Schmitt, n. 123 above, p. 38. 
150  See Houlder, Financial Times, 22 November 2004, 9. On this basis, Mr Owens has also opined 
that it would not be good for MNCs to move holding companies abroad in the absence of a 
‘business reason’, i.e. solely or mainly for corporation tax reasons (see Houlder, Financial Times, 
23 December 2005, 4). 
151  See www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2 (accessed 9 March 2006). 
152  See www.ctj.org/ (accessed 9 March 2006). 
153  See Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-
wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 185-186; 
also Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 144-145.  
154  See Plato (427-347 BC), The Laws, ed. by Trevor Saunders (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 5-6. In 
Loughlin’s approving phrase, Schmitt follows ‘an understanding of the political to its very 
foundations’ (see Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 32). 
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 as to Loughlin’s ‘second order of the political’, the ‘practices of politics’.156 How might we 
interpret the process by which the types of antagonisms referred to above are managed? A 
useful answer depends on the view that is taken of what the practice of politics is all about. 
In his admirable overview, Heywood offers four possible views of politics, i.e. as ‘the art of 
government’; as ‘public affairs’; as ‘compromise and consensus’ and, finally, as ‘power and 
the distribution of resources’.157 In what follows, the view is taken that, in the context of 
corporation tax reform, politics is best seen as the art of government, or rather, of 
‘governance’.158 It is in the context of this examination that we consider how and why, in the 
writer’s view, Radaelli’s conception of ‘the politics of corporate taxation’159 radically 
underestimates its ‘political’ dimension. 
 
Politics and ‘the art of government’ 
The practice of politics, the ‘second order of the political’, has classically been defined as 
‘the art of government’.160 Within the state, the ‘human community’ that, in Weber’s 
definition, ‘(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within 
a given territory’,161 Loughlin tells us, the ‘activity of governing’ entails drawing a 
distinction between ‘a governing authority and its subjects’.162 Although we explore the 
significance of this often understated distinction in Chapter 2, what we can say for present 
purposes is that it is the office of the government to promote the responsibilities of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
155  This corresponds to Loughlin’s ‘second order of the political’ (see n. 124 above). 
156  See Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 31. 
157  See Andrew Heywood, Politics, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 5-7.  
158  See Richards and Smith, n. 11 above, pp. 3-6. See also Chapter 2 below. 
159  See n. 127 above. 
160  See Heywood, n. 157 above, p. 5. 
161  See Max Weber (1864-1920), ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
trans. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 77-128, 78 (Weber’s 
italics); also the references given in Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern 
Government, 4th edn (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 10.  
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 state,163 encapsulated by Cicero in the idea, ‘salus populi suprema lex esto’, ‘let the welfare 
of the people be the supreme law’.164 The various meanings attributed to this elusive ‘law’ 
have been analysed by Oakeshott, in the posthumously published The Politics of Faith and 
the Politics of Scepticism.165 Whilst describing it as ‘the emblem of all the ambiguity of our 
political vocabulary’,166 Oakeshott is nonetheless able to find five historical meanings of the 
word ‘salus’,167 of which the most appropriate in the present context is indeed probably 
‘welfare’.168 Loughlin draws attention to the point that, from the mid-twentieth century 
onwards, the promotion of the people’s welfare has been taken to comprise, not only 
Hobbes’s classical four jobs (defence, ‘acquisition of wealth, so far as this is consistent with 
public security’, law and order, and the ‘full enjoyment of innocent liberty’),169 but a 
widening range of social tasks including social provision and environmental regulation.170 
Promoting the welfare of the state and its people, that is, governing, is the preoccupation 
of a considerable literature, not only in political science, but also in the business, schools. In 
the UK, the scholarship has tended to concentrate on the changes of emphasis suggested by a 
transition, over the latter decades of the twentieth century, from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’.171 The latter term, once taken to be merely synonymous with the former,172 
                                                                                                                                                       
162  See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 5. 
163  Ibid., p. 7. 
164  See Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), de Re Publica; de Legibus, ed. and trans. by Clinton 
Walker Keyes (London: William Heinemann, 1928), p. 466 (also, ibid., p. 404, on ‘salus’ as a 
Roman deity); also Hobbes, On the Citizen, n. 153 above, p. 143, where ‘salus’ is translated as 
‘safety’. 
165  Edited by Timothy Fuller (London: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 39. Michael Oakeshott (1901-
1990) was a conservative political theorist (see ODNB). 
166  Ibid., p. 39. 
167  Ibid. 
168  Oakeshott refers to Fleming C.B.’s rendering of ‘salus populi’ in Bates’s case (1606) 2 St. Tr. 
371, 389, as ‘the general benefit of the people’ (see Oakeshott, n. 165 above, p. 40n). 
169  See Hobbes, On the Citizen, n. 153 above, p. 144.  
170  See Loughlin, n. 162 above, pp. 8-12. Also Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chs 3 and 4. 
171  See the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 below. 
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 has come to signify a shift from what is generally referred to as the ‘Westminster model’, a 
‘top-down’ idea of policy-making, dominated by the Cabinet and senior civil servants,173 to 
what Rhodes has characterised as a ‘differentiated polity’ model, with government operating 
closely with civil society, in a context where policy-making is conditioned by the UK’s 
place, not only in Europe, but also in the wider world.174 The shift is as significant in 
corporation tax policy as in any other area of public policy-making. We have already 
referred to one element of this transition, the Departmental theme in corporation tax reform, 
introduced at the beginning. This is the move within the Inland Revenue to NPM from its 
older, less theorised, counterpart, the idea of ‘public administration’.175 However, both the 
consultation theme and the European and international theme are also symptomatic of the 
transition. The shift from government to governance is thus essentially concerned with who 
is involved in making public policy176 and the ways, and to what ends, such policy is made. 
Public policy making, be it noted, is by definition, a goal-oriented activity.177 Tax policy, as 
an aspect of public policy-making, raises particularly sensitive issues. We return to these 
issues in detail in Chapters 2 and 3; for the moment it is sufficient simply to allude to them. 
It is, so we are told, ‘the activity of governing’ that has given rise to the practice of 
politics,178 and every conception of politics as the art of governing must ultimately take its 
                                                                                                                                                       
172  See, e.g., Harold Wilson, The Governance of Britain (London: Sphere, 1977); Ministry of Justice, 
The Governance of Britain (Cm 7170) (London: TSO, 2007). 
173  See, e.g., R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity 
and Accountability (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 1997), pp. 5-7. 
174  Ibid., pp. 7-22. 
175  See Patrick Dunleavy, ‘Is there a radical approach to public administration?’ (1982) 60 Public 
Administration 215-224. 
176  For tax policy as public policy, see Arye L. Hillman, Public Finance and Public Policy: 
Responsibilities and Limitations of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
ch. 7. 
177  Not least because the antonym of ‘policy’ is, of course, ‘aimlessness’ (see Wayne Parsons, Public 
Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1995), p. 13).  
178  See Loughlin, n. 162 above, p. 32. 
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 inspiration from Machiavelli.179 Faintly distasteful as it may seem, the ‘odd politician’180 
provides both the key to understanding the practice of politics, and a useful guide to its 
practitioners themselves.181 For Machiavelli, as Fleisher puts it, ‘there is no power of 
[practical] reason superior to prudenza’,182 to ‘prudence’. Thus Loughlin quotes Fleisher’s 
summary of Machiavelli’s notion of prudence: 
 
‘Machiavelli’s prudenza is rooted in his conception of the human world. Prudence is not 
to be measured principally by the existing standards of right and wrong but by the 
requirements of the situation, by necessity, and by the assessment of the best means to 
achieve one’s ends. Prudence is not synonymous with caution, nor is it the dominance of 
reason over the appetites and passions. It is, instead, the cool calculation of what must be 
done in a given situation to accomplish one’s purposes without judgment of the situation 
being unduly affected by passions or the contemporary conventions and ideals of right 
and wrong.’183 
           
It is interesting that, despite the Machiavellian emphasis on assessing ends and means, as 
well as on judging situations in a cool and calculating way, Machiavelli’s prudence has not 
become more closely associated with the former Chancellor of the Exchequer’s, the Rt Hon. 
Gordon Brown, MP’s, well-known ‘prudence … for a purpose’.184 In other words, with that 
studious care with which, on the election of Labour to office in 1997, the Labour Chancellor, 
                                                 
179  See, especially, Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), esp. chs XXV and XXVI. 
180  See The Tragedy of Hoffman by Henry Chettle (1631), Act II, line 511 (Oxford: Malone Society, 
1950). 
181  See Les Metcalfe and Sue Richards, Improving Public Management, 2nd edn (London: Sage, 
1990), p. 211. See Parsons, n. 177 above, pp. 42-43, for a persuasive gathering of material 
attesting to Machiavelli’s continuing relevance.   
182  See Martin Fleisher, ‘A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the World of Machiavelli’, in 
Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, ed. by Martin Fleisher (London: Croom Helm, 
1973), pp. 114-145, 139.   
183  Ibid., pp. 139-140. (In fact, Loughlin’s transcription (see Loughlin, n. 112 above) is a slight 
mistranscription of Fleisher’s wording, but this is not material.) 
184  See Hansard HC, 21 March 2000, col. 860 (‘Budget Statement’); also Prudent for a Purpose: 
Working for a Stronger and Fairer Britain: Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report and Financial 
Statement and Budget Report March 2000 (House of Commons Papers, Session 1999-2000, 346) 
(London: TSO, 2000); also Keegan, n. 85 above, p. 333; also Keegan’s comments on the lessons 
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 now Prime Minister, had aimed ‘at a reputation for fiscal responsibility in the early years … 
in order to … earn the credentials with “Middle England” and the financial markets, for 
higher spending in years three to five and the second term “without being blown off 
course”’.185 Or again, with the Chancellor’s early commitment to continuing the 
Conservatives’ Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), as ‘a 
way of demonstrating that [Labour] … could do business with the City’.186 The common 
thread is the management of the existential conflict between the City and a Labour 
Government. This management, as we shall see in Chapter 2, has for over a decade been 
‘steered’ by Gordon Brown’s Treasury and by members of City institutions. The former 
Chancellor’s choice of the Rt Hon. Alistair Darling, MP, as his successor, suggested a 
continuance of the same approach. It is what Gordon Brown has himself referred to as 
‘credible socialism’, ‘to be socialist and at the same time credible’.187 Thus, in November 
1999, we find Gordon Brown announcing that: 
 
‘The reforms made and the reforms to be made today reflect our resolve that Britain must 
leave behind the sterile, century-long conflict between enterprise and fairness – between 
the left, which promoted the good society at the expense of the good economy, and the 
right, which promoted the good economy at the expense of the good society, and too often 
achieved neither. Only by pursuing enterprise and fairness together – enterprise and 
fairness for all – can we equip all of Britain for our future and secure rising living 
standards for all.’188 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the former Chancellor learnt from his political ‘hero’, James Maxton, loc. cit., showing that this is 
far from idle speculation. 
185  See Keegan, n. 85 above, p. 242. 
186  Ibid., p. 269 (quoting an unnamed ‘Treasury official closely involved’). 
187  See Peston, n. 76 above, p. 21, quoting a 1997 speech in commemoration of Anthony Crosland 
(1918-1977). 
188  See Hansard HC, 9 November 1999, col. 883 (‘Pre-Budget Statement’). 
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 Redolent though it is of the ‘Third Way’,189 this is a clear affirmation of politics as being 
about the management of potential conflict and thus as the art of government. What is 
important about ‘prudence’, says Loughlin, is that ‘[i]t is to be distinguished from rule-
governed action or from following the precepts of conventional morality primarily because 
new situations require innovative responses’.190 In the case of Gordon Brown, it has meant 
an effort to meet the challenges and opportunities presented by global business with 
prudence. Nowhere, perhaps, has this been demonstrated more decisively than in May 1997, 
in the ‘hollowing out’ of the Treasury’s responsibilities, by the transfer of responsibility for 
the control of interest rates from the Treasury to the Bank of England.191 In the specific 
context of corporation tax reform, it has meant harnessing the NPM reforms of the 1980s to 
the development of co-operation between HMRC and the corporate sector.192 This is 
something which the latter has seemed extremely keen to encourage,193 despite occasional 
threats to ‘withdraw support from the government if taxes on business income rise any 
further’.194 
                                                 
189  See Anthony Giddens, The Third Way; the Renewal of Social Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1998), ch. 3, and Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2000), ch. 3. 
190  See Loughlin, n. 112 above, p. 38. Moreover, ‘ … the limits of laws should be … acknowledged 
and rulers might find it necessary, for the promotion of the common good, to break promises, to 
proceed deceptively or act belligerently’ (ibid., referring to Machiavelli’s account of Florence’s 
ruler between 1502 and 1512, Piero Soderini, and his fatal patience and unfailing good nature (see 
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and trans. by Bernard Crick, Leslie J. Walker and Brian 
Richardson (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 431).  
191  See Peston, n. 76 above, p. 112. 
192  e.g. as in the establishment of the Government’s Business Tax Forum (see Parker, Financial 
Times, 24 February 2004, 1); also the 2006 Review of Links with Large Business: November 2006 
(Chair, Sir David Varney) (London: HMRC, 2007); also HMRC, Giving Certainty to Business 
through Clearances and Advance Agreements: Consultation Document 20 June 2007 (London: 
HMRC, 2007); also Wharrad, Tax Journal, 2 July 2007, 17; Houlder, Financial Times, 25 July 
2007, 4. See Chapter 2 below. 
193  See, e.g., Financial Times, 2 November 2004, 18 (letter from Loughlin Hickey, KPMG); also 
Houlder, Financial Times, 17 November 2006, 3; also Houlder, Financial Times, 21 June 2007, 3. 
194  See Houlder, Financial Times, 7 November 2005, 3. Peston, n. 76 above, reports that Gordon 
Brown ‘is neurotically fearful of the damage that can be done to the poorest through a policy of 
redistribution that would drive wealth creators to countries with lower taxes’ (ibid., p. 21).  
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 The politics of corporation tax have never, no doubt for the reasons discussed in the 
second part of the chapter, received systematic academic consideration in the UK context. 
The topic has, however, been discussed by Radaelli, in the context of a UK/Italian 
comparative study, from the late 1990s.195 Though valuable – reference will be made to it 
later in the study – it does not attempt to reach into the essence of what is ‘political’ in UK 
corporation tax reform, and it is heavily reliant on Gammie’s196 views of the reform process. 
Possibly because he is concerned with developments related to the European and 
international level theme, Radaelli seems to follow a combination of Heywood’s second and 
third concepts of politics197 and, although he concedes that ‘[p]olitics generates conflict’,198 
sees the salvation of any project to harmonise corporate taxation within the EU as being the 
slow but steady ‘politicization’ of a project originally conceived in purely ‘technocratic’ 
terms.199 In short, like the theoretical literature referred to above, in the second part of the 
chapter, it understates the ‘political’ in ‘political economy’, in the particular context of 
corporation tax reform. 
The study’s conception of corporation tax reform as a public law enterprise next requires 
us to consider some of the contours of public law discourse, and to seek some explanation of 
the significance of  ‘theory’ and ‘values’ within it. 
                                                 
195  See Radaelli, n. 127 above, pp. 125-131. 
196  See n. 47 above. 
197  See n. 157 above. 
198  See Claudio M. Radaelli, Technocracy in the European Union (London: Longman, 1999), p. 154. 
(In the light of the previous discussion, this seems a curious inversion of the elements at play 
here.) 
199  Ibid., ch. 7. See also Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘The Political Economy of EU Direct Tax Policy’, in 
Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research, ed. by Andy Lymer and David Salter (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 145-165. 
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 VALUES, THEORY AND PUBLIC LAW 
 
One of the most intriguing features of the notion of public law in the UK is the elusiveness of 
some reassuringly straightforward definition of the term itself.200 This, no doubt, is due to 
the relatively late appearance - during only the early 1980s - of the expression ‘public law’ in 
the mouths of British judges.201 McEldowney notes the traditional absence of the 
public/private distinction202 in quoting van Caenegem’s observation that: 
                                                
 
‘Until the nineteenth century, and even beyond, English doctrine proudly maintained that, 
unlike the continent, England knew no separate public law or public-law courts: the 
traditional common law assumed that the law was indivisible in the sense that the same 
body of rules applied to the government and its agents as well as to private citizens.’203 
 
Allowing for this historical phenomenon, McEldowney does, however, make the allusion to 
the ‘traditional’ English viewpoint having already characterised public law as ‘ … broadly 
referring to the relationship between the citizen and the state’.204 The cautious generality of 
his definition, especially given the mainly student readership of McEldowney’s wide ranging 
account, should not however be taken to restrict its scope to the relationship between the 
state and human agents. Nor should it, with its implicit emphasis on civil liberties, be taken 
to restrict the concept of public law to matters of law and order. Whilst it is undoubtedly 
 
200  Unlike, e.g., in Roman law (see The Digest of Justinian, ed. and trans. by Theodor Mommsen, 
Paul Krueger and Alan Watson (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania, 1985), p. 1 (Book One, I.1.2. (‘de 
iustitia et iure’)), which reads, in part: ‘publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat’ 
(‘public law is that which relates to the Roman state’)). 
201  See Barendt, n. 106 above, para. 1.08. See Davy v. Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] AC 262, 
276 (Lord Wilberforce); but also O’Reilly and Others v. Mackman and Others [1983] AC 237, 
273-285 (Lord Diplock). 
202  See McEldowney, also n. 106 above, para. 8-001. 
203  See R.C. van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 3; also H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 2nd 
edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 234n; also N.E. Simmonds, The decline of 
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 correct to emphasise the ultimately human ownership of the joint-stock corporation or 
corporate group,205 it is unnecessary so to do in order to bring the relationship between the 
state and legal persons within the ambit of public law as conceived of in the UK. As long ago 
as 1973, the Royal Commission on the Constitution206 highlighted the importance of the 
relationship between the state and the corporation, in promoting national prosperity and 
managing the economy.207 No doubt taking account of factors such as these, although not 
with an eye specifically on tax as public law, Birkinshaw offers the following definition of 
the term: 
 
‘Public law denotes that system of law that deals with our public affairs. It denotes the 
public sphere, defines its extent, the relationship between different tiers in the public 
sphere and between those tiers and individuals, corporate or personal, citizen or alien. 
Public law is primarily concerned with the exercise or non-exercise of public power, 
sometimes by private actors, and its fairness, rationality, legality and proportionality.’208 
 
The usefulness of this definition to the study should perhaps be underlined. First, and most 
importantly, it was made in the context of an analysis of the ways in which UK public law 
has been influenced by both the public law of the EU and that of its individual Member 
States.209 Understood not as ‘ … a distinct body of law applied in a distinct body of courts or 
                                                                                                                                                       
juridical reason: Doctrine and theory in the legal order (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984), pp. 130-131.  
204  See McEldowney, n. 106 above, para. 1-003. 
205  See Kay, n. 132 above. 
206  See Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, vol. I, Report: Presented to Parliament by 
Command of Her Majesty October 1973 (Cmnd 5460) (London: HMSO, 1973), p. 76. 
207  As witness the prominence which Loughlin gives both to this point and to the Royal Commission 
report (see Loughlin, n. 162 above, p. 12).   
208 See Patrick Birkinshaw, European Public Law (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003), p. 562. 
209  As to which note, e.g., the French law concept of droit public interne, consisting of le droit 
constitutionnel et politique and le droit administratif (see A Source-Book on French Law – Public 
Law: Constitutional and Administrative Law; Private Law: Structure, Contract – Kahn-Freund, 
Lévy, Rudden, ed. by Bernard Rudden, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 19 (extracting 
J.-M. Auby et R. Ducos-Ader, Droit Public (1966), vol. 1, pp. 1-7)); also, generally, L. Neville 
Brown and John S. Bell, French Administrative Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), ch. 
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 jurisdiction … [but as] a body of evolving principles, shaped by a variety of jurisdictions and 
their mutual intercourse’,210 it is something to which we shall briefly return later in the study. 
Here, it is sufficient to note that any discussion of UK public law must take account of the 
public law of the EU, not least when it comes to assessing the influence of the EU on UK tax 
policy.211 Secondly, in describing public law as a ‘system of law’, Birkinshaw elsewhere 
makes explicit the fact that it comprehends what he refers to as ‘regulatory law’, and he 
instances as falling within this category ‘[c]ompetition, data protection, environmental 
protection and access to environmental information, procedures for public procurement and 
so on …’.212 This acceptance of public law as including forms of regulation is emphasised, 
too, by Loughlin, who describes the practitioner’s ‘loose-leaf encyclopaedias’ on subjects 
such as these, rather than ‘some slim constitutive document’ as symbolic of ‘[t]he empirical 
world of public law’.213 The claim of tax law and policy to be included in such a list, 
something already referred to,214 is developed in the next part of the present chapter. That 
public law also relates to the behaviour of the institutional actors involved in regulatory law 
and policy, not all of which may be ‘public’ actors, is the third feature of Birkinshaw’s 
definition that we should note. Public law is applicable, not only to the exercise of 
governmental power but also, as its practitioners would doubtless expect, to the non-exercise 
of that power.215 Finally, as Birkinshaw tells us, certain values, such as fairness, are to be 
regarded as part of public law. A principal concern of the study will be to demonstrate that 
the list of values is not a closed one, and that its content, no less than the emphasis to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
1); also John Bell, French Legal Cultures (London: Butterworths, 2001), pp. 30-31 and chs 5 and 
6. 
210  See Birkinshaw, n. 208 above, pp. 578-579. 
211  See the European and international theme in corporation tax reform identified above. 
212  See Birkinshaw, n. 208 above, p. 563 [emphasis added]. 
213  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 241. 
214  See Thuronyi, n. 107 above, ibid. 
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 placed on particular values over others, will vary according to the policy area under 
consideration. Recent years have seen a sometimes acrimonious debate about the sources and 
scope of public law values, the contours of which we shall need to explore as a preliminary 
to interrogating the place of corporation tax within public law.    
 
‘Values’ in public law 
In line with the preceding discussion, the present study envisages the British constitution as 
what might be described as a teleologically defined and ordered configuration of values.216 
In doing so, it emphasises that these ‘values’ – or ‘principles’ – are what W.B. Gallie 
characterised as ‘essentially contested concepts’.217 In other words, the content of these 
values, as well as their relationship with each other, is conditioned by what we think public 
law is all about. In the context of the study, it has been decided not to follow the example of 
Sheffield school writers and refer to these as ‘rule of law values’, since the use of that term is 
controversial, both as to the nature and scope of the values themselves and their relationship 
to what Dicey218 referred to as ‘the rule of law’.219 
                                                                                                                                                       
215  See Ian Harden and Norman Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British constitution and the rule of law 
(London: Hutchinson, 1986), ch. 8.  
216  See Terence Daintith and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and 
Internal Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 18.  
217  See W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955-1956) 56 Aristotelian Society 
(Proceedings) 167-198; also William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd edn 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 10-12, 225-231. 
218  Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922), barrister, fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. A ‘double first’, he 
was distinguished as a technical lawyer (Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws is still in print), 
as a theorist (see the text above) and as a pamphleteer (vociferously opposed, as he was, to Irish 
Home Rule). He also had a successful career at the Bar and became a Queen’s Counsel in 1890 
(see ODNB). 
219  See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, ed. by E.C.S. Wade, 10th 
edn (London: Macmillan, 1965), Part II. Earlier, in a carefully wrought account, Hearn had 
described a similar idea of ‘the supremacy of the law’ (see William Edward Hearn, The 
Government of England: its Structure and its Development, 2nd edn (London: Longmans, Green, 
1887), esp. pp. 89-91).  
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 Ever since the publication in 1986 of Harden and Lewis’s The Noble Lie,220 its highly 
critical reception - significantly by Loughlin221 - and the latter’s own contributions, Public 
Law and Political Theory, in 1992,222 and The Idea of Public Law, in 2003,223 much 
attention has been focussed on the respective roles of ‘values’ and ‘theory’ in public law. 
Even more recent contributions, by Cane224 and by Craig,225 no less than by Loughlin 
himself,226 have, as is said, ‘breathed new life’ into the debate. Difficult as it is to do justice 
to the complexities of the controversy, yet, in the context of the present study, its main 
insights are important and rewarding. It is to these that we turn next, in analysing the 
significance of ‘rule of law values’ to the present endeavour, and the reasons why we have 
opted to refer simply to ‘values’. 
                                                
The catalyst of the debate, as indicated above, is Harden and Lewis’s The Noble Lie, a 
work which focussed attention on the possibility of conceiving of public law in terms of 
certain ‘values’, arrived at by a process of what its authors described as ‘[a]n immanent 
critique’.227 Pre-eminent among those values were the ‘open and accountable conduct of 
government and public affairs’,228 and their existence enabled a remodelling of Dicey’s 
 
220  See n. 215 above. 
221  See Martin Loughlin (1988) 51 MLR 531-548 (‘Review Article’); also ‘The Pathways of Public 
Law Scholarship’, in Frontiers of Legal Scholarship: Twenty five years of Warwick Law School, 
ed. by Geoffrey P. Wilson (Chichester: John Wiley, 1995), pp. 163-188, esp. 176-179; also the 
much less critical reception to The Noble Lie accorded by Trevor Smith [1987] PL 642-643 (book 
review). 
222  See n. 114 above. 
223  See n. 162 above. There is also a third book, to which occasional reference will be made, but this 
offers a conspectus of existing learning, rather than formulating a new theory (see Martin 
Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
224 See Peter Cane, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law’, in Law and Administration in Europe: Essays 
in Honour of Carol Harlow, ed. by Paul Craig and Richard Rawlings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 3-21. 
225  See Paul Craig, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law: A Response’, in ibid., pp. 23-46. 
226  See Martin Loughlin, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law: An Interpretation’ [2005] PL 48-66. 
227  See Harden and Lewis, n. 215 above, p. 10. 
228  Ibid., p. 288. 
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 somewhat restrictive notion of ‘the supremacy or the rule of law’.229 It was not to be seen 
simply in terms of Dicey’s three ‘distinct though kindred conceptions’230 of the ‘absence of 
arbitrary power’;231 the universal application of ‘the ordinary law administered by ordinary 
tribunals’;232 and the contribution of ‘judicial decisions determining the rights of private 
persons in particular cases brought before the courts … ’.233 Instead, the rule of law was to 
be viewed as a transcendent concept234 and ‘master ideal’,235 which consisted of values 
(‘rule of law values’)236 facilitating ‘… the exclusion of arbitrariness: the minimization of 
the contribution of naked social, economic and physical power to public life’.237 If it was 
possible so to conceive of public law, then it was also possible to analyse existing 
institutions, processes and policy solutions in such terms. Ultimately, such an approach 
would, so Harden and Lewis claimed, yield ‘ … a new descriptive and analytical model of 
constitutionally legitimate action in Britain’.238 Even today, 20 years on, the authors’ 
excitement at their creation is palpable on every well-thumbed page of the remaining library 
copies of The Noble Lie. It was an ambitious claim and, had it been somewhat less 
aggressively or uncompromisingly argued, it might not have collided so violently with other 
strands of scholarly opinion.239 
                                                 
229  See Dicey, n. 219 above, Part II.  
230  Ibid., p. 187. 
231  Ibid., p. 188 (marginal note). 
232  Ibid., p. 193 (marginal note). 
233  Ibid., p. 195. 
234  See Harden and Lewis, n. 215 above, p. 17. 
235  Ibid., p. 13 (quoting Philip Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1969), p. 28). 
236  See Harden and Lewis, n. 215 above, p. 302. 
237  Ibid. 
238  Ibid., p. 7. 
239  See, e.g., Loughlin (1988), n. 221 above, passim. 
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 What is important about Harden and Lewis’s approach is that, to the extent that it 
deliberately addressed itself to areas of the constitution other than human rights,240 its 
argument occupies a different intellectual space from the arguments over rights that have 
become a feature of public law discourse. Moreover, although, as Daintith has pointed out,241 
the authors’ selection of values, like that of others in search of a ‘structure of values’,242 ‘is 
inherently open to question’, and, despite the fact that the ‘ … chosen values … may not be 
precise enough to guide decision-making in practice or to test its legitimacy’,243 conceiving 
of the constitution as a configuration of values has one pre-eminent virtue. It is, as Daintith 
and Page elegantly conclude, the only vision of the constitution ‘ … which might be capable 
both of accommodating norms of executive self-management as part of the constitution … 
’.244 In the context of our analysis of corporation tax policy, policy conducted, as we shall 
see, often without the accountability mechanisms applicable to other areas of governmental 
activity, this is a particularly important point. Nonetheless, the difficulties inherent in Harden 
and Lewis’s method need to be addressed, and Loughlin, who can only be described as 
‘antagonistic’ to their approach, suggests a number of theoretical elements, which, for 
present purposes, may usefully be made to illuminate it. It should be stressed, however, that 
                                                 
240  See Harden and Lewis, n. 215 above, p. 310. 
241  See the discussion in Terence Daintith, ‘Comment on Lewis: Markets, Regulation and 
Citizenship’, in Law and The Public Interest: Proceedings of the 1992 ALSP Conference, ed. by 
Roger Brownsword (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993), pp. 140-146. 
242  See, e.g., Patrick McAuslan, ‘Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy’ 
(1983) 46 MLR 1-20; T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); also T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A 
Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); also Sir John Laws, 
‘Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights?’ [1993] PL 59-79 and Sir 
John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72-93. 
243  See Daintith and Page, n. 216 above, p. 18. 
244  Ibid. 
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 Loughlin does not himself present them as elucidations of Harden and Lewis’s thesis;245 they 
are instead elements of his own, entirely distinctive, public law method. 
Since we shall not be adopting the term ‘rule of law values’, it is necessary to explain the 
rationale for the decision. In favour of its use is the fact that, as Cane makes clear,246 it is 
now widely accepted that English public law has certain ‘immanent’ values. He himself lists 
a number of illustrative values, four of which are as follows: ‘representation’, the idea that, 
being democratically sanctioned, legislation takes priority over judge-made law; 
‘accountability’ which, among other things ‘ … underpins … the principle that governmental 
power must be exercised according to law’; ‘participation’, that is, in the sense that 
individuals should have the opportunity to participate in governmental processes;247 and 
‘transparency’, a value now illustrated by the ‘right to know’ provided by the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000.248  Cane’s list – any such list, indeed – is not a closed one, and, in 
specifically including accountability and transparency (what used to be called ‘openness’), is 
obviously similar to that of Harden and Lewis. Although Loughlin does not find satisfactory 
Harden and Lewis’s identification of these values with ‘the rule of law’,249 and, although he 
does so specifically in reference to Cane’s arguments, the existence of these ‘immanent 
values’ is something that even he accepts.250 Where Loughlin differs from Cane, and 
presumably from Harden and Lewis also, is in reference to the significance that these values 
have. They may - or may not - be ‘legal’ in origin, but they are less significant, in Loughlin’s 
                                                 
245  In fact, ‘Loughlin does no more than mention the work of Harden and Lewis in passing’ (see 
Prosser [1993] PL 346-357, 353 (Review Article)). But see Loughlin (1995), n. 221 above, pp. 
176-179. 
246  See Cane, n. 224 above, pp. 14-17. 
247  Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
248  As to the general provisions of which, see O. Hood Phillips & Jackson: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, ed. by Paul Jackson and Patricia Leopold, 8th edn (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2001), paras 26-029-26-031. 
249  See Loughlin (1988), n. 221 above, p. 540. 
250  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 59. 
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 view, than the theory which makes sense of them. This reflects the functionalist, rather than 
normativist, nature of Loughlin’s approach. It is something to which we shall return in a 
moment; for the present, it is important simply to note a general willingness to assent to 
values such as accountability, openness, representation and participation. That said, although 
the general assent to these values might speak in favour of the use of ‘rule of law values’, the 
difficulty with using the ‘rule of law’ in the expression may require some further elaboration. 
In its ‘Diceyan’ sense, after all, the rule of law seems to have three fairly specific 
components. Accountability, which informs the principle that the power of government must 
be exercised according to law, is certainly within the spirit, if not the letter, of the second of 
Dicey’s three ‘kindred conceptions’. The ‘classical’ conception of the rule of law, broader 
than Dicey’s uniquely British one, and going back at least as far as Aristotle251 and forward 
as far as Rawls,252 does indeed speak to values or principles.253 Finally, even if, as discussed 
below, we characterise the immanent values of public law as in origin political, rather than 
legal, it could be argued that the political dimension to the classical rule of law means that 
there is no inherent contradiction in speaking of ‘rule of law values’. As Allan says of its 
British conception: ‘Allegiance to the rule of law is not … a technical (or even “lawyerly”) 
commitment: it is necessarily allegiance to a political philosophy – albeit a practical 
philosophy grounded in existing constitutional tradition’.254 The problem with using the 
expression ‘rule of law values’, however, is that it fits uneasily with the approach to be taken 
in the study. This is essentially a functionalist inquiry, and the expression ‘rule of law 
                                                 
251  See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. by J.A.K. Thomson, Hugh Tredennick and 
Jonathan Barnes (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 129, 156; also van Caenegem, n. 203 above, pp. 
17-21; also Loughlin, n. 223 above, pp. 69-70.  
252  See John Rawls (1921-2002), A Theory of Justice, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 206-213. 
253  See Allan, n. 242 above, ch. 2. But see Judith Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’, in 
The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology?, ed. by A.C. Hutchinson and P. Monahan (Toronto: Carswell, 
1987), pp. 1-16. 
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 values’ seems too closely associated with a liberal normativist approach, with a view of the 
‘rule of law’ as somehow existing outside politics. 
 
‘Theory’ in public law 
Acerbic as it often is, Loughlin’s writing brings an acute awareness of the historical 
development of British political theory to the debate on public law. Our main business in this 
chapter is with Public Law and Political Theory,255 although it will be necessary to refer to 
various aspects of Loughlin’s development of its thesis as the study progresses. Unavoidable 
though Dicey is, for Loughlin, he is not where the debate on public law begins. Loughlin’s 
earlier work starts by identifying the particular nature of Dicey’s project: ‘Dicey’s objective 
… [was] to sever links and to establish [constitutional law as] an autonomous subject’. By 
contrast, the eighteenth century thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment,256 pre-eminently 
Smith himself, whose work on taxation has already been mentioned, had been concerned to 
build up a complete ‘science of legislation’.257 Far from trying to unravel the task of law in 
constitutional theory, Smith, and later Millar,258 took a range of political, social and legal 
thought, with the object of drawing general conclusions by making connections between the 
disciplines. Even the Wealth of Nations of 1776259 was only a segment of what, in Smith’s 
case, was an unfinished ‘scheme for constructing a complete social philosophy’.260 
                                                                                                                                                       
254  See Allan, n. 242 above, pp. 21-22. 
255  See n. 114 above. 
256  See Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London: Penguin, 
2000), pp. 242-257. 
257  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, pp. 4-13. 
258  John Millar (1735-1801) was Regius Professor of Law at the University of Glasgow (1761-1801) 
and author of An Historical View of the English Government (1787) (see Knud Haakonssen, ‘John 
Millar and the Science of a Legislator’ (1985) Juridical Review 41-68) (see also ODNB). 
259  See Smith, n. 96 above. 
260  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 5. 
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 For Loughlin, ‘theory’, not ‘values’, is at the heart of public law. Values – or principles – 
have a role to play, but even they are shaped by theory. He accordingly identifies what he 
terms ‘normative’ and ‘functionalist’ theoretical approaches to the subject.261 Normative 
theory, which ‘reflects an ideal of the autonomy of law’,262 is associated, in its liberal form, 
with Hayek,263 especially in Law, Legislation and Liberty,264 and Nozick,265 in Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia.266 Its conservative variant, which is ‘the dominant tradition of public law 
thought’,267 finds its most eloquent expression in Oakeshott,268 especially in his final work, 
dealing with law and government, On Human Conduct.269 Normative theory, which begins 
with Dicey, is, says Loughlin, ‘rooted in a belief in the ideal of the separation of powers and 
in the need to subordinate government to law’.270 The failure of normativism to reflect, not 
only history, but also rapid change, has made it largely irrelevant, however.271 Although 
Oakeshott’s work remains valuable, conservative normativism has been overtaken by the 
pace of change,272 while normativism’s liberal variant ‘fails on grounds of historical fact’.273 
                                                 
261 Ibid., pp. 59-61. Craig did not agree with the ‘normative’/’functionalist’ labels (see Craig [1993] 
LS 275-283, 276). 
262  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 60. 
263  Ibid., p. 84 (Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992)). Philosopher and Nobel Prize-winning 
economist (1974); though born in Austria, Hayek’s works were produced mainly in the UK (he 
was Tooke Professor of Economic Science in London University between 1931 and 1950) and the 
United States, where he was held a chair of social and moral science at the University of Chicago, 
from 1950 to 1962 (see ODNB). His work had a profound influence on Lady Thatcher (see 
Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (London: HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 50-51). 
264  F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and 
political economy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982).  
265  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 94 (Robert Nozick (1939-2002)) (see ODNB). 
266  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). 
267  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 139. 
268  Ibid., p. 64. See n. 165 above.  
269  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). This work might be seen as complimentary to H.L.A. Hart’s, 
The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
270  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, pp. 60, 144; also Rodney Barker, Political Ideas in Modern Britain 
(London: Methuen, 1978), pp. 193-194. 
271  Loughlin’s view of ‘liberal normativism’ reflects something of Huxley’s definition of tragedy 
(quoted in Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality: Fragments of Autobiography (London: 
MacGibbon and Kee, 1965), p. 68).  
272  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 237. 
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 By contrast, ‘the functionalist style has a certain affinity with a political theory of socialism’, 
or, more accurately, can be identified with ‘those who adopt a collectivist social 
ontology’.274 Functionalism: 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
‘… views law as part of the apparatus of government. Its focus is upon law’s regulatory 
and facilitative functions and therefore is oriented to aims and objectives and adopts an 
instrumentalist social policy approach. Functionalism reflects an ideal of progressive 
evolutionary change.’275  
   
Chief among functionalists, historically, has been Duguit276 who, in his Law in the Modern 
State,277 sought to create an ‘empirical’ concept of public law, under the intellectual 
influence of the sociological positivism of Comte278 and Durkheim.279 Whilst it has been 
equipped to confront the growth of the regulatory state, functionalism ‘seems to have lost 
much of its power’,280 given the ever more moribund ‘empiricist’ and ‘positivist’ forms that 
it has taken. Among modern ‘normativist’ writing, Loughlin instances281 work by Wade (a 
conservative normativist and Dicey’s modern champion),282 by Dworkin283 (a liberal 
normativist, whose work is elaborated in the public law context by Allan,284 Lester285 and 
 
273  Ibid., p. 240. 
274  Ibid., p. 105. 
275  Ibid., p. 60. 
276  Duguit (1859-1928) was Professor of Law at the University of Bordeaux, from 1886 to 1928. 
277  Léon Duguit, Law in the Modern State, trans. by Frida and Harold Laski (New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1970). See Martin Loughlin, ‘The Functionalist Style in Public Law’ (2005) 55 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 361-403, 368-374. 
278  Isidore Auguste Marie François Xavier Comte (1798-1857). See Frank E. Manuel, The Prophets 
of Paris: Turgot, Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Comte (New York: Harper and Row, 
1965), ch. 6.  
279  Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). See Gianfranco Poggi, Durkheim (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), ch. 6, esp. pp. 100-101. 
280  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 235. 
281  Ibid., pp. 207-208. 
282  See H.W.R. Wade, ‘Law, Opinion and Administration’ (1962) 78 LQR 188-204, esp. 189-190.  
283  See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); Ronald Dworkin, A 
Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986). 
284  See now Allan (1993) and (2001), n. 242 above, passim.  
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 Jowell286) and, finally, by Rawls.287 Leading ‘functionalists’, by contrast, include 
McAuslan288 and Griffith289 but, although their functionalist approach is good, it needs to be 
revived.290 Possibly, had he included it in this survey, Loughlin would regard the Sheffield 
school style as a fatally flawed, though nevertheless functionalist, style. What he does say is 
that systems theory, the relevance and claims of which we consider presently, might help to 
revivify the functionalist approach.291        
 
An ‘interpretative’ and ‘functionalist’ approach 
The idea that ‘rule of law values’, in the sense considered above, cannot be satisfactorily 
reconciled with Loughlin’s theoretical approach does not, however, preclude the possibility 
of interrogating, in their proper context, immanent public law values. Thus, in order to be 
able to interpret the thematic development of some area of public law, it is necessary, not 
only to be able to identify its immanent values, but also to have some idea of the contexts in 
which one, or more, of them may have to give way to another, or to others. The role, for 
instance, which has been accorded to fairness in corporation tax reform might be one such 
question, and the contexts in which it has been made to give way to the value of efficiency 
                                                                                                                                                       
285  See Jeffrey Jowell and Anthony Lester, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: substantive principles of 
administrative law’ [1987] PL 368-382. 
286  See Jeffrey Jowell, ‘The Rule of Law Today’, in The Changing Constitution, ed. by Jeffrey Jowell 
and Dawn Oliver, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 5-25. 
287  See Rawls, n. 252 above; A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); also Samuel 
Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007).  
288  See McAuslan, n. 242 above; also ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution: the dissonance between 
theory and practice’, in Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, ed. by Patrick McAuslan and John 
F. McEldowney (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985). 
289  See, e.g., J.A.G. Griffith, ‘Comment’ (1963) PL 401-402; J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Political 
Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1-21. 
290  A view shared by Daintith and Page (see n. 216 above). Also Loughlin, n. 277 above, 402-403.    
291  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 250. 
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 would be another. The status of equity and efficiency as ‘values’ will be assessed in Chapter 
4. 
The important point at this juncture is that neither Cane, in speaking of ‘immanent’ 
values, nor Harden and Lewis, in talking about ‘rule of law values’, can explain how the 
values relate to each other. That they need to do so is explicitly recognised by Cane, who 
acknowledges, but does not resolve, the problems both that ‘[b]ecause the immanent values 
of (public) law are abstract, people may disagree about what concrete rules they require or 
justify …’292 and that ‘ … public law values may be in competition with one another …’.293 
The need for a theory which helps to identify and prioritise values is something which 
Loughlin does however specifically address: 
 
‘We need to lay bare the conceptual structures through which we come to describe and 
explain the subject, and to understand the relations and features entailed in these 
structures and the assumptions on which they are founded. And we must subject the 
structures and assumptions which pervade public law thought to critical scrutiny.’294  
 
What Loughlin proposes, as mentioned above, is a ‘revitalized functionalist style’295 and he 
wonders whether, in the quest for such an approach, Luhmann’s296 ‘sociological theory of 
                                                 
292  See Cane, n. 224 above, p. 17. 
293  Ibid., p. 16. 
294  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 36; also Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 59. 
295  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 250. 
296  (1927-1998). English-speaking commentators tend to be sceptical: see, e.g., J.W. Harries, Legal 
Philosophies, 2nd edn (London: LexisNexis, 1997), p. 251. 
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 law’,297 the biologically inspired theory of legal systems as ‘self-referential systems’298 – as 
‘autopoiesis’299 - might prove illuminating. An autopoietic system, Luhmann tells us: 
 
‘ … constitutes the elements of which it consists through the elements of which it 
consists. … [S]ocial systems [for instance, the legal system] can themselves be regarded 
as special kinds of autopoietic systems. [Such systems are ‘operationally closed’, in that] 
… all operations always reproduce the system.’300 
 
However, since a legal system consists of ‘normative expectations’301 - not ‘cognitive’ 
ones302 - it may be said to be ‘normatively closed’.303 Normative closure means that ‘only 
the legal system can bestow legally normative quality on its elements and thereby constitute 
them as elements. Normativity has no purpose beyond this …’.304 Normatively closed as it 
is, however, a legal system is able to communicate with, and respond to, its environment, 
because it is ‘cognitively open’.305 Such communication takes place through the concept of 
‘structural couplings’, orderly systemic responses to outside influences.306 It is thus that 
Luhmann is able to intone the mantra of law being ‘a normatively closed but cognitively 
                                                 
297  See Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, trans. by Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), esp. ch. 2; Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Unity of the Legal 
System’, in Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1988), pp. 12-35; Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, ed. by Fatima Kastner, Richard 
Nobles, David Schiff, and Rosamund Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
298  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 255. 
299  See Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization 
of the Living (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1980), esp. pp. 63-72 (by Stafford Beer), 73-76; 
Michael King and Chris Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 204-206. 
300  See Luhmann (1988), n. 297 above, pp. 14-15 (emphasis added). 
301  i.e. ones that do not need to be modified if disappointed. 
302  i.e. ones that do need to be modified in such circumstances (see Luhmann (1988), n. 297 above, p. 
19). 
303  Ibid., p. 20; Luhmann (2004), n. 297 above, pp. 107-109. 
304  Ibid., p. 20. This normative ‘function’, as Freeman reminds us, differs from Hart’s ‘rule of 
recognition’ (see Hart, n. 269 above, p. 92ff) in that it ‘ … is a part of the legal system and is 
distinctly separate from the society’ (see Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, ed. by M.D.A. 
Freeman, 7th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), p. 701). 
305  See Luhmann (1988), n. 297 above, p. 20; Luhmann (2004), n. 297 above, pp. 109-113. 
306  See Luhmann (2004), n. 297 above, ch. 10. 
 52
 open system’.307 Whether Luhmann’s systems theory, to the extent that it seeks to illuminate 
the processes by which a range of possible policy alternatives are narrowed down to the 
probable, is useful in helping us to interpret the reform of corporation tax, is something to 
which we shall return in Chapter 3. 
The emphasis placed at the end of the previous paragraph on ‘interpretation’ is of 
considerable importance to the study as a whole. It seeks to take an interpretative approach to 
three distinct, yet interrelated, aspects of corporation tax reform: the institutions involved in 
it; the processes by which policy solutions have been reached; and the adopted solutions 
themselves.308 In each of these areas, the seven themes identified at the beginning of the 
study have varying degrees of importance. The study recognises that, whilst it is possible, 
though difficult, to ‘articulate the standards of objectivity relevant to different domains of 
inquiry’,309 positivism does not provide a satisfactory alternative because, as Loughlin says, 
‘in the field of law fact and value cannot be kept categorically distinct’.310 So we must look 
for ‘human purposes’ and attempt to distil meaning from the processes by which policy 
solutions have been reached. Secondly, just as an interpretative approach is taken, so also it 
is intended that the discussion will be attentive to the history of the 15 or so years over which 
the seven themes have unfolded, particularly with regard to the implications for public law 
values and theory of the speed and scope of changes in global financial markets, and in 
approaches to public policy, especially NPM.311 Indeed, the lack of a satisfactory historical 
dimension in the ‘immanent critique’ employed in Harden and Lewis’s The Noble Lie 312 
                                                 
307  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, pp. 255; Luhmann (2004), n. 297 above, p. 106. 
308  The reasons for approaching the material in this way are discussed in the next part of the chapter. 
309  See Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1976), p. 111. 
310  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 36. 
311  See n. 72 above. 
312  See n. 215 above. 
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 was the subject of one of Loughlin’s most telling criticisms of that work.313 Important 
though the historical dimension is, Loughlin also – thirdly - calls on students of public law to 
be critical, ‘both in subjecting various interpretations to rational scrutiny and to inquiry in 
respect of empirical understandings of the functions of government and law’.314 This means 
testing the relationships between the immanent values of public law by ‘the basic canons of 
rationality (consistency, coherence and non-contradiction).’315 This will also be an important 
element in the discussion in subsequent chapters. Finally, in accordance with Loughlin’s 
remaining injunction, the discussion will be ‘empirical’ in the sense that our interpretation 
will be ‘rooted in an appreciation of government and the functions law is expected to 
perform in respect of those functions’.316 However, it should be stressed that the purpose of 
the discussion is not to make proposals for further reform; the study has the much less 
ambitious objective of interpreting what is happening and suggesting aspects on which 
greater emphasis might be placed in the future. 
                                                
Building on the approach discussed above, and in the light of the definitions offered at the 
beginning of this part of the chapter, it should now be possible to deepen our understanding 
of public law and possibly even to assent to Loughlin’s functionalist and interpretative 
definition of the subject: 
 
‘Public law is a set of practices concerned with the establishment, maintenance and 
regulation of the activity of governing the state … [T]he nature of these practices can be 
grasped only once that activity is conceptualised as constituting an autonomous sphere: 
the political realm.’317                  
 
 
313  See Loughlin (1988), n. 221 above, pp. 535, 546.  
314  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 36. 
315  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 59. 
316  See Loughlin, n. 114 above, p. 231. 
317  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 58. 
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 When speaking of corporation tax reform as an enterprise of public law, we do so in 
accordance with the ideas encapsulated in this formulation, although subject to the two main 
qualifications which have already been mentioned.318 The scope of public law is indeed 
broad enough, as Loughlin, McEldowney and Birkinshaw each imply,319 to refer to the 
relationship between the state and the corporation, whether in its national or in its 
multinational forms. 
Defined as a ‘set of practices’, public law is not limited to formal types of law, such as 
legislation and case law, because it is an aspect of ‘the activity of governing the state’, which 
is the business of politics. Viewed in this light, aspects of the technical theme, such as ESCs 
and SPs, seem less aberrant than ‘analytical’ or ‘empiricist’ accounts of tax law,320 as well as 
the occasional judicial pronouncement,321 might otherwise lead us to believe. This, 
Loughlin’s view of the subject, is neither Cane’s legal positivism, nor the ‘law behind law’ 
of Allan and Laws.322 It is that public law may be regarded, to use Loughlin’s own term, as 
‘the third order of the political’.323 Public law, and therefore corporation tax law, is 
fundamentally about governing – or governance – and the maintenance and regulation of this 
activity requires constant responsiveness to changing circumstances. To the extent that 
public law ‘operates in accordance with its own conceptual logic and remains free from gross 
manipulation by power-wielders’,324 its ‘even-handedness’ helps to ‘create intimacy, shape 
identity, generate trust, and strengthen allegiance’.325 Such a formulation might possibly be 
                                                 
318  See n. 120 above. 
319  See nn. 202 and 208 above. 
320  See, e.g., Lee, n. 56 above, paras [1.25]-[1.40].    
321  See, e.g., Vestey (No. 2) v. IRC [1979] 2 All ER 225, 233 (Walton J.); but also R v. IRC, ex parte 
Fulford-Dobson [1987] STC 344, 351 (McNeill J.) 
322  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, pp. 53-55. (See also n. 242 above.) 
323  See Loughlin, n. 112 above, pp. 40-42. 
324  Ibid., p. 41. 
325  Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
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 regarded as a modern version of the rule of law but, unlike Harden and Lewis326 and the 
Sheffield school, the study does not thereby attempt to rely on ‘rule of law values’. Since it 
operates in the realm of the political, the values of public law are political ones, and what we 
should at least ask of public law solutions is that they are coherent, consistent and non-
contradictory. The more successful public law is in promoting these values within a rational 
theoretical framework, the greater the legitimacy – the political acceptability - of the 
solutions offered. 
In seeking to interpret the various themes in corporation tax reform, therefore, it is 
essential to recognise that they have nothing to do with personal morality. It is no use, 
therefore, to appeal to generalised notions of morality,327 to notions of honesty and 
dishonesty,328 when attempting to distinguish, for instance, between acceptable and non-
acceptable ways of attempting to avoid corporation tax. However, corporation tax reform has 
a great deal to do with Machiavellian prudence, with both political values and the theory that 
makes sense of them. As Loughlin points out: 
 
‘In the interpretative mode, theory is to values what grammar is to vocabulary. The 
meaning of words such as … accountability can be determined only by observing their 
grammar, the way in which they are set to work within a defined field.’329 
 
Thus, corporation tax reforms are more likely to be successful the more HMG observes the 
‘prudential necessity’ of ensuring that they reflect, not only political values, but a clear view 
of the theory that demonstrates, in the particular context, the importance of those values 
relative to each other. Equally, an interpretation of corporation tax reform is more likely to 
                                                 
326  See n. 215 above. 
327  As, e.g., Dave Hartnett, then Inland Revenue Director-General, Policy and Technical, appeared to 
do in a speech in 2003 (see Parker, Financial Times, 4 May 2004, 4).  
328  But see Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson and related appeals [1984] AC 474, 518 (‘a 
simple and honest scheme’ (Lord Brightman)). 
 56
 be successful the more it reflects an appreciation of the ‘field’ in which political values have 
been deployed, as well as the way in which the deployment has taken place. 
In the final part of the chapter, therefore we relate each of the above points to the specific 
policy area of corporation tax reform and, in so doing, draw out the theoretical framework on 
which the rest of the study is based.      
 
CORPORATION TAX AS PUBLIC LAW 
 
Although, following devolution, the UK might almost be regarded as a federal state, its 
historically unitary nature,330 together with the absence of a ‘slim constitutive document’,331 
has tended to militate against any necessity to define the concept of a tax for constitutional 
law purposes.332 Whether the reference to ‘local taxes to fund local authority expenditure’ in 
the Scottish devolution scheme,333 or those to ‘taxation’ in the European Treaty,334 will 
eventually require the courts to pin the idea down, as the federal constitutions of a number of 
                                                                                                                                                       
329  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 65.   
330  See Jackson and Leopold, n. 248 above, paras 2-001-2-005. 
331 See Loughlin, n. 213 above. Baker’s claim, that ‘the United Kingdom … has never had a written 
constitution’ is too literal (see Baker, n. 113 above, p. 165). The 1653 Instrument of Government, 
which was in force between 1653 and 1660, under the Protectorate, covered Scotland and Ireland, 
as well as England and Wales (reproduced in Samuel R. Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of 
the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), pp. 405-417).   
332  But see, e.g., Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v. Wallbank 
and Another [2001] EWCA Civ 713; [2002] Ch 51, para. 40 (Sir Andrew Morritt V.-C., holding 
chancel repair liability to be a tax), overruled by HL at [2003] UKHL 37; [2004] 1 AC 546 (esp. 
para. 133) (Lord Scott of Foscote, disagreeing with Morritt V.-C.’s analysis); also Paul K. 
Marchetti, ‘Distinguishing Taxes from Charges in the Case of Privileges’ (1980) 33 Nat. Tax Jo. 
233-236. 
333  Scotland Act 1998, Sched. 5, Part II, Head A1. 
334  See Art. 90, European Treaty (ex 95) and, e.g., Case C-10/65, Deutschmann v. Germany [1968] 
CMLR 259; Case C-74/76, Iannelli and Volpi v. Meroni [1977] 2 CMLR 688. Article 90 is the 
European Treaty’s ‘national treatment obligation’ and, as such, is the equivalent, in relation to 
trade within the EU, of Art III(2), GATT 1994. 
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 Commonwealth countries have done,335 remains to be seen. For the present, the significance 
of a tax in UK law has largely centred on the prohibition in the 1689 Bill of Rights on ‘the 
levying of money for or to the use of336 the Crown by pretence of prerogative without grant 
of Parliament’.337 Since the prohibition refers to the ‘levying of money’, it has not resulted in 
the making of fine distinctions between taxes and distinct types of levy, but on the presence 
or absence of statutory authority for the levy in question.338 Although Dicey devotes a 
separate chapter to ‘the revenue’,339 this is mainly concerned with the rules under which 
revenue raised is expended, and, although he refers to the principle of the Bill of Rights, he 
does not analyse it in detail.340 Unless some other approach can be found, therefore, those 
                                                 
335  See, especially, Re Eurig Estate (1999) 165 DLR (4th) 1; also the survey of the Commonwealth 
case law in Tiley, n. 57 above, pp. 3-5; also, for a comparative conspectus, see Thuronyi, n. 107 
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336  The wording ‘for or to the use of’ seems to encompass both the possibility of an outright grant of 
money to the Crown and also a grant on trust.  
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pp. 2-6).). Previously, certain types of tax had been upheld under the royal prerogative in foreign 
policy (see Bates’s case, n. 168 above, and R. v. Hampden (1637) 3 St. Tr. 825). But see the 1653 
Instrument of Government, n. 331 above, Recital 6, and Art. 30, and Adam Tomkins, Our 
Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 74-76, 83-87; also Toby Barnard, 
The English Republic 1649-1660 (Harlow: Longman, 1982), pp. 38, 46-48. 
338  See, e.g., Brewster v. Kidgill (1697) 88 ER 1239; Baker v. Greenhill (1842) 114 ER 463, 470 
(Lord Denman C.J.); Coltness Iron Company v. Black (Surveyor of Taxes) (1881) 1 TC 287, 316-
317 (Lord Blackburn); Bowles v. Bank of England [1913] 1 Ch 57 (Parker J.); Attorney-General v. 
Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) 124 LT 319, 322-323 (Bailhache J., overruled by CA and HL at 
[1922] WN 217, 218); Ormond Investment Company, Limited v. Betts (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) 
(1928) 13 TC 400, 422 (Lawrence L.J.), 434 (Lord Atkinson); Scott v. Russell (H.M. Inspector of 
Taxes) (1948) 30 TC 394, 419 (Porter L.J.); Congreve v. Home Office [1976] QB 629 (EWCA); 
Daymond v. South West Water Authority [1976] AC 609; IRC v. Océ van der Grinten [2000] STC 
951; Steele Ford and Newton and Others v. Crown Prosecution Service (No. 2) [1994] 1 AC 22, 
33E-F (Lord Bridge of Harwich); and Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank (EWCA), n. 332 above. 
339  See Dicey, n. 219 above, ch. 10.   
340  Ibid., p. 315. This is surprising, since Dicey seems to have had an extensive tax practice: see, e.g., 
Bowers (Surveyor of Taxes) v. Harding (1897-1898) 3 TC 22, 24, 28-30; Bartholomay Brewing 
Company v. Wyatt (Surveyor of Taxes) (1897-1898) 3 TC 213, 218; Nobel Dynamite Trust 
Company v. Wyatt (Surveyor of Taxes) (1897-1898) 3 TC 224, 229; and Leeds Permanent Benefit 
Building Society v. Mallandaine (Surveyor of Taxes) (1897-1898) 3 TC 577, 589-590. (Although 
each of these reports appear in the same TC volume, they were decided over the period 1891-
1897.) 
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 looking for a sense of the deep structure of corporation tax are confronted with the largely 
‘uncoupled’ technical and theoretical strands of scholarship discussed earlier in the chapter. 
It is suggested that, by using a functionalist and interpretative public law approach to 
corporation tax, a new and, it is suggested, more rewarding way, into the material can be 
found. This is by regarding the tax as being, in essence, no different from any other form of 
regulation. Most scholars, notably Picciotto, have long regarded the taxation of corporations, 
especially MNCs, as constituting a self-evidently ‘regulatory system’.341 What might at first 
sound like a dissentient voice is that of Majone,342 who, taking tax policy to be in essence 
‘redistributive’, might be understood to view regulation as involving somewhat distinct 
considerations. However, on a close reading, it is clear that this comment is made with 
regard solely to the majoritarian nature of the processes by which tax policy decisions should 
be reached.343 Even this point does not, however, relieve us of the obligation of deciding on 
what are taken to be the defining characteristics of regulation. Consistent with the idea that 
politics is concerned with the art of government, or of governance, the contention in the 
study will be that ‘regulation’ is a large enough term to cover all ways of bringing about a 
particular policy objective. Again, cast in wide terms though it is, Parker and Braithwaite’s 
definition of regulation as ‘influencing the flow of events’,344 as well as Baldwin, Scott and 
Hood’s definition of regulation as ‘an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some 
mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with these 
                                                 
341  See Picciotto, n. 7 above, p. 83. So-called ‘corrective taxes’ have long been regarded as regulatory 
in nature (see, e.g., Anthony Ogus, ‘Corrective Taxation as a Regulatory Instrument’, in 
Regulation and Deregulation: Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services 
Industries, ed. by Christopher McCrudden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp. 15-36). 
342  See Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 294.  
343  Ibid., p. 285. See also Radaelli, n. 198 above, pp. 34-35. 
344  See Christine Parker and John Braithwaite, ‘Regulation’, in Cane and Tushnet, n. 92 above, pp. 
119-145, 119. 
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 rules’345 each seem no less apposite to the case of taxation than to any other policy arena.346 
As a form of regulation, corporation tax counts, of course, as economic, rather than social, 
regulation.347 Its immediate policy objective might, at a fairly superficial level, be stated as 
the fair and efficient raising of revenue. Digging deeper, however, we might look to 
statements of Government economic policy to relate that objective to the broader one of 
fostering economic growth. This is something to which we shall return before the end of the 
chapter, since it is essential to the respective roles of ‘theory’ and ‘values’ in the study as a 
whole. For the present, it is enough to underline the dimension of corporation tax as 
economic regulation. Even if Majone is right, and this does not capture some ‘redistributive’ 
element in the notion of taxation,348 it is at least enough to cover the mechanisms by which 
that revenue is gathered in the first place. Moreover, it is clear from both HMG’s use of 
‘regulatory impact assessments’ (RIAs) in reforming corporation tax,349 as well as from the 
European Commission’s view of regulation as including corporate tax matters,350 that 
corporation tax policy is regarded as a regulatory activity, both at the domestic and at the 
European levels. Each of these empirical examples reflects the wider academic consensus 
                                                 
345  See A Reader on Regulation, ed. by Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3. 
346  This is not to deny that the term ‘regulation’, when restricted to ‘command and control’ 
regulation, has often been contrasted with taxation (see R. and the Minister of State for the 
Commonwealth v. Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41, 120 (Higgins J.)) and that, thus contrasted, it is itself 
capable of imposing costs similar to taxation on those regulated (see Mark Kelman, Strategy or 
Principle? The Choice between Regulation and Taxation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1999).   
347  See Tony Prosser, Law and the Regulators (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 4-6; also 
Picciotto, n. 7 above, p. 83. 
348  Including, e.g., progressive rates of taxation and the application of the revenue raised. 
349  See, e.g., Regulatory Impact Assessment for Reform of the Corporate Debt, Financial Instruments 
and Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses Regimes, 15 April 2002 (London: Inland Revenue, 
2002). See Chapter 3 below. 
350  See, e.g., Document No. IP/05/1382, Transparency and Better Regulation: Commission puts 
online a public register of expert groups, 8 November 2005 (Brussels: European Commission, 
2005). The expert groups referred to in this press release include the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) Working Group, as well as various other tax and tax-related 
groups.  
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 referred to above, that taxation is one form, perhaps one of the earliest forms,351 of economic 
regulation.352 
If, as is contended, corporation tax can be viewed as being essentially similar to any other 
form of regulation, it becomes possible, in interpreting it, to draw selectively on a vast 
theoretical literature. Regulation has been analysed both from a law and economics 
perspective,353 and also from a public law perspective, where the emphasis has been on 
regulatory legitimacy.354 The latter has been a major preoccupation of regulation scholarship 
ever since it began to acquire a public law dimension in the mid-1980s. Motivated as it was 
by the concern that NPM reforms were being rolled out under the Thatcher Government with 
no obvious regard for their constitutional implications, regulation scholarship began to look 
for accountability mechanisms which might nonetheless provide some safeguard for both the 
subject and the consumer, and possibly even guide future reform. This is why Baldwin, Scott 
and Hood, in the definition of regulation set out above, refer to public agencies, rather than 
Government Departments.355 It was against this background that the Sheffield school began 
to look for ‘rule of law values’ in the UK’s constitutional arrangements.356 Other areas of 
regulation, pre-eminently areas of social regulation, could usefully be viewed in this 
                                                 
351  See Parker and Braithwaite, n. 344 above, p. 120. 
352 See Baldwin, Scott and Hood, n. 345 above, ibid. To similar effect, although in the context of 
seventeenth-century ‘mercantilism’, see Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere, trans. by Thomas Burger, with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1992), p. 24. 
353  Notably by Anthony Ogus (see Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)); also Black (1996) 16 OJLS 699-711 (Review Article). 
354  See, e.g., in relation to ‘a classic example of social regulation’, Chris Hilson, Regulating 
Pollution: A UK and EC Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000). 
355  See nn. 75 and 77 above. 
356  See, esp., Harden and Lewis, n. 215 above. 
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 prism.357 Corporation tax reform has been unusual, however, since it is one area to which 
this approach has not yet been systematically applied.358 
                                                
Granted that what has just been said is well-founded, the next question is that of what 
additional elements taxation might have, above and beyond other forms of economic 
regulation. More recently, although in a different jurisdiction, and with separate though 
related concerns in mind, legal and political philosophers have begun to look anew at the 
legitimacy of taxation. The pre-eminent contribution to this debate has been Murphy and 
Nagel’s The Myth of Ownership,359 a provocatively entitled interrogation of two pervasive 
ideas: those of ‘pre-tax ownership’ and of tax justice. Although the two are closely 
intertwined, we need here to place the accent on the former,360 since it offers a theoretical 
perspective on the nature of taxation itself. The taxation of corporations is scoped out of 
Murphy and Nagel’s inquiry,361 but both main elements of their theory have interpretative 
resonances even in this area. Most importantly, they ask us to accept the ‘conventionality of 
property’, as contrasted with a concept of it as being in some sense ‘morally fundamental’.362 
‘We have to think of property’, claim Murphy and Nagel, ‘as what is created by the tax 
system, rather than what is disturbed or encroached on by the tax system. Property rights are 
the rights people have in the resources they are entitled to control after taxes, not before.’363 
Their argument, heavily consequentialist as it is, can be assimilated to a functionalist 
 
357  See Hilson, n. 354 above. 
358  That constitutions might entrench certain expectations about the tax system, of which tax 
reformers should be aware, is explored at some level of abstraction, in John G. Head, ‘Tax 
Reform: A Quasi-Constitutional Perspective’, in Cooper, n. 113 above, pp. 155-180. Freedman 
also uses a Dworkinian methodology in the specific context of a ‘GANTIP’ (see Judith Freedman, 
‘Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle’ [2004] 
BTR 332-357). 
359  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
360  See Chapter 4 below. 
361  See Murphy and Nagel, n. 359 above, p. 10. 
362  Ibid., p. 175. 
363  Ibid. 
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 perspective on tax law as public law, despite having much in common with what we are 
content to accept is the ‘liberal normativist’ tradition of Rawls364 and Dworkin.365 
Contentious as it is,366 this ‘conventional’, rather than ‘moral’, view of property rights is 
accepted in what follows.367 It is a key contention of the study that it is not even possible to 
begin to articulate a convincing interpretation of, say, tax avoidance measures, without 
rejecting the notion that taxes involve the ‘exactions’368 of property which can be said to be 
the absolute moral entitlement of its owner.369 Its significance in what follows is elaborated 
in a later chapter,370 in connection with the choice of one policy solution over others. What is 
plainly inadequate, however, is the generality of Dicey’s statement about the liability of the 
subject to pay taxes371 or Lord Clyde’s homely metaphor, often cited, of the ‘shovel’ and the 
‘stores’ in connection with tax avoidance.372 As Simester and Chan forcibly point out, few, if 
any, lawyers really believe this type of statement any more.373 To the extent that Murphy and 
Nagel are almost exclusively concerned with substantive issues, rather than institutional or 
                                                 
364  See Rawls (1999), n. 252 above, esp. pp. 245-247 and 249-251.  
365  See n. 283 above. 
366  It is clearly incompatible, e.g., with Nozick’s famous characterisation of ‘[t]axation of earnings 
from labor … [as being] on par with forced labor’ (see Nozick, n. 266 above, p. 169). For a 
cogently argued dissent from Murphy and Nagel’s thesis, see Felix Maultzsch (2004) 67 MLR 
508-523 (Review Article). The idea of taxation as ‘slavery’ is an ancient one; it appears, for 
instance, in Herodotus (see James Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots 
of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 20-21). See also Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy and The Social Contract, trans. and ed. by Christopher 
Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 126 (in ‘The Social Contract’). 
367  See also A.P. Simester and Winnie Chan (2003) 23 OJLS 711-726 (Review Article). 
368  See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Newman 159 F 2d 848, 851 (1947) (Learned Hand J., 
dissenting). 
369  As witnessed by the exception for taxation in the right to property enshrined in the ECHR (see 
ECHR, First Protocol, Art. 1).  
370  Particularly as regards ‘societal fairness’, rather than ‘tax fairness’. See Chapter 4 below. 
371  See Dicey, n. 219 above, p. 315. 
372  See Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services and D.M. Richie v. IRC (1929) 14 TC 754, 763. It is slightly 
odd that Lord Clyde should have looked for homely metaphor. Although Montchrétien compares 
the management of the commonwealth with that of the household (see n. 94 above, p. 31), both 
Aristotle and Rousseau makes it plain that it is a ‘mistake’ so to do (see Aristotle, The Politics, ed. 
by Stephen Everson (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988), p. 1; Rousseau, n. 366 
above, pp. 3-6). 
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 procedural ones, their thesis complements the regulatory material outlined above. Their 
preoccupation is not, indeed, surprising. A concern for, for instance, accountability, a key 
legitimising value, has only relatively recently surfaced in the language of tax reform in the 
UK,374 in the context of the discussion in the O’Donnell Report.375 It is thus that it seems 
appropriate, in what follows, to combine elements of a view of corporation tax as regulation, 
with Murphy and Nagel’s conception of taxation as involving only ‘conventional’ property 
rights. 
In the rest of the study, a functionalist and interpretative approach is followed in three 
interrelated, but distinct, stages. Consistent with the idea of corporation tax as public law, 
with attributes peculiar to the taxation of corporations, as well as ones common to economic 
regulation generally, we contemplate the phenomenon of corporation tax reform from three 
different angles: institutions, processes and policy solutions.376 Taken as a whole, this 
structure is the clearest sign of the influence on the study of Sheffield school writers such as 
Hilson, who organises his examination of one area of social regulation, at least in part, on 
these lines,377 and Lewis, who takes a similar approach in discussing law and governance.378 
Where the study differs from that body of work, however, is in its rejection, on historical and 
interpretative grounds, of a Sheffield school methodology. This allows us to say rather more 
                                                                                                                                                       
373  See Simester and Chan, n. 367 above, p. 711.   
374  Although Robinson and Sandford’s 1983 study was concerned with the types of accountability 
mechanisms discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 below, e.g., the system of Parliamentary committees, 
the expression ‘accountability’ is not used (see Ann Robinson and Cedric Sandford, Tax Policy-
Making in the United Kingdom: A Study of Rationality, Ideology and Politics (London: 
Heinemann, 1983).   
375  See, e.g., Cm 6163, n. 82 above, pp. 11-12. 
376  See, e.g., Majone, n. 342 above, p. 291. As Majone points out (ibid.), discussions of the 
institutions of the EU have made similar divisions in the material (referring to Joseph H.H. 
Weiler, ‘After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe’, in Singular Europe: 
Economy and Polity of the European Community after 1992, ed. by William James Adams (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 11-41).      
377  See n. 354 above. 
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 about the content and relative importance of the values at work in corporation tax reform 
than might otherwise have been possible. 
A functionalist style, one that ‘reflects an ideal of progressive evolutionary change’, 
requires us to be ever alert to public law’s ‘aims and objectives’.379 Given a certain 
sensitivity of approach, the wealth of material making up the technical theme in corporation 
tax reform enables us, with perhaps unusual clarity, to uncover and interpret those aims and 
objectives. The Budget ‘red books’ published over the period of Gordon Brown’s 
Chancellorship comprise a particularly rich source of information. Although we shall have 
occasion to return to these in greater detail at various points in the study, it is worth referring 
here to the kinds of aims and objectives that they contain. 
One of the earliest such documents that we shall be considering is the incoming Labour 
Government’s first full Budget report, published in March 1998.380 Here it was stated that 
the four objectives of the Government’s economic strategy were ‘to ensure economic 
stability, reward work, encourage enterprise and promote fairness’.381 To these ends, there 
would be ‘enterprise reforms, including major corporation tax changes’, and ‘fairness 
measures’, including anti-avoidance provisions, which would be designed to ‘ensure that 
people and companies pay a fair share of tax’.382 It was predicted that corporation tax would, 
in 1998-1999, raise 23.79 per cent. of ‘total Inland Revenue’.383 Two years later, in Budget 
                                                                                                                                                       
378  N. Douglas Lewis, Law and Governance: The Old Meets the New (London: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2001). 
379  See extract relating to n. 275 above. 
380  See New Ambitions for Britain: Financial Statement and Budget Report March 1998 (House of 
Commons Papers, Session 1997-1998, 620) (London: TSO, 1998). July 1997, a matter of months 
after the General Election, had seen the publication of a mini Budget (see Equipping Britain for 
our long-term future: Financial Statement and Budget Report July 1997 (House of Commons 
Papers, Session 1997-1998, 85) (London: The Stationery Office, 1997)). 
381  Ibid., para. 1.01. 
382  Ibid. 
383  i.e. £30 billion of a predicted total tax yield from ‘Inland Revenue’ taxes of £126.1 billion (ibid., 
p. 117). (Figures calculated on a ‘cash basis’ and including what was then ACT: see n. 40 above.) 
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 2000, the Government ambitiously stated that it was pursuing a ‘comprehensive and 
coordinated strategy to fulfil Britain’s national economic potential and deliver the objective 
of high and stable levels of growth and employment – with rising living standards for all’.384 
This required ‘a fair and efficient tax system’, a blot on which was the failure of ‘individuals 
and businesses [to] pay their fair share of taxes’.385 To this end, Budget 2000 promised ‘a 
package of measures’ to ‘tighten up the controlled foreign company rules’.386 Corporation 
tax was predicted, in 2000-2001, to raise 23.50 per cent. of ‘total Inland Revenue’.387 The 
equivalent opening statement on the Government’s objective in Budget 2003 closely 
followed that of 2000: ‘[t]he Government’s objective [it ran] is to deliver high and stable 
levels of growth and employment, with opportunity and rising living standards for all – a 
Britain of economic strength and social justice’.388 Again, emphasis was placed on tax 
avoidance as an obstacle to tax fairness, further measures being announced on controlled 
foreign companies (CFCs),389 as well as on life insurance companies.390 There was also a 
‘compliance and enforcement package’: 
 
‘We want to make sure that the burden of tax does not fall unfairly on taxpayers who play 
by the rules and pay their fair share. This package is the first step in a new strategic 
approach to compliance work, designed to modernise the way risks to revenue are 
assessed and managed by the Inland Revenue. It identifies areas of the tax system where 
the potential loss of revenue is high and targets resources and compliance activity 
                                                 
384  See Prudent for a Purpose: Working for a Stronger and Fairer Britain, n. 184 above, para. 1.1. 
385  Ibid., para. 1.25. 
386  Ibid., para. 5.116. 
387  i.e. £33.8 billion of a predicted total tax yield from ‘Inland Revenue’ taxes of £143.8 billion (ibid., 
p. 203). 
388  See Building a Britain of economic strength and social justice: Economic and Fiscal Strategy 
Report and Financial Statement and Budget Report April 2003 (House of Commons Papers, 
Session 2002-2003, 500) (London: The Stationery Office, 2003), para. 1.1. 
389  Ibid. p. 193. 
390  Ibid.; see H.M. Treasury PN07, Fairness in Taxation – Protecting Tax Revenues, 9 April 2003, 
available from www.hm-treasury.gov.uk (accessed 19 July 2006). 
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 accordingly; and creates a more stable framework upon which to plan public 
investment.’391 
 
This time, it was predicted that, for 2003-2004, corporation tax would generate 19.09 per 
cent. of ‘total Inland Revenue’.392 Three years later, Budget 2006 proclaimed that ‘[t]he 
Government’s economic objective is to build a strong economy and a fair society, where 
there is opportunity and security for all’.393 Again, a strong anti-avoidance line was to the 
fore; although there was a recognition that, at the same time as blocking avoidance 
opportunities, ‘the competitiveness of the UK … [had to be] maintained’.394 Measures were 
therefore announced to ‘close down a number of avoidance schemes which use financial 
products’ and to ‘close a loophole in the controlled foreign companies legislation’.395 For 
2006-2007, the predicted ‘take’ from corporation tax was very roughly 16.7 per cent. of 
taxes formerly collected by the Inland Revenue.396 Such statements together enable us to 
infer that one aim of corporation tax reform is the moulding of a tax that raises something 
around very approximately 20 per cent. of the total tax ‘take’,397 consistent with promoting 
economic growth and achieving fairness. The public interest requires, not only the promotion 
of the former, which is a question of efficiency, but also the drawing of a clear distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of tax avoidance, which is a question of fairness. 
It follows that, to identify those areas in which this double objective may be frustrated, it is 
                                                 
391  Ibid., Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo MP, Paymaster General. 
392  i.e. £30.8 billion of a predicted total tax yield from ‘Inland Revenue’ taxes (excluding social 
security contributions) of £161.3 billion (see Building a Britain of economic strength and social 
justice, n. 388 above, p. 257).  
393  See A strong and strengthening economy: Investing in Britain’s future: Economic and Fiscal 
Strategy Report and Financial Statement and Budget Report March 2006 (House of Commons 
Papers, Session 2005-2006, 968) (London: The Stationery Office, 2006), para. 1.1. 
394  Ibid., p. 119. 
395  Ibid., p. 120. 
396  i.e. £49 billion out of a total yield from former ‘Inland Revenue’ taxes of £292.9 billion (see A 
strong and strengthening economy, n. 393 above, p. 262).  
397 Lee’s figures are consistent with this: see Lee, n. 56 above, para. [1.5]. 
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 necessary to scrutinise each element of corporation tax reform, whether it be the institutions, 
the processes, or the policy solutions actually adopted. To the extent that the values at work 
in each aspect of corporation tax reform, as well as the significance accorded to each one 
relative to the others, seem to make a rational whole, we can say that they are satisfactory, 
and therefore legitimate. In relation to the former point, values such as certainty and 
accountability, may help to further the efficiency and fairness objectives. However, to the 
extent that, in particular contexts, values conflict with each other, they may need to be 
reconciled to the objective of corporation tax reform set out above, in accordance with 
prudential techniques. The reconciliation of conflicting values through prudence is a much 
more difficult task even than the identification of the values themselves. 
The argument against approaching the material in the manner just described is that 
documents such as the Budget Financial Statement may conceal the reality or, at the very 
least, the objectives that they contain may be highly contestable ones. The former might 
seem to be a point well made. Recall, however, the interpretative dimension of the study 
discussed above. This requires us, being historically sensitive all the while, to look for any 
inconsistencies, contradictions or incoherence in the Government’s stated aims and 
objectives. In the absence of a journalist’s dream, such as a compromising Departmental 
memorandum accidentally left on the Tube, or a wayward email, such canons of rationality 
are the sharpest tools we have. Rationally, we can only assume, absent such incriminating 
evidence to the contrary, that the Government is acting to promote ‘the welfare of the 
people’,398 to promote the public interest. The latter point, i.e. the contestability of the object 
itself, does, however, have greater merit. It is Oakeshott who, in On Human Conduct,399 
                                                 
398  We assume here that ‘the welfare of the people’ can be equated with ‘the public interest’ (see 
Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 9n). See n. 168 above, and Chapter 3 below. 
399  See Oakeshott, n. 269 above.  
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 points to the ‘puzzle set by the character of a modern European state’, the ‘unresolved 
tension’ between the ‘irreconcilable’ conceptions of a state as ‘societas’ and as 
‘universitas’.400 What the latter implies, that the former does not, is ‘the pursuit of some 
acknowledged substantive end, … the promotion of some specified enduring interest’.401 
Although, in interpreting corporate tax reform, we confront the problem that notions of the 
modern state combine elements of both, it is also the case that the regulatory state, the state 
as universitas, predominates.402 Modern politics in Europe tends to be concerned, not with 
the existence, but with the nature and extent of the regulatory state. What renders acceptable 
a certain view of it, if only for a time, is the policy of a democratically elected Government. 
Corporation tax reform, in short, is about the legitimate facilitating of the aims and 
objectives of a democratically elected government in the particular policy area. But there is 
no doubt about the contestability, the political, nature of the solutions adopted. The only 
question is the prudence with which they are managed. It is not even a case of Lord 
Hailsham’s ‘elective dictatorship’,403 because a democratically elected government may be 
both constrained and empowered by human rights law, although this is itself a – distinct - 
political arena.404   
In each of the study’s three divisions, our initial concern will be the identification of aims 
and objectives, and relative thereto, the interpretation and prioritisation of the political values 
                                                 
400  Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
401  Ibid., p. 203. What characterises the state as ‘societas’ is ‘not that of an engagement in an 
enterprise to pursue a common substantive purpose or to promote a common interest, but that of 
loyalty to one another’ (ibid., p. 201). 
402  As witness the massive administrative machinery of modern European states (see Loughlin, n. 162 
above, p. 18). 
403  See Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and Prescription (London: Collins, 
1978), ch. 20, esp. 126-127.   
404  See Loughlin, n. 162 above, ch. 7. Technically, the Human Rights Act 1998 can, of course, be 
repealed, as the Conservatives advocated in their 2005 General Election campaign. (The 
Conservatives’ latest plan does not, apparently, involve the repeal of HRA 1998 (see Hall, 
Financial Times, 26 June 2006, 2)). 
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 at work in each area. Chapter 2 pursues this inquiry in relation to the Departmental theme 
picked out at the beginning of the study. The discussion is not, however, confined to H.M. 
Treasury and to HMRC, but reaches out to the impact of non-governmental bodies such as 
the International Accounting Standards Board (the IASB).405 This is both to reflect the 
overall objective of NPM reforms, that of greater efficiency, and to enable an assessment of 
the institutional significance of other reforms, such as those comprised in the accounting 
theme. Examining the political values at work at the Treasury, for example, depends on an 
analysis, not only of its aim, but of the qualities that its personnel bring to their task.406 Thus, 
in the context of the Treasury’s single aim, to ‘[r]aise the rate of sustainable growth and 
achieve rising prosperity and a better quality of life, with economic and employment 
opportunities for all’,407 we need to assess the qualities of both politicians and officials in 
promoting it. Efficiency, as we have said, is a deeply embedded value, because of its 
importance to effectiveness. However, as we have also said, other values, most importantly, 
after O’Donnell,408 accountability, have assumed a greater importance. The functionalist 
approach requires us to be sensitive both to the way in which, in the particular context of 
corporation tax reform, the Treasury’s overall aim shapes the content of the values that it 
embodies, as well as their importance relative to each other. New Public Management has 
tied both ‘policy networks’ and non-governmental institutions, such as the IASB, ever more 
closely into the making of corporation tax policy. 
One of the more controversial consequences of the O’Donnell report has been the severe 
restriction of HMRC’s policy making function, and the concentration of policy mainly 
(though not exclusively) in H.M. Treasury. This is reflected in the relatively low profile 
                                                 
405  See www.iasb.org (accessed 30 March 2006).  
406  See www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/about/about_aimsobject.cfm (accessed 28 March 2006). 
407  Ibid. 
408  See n. 82 above. 
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 accorded to HMRC in both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, although it will be seen from Chapter 3 
what is crucial about HMRC’s ‘presentation’ and ‘delivery’ function. In Chapter 3, too, it is 
necessary to elaborate briefly on the reasons for excluding Luhmann’s systems theory from 
the analysis.409 Although Loughlin originally suggested that systems theory might assist in 
the interpretation of the emergence of the probable from a range of possibilities,410 the study 
rejects this approach. The rationale for the rejection, together with an assessment of the 
interpretative significance of a number of rival theories,411 forms an introduction to Chapter 
3. Our interest in Chapter 3 is in constituent power, so, rather than clinging to Luhmann, or 
analysing Habermas’s ‘democratic principle’,412 or the ‘deliberative democracy’ of 
Sunstein,413 we attempt to pinpoint the reality of tax policy-making in this particular 
representative democracy. In relation to the policy-making process, the dominant idea is 
prudence, in which reform may, or may not, be the result of consultation and participation. 
Experts are crucially important, but alone, as Loughlin points out, they cannot solve the 
problems of public law.414 He might have added that this is as true of corporation tax as any 
other area of the subject. 
The anti-avoidance theme figures prominently in the discussion of the evolving 
corporation tax code in Chapter 4. This, too, is where the accounting and European and 
international themes come to the fore. What values, we need to ask, are at work in aligning 
the measurement of tax profits and accounting profits? Why are certain tax avoidance 
                                                 
409  See n. 120 above. 
410  See n. 305 above.  
411  On the possibility that systems theory might help to interpret at least what we refer to as the 
accounting theme in corporation tax reform, see Judith Freedman, ‘Aligning Taxable Profits and 
Accounting Profits: Accounting standards, legislators and judges’ (2004) 2 eJournal of Tax 
Research 71-99, 98-99. 
412  Especially as developed in Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1997), pp. 457-458. 
413  See, e.g., the contribution of Cass Sunstein and others to Deliberative Democracy, ed. by Jon 
Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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 techniques unacceptable? How are policy choices constrained or facilitated by the UK’s 
European and international commitments? It is in offering answers to these questions that we 
make our second major departure from Loughlin.415 This is in the relative weight to be 
accorded to theory and values in analysing the policy choices actually made. The best 
discussions of corporation tax reform would hark back to Smith and to Millar, and to the 
‘science of legislation’.416 Values need to be given a higher prominence in the specific area 
of corporation tax than perhaps Loughlin would accord them. This is because corporation tax 
discourse has always been, as the above discussion has demonstrated, conducted in terms in 
which principles – or values – have been uppermost. A key challenge in analysing solutions 
to corporation tax problems is in mapping the classification and content of the four maxims 
of ‘equality’, ‘certainty’, convenience and cost-effectiveness in the corporation tax context. 
Equally important, however, is the need to consider how and why Smith’s maxims are 
modified to take account of the policy objectives that, as reformed, corporation tax is 
intended to serve. 
Since this is a functionalist, not a normative, inquiry, the aim of analysing the three areas 
in Chapters 2 to 4 is not to produce some ‘blueprint’ for reform. Its primary purpose is to 
offer an interpretation of the public law implications of the seven themes set out at the 
beginning. In reflecting in extenso on this interpretation, in Chapter 5 below, it is hoped to 
identify areas in which the prudential quality of corporation tax reform appears weak. 
Although this has implications for the direction that corporation tax reform might take in 
future, Loughlin is right to emphasise that the functionalist approach is a scholarly, rather 
                                                                                                                                                       
414  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 66. 
415  See n. 120 above. 
416  See nn. 258 and 259 above. 
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than an active one. If the tax law scholar, a non-practitioner, has anything to contribute to the 
discourses on reform, it is a competing, but distinct, type of discourse.417 
 
417  See Loughlin, n. 226 above, p. 66. 







A visitor to London in the first decade of the twenty-first century can take a ride on the 
London Eye, one of the capital’s remaining millennium attractions. From the gondolas of 
this gigantic fairground wheel, mounted above the brown-green waters of the River Thames, 
can be seen, does one choose to remark them, the tangible manifestations of the political 
institutions most closely associated with the themes announced at the beginning of Chapter 
1. 
The view to the south is dominated by the Victorian Gothic splendour of the Palace of 
Westminster and the Houses of Parliament.1 There, although in committee rooms and in 
Westminster Hall,2 rather than in the main chambers, have individual Finance Act provisions 
been debated by some numbers of the elected representatives of the people. There, too - 
perplexingly for anyone expecting more tangible signs of a ‘separation of powers’ - at the 
bar of the House of Lords, the Law Lords have handed down the most important judgments 
in corporation tax appeals. Just to the right, clearly discernible to the north west of 
Westminster, are the impressive and newly modernised New Government Offices on Horse 
                                                 
1  See Simon Bradley and Nikolaus Pevsner, The Buildings of England – London 6: Westminster 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 216-218. 
2  Ibid., pp. 229-231. 
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 Guards Road, the western part of which houses H.M. Treasury.3 The Treasury building, in 
Whitehall, is nearer to the Houses of Parliament than any of the other Departmental 
buildings in the area; it is also, with the exception of the Foreign Office, the most imposing 
of them. This is where the economic policies that help to shape the reform of corporation tax 
have been evolved. 
Further to the north east, by Waterloo Bridge, no more than a mile away, can be discerned 
the classical lines of Somerset House in the Strand, the western part of which, in Lancaster 
Place, has been the seat of successively, the Inland Revenue and H.M. Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC).4 Just visible behind it are the Royal Courts of Justice, the principal seat both of the 
Court of Appeal and of the High Court. The Government buildings are not, however, all that 
the interested visitor might see. Signs of the presence of ‘policy community’ membership, 
close to the centres of tax policy, are visible too. Located somewhere between the Treasury 
and Somerset House, above Charing Cross railway station, and looking out over the Golden 
Jubilee Bridges, is the headquarters, in Embankment Place, of one of the ‘Big Four’ 
accountancy firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers.5 Ernst and Young, another Big Four firm, has 
its headquarters on the other side of the river, in Lambeth Palace Road, near Tower Bridge.6 
If the location of the Treasury building is symbolic of the centrality of tax policy to the 
British state,7 then the presence of the imposing premises of two Big Four accountancy 
practices, so close to the nerve centre of H.M. Government (HMG), is surely emblematic of 
                                                 
3  Which modernisation only the London Eye has made clearly visible from outside the building. 
The modernisation was designed by Foster and Partners, ‘from 2000, creating open-plan offices 
and making lesser courtyards and light wells into glass-roofed communal spaces’ (see Bradley and 
Pevsner, n. 1 above, p. 270). 
4  Ibid., p. 324. Although it should be noted that the Business Tax Unit is based in Kingsway, which 
is near Somerset House.  
5  ‘Mysteriously lit, with a fountain issuing as if from a giant pipe, ... [the reception area of 
Embankment Place] suggests the sanctum of some strange earth-cult’ (ibid., p. 300).  
6  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 144 and 148; also n. 124 below. 
7  See, in another context, Fisher (2001) 13 J. Env. L. 115-117, 115 (book review). 
 75
 the importance of accountants in the formulation of tax policy. The presence of other 
professionals, though less visible from the Eye, is no less striking. From the Treasury in 
Whitehall, to St Paul’s, in the heart of the City, is a little over a mile and a half - a cab-ride 
away for the busy civil servant, accountant or solicitor with the inevitable ‘pilot case’ of A4 
policy documents and multi-volume taxation statutes.8 Within the City’s ‘square mile’ are 
the offices of no less than 40 major international and European and domestic banks, 
including Goldman Sachs,9 Merrill Lynch,10 Nomura and Deutsche Bank;11 no less than two 
dozen fund managers, including Fidelity Investments, Henderson Global Investors, and 
Schroders;12 at least a dozen international law firms, including Allen and Overy, Freshfields, 
and Slaughter and May; and the other two Big Four accountancy practices, Deloitte and 
KPMG.13 Even Canary Wharf, the City’s Docklands extension, with its 50-storey, 800-foot 
tower, and its two slightly smaller 42-storey companions, each dominating the eastern 
horizon seen from the Eye, is only two miles or so from St Paul’s, and not much more than 
two and a half miles, as the crow flies, from Whitehall and the Houses of Parliament. Canary 
Wharf, once ‘unfashionable’, is now home to at least ten other major banks, including Credit 
Suisse and Morgan Stanley,14 and the law firm Clifford Chance.15 
                                                 
8  Tax specialists in the practising professions universally use commercially-produced anthologies of 
tax legislation, annual publications which incorporate legislative amendments made from FA to 
FA. 
9  Whose offices, Pevsner tells us, are ‘a sleek, complex pile, not the usual atrium block’ (see Simon 
Bradley and Nikolaus Pevsner, The Buildings of England – London 1: The City of London 
(London: Penguin, 1997), p. 500). 
10  Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (‘MGM’) are the world’s leading investment 
banks, known as ‘the super bulge’ (see Philip Augar, The Greed Merchants: How the Investment 
Banks Played the Free Market Game (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 37-39). 
11  See the large-scale map in the Financial Times Special Report: The New City, 27 March 2006, 2 
and 5. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Part of KPMG will relocate to a new building in Canary Wharf in 2009 (see Jopson and Pickard, 
Financial Times, 7 November 2006, 27). 
14  See Pickard, Financial Times, 3 April 2007, 19. 
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 Faced with the economic might whose ‘lifeworld’ seems so vivid from the Eye,16 it might 
seem perverse, almost, to begin this chapter by highlighting certain analytical problems in 
interpreting the significance of institutions to the process of corporation tax reform. It is, to 
be sure, a matter of understanding their make-up, objectives and values, but, equally 
importantly, we need to be able to interpret the significance of the relationships between the 
institutions of HMG and those of the corporate sector.17 Describing the duties and powers of 
political institutions is something that comes rather easily to public lawyers – briefly turning 
up a standard constitutional law18 or taxation law19 text will illustrate the truth of this point. 
Since, however, we are engaged in a functionalist and interpretative inquiry, and since 
Loughlin’s references to political institutions occur in the context of ‘high-level’ discussions 
of representation, sovereignty and constituent power,20 we need to look beyond the public 
law texts themselves, to find ways of understanding the wider significance of institutions, 
and the ways in which they interact, in the reform of corporation tax. The task is complicated 
by the fact that the discourse on institutions (the ‘new institutionalism’)21 in the field of 
                                                                                                                                                       
15  The offices of which are so impressive that its ‘entrance halls … (one visiting judge observed) 
could accommodate a small law practice’ (see Anthony Sampson, Who Runs This Place? The 
Anatomy of Britain in the 21st Century (London: John Murray, 2004), p. 181). 
16  London, in the words of Ed Balls MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury until 28 June 2007, 
vies with New York as ‘the world’s greatest global financial centre’ (quoted in Freeland, 
Financial Times, 4-5 November 2006, 11).  
17  See Charles J. Fox and Hugh T. Miller, Postmodern Public Administration: Toward Discourse 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), pp. 91-92. 
18  See, e.g., Paul Jackson and Patricia Leopold, O. Hood Phillips & Jackson: Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 8th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), Parts II and III; also R.A.W. 
Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 1997), pp. 76-77. 
19  See, e.g., John Tiley, Revenue Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 62-65. 
20  See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chs 5 and 
6. 
21  ‘Old institutionalism’, though still useful, is not unlike the kind of descriptive public law to which 
reference has just been made. For an example, see the topics covered in Herman Finer, The 
Theory and Practice of Modern Government, 4th edn (London: Methuen, 1961). 
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 politics has as many as six distinct strands.22 These range from the ‘normative 
institutionalism’ of March and Olsen,23 which emphasises ‘the “logic of appropriateness” as 
a means of shaping the behaviour of the members of institutions’,24 via the ‘rational choice 
institutionalism’ of, for instance, Tsebelis and Money,25 to the ‘empirical institutionalism’ of 
Weaver and Rockman.26 All have insights to offer; all are, broadly speaking, ‘functionalist’ 
accounts. A further complication arises from the fact that there is little published material 
that applies the new institutionalism to the particular institutions centred on the imposing 
buildings visible from the London Eye. Fortunately, however, David Judge makes a valuable 
attempt to interpret these particular institutions in terms that combine various elements of the 
new institutionalism.27 Using an ‘organizing perspective’, of a type suggested by Andrew 
Gamble,28 rather than a general theory, he takes new institutionalism to conceive of political 
institutions as contingent ‘formal organizations and structures … mediated by wider social, 
economic and political conditions and forces’. The activities of such structures and 
organisations are delimited and defined by their ‘interactions’ with other institutions, and, 
insofar as they correspond to ‘normatively appropriate behaviour’, reflect ‘internal 
organizational norms and values’ shaped by ‘wider societal understandings and 
expectations’.29        
                                                 
22  See the list in B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’, 
2nd edn (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 19-21. 
23  James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989), esp. ch. 9. 
24  See Peters, n. 22 above, p. 19. 
25  See George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997). 
26  See R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in 
the United States and Abroad (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993). 
27  See David Judge, Political Institutions in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
28  See Andrew Gamble, ‘Theories of British Politics’ (1990) 38 Political Studies 404-420, 404-406. 
29  See Judge, n. 27 above, p. 21. 
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 The insights that Judge offers, as well as the approaches that he synthesises, though useful 
in interpreting how institutions function, do not, however, set out to identify the true ‘source 
of authority’ when it comes to public policy decisions.30 The need to pinpoint this brings us 
back to texts that are foundational to public law as a ‘political practice’. In Hobbes’s analysis 
of ‘the Seat of Power’,31 as Loughlin reminds us,32 authority originates from the ‘COMMON-
WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS’,33 the entity that Hobbes himself refers to as the ‘STATE’.34 
Although the state is a ‘fictitious person’, it is not like others, since both it, and its 
representative, the Crown in Parliament,35 ‘are instituted precisely for the purpose of 
creating law’.36 This is a particularly important point, since much of the material in the 
politics field, especially as it relates to governance,37 tends to underestimate the pre-eminent 
place of the state in the policy-making process.38 Whatever the objectives and values of the 
non-state actors in corporation tax reform – whether accountants, bankers, lawyers, or policy 
networks drawing in each of these groups – it is important to recognise that they may not be 
the same as those of the state. Possible divergences, in the purposes and objectives of 
institutions, as well as in the values that they promulgate, form the first important strand in 
the following discussion. When the visitor to London catches sight of the Palace of 
Westminster, the New Government Offices, Somerset House or the Royal Courts of Justice, 
what he or she is seeing is the physical location of the institution which ‘represent[s]’ the 
                                                 
30  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 54. 
31  See Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-
wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 75. 
32  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 55. 
33  See Hobbes, n. 31 above, p. 227. 
34  Ibid., p. 81. 
35  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 84. 
36  Ibid., p. 60. 
37  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 32-33. 
38  See Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000), p. 82; also Martin Loughlin, ‘The State, the Crown and the Law’, in The Nature of the 
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 ‘LEVIATHAN’39 - that is, the state - in this particular area of policy-making.40 Only the state, 
the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, the ‘fictitious’ personality41 
represented by the Crown in Parliament, and created by the ‘authorization … [of the] 
multitude’,42 is sovereign. The power to impose or repeal taxes is one of its most 
fundamental attributes.43 A second important strand in the discussion is thus the sovereign 
status of the Crown in Parliament and the point, all too easily elided, that the ‘transfer of 
jurisdiction and competence’ in matters other than taxation,44 to the institutions of the EU, 
has not necessarily affected the sovereign status of the UK in corporation tax matters.45 
Pressing though the problems of the European and international theme may be, they are 
problems of jurisdiction and competence rather than ones of sovereignty.  
The extent to which public lawyers have underestimated the concept of sovereignty is a 
cru
                                                                                                                                                      
cial element in Loughlin’s conception of public law. Sovereignty must be thought of 
separately from the person of the sovereign. It has both a legal and a political dimension, he 
argues, and public lawyers must be alive to the precise significance of each of them. The 
legal dimension of sovereignty is the relationship between state and ‘subject’;46 its political 
facet is the relationship between state and people.47 The former, a ‘distributive 
 
Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis, ed. by Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (Oxford: 
 34.  
d 227. 
, n. 20 above, p. 56. 
43  
, ‘Building 
ernance’ (2002) 33:3 IDS Bulletin 10-20. 
x 100a). 
0 above, p. 67. 
Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 33-76,
39  See Hobbes, n. 31 above, pp. 81 an
40  See Loughlin
41  Ibid., p. 59. 
42  Ibid., p. 58. See Hobbes, n. 31 above, p. 227. 
See Jean Bodin (1530-1596), On Sovereignty: Four chapters from The Six Books of the 
Commonwealth, ed. and trans. by Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 81; also Hobbes, n. 31 above, pp. 235, 236; also Deborah Bräutigam
Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity and Gov
44  See Art. 95(2), European Treaty (e
45  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 94. 
46  See Hobbes, n. 31 above, p. 228. 
47  See Loughlin, n. 2
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 conception’,48 which Loughlin calls ‘competence’,49 is constructed on the latter, a 
‘generative conception’,50 which he designates ‘capacity’.51 The former is the absolute 
authority of the Crown in Parliament to enact law;52 the latter, ‘inextricably linked’ to 
authority, is ‘political sovereignty’ or ‘constituent power’, the ‘power to model a state’,53 
which is confided ‘in trust’ to HMG.54 Political sovereignty is therefore a ‘relational’ 
concept’, and, ‘being relational, … [it] does not reside in any particular locus’.55 It is 
dependent on the relationship between state and people or, possibly, between state and 
society. It is ‘power to’56 and, as such, is different from ‘power over’,57 which is mere 
domination. A third significant element of the discussion is therefore how HMG’s 
sovereignty in corporation tax is not merely a matter of competence. Whatever competence 
HMG may have in such matters is in turn founded on capacity, and thus upon the quality of 
the relationship between state and non-state actors involved in corporation tax reform. 
                                                
Developing a positive relationship between state and non-state institutions therefore 
depends on constantly augmenting the ‘bonds of allegiance’ between the government and the 
 
48  Ibid., p. 160. 
49  Ibid., p. 84. 
50  Ibid., p. 160. 
51  Ibid., p. 85. 
52  Ibid., p. 84. This is, of course, Dicey’s ‘sovereignty of Parliament’ (see A.V. Dicey, Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, ed. by E.C.S. Wade, 10th edn (London: Macmillan, 
1965), pp. 39-40). Also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 
53  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 85, quoting George Lawson (c1598-1678), Politica Sacra et Civilis: 
or, A Modell of Civil and Ecclesiasticall Government, ed. by Conal Condren (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 47. 
54  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 85, quoting Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836), What is the 
Third Estate?, ed. by S.E. Finer and trans. by M. Blondel (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp. 
124-128. 
55  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 112. 
56  See Hobbes, n. 31 above, p. 150. 
57  Ibid.; and Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. by Ferdinand Tönnies, 
2nd edn (London: Frank Cass, 1969), p. 34 (see Mark Anthony Wenman, ‘Power’, in Political 
Concepts: A Reader and Guide, ed. by Iain MacKenzie (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005), pp. 370-385, 371-372). 
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 governed.58 Such a process goes to the heart of promoting the public interest, that is, of 
governing. The nature of corporation tax reform, especially given the prominence of the anti-
avoidance and compliance and enforcement themes, means that augmenting these bonds is 
no easy task. Nonetheless, ‘[t]he vital function [says Loughlin] of the established framework 
of constituted authority [,] is that of being able to generate trust between governors and 
governed’.59 Generating trust depends on a range of factors, including effective action, the 
cultivation of democratic values,60 the creation of suitable systems of accountability, and 
(even), in appropriate situations, on the transference of ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘competence’ to the 
EU. A fourth - perhaps the most important - strand in the discussion is therefore the extent to 
which the structure, objectives and values of the institutions involved in corporation tax 
reform help to build up trust and strengthen allegiance to the state in this particular policy 
area. Such a task is, of course, an exercise in ‘constitutionalism’,61 an aspect of state 
building, albeit in a rather arcane area of public policy. It complements the discussion in 
Chapter 3, where some of the emphasis passes to the processes by which the goals of 
corporation tax policy are determined. Generating trust and confidence in the institutions, in 
a policy area with so great a corporate sector involvement, is difficult because of the 
accountability problems to which it gives rise.  
                                                 
58  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 85. 
59  Ibid., p. 104, quoting John Locke (1632-1704), Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 407.  
60  See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 85. 
61  Ibid., p. 69, referring to Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal 
Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. xi. 
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 INSTITUTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Within the framework just outlined, this chapter seeks to analyse the institutional dimension 
of corporation tax reform. Fundamental to HMG’s power to initiate successful processes for 
realising policy objectives - the subject matter of Chapter 3 - is the effectiveness of the 
institutions engaged in those processes. An introduction to the ‘governance perspective’,62 to 
be taken throughout the study, forms the first part of the discussion. This is an attempt to 
understand the opportunities, as well as the challenges, presented by possible divergences 
between the objectives and values of the state, on the one hand, and the corporate sector, on 
the other. Surprisingly perhaps, for a discussion that began with a mental image of central 
London, this first part of the discussion requires us to drop a strict ‘Westminster model’ of 
the institutions of HMG, in favour of one which is ‘fragmented [, and predicates] … a maze 
of institutions and organizations’.63 To isolate how institutional structures, objectives, and 
values may strengthen or weaken sovereignty, from the processes by which policy goals are 
set, is no easy task. Yet each is no less important than the other in enhancing trust and 
confidence in corporation tax policies. Hilson, in his discussion of an entirely distinct policy 
area, one of ‘social regulation’,64 does so with some success, but his analysis, which 
emphasises institutional accountability, without explaining its relationship to institutional 
effectiveness, makes use of the ‘Sheffield school’ approach, rejected on historical and 
methodological grounds in Chapter 1.  
This brings us to an attempt to encapsulate, in the second part of the discussion, the 
objectives and values of the corporate sector, especially those of multinational corporations 
                                                 
62  See Gerry Stoker, ‘Governance as theory: five propositions’ (1998) 50 International Social 
Science Journal 17-28.  
63  Ibid., p. 19. 
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 (MNCs) and the City of London. This is, in a sense, about how far government may be 
dominated by economic power, but it is also about whether, prudently managed, the 
corporate sector may serve the public interest. What we find is rather surprising. Although 
contemporary political debate is dominated by the tensions between the nation state and the 
multinational corporate sector, we discover that, given the political choices discussed in 
Chapter 3, there is a fundamental unity of interest in this particular area between public and 
private sector institutions. There are tensions, to be sure, but there are also commonalities. 
To try to pinpoint what these may be, we need to distinguish between different 
constituencies of economic power, between inward investment by multinationals, and the 
allocation of funds by international fund managers. Although the differences between these 
two constituencies could be over-stated, what cannot be denied is the fundamental 
importance to current political choices of finding some such identity of interest.    
The difficulties, given that a government is seeking to build up trust and confidence in its 
corporation tax policies, are highlighted in the third and fourth parts of the chapter, which 
examine the constitutional opposition between the structure, objectives and values of 
Parliament, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Treasury and HMRC (together the 
Crown). The study takes as axiomatic the view of the UK’s constitutional arrangements so 
elegantly articulated by Adam Tomkins.65 This is that Parliament holds power which has, 
over centuries, been ‘forced’ from the Crown,66 and that ‘[t]o the extent that there is a 
separation of powers in English public law it is a separation between the Crown on the one 
hand, and Parliament on the other’.67 What we need to identify in the third and fourth parts 
of the chapter, therefore, are the characteristics of Parliament and of HMG (here, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
64  See Chris Hilson, Regulating Pollution: A UK and EC Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2000), ch. 4. 
65  See Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
66  Ibid., p. 42. 
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 Treasury and HMRC) that may contribute to, or detract from, generating trust and 
confidence in corporation tax reform. So far as Parliament is concerned, our main concern is 
the effectiveness with which it holds HMG to account. With the Treasury and HMRC, 
however, the concern is rather with the qualities that may contribute to their effectiveness in 
the art and science of governing.68 Our discussion of the Treasury begins, therefore, with 
power, and how it is wielded effectively; our discussion of Parliament starts with how HMG 
is made to account for the wielding. The discussion of Parliament is therefore mainly about 
parliamentary select committees, while that of the Treasury and HMRC is about prerogative 
power and how it is constrained.  
What we are envisaging, then, is an institutional framework in which there is a pervasive 
tension between Parliament and Crown. The Crown perceives that it needs to involve the 
corporate sector, given the similarities in their respective interests. Parliament, however, 
fears the lack of accountability that this may bring. Accordingly, in the fifth part of the 
chapter, we need to look a little more closely at the objectives and values of those who are 
often seen merely as ‘technicians’ in the reform process, and at their relationship with HMG. 
These are the specialists (lawyers, accountants, etc.), whose presence near the seat of power 
is so striking to the visitor looking across London from the Eye. The technical expertise of 
accountants and lawyers, as well as of ‘policy networks more generally’, means that they 
have a crucial role in bringing to prominence certain policy issues, and co-ordinating 
representations thereon. Their contributions will be referred to again in the discussion of 
policy-making in Chapter 3. For present purposes, however, it is policy networks, as 
institutions, that claim our attention. This is because, besides private sector bodies, some 
such networks incorporate public servants. Others, however, do not; recent years have seen 
                                                                                                                                                       
67  Ibid., p. 44. 
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 the emergence of extremely well informed ‘issue networks’, anxious to highlight what they 
perceive to be injustices caused by the manipulability of the corporation tax system. 
By the end of the chapter, therefore, the key actors, and the dynamics between them, will 
have been established. The foregoing has posited the fundamental Crown/Parliament 
opposition: the opportunity of the former to involve the corporate sector, and the concerns of 
the latter at the accountability problems that this may raise. One other institutional actor 
needs to be reflected, however: the judiciary. In the sixth, and final, part of the chapter, we 
look at the role of the judges in corporation tax reform. Following Tomkins and Loughlin, 
we place them closer to the Crown than to Parliament (judiciary and Crown being related 
simply by trust),69 and we consider how the judiciary’s presence may affect the range of 
reform alternatives. Judicial review is important here, to be sure, but equally so, it is 
contended, is the judiciary’s approach to interpreting corporation tax legislation.  
Corporation tax law as ‘practice’, as the area of public law tasked with enhancing the 
capacity of the state to ensure that the corporate sector assumes its ‘fair share’ of the overall 
tax burden, operates in a complex institutional setting. We begin, therefore, with one way of 
interpreting the interaction between state and corporate sector: the ‘organizing perspective’ 
of governance. According to Gamble, such an ‘organizing perspective’ provides ‘a 
framework for analysis, a map of how things relate ... ’.70 In the words of Judge and others 
(in a different context), it provides ‘a language and frame of reference through which reality 
can be examined and [which] lead[s] [us] to ask questions that might not otherwise occur’.71 
                                                                                                                                                       
68  See Chapter 1, nn. 160-164. 
69  See In re M. [1994] 1 AC 377, 425D (Lord Woolf) (see Tomkins, n. 65 above, pp. 51-55; 
Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 152). 
70  See Gamble, n. 28 above, p. 405. 
71  See David Judge, Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman, ‘Urban Politics and Theory: An 
Introduction’, in Theories of Urban Politics, ed. by D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman (London: 
Sage, 1995), pp. 1-12, 3. 
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 It will readily be appreciated that the ‘organizing perspective’ of governance both 
complements and illuminates the functionalist, interpretative, public law, inquiry on which 
we are engaged. What we want, in Isaiah Berlin’s words, is to bring to ‘consciousness … the 
model or models that dominate and penetrate … thought and action’,72 in particular, in this 
case, the idea of governance. For this, we need to turn to politics and, in particular, to the 
‘new institutionalism’, to test governance values for coherence, consistency and non-
contradiction, while appreciating the role that public law plays in shaping and prioritising 
these values. The UK may well retain its sovereignty in tax matters, but this depends on 
HMG’s capacity to shape corporation tax policy and this, in turn, depends on how 
institutional structures, objectives and values help to build up trust, and to strengthen 
allegiance to the British state.   
 
GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATION TAX REFORM 
 
John Tiley, when discussing the ‘constitutionality’ of Extra-Statutory Concessions (ESCs), 73 
describes the running of ‘the UK tax system’ with characteristic pungency. The system is, he 
says, ‘a club’, one whose membership consists of ‘the professions and the department’,74 i.e., 
accountants and lawyers, on the one hand, and the ‘Commissioners for Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs’,75 on the other. Tiley’s ambiguous imagery contains the kernel of a 
‘governance perspective’ on the various institutions whose impressive ‘homes’ are visible 
from the London Eye. This kernel is an obvious alertness to the implications of involving 
                                                 
72  See Isaiah Berlin, ‘Does political theory still exist?’, in The Proper Study of Mankind: An 
Anthology of Essays, ed. by Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp. 59-
90, 76. 
73  See Vestey (No. 2) v. IRC [1979] 2 All ER 225, 233 (Walton J.) (referring to Godden v. Hales 
(1686) 89 ER 1050). 
74  See Tiley, n. 19 above, p. 64. 
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 both state and non-state actors in corporation tax reform. Gone, we reiterate, is the 
‘Westminster model’, with its ideals of public administration,76 and in its place is something 
of a ‘differentiated polity’,77 organised in terms of ‘the New Public Management’ (NPM). 
These contrasts get at the heart of the state’s role in governance theory, and they are just two 
of the main strands in an extensive, searching, but not always consistent, governance 
literature.78 
What a ‘governance perspective’ does, claims Gerry Stoker, in the first of five 
‘propositions’, designed ‘to present a number of aspects of governance for consideration’,79 
is to sensitise the observer to the implications of involving a range of institutions in - in this 
case - the process of reforming corporate taxation. 
‘Governance [Stoker first points out] refers to a complex set of institutions and actors that 
are drawn from[,] but also beyond[,] government’.80 The term therefore highlights the 
‘complexity’ created by an institutional framework that includes, not only the Treasury and 
HMRC, but also regulatory bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB),81 the Accounting Standards Board (ASB),82 and even supranational and 
international institutions, such as those of the EU (especially the European Commission and 
                                                                                                                                                       
75  See Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, s. 1(1). 
76  See Chapter 1 above, n. 175; also, e.g., Rosamund Thomas, The British Philosophy of 
Administration: A comparison of British and American ideas 1900-1939 (Cambridge: Centre for 
Business and Public Sector Ethics, 1989). For the context of this work, see Rhodes, n. 18 above, 
pp. 166-168. See  also Finer, n. 21 above, ch. 30. 
77  See Rhodes, n. 18 above, pp. 7-22. 
78  Ibid., passim; Jon Pierre, ‘Introduction: Understanding Governance’, in Debating Governance, ed. 
by Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1-10; Pierre and Peters, n. 38 above; 
Andrew Gamble, Politics and Fate (London: Polity, 2000) and ‘Economic Governance’, in 
Debating Governance, above, pp. 110-137; Jan Kooiman, ‘Societal Governance: Levels, Modes, 
and Orders of Social-Political Interaction’, in Debating Governance, above, pp. 138-164; David 
Richards and Martin J. Smith, Governance and Public Policy in the UK (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), ch. 1. 
79  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 18. 
80  Ibid., p. 19. 
81  See www.iasb.org (accessed 21 February 2007). 
82  See www.asb.org (accessed 22 February 2007). 
 88
 the ECJ), the OECD, the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), and the WTO. Simply 
reciting the range of institutions whose activities impact - in some way or other - on 
corporation tax reform illustrates only one level of complexity, however. At another level, 
the ‘governance perspective’ highlights the different loci of ‘strategic decision making’.83 In 
proposing a ‘complex set of institutions and actors’, Stoker does not of course have in mind 
the specific context of corporate taxation. Had he done so, however, he might have drawn 
attention to the fact that the IASB, the body responsible for formulating the ‘international 
GAAP’ that underpins the accounting theme in this study, is not an agency of HMG, and that 
its funding comes from a range of corporate sector and central bank sources.84 Nonetheless, 
the various documents that it produces play a significant, though not decisive, part in shaping 
the corporation tax base. None of this is to detract, of course, from the point that competence 
in corporation tax matters remains with HMG. 
                                                
Thus sensitised, both to the complexity of the institutional framework, and to the fact that 
strategic decisions are taken outside the institutions of HMG, we are presented with what 
Stoker designates ‘the first dilemma of governance’.85 This is that, whatever efficiency gains 
may result from a reliance on expertise, a division of responsibility that requires strategic 
decisions to be made by people other than ministers of HMG, may not be recognised as 
legitimate. Distrust of deliberations made in non-governmental institutions has a long history 
in political discourse in the UK. Recalling the seventeenth century origins of British 
constitutionalism,86 this point can be forcefully illustrated with one of the demands made by 
Parliament to King Charles I in 1642:  
 
 
83  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 18. 
84  See International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, Annual Report 2005 (London: 
IASCF, 2006), p. 31. 
85  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 19. 
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 ‘That the great affairs of the kingdom may not be concluded or transacted by the advice of 
private men, or by any unknown or unsworn councillors, but that such matters as concern 
the public, and are proper for the High Court of Parliament, which is your Majesty’s great 
and supreme council, may be debated, resolved and transacted only in Parliament, and not 
elsewhere : and such as shall presume to do anything to the contrary shall be reserved to 
the censure and judgment of Parliament …’87  
 
What is unusual about corporation tax reform is that the nature and scope of the involvement 
of a body such as the IASB is largely hidden from sight.88 It may be, therefore, that, valuable 
as IASB assistance is, the shadowy nature of its influence, in Peters’ words, compounds the 
widespread difficulties ‘of citizens ... understanding and influencing the actions of their 
governments’.89 The more that corporation tax policy comes to be seen as involving 
political, rather than merely technical, issues, the more the IASB’s involvement will be 
scrutinised.90 
                                                                                                                                                       
86  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 45. 
87  ‘The Nineteen Propositions Sent by the Two Houses of Parliament to the King at York’, 
Proposition 2, reproduced in Samuel R. Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the Puritan 
Revolution 1625-1660, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), pp. 249-254, 250-251 (see 
Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 130); see G.E. Aylmer, Rebellion or Revolution? England 1640-1660 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 35-36.  
88  Besides familiarity with FA 1998, s. 42, understanding of this point requires an appreciation of s. 
42’s relationship with FA 2004, s. 50(1), and of both with CA 1985, ss. 226(2), 227(2) and 227(3) 
(see European Parliament and Council Regulation EC/1606/02 [2002] OJ L243 1, Art. 4); also 
Stephen Mayson, Derek French and Christopher Ryan, Company Law, 22nd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 282-286. 
89  See B. Guy Peters, ‘Managing the Hollow State’, in Managing Public Organizations: Lessons 
from Contemporary European Experience, ed. by Kjell A. Eliassen and Jan Kooiman, 2nd edn 
(London: Sage, 1993), pp. 46-57, 55. 
90  See, e.g., the arguments over IAS 39 and the subsequent adjustments to the special corporation tax 
code on derivatives (Chapter 1 above, n. 23): Parker, Financial Times, 2-3 October 2004, M6; 
Anon, Financial Times, 14 October 2004, 18 (editorial); Hargreaves, Tricks and Arnold, 
Financial Times, 18 October 2004, 1; Bolkestein, Financial Times, 9 November 2004, 19; Buck, 
Financial Times, 22 November 2004, 27; Anon, Financial Times, 24 November 2004, 20 
(editorial); Felsted, Financial Times, 30 November 2004, 25; Croft, Financial Times, 20 
December 2004, 21; Batchelor and Fuller, Financial Times, 22 December 2004, 37; Felsted, 
Financial Times, 5 January 2005, 21; Felsted, Financial Times, 18 January 2005, 31; Jopson and 
Felsted, Financial Times, 15 March 2005, 30; Jopson, Financial Times, 17 March 2005, 9; 
Jopson, Financial Times, 17 March 2005, 50; Jopson, Financial Times, 17 September 2005, 30 
(see Julian Ghosh and Ian Johnson, Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivatives (London: 
Butterworths LexisNexis, 1999), paras [10B.471]-[10B.521] (securitisation special purpose 
vehicles); [10B.861]-[10B.862] (amounts ‘recognised in determining a company’s profit or 
loss’)). 
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 Within this context of complexity, of fragmented responsibility for ‘strategic decision 
making’, the tasks of Parliament and HMG in augmenting trust and confidence are 
particularly sensitive. Stoker characterises the problem in terms of the absence, as regards 
both the media and society, of ‘a legitimation framework in which to place the emerging 
system of governance’.91 At a general level, ‘tensions’ have emerged over the last decade 
and more about the implications of NPM for ‘separating policy and operational matters’, 
about ‘unaccountable quangos’ and about ‘the nature of ministerial accountability’.92 These 
general concerns are particularised in corporation tax reform in terms of concerns about the 
demarcation lines between politics and administration (which can be blurred, when 
government is seen in terms of management); of concerns about the nature and influence of 
the IASB;93 and of worries about the relative unaccountability of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for the conduct of fiscal policy.94 If the influence of the IASB has tended to be 
discussed in financial reporting circles, rather than in tax circles, it may be because expertise 
was until recently a source of greater trust and confidence in tax circles than in other policy 
areas. However, to recall Tiley once more, one ‘only has to mention the name “Enron”’95 to 
illustrate the assertion that that time may now be past. 
                                                 
91  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 20. 
92  Ibid. 
93  See Anon, Financial Times, 31 March 2004 (editorial), 17; Pierce and Knight, Financial Times, 7 
April 2004, 16 (letter); Hargreaves and Tricks, Financial Times, 9 December 2004, 20; Buck, 
Parker and Mai, Financial Times, 17 January 2005, 6; Jopson, Financial Times, 27 January 2005, 
26; Buck and Jopson, Financial Times, 3 February 2005, 27; Jopson, Financial Times, 22 
February 2005, 30; Anon, Financial Times, 10 March 2005, 18 (editorial); Tyrrall, Financial 
Times, 17 March 2005, 42 (letter); Thal Larsen, Financial Times, 13 June 2005, 21; Jopson, 
Financial Times, 21 October 2005, 30; Jopson, Financial Times, 30 January 2006, 26; Fearnley 
and Hines, Financial Times, 25 May 2006, 12. 
94  See Cable, Financial Times, 6 December 2006, 19. 
95  See Tiley, n. 19 above, p. 392. 
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 Whilst Stoker frames the problem in terms of how to ensure the ‘legitimacy’ of 
institutions involved in governance,96 this is only a version of the point made at the end of 
the previous part, i.e. that, ‘to be effective in the long run power-holders must be seen to be 
legitimate. A legitimation deficit undermines public support and commitment to programmes 
of change [,] and ultimately undermines the ability of power-holders to mobilise resources 
and promote co-operation and partnership’.97 In other words, as we shall see later, ensuring 
that institutions are effective, whether because of their skill in governing, or their ability to 
hold other institutions to account, is a prudential approach, which helps to augment trust and 
confidence, and thus to enhance HMG’s sovereignty in tax matters. Effectiveness and 
capacity are closely interwoven concepts. 
In essence, therefore, the governance approach alerts us, first, to the challenge that 
institutional complexity presents to analysing corporation tax reform, and, secondly, to how, 
within the context just analysed, responsibilities become ‘blurred’ as between state and non-
state actors. 
What Stoker asserts, in his second proposition, is that ‘[g]overnance recognises the 
blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling … economic issues’.98 Corporation 
tax reform, of course, raises crucial economic issues, it being, in common with other areas of 
tax reform, an aspect of ‘microeconomic’ (‘supply-side’) economic policy.99 Whilst the 
importance of this second proposition to illuminating the values and priorities of the actors in 
corporation tax policy may seem obscure, it does highlight an important dimension to the 
                                                 
96  See David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1991), pp. 19-20. 
97  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 20. 
98  Ibid., p. 21. 
99  See H.M. Treasury, Microeconomic Reform in Britain: Delivering Opportunities for All, ed. by Ed 
Balls, Joe Grice and Gus O’Donnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), esp. ch. 1; also 
Nigel Lawson (Lord Lawson of Blaby), ‘Changing the Consensus’, in The Chancellors’ Tales: 
Managing the British Economy, ed. by Howard Davies (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 113-146, 
115-116 (see also pp. viii-ix). 
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 respective roles of the state and the corporate sector: the views of the Treasury and HMRC of 
their responsibilities to the corporate sector, as well as the corporate sector’s views of its 
responsibilities to the state. Stoker sees this second proposition primarily in terms of the 
respective responsibilities of state and private sector in the specific context of public service 
provision. The ‘unbundling’ of utilities offers an obvious, and highly contentious, example. 
But the ‘blurring’ of responsibilities is important, too, in relation to the present area of 
inquiry, even though this involves the provision of services by the Crown only in some rather 
limited sense. This is because there is an increasing acceptance among writers on corporation 
tax reform of the need for greater mutual respect between the Treasury and HMRC, on the 
one hand, and the corporate sector, on the other. This is manifested by demands for the 
former to ensure that market sensitive information on big taxpayers does not become a 
matter of public knowledge, for instance through ‘leaks’ to the press, etc.;100 by calls for the 
Treasury to justify much more carefully the introduction of statutory measures which have 
an obvious anti-avoidance dimension; and by suggestions for a ‘much lighter touch’ in 
compliance and enforcement matters.101 The emphasis on responsibilities is no less forceful, 
however, in the mouths of the officials of HMRC. Companies should look to their social 
responsibilities, they say; companies should not go around looking to purchase tax avoidance 
‘products’;102 and they should be much more willing to disclose fully to HMRC the details of 
                                                 
100  See Parker and Budden, Financial Times, 2 April 2004, 2; also Wales, Tax Journal, 20 November 
2006, 9-11, esp. 9. 
101  See Eaglesham, Financial Times, 6 December 2005, 4; Houlder, Financial Times, 31 March 2006, 
5; Houlder, Financial Times, 21 August 2006, 3; Houlder, Financial Times, 17 November 2006, 
3; Houlder, Financial Times, 25 July 2007, 4. 
102  See Parker, Financial Times, 4 May 2004, 1; Parker, Financial Times, 4 May 2004, 4 (FA 2002, 
Sched. 26, para. 22A); Croft, Jolliffe and Davies, Financial Times, 17 March 2005, 9; Plender, 
Financial Times, 17 March 2005, 19 (F(No. 2)A 2005, ss. 24-31); Houlder, Financial Times, 15 
March 2006, 21; Thal Larsen, Financial Times, 15 March 2006, 21 (FA 2006, s. 76 and Sched. 6). 
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 their taxation activities.103 Since there is a responsibility on HMG to raise a ‘fair share’ of 
tax from the corporate sector, there is also a responsibility on the corporate sector not to seek 
to cast off that burden. 
                                                
However, as Stoker says, ‘the dilemma suggested by the blurring of responsibilities is that 
it creates an ambiguity and uncertainty in the minds of policy-makers and public about who 
is responsible[,] and can lead to government actors passing off responsibility to … [the 
corporate sector] when things go wrong’.104 Current initiatives, therefore, such as HMRC’s 
Large Corporates Forum,105 the assessment of high risk and low risk taxpayers, as well as the 
secondment of HMRC officials to individual companies, all have the capacity to build up 
trust and confidence between the ‘Revenue Departments’ and the corporate sector. Equally, 
however, they have the potential to create precisely the opposite effect. Her Majesty’s 
Government may stigmatise the corporate sector if corporation tax receipts suddenly drop, 
while the corporate sector may blame HMG for the adverse effects of tax policy on the UK’s 
‘competitiveness’. Again, this is a matter of building up the foundational, political, aspect of 
sovereignty.  
It is the debate on the types of issue just referred to that highlights another consequence of 
‘blurred’ responsibilities. This is that the blurring enhances the scope for ‘[t]hose in a 
position to interpret and lead public debate … [to], often with considerable effectiveness, 
blame others for failures and difficulties’.106 Corporation tax policy provides a rather 
interesting context for this type of problem. It is an area of public policy where those best 
placed to ‘interpret and lead public debate’ are multinational corporations, especially, as we 
shall see in a moment, through their spokespersons in parts of the press and in the legal and 
 
103  As envisaged by the ‘interventions’ initiative (see Hubbard, Taxation, 2 November 2006, 111-
113).  
104  See Stoker, n. 62 above, pp. 21-22. 
105  See www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 1 October 2007).  
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 accountancy professions. In this connection, the role of the Financial Times cannot be 
underestimated. Although its subtle and studiously detached coverage (often involving 
interviews with leading tax professionals) strives to avoid any element of the partisan, it is 
extremely effective at shaping issues for debate. For instance, its policy suggestions107 after 
the ECJ’s decision in Cadbury Schweppes,108 in September 2006, were largely adopted in the 
Pre-Budget Report of December that year.109 Only occasionally, by contrast, does 
corporation tax policy achieve comparable coverage in more widely consumed media.110 In 
this connection, too, PricewaterhouseCoopers, together with the so-called ‘Hundred Group 
of Finance Directors’ have begun to publish a striking, if somewhat crude, annual survey of 
‘the tax contributions made by the UK’s largest businesses to government revenues’.111 
The interpretative approach taken thus far should have created an impression of 
complexity, both as to the range and the roles of institutions involved in corporation tax 
reform, and as to the blurring of responsibility for the results. Each of these points raise 
problems of sovereignty, partly because of ‘gaps’ in the legitimation of power, and partly 
because of the tendency of each of government and corporate sector to blame the other, in 
the event that corporation tax reforms have unintended, and undesirable, consequences. 
Problems of sovereignty also arise, however, through the power relations between 
institutions of government and those of the corporate sector. This brings us to the third of 
                                                                                                                                                       
106  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 22. 
107  See Anon, Financial Times, 14 September 2006, 16. 
108  See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc. and Another v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[2007] 1 CMLR 2.  
109 See Investing in Britain’s potential: Building our long-term future: Pre-Budget Report December 
2006 (Cm 6984) (London: TSO, 2006), para. 5.102. 
110  As in The Money Programme, 2006. ‘No tax please, we’re rich!’. TV, BBC 2. 2 March, 
discussing, inter alia, the personal tax affairs of John Caudwell, the founder of Dextra 
Accessories/Phones 4U (see Macdonald (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dextra Accessories Ltd and 
Others [2005] UKHL 47; [2005] STC 1111, para. 8 (Lord Hoffmann)). 
111  See Broadley and Collier-Keywood, Tax Journal, 12 February 2007, 7-8, referring to the survey’s 
website at www.pwc.com/uk/ttc (accessed 12 September 2007). 
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 Stoker’s interpretative propositions: that ‘[g]overnance identifies the power dependence 
involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action’.112 
‘[G]overning is an interactive process [he contends] because no single actor, public or 
private, has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems unilaterally’.113 We 
have already noted one example of this phenomenon, in the apparent willingness of the 
Treasury to entrust part of the responsibility for shaping the corporation tax base to the 
IASB. This is a form of ‘principal-agent’ relationship114 and, as we shall see, it raises 
classical issues of accountability. We shall, however, be noting a subtly different type of 
power dependency, that which involves a ‘partnership’ between HMG and the corporate 
sector, in which each negotiates ‘joint projects in which by blending their capacities they are 
better able to meet their own … objectives’.115 This is the spirit of the various forms of 
enhanced co-operation suggested both by the Varney Review, of November 2006,116 and by 
the emerging concept of ‘tax governance’, which is currently being fashioned at the hands of 
tax professionals.117 Some of the issues of power and its legitimation to which they give rise 
are considered in the next part of the discussion. Again, our concern is with the ‘generative’ 
aspect of sovereignty, with capacity. 
The fourth of Stoker’s interpretative ‘propositions’ is closely linked to the power 
relationships to be examined later in the chapter. It is that partnership relationships, such as 
those referred to above, tend to lead to the development of ‘autonomous self-governing 
                                                 
112  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 22; Colin Thain and Ross Christie, ‘Treasury Power: Past, Present and 
Future’, p. 13, available from www.treasuryproject.org (accessed 22 February 2008). 
113  Ibid., referring to Jan Kooiman, ‘Social-Political Governance: Introduction’, in Modern 
Governance: New Government-Society Interactions, ed. by Jan Kooiman (London: Sage, 1993), 
pp. 1-6, 4.  
114  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 22. 
115  Ibid. 
116  See 2006 Review of Links with Large Business: November 2006 (Chair, Sir David Varney) 
(London: HMRC, 2006). 
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 networks of actors’.118 The idea that public policy is influenced by ‘policy communities’, or 
‘issue networks’ has been explored, most notably perhaps, by Marsh and Rhodes.119 Two 
main possibilities are postulated: first, the existence of groups whose purpose is to influence 
policy; and, secondly, what are referred to as ‘governance networks’, ones whose purpose is 
‘not just influencing government policy but taking over the business of government’.120 In 
the specific context of corporation tax reform, governance networks clearly exist – 
comprising representatives of bodies such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW),121 the Law Society122 and the Chartered Institute of 
Taxation123 – all of which have both the resources and the expertise to take an active part in 
this particular area of public policy making. The nature of tax policy is such that, whilst 
reliant on such bodies for their expertise, HMG retains a more pre-eminent position than it 
does in the other areas of policy making discussed in the literature. Indeed, corporation tax 
reform has become an area in which the type of partnership just identified is a key feature of 
the institutional framework. This point will be underlined in Chapter 3 when the time and 
manner of the involvement of policy communities will be highlighted. Two illustrations will 
suffice at this stage: first, the discussions under ‘Chatham House rules’ conducted in 
Cambridge, involving members of the Treasury and HMRC, as well as academics and 
                                                                                                                                                       
117  See David F. Williams, Developing the Concept of Tax Governance: A discussion paper by David 
F Williams of KPMG’s Tax Business School (London: KPMG, 2007). 
118  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 23; see Thain and Christie, n. 112 above, p. 13. 
119  See David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond 
Typology’, in Policy Networks in British Government, ed. by David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 249-268; also Rhodes, n. 18 above, pp. 43-45.  
120  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 23. 
121  See www.icaew.co.uk (accessed 21 September 2007). 
122  See www.lawsociety.org.uk (accessed 21 September 2007). 
123  See www.tax.org.uk (accessed 21 September 2007). 
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 members of the practising professions; and, secondly, the regular transfer of prominent 
individuals between the Revenue Departments and the corporate sector.124 
‘The dilemma created by such self-governing networks [Stoker correctly points out] is 
that of accountability’.125 He analyses this as being problematic ‘at two levels’, which he 
formulates as ‘an accountability deficit’, both as regards ‘the individual constituent elements 
of the network and … those excluded from any particular network’.126 Thus, not only may 
members dissatisfied with the direction that ‘reform’ has taken (such as the ‘Tax Law 
Rewrite’) find it difficult to act, but ‘all networks are to a degree exclusive. They are driven 
by the self-interest of their members rather than a wider concern with the public interest or 
more particularly those excluded from the network’.127 The recent controversy over 
corporation tax relief for interest payments in ‘private equity’ acquisitions may offer an 
example, given the nature and extent of trade union intervention in the debate.128 This self-
interest, or the perceptions that it generates, is a major challenge to the capacity of HMG in 
the particular policy area. 
The fifth, and final, of Stoker’s ‘propositions’ is as follows. ‘Governance [he says] 
recognizes ... [a] capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government 
to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new techniques and tools 
                                                 
124  See the movements of staff between ‘professional services’ firms, on the one hand, and H.M. 
Treasury and HMRC, on the other: Chris Sanger, who is in charge of tax policy at Ernst and 
Young, was previously an adviser to H.M. Treasury (see Houlder, Financial Times, 4 December 
2006, 3); Edward Troup, who was in charge of tax policy at Simmons and Simmons, the City law 
firm, moved to H.M. Treasury in 2005; Sir David Varney, Chairman of HMRC from September 
2004 until September 2006, was formerly the chairman of a mobile phone company (see Adams, 
Financial Times, 14 May 2004, 3); and Richard Lambert, the Director-General of the CBI since 
July 2006, was formerly a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England 
(see Daneshkhu, Financial Times, 24 March 2006, 4). 
125  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 23. 
126  Ibid. 
127  Ibid., p. 24. 
128 See Barber (TUC General-Secretary), Financial Times, 16 March 2007, 15; Dromey (Unite 
Deputy General-Secretary), Financial Times, 3 July 2007, 13. 
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 to steer and guide’.129 Government as ‘steering’130 is a key aspect of governing by 
‘governance’.131 Stoker refers to the work of Kooiman and van Vliet in this connection,132 as 
elaborating on the institutional aspect of NPM. Besides ‘identifying key stakeholders’, 
‘steering’ involves ‘influencing and steering relationships in order to achieve desired 
outcomes’. Most importantly, perhaps, governance is ‘about what others call “system 
management”. It involves thinking and acting beyond the individual sub-systems, avoiding 
unwanted side-effects and establishing mechanisms for effective co-ordination’.133 It is in 
this context, possibly, that the biggest perceived failure of corporation tax (arising perhaps 
out of HMG’s wish to bring about particular political results) has occurred, that of systemic 
‘complexity’.134 This in turn can perhaps be attributed to mutual suspicion between the 
Treasury and HMRC, and the corporate sector, as well as to the inability of the two to 
achieve a close working relationship. That they must do so, in order for the system to work, 
is dictated by the need to build up the state’s capacity in the area. 
The purpose of this part of the discussion has been to highlight the institutional trends that 
have the greatest implications for sovereignty, for the ability of HMG to shape corporation 
tax reform and, in doing so, to augment the state. As Stoker says, however, the map 
constituted by his five ‘propositions’, ‘the governance perspective’, ‘applies a simplifying 
lens to a complex reality’, identifying ‘key’ features of that reality and posing ‘significant 
                                                 
129  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 24. 
130  See Christopher D. Foster and Francis J. Plowden, The State Under Stress (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1996), pp. 46-47. 
131  See B. Guy Peters, ‘Politics is About Governing’, in What is Politics?, ed. by Adrian Leftwich 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2004), pp. 23-40, 24-27. 
132  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 24; also Jan Kooiman and Martijn van Vliet, ‘Governance and Public 
Management’, in Eliassen and Kooiman, n. 89 above, pp. 58-72. 
133  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 24. 
134  See Houlder, Financial Times, 21 October 2004, 3; Giles, Financial Times, 21 October 2004, 3; 
Howe, Financial Times, 22 March 2006, 17; Eaglesham and Houlder, Financial Times, 31 
January 2006, 4; Houlder, Financial Times, 24 March 2006, 2; Houlder, Financial Times, 21 April 
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 questions about that reality’.135 The key element that now requires further elaboration is the 
exact nature of the challenge to sovereignty presented by the objectives and values of the 
corporate sector institutions visible from the London Eye. 
 
THE CORPORATE SECTOR AND THE STATE 
 
If, as is likely, some of the civil servants, accountants and lawyers whose workplaces we 
imagined at the beginning of the chapter, were listening to the Today programme,136 at 
around 6.35 on the morning of 8 March 2007, they would have heard a familiar pre-Budget 
exchange between Sir Digby Jones,137 then famous as a former Director-General of the 
Confederation of British Industry (the CBI),138 and Stuart Wheeler,139 a City financier and 
major Conservative party donor. The discussion dealt with the broad outlines of some central 
issues of the study: the nature of the power of the corporate sector, and the extent to which it 
facilitates or hinders HMG in achieving its policy objectives. Although the respective 
contributions, inevitably perhaps, were directed at the contrasting personalities of the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon. Gordon Brown, MP, and the Rt Hon. David 
Cameron, MP, the leader of the Opposition, they were about the extent to which Gordon 
Brown, as Prime Minister, would be able to rely on the constructive engagement of different 
                                                                                                                                                       
2006, 3; Houlder, Financial Times, 8 November 2006, 4; Houlder, Financial Times, 15 August 
2007, 3; Giles, Financial Times, 26 July 2007, 2. 
135  See Stoker, n. 62 above, p. 26. 
136  See www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today (accessed 21 September 2007). 
137  On Sir Digby Jones’s generally supportive attitude to the governing party, see the acerbic 
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Birmingham (see Guthrie, Financial Times, 12 July 2007, 13), Sir Digby Jones became a Minister 
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 corporate sector constituencies. While conceding that the Chancellor had demonstrated 
‘economic competence’, the former CBI Director-General stressed Gordon Brown’s status as 
what he described as ‘one of the great taxing Chancellors’, and hinted at the long-stop 
possibility of businesses dissatisfied with the UK’s taxation climate relocating to other, more 
‘business friendly’ jurisdictions. Properly interpreted, this contribution could perhaps be seen 
as no more than a voicing of the predictable concerns of a corporate sector operating within 
the governance context discussed above. Stuart Wheeler’s approach was, however, rather 
different. Gordon Brown may well have been a ‘taxing Chancellor’, he opined, but what was 
much more significant was that he was ‘not at all trusted in the City’,140 and David Cameron 
would, in this respect, be a breath of fresh air. Moreover, the Chancellor faced the real risk 
that the headquarters operations of MNCs, though probably not fairly small businesses 
operating solely in the UK, would look to relocate in other countries, in order to avoid 
corporation tax. 
Setting aside the inevitable media preoccupation with personalities, and bearing in mind 
the untheorised and partisan nature of the radio discussion, it nonetheless distilled some 
important realities about the relative power of corporate sector and governmental institutions. 
This is a huge and important topic but it is possible, even within a relatively brief compass, 
to elucidate it. First and foremost, it arises in the context of debates about the continuing 
significance of the nation state, under conditions created by that nebulous141 but much-
                                                                                                                                                       
139  Known both for his generosity to the Conservative party (he donated £5 million in 2001) and for 
his extravagant admiration for Lady Thatcher. 
140 A sally with which Sir Digby Jones would not explicitly concur although, interestingly (given the 
difference of perspective) one echoed by Lord Giddens, in an observation raised in questions 
following a lecture at Warwick University on 20 February 2007, when he said that the Chancellor 
was ‘not very popular in the City’.  
141  See Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), pp. 15-22. 
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 discussed idea of ‘globalisation’.142 From Saskia Sassen, who maintains that ‘the major 
dynamics at work in the global economy carry the capacity to undo the particular form of the 
intersection of sovereignty and territory embedded in the modern state’,143 to Hardt and 
Negri, who proclaim the end of the ‘centuries-long dialectic’ between capital and the state,144 
a succession of commentators145 has asserted that governmental sovereignty has been 
eviscerated, or at least transformed, by global economic power. The view taken in this study 
is that, in the context of corporate tax policy, the state does indeed retain its importance, but 
that, in the global economy, new demands are made upon its sovereignty in the particular 
policy area. The problem is a serious one, nevertheless. If, as is suggested above, the first 
dilemma of the governance of corporation tax reform is taken to be that we, or – more 
accurately – Parliament, cannot effectively interrogate certain key areas of policy, then the 
possibility that those areas may be ones in which global economic power is dominant surely 
gives clear cause for concern. Prudent management of the corporate sector’s economic 
power is therefore needed for HMG to maintain the trust and confidence of the governed, 
and effective scrutiny of that management is required from Parliament. 
Secondly, it is important in speaking of economic power, especially global economic 
power, to make some careful distinctions. Hobbes, as mentioned earlier, differentiated 
                                                 
142  See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002); Martin Wolf, 
Why Globalization Works (London: Yale, 2005); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 
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Domestic Politics: A Conclusion’, in Internationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. by Robert O. 
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and the Olive Tree (London: HarperCollins, 1999); Hardt and Negri, n. 144 above, pp. 306-307. 
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 between ‘power to’ (capacity) and ‘power over’ (domination).146 The idea that the corporate 
sector might dominate a government was a matter for concern at least as far back as the 
closing years of the nineteenth century.147 This was unsurprising, since the joint-stock 
company was, in the words of Peter Drucker, ‘the first new autonomous institution in 
hundreds of years, the first to create a power center that was within society yet independent 
of the central government of the national state’.148 Nonetheless, as Angus Stewart has 
contended,149 and contrary to Talcott Parsons,150 Steven Lukes,151 and Hardt and Negri152 
(via Michel Foucault),153 power is not the same as domination, and, although thinkers on the 
Left deplore it, there is no denying the reality of the ‘neoliberal’ economic consensus.154 
Keeping the confidence and trust of the governed, in corporate tax policy, as in any area, is 
essential to a government’s capacity,155 and it involves managing the potential of the 
corporate sector to dominate. ‘Power to’, as Stewart says, is ‘the expression of collective 
autonomy, conceived as the intersubjective generation of specific forms of solidarity … 
                                                 
146  See Hobbes, nn. 56 and 57 above. 
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151 See Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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153  See Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, in Michel Foucault, Power, ed. by James D. 
Faubion (London: Allen Lane Penguin, 2001), pp. 326-348. See Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 96.  
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Verso, 2001), ch. 3; also Adair Turner, Just Capital: The Liberal Economy, rev. edn (London: Pan 
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 power as action in concert’.156 To the profound disapproval of the Left,157 HMG’s 
commitment to private sector economic growth158 is at least consistent with the corporate 
sector’s interests. The potential for conflict is real enough;159 but it is capable of being 
managed. If taxation policies provoke conflict, it is the ‘flight’ of capital that will damage 
economic growth;160 an important aspect of HMG’s task is to see that that does not happen. 
Thirdly, some important distinctions need to be drawn between various constituencies of 
economic power. The key distinctions here are the ones implied by the radio discussion 
referred to earlier, between the power of MNCs and that of the City, and between MNCs and 
the power of firms operating exclusively in the UK. So far as MNCs are concerned, one 
important relationship might be that between HMG and ‘foreign-owned subsidiaries’ but, 
given certain historical factors, the relationship between HMG and ‘parent firms’161 might 
possibly be even more important.162 The nature and extent of the economic power of MNCs 
has spawned an extensive literature,163 ever since the rapid expansion into Europe of United 
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 States firms in the decades after the Second World War.164 Only relatively recently, 
however, in the work of Nathan Jensen, has its political significance been identified with 
some precision.165 What Jensen proposes is a certain identity, rather than an opposition, of 
interests, between MNCs and civil society. This is not to deny that MNCs have ‘policy 
preferences’, nor that their prime objective is profit-maximisation, but it does assert that ‘the 
consolidation and maintenance of democratic institutions’ are crucial factors in the 
willingness of MNCs to invest in particular states, in the UK no less than any other.166 In 
other words, that there is little more unappealing for foreign direct investment (FDI) than 
wide ‘executive discretion’.167 What Jensen does assert, against the arguments of Rosanne 
Altshuler and others,168 is that ‘there is very little empirical support for claims that taxes or 
other forms of government fiscal policy seriously affect FDI inflows’.169 Such matters are far 
less important, from MNCs’ viewpoint, than institutions structured in such a way as to 
minimise ‘political risk’: ‘Institutions affect policies, and policies affect multinational 
operations’.170    
If the power of MNCs has given rise to extensive debate, so, too, has the power of the 
City of London,171 and the issues raised by the possibility of ‘capital flight’. In this 
                                                 
164 For a famous example, at least in its day, see Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s The American 
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 connection, Layna Mosley’s work172 provides useful complementary insights to those 
offered by Jensen. Mosley’s analysis is not specifically concerned with the relationship 
between HMG and the City.173 Nonetheless, it does seek to throw light on the weight given 
to matters such as ‘the structure of a nation’s tax system’ ‘[w]hen a bond trader at Goldman 
Sachs, or a fund manager at Fidelity, sits at his desk, contemplating where to allocate 
investment’.174 Just as the territory of Jensen’s analysis is FDI, Mosley is concerned with 
‘portfolio investment’,175 in particular with ‘the government bond market ... and ... the causal 
pathways associated with it’.176 Her conclusion is perhaps surprising, which is that: 
 
‘[i]n the advanced capitalist democracies, market participants consider key 
macroeconomic indicators, but not supply-side or microlevel policies. … So, whereas 
many governments have converged cross-nationally in the pursuit of lower inflation and 
lower government budget deficits, they have not converged in a variety of other areas, 
including overall government consumption, the structure of tax systems, and the role of 
labor market institutions within the economy’.177 
 
Fourthly, it is clear that the corporate sector cannot legitimise itself by making decisions 
based on rather narrow ‘economistic’ calculations. Increasingly, as the ‘governance’ 
phenomena referred to earlier, as the PricewaterhouseCoopers/Hundred Group ‘total tax 
contribution’ database, and as the evolving notion of ‘tax governance’ illustrate, the 
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 corporate sector must seek more subtle and broader-based ways of legitimating its activities. 
These are usually gathered together under the umbrella term of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’,178 an expression that is coming to include the payment of ‘appropriate’ levels 
of taxation.179 For example, although said to be attributable to technical matters (levels of 
pensions contributions), reports such as that in 2007 of the retailer, J. Sainsbury, having ‘paid 
no corporation tax in 2005-06’,180 cannot be said to enhance the firm’s reputation for 
corporate social responsibility. Short-term considerations over maximising shareholder value 
have wider implications, themselves of an economic nature.  
Finally, there is an element of the experiential in interpreting the impact of corporate tax 
policy on levels of inward investment and incipient ‘capital flight’. Experience would 
suggest that, though often discussed, capital flight based on corporation tax levels has rarely, 
if ever, materialised in this jurisdiction. The problem for HMG is how to retain the trust and 
confidence of society as a whole, in circumstances such that the influence of the corporate 
sector appears to be so great. In so far as there is a solution, it would appear to lie in the 
extent to which the objectives, structure and values of the UK’s political institutions are such 
as to enable them to uncover the true extent to which that influence is exercised.   
                                                 
178  See Micklethwait and Wooldridge, n. 147 above, pp. 79-81, 153, 174; also Berle and Means, n. 
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For some, such as David Marquand181 and Will Hutton,182 the turrets and pinnacles of the 
Palace of Westminster have long been emblematic of a state whose political institutions are 
ill equipped, either to work with the corporate sector, or to safeguard the public interest 
against corporations’ encroaching influence.183 Impatience on the former count is detectable, 
too, in commentaries on changes to corporation tax legislation.184 Having highlighted, earlier 
in the chapter, some of the issues arising from recent trends in governance, we next assess 
how well placed Parliament, the key institution of the UK’s representative government, is to 
scrutinise the relationship between the Crown and the corporate sector. 
What constitutes a representative, as opposed to a direct democracy, Bernard Manin tells 
us, ‘is not the fact that a few govern in the place of the people, but that they are selected by 
election’.185 However low (or high) our opinion of representative government is, therefore, 
we need to remember that the strength of representative institutions is that they ‘subject those 
who govern to the verdict of those who are governed’.186 It is the latter, ultimately, who will 
pass judgment, if not on corporation tax reform in particular, then on the ‘UK economy’ in 
general, the stability and growth of which corporation tax reform is intended to strengthen 
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 and support.187 The UK’s constitutional arrangements mean that the relationship between 
HMG and Parliament is peculiarly close, the Crown in Parliament being ‘the sole 
representative of the person of the state’.188 The fact that members of the executive both sit 
and vote in the legislature is, as Tomkins reminds us, Walter Bagehot’s ‘efficient secret’ of 
the constitution. 189 The objection to the governance trends highlighted above is thus, in part 
at least, precisely that the non-state actors involved are not ministers, and therefore do not 
(by definition) have a seat in one or other of the Houses of Parliament. Although Parliament 
tends to be thought of as a legislative body, its real strength, as Tomkins has argued 
persuasively, is that it is a scrutinising body.190 This scrutinising role includes, of course, 
Parliament’s ex ante scrutiny of legislation,191 but it also comprises its ex post scrutiny of 
governmental policy through select committees.192 Parliament is the body that, in Walter 
Bagehot’s words, ‘has ... an informing function … to inform the Sovereign what … [is] 
wrong … [and] to lay … grievances … before the nation’.193 It is in this sense that 
Parliament holds HMG to account, and not precisely, as John Stuart Mill claimed, by 
‘watching’ and ‘controlling’ it.194 Select committees, in advising HMG of failures in policy, 
are thus, if Parliament is seen as the scrutinising element of the Crown in Parliament, a 
source of capacity, of political power. ‘[W]e at no time stand so highly in our estate royal’, 
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 said the Tudor monarch, ‘as in the time of parliament’.195 Tomkins’ proposal for interpreting 
the role of Parliament in this way relies on the ancient idea that more people are available to 
advise the Crown when Parliament is sitting than at any other time.196 The ‘ancient 
constitution’ thus envisaged that taxation, the archetype of a measure that touches and 
concerns everyone, and that therefore needs political power in order to be effective, should 
be considered by the Crown in Parliament.197 Charles I’s attempt to impose taxation in 
reliance on the royal prerogative, and counting on the allegiance of the judges, has long 
provided a salutary illustration of the consequences of ignoring this principle.198 This is why 
the 1689 Bill of Rights, the curiously anomalous founding document of English 
government,199 which itself invokes the principles of the ancient constitution, bans the 
raising of taxation ‘by pretence of prerogative’,200 and requires that Parliament grant taxation 
(i.e. ‘supply’) to the Crown. 
In case all of this sounds as though it owes too much to a Whig version of history, it is 
useful to reflect on the kind of representative institution that the House of Commons has 
become. Manin finds the principle that ‘[t]hose who govern are appointed by election at 
regular intervals’ as one of the key ‘constants’ of representative government.201 David Judge 
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 relates Manin’s insights to the contemporary House of Commons,202 to show us why, even in 
times of disillusionment, the Commons might nonetheless be a source of trust and 
confidence. The situation today, Manin tells us, is not one of ‘parliamentarianism’, nor yet 
one of ‘party democracy’. Instead, what we experience today is ‘”audience” democracy’,203 
which nonetheless retains a key legitimating feature of those earlier models. The electorate 
chooses the 646 MPs because it thinks that they are ‘special’, and it also decides the basis on 
which that status is to be awarded.204 This has, as we shall see, resonances for corporation 
tax reform when it comes to the qualities of the ministers of the Crown – the Treasury 
ministers – who sit on the Government front bench and deal with corporation tax matters. 
But it applies, too, to the individual MPs who carry out the Commons’ scrutinising function 
in relation to this particular area of public policy: the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee.205 This representativeness is lacking, to be sure, in the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs; it is very doubtful whether this is compensated by the 
Committee’s undoubted technical expertise.206 
Select committees, today Parliament’s main scrutiny mechanism,207 have increased in 
significance as ministerial responsibility has been seen to decline.208 Summarising the 
strengths and weaknesses of select committees, in the matrix of their scrutiny, or 
                                                 
202  See Judge, n. 27 above, pp. 34-35.  
203  See Manin, n. 185 above, pp. 218-226.  
204  Ibid., p. 236. 
205  Of the Committee’s 14 members, as at 1 July 2007, at least 10 were graduates (eight of these from 
Oxbridge), and one was a Scottish aristocrat (John Thurso, MP (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter 
Ross, Liberal Democrats)). 
206  See Judge, n. 27 above, p. 76. 
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Usage of Parliament, ed. by Sir William McKay et al., 23rd edn (London: LexisNexis UK, 2004), 
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(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 175-176; Michael Rush, Parliament today (Manchester: 
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 accountability, function, Tomkins has some useful comments. Reflecting on stories of the 
Government, via its whips, seeking to control select committee membership, he says: 
 
‘Both positive and negative conclusions can be drawn from these stories. On the plus side, 
they suggest that select committees are sufficiently powerful, prestigious, and effective to 
be taken seriously by the government and its whips. If select committees were worthless, 
or ineffective, why go through the bother of seeking to manipulate their membership and 
direction? But on the minus side, of course, these committees are supposed to be rigorous 
and independent committees of inquiry. If the whips can so easily remove thorns from the 
government’s flesh, will that not discourage rigour? If the whips have control over 
membership, does that not dilute the extent to which the committees can truly be said to 
be independent of government?’209 
 
Accountability, ‘[t]he rendering of accounts’, is, in Manin’s view, nothing less than ‘the 
democratic component of representation’.210 Departmental select committees,211 which date 
from 1979, take their cue from the Public Accounts Committee, instituted by Gladstone in 
1861.212 In common with other select committees, the Treasury Committee deliberates in 
private,213 but it hears evidence in public,214 and these proceedings are widely reported.215 It 
has summarised its ‘first and most important objective’ as being ‘to examine and comment 
upon the economic policy of the Government’.216 Treasury ministers do well to weigh the 
Committee’s findings carefully, since, if one thing at least is certain, it is that representative 
government ‘still entails that supreme moment when the electorate passes judgment on the 
                                                                                                                                                       
208  See Colin Turpin, ‘Ministerial Responsibility’, in The Changing Constitution, ed. by Jeffrey 
Jowell and Dawn Oliver, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 109-151. 
209  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 164. 
210  See Manin, n. 185 above, p. 234. 
211  See S.O., No. 152; Erskine May, n. 207 above, pp. 779-782. 
212  See H.C.G. Matthew, Gladstone: 1809-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 117; H.C.G 
Matthew, Gladstone: 1875-1898 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 166. 
213  See Erskine May, n. 207 above, pp. 738 and 755. 
214  See S.O., No. 125(1); Erskine May, n. 207 above, p. 755. 
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216  See House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2nd Report. The 2005 Pre-Budget Report (House of 
Commons Papers, Session 2005-2006, 739) (London: The Stationery Office, 2006), p. 5. 
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 past actions of those in government’.217 We can illustrate the effectiveness of the Committee 
by considering the success with which it has illuminated the problems raised by the 
governance trends in corporation tax reform discussed in the first part of the chapter. 
One group of issues, it will be recalled, arises from the Chancellor’s accountability for the 
conduct of fiscal policy, in a climate in which NPM ideas have tended to ‘blur’ questions of 
policy and administration. During the current Parliament, Gordon Brown (as Chancellor) has 
appeared before the Committee on at least four separate occasions, corporation tax featuring 
to a greater or lesser extent each time. The strengths and weaknesses of the Committee in 
addressing the issues on each occasion mirror those analysed in an extensive literature on 
select committees in general.218 What is striking, first, is the limited scope of the inquiry into 
corporation tax. The focus tends to be on tax rates, rather than on (say) the corporation tax 
base,219 although, as in Angela Eagle, MP’s,220 2007 questioning of Gordon Brown, this can 
raise interesting questions about the possibly detrimental effects on the public finances of 
continuing to drive corporation tax rates down.221 Secondly, it is noteworthy how, despite 
claims to the contrary, the discussion can take on a party political character. This is 
particularly noticeable in the attempts by a Conservative Member in 2006 to get the 
                                                 
217  See Manin, n. 185 above, p. 234. 
218  See Tomkins, n. 190 above, pp. 61-74. 
219 See House of Commons Treasury Committee, 4th Report. The 2006 Budget, Volume II: Oral and 
written evidence (House of Commons Papers, Session 2005-2006, 994) (London: The Stationery 
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of two Conservative MPs subsequently replaced on the Committee by Graham Brady, MP 
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221  See House of Commons Treasury Committee, 5th Report. The 2007 Budget, Volume II: Oral and 
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 Chancellor to admit that he was manipulating tax rates for political advantage,222 something 
the latter was never going to do, and which would have required the clearest of evidence to 
substantiate. Such partisanship is not peculiar to Conservative Members, however. In the 
same debate, Sally Keeble, MP, gave the Chancellor the opportunity to say why his approach 
to corporate taxation was better than Germany’s,223 while John McFall, MP’s,224 questions 
in 2007 seemed designed to enable the Chancellor to emphasise still further the importance 
of economic growth.225 Such examples highlight the inadequacy of the approach of 
backbench Members to the Chancellor, of whom they were clearly in awe. If Sally Keeble 
was intent on doing more than enabling the Chancellor to justify his policies still further, it 
was not apparent from her failure to follow up on Gordon Brown’s replies. This failure to 
interrogate the Chancellor’s replies is a third striking feature of the Committee’s discussions. 
It is true, too, of the very limited follow up to the Chancellor’s answers to Peter Viggers, 
MP’s,226 questions in 2006,227 and also of a surprising failure by the same Member to quiz a 
passing reference by Gordon Brown in 2007 to a large number of companies not paying 
tax
          
.228 
The second and third features mentioned above each illustrate two frequent criticisms of 
select committee hearings: that the discussion is skewed by the absence of legal 
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 representation for committee Members (unlike in the United States),229 and by the fact that, 
although the committee chairman has a role in shaping the discussion, questions from 
individual Members are largely uncoordinated.230 The result, it might be inferred, is that 
Committee hearings have become little more than a further opportunity for the Chancellor to 
pursue familiar themes: the need to combat tax avoidance;231 the overwhelming importance 
of promoting economic growth,232 and the categorical assertion of the UK’s relative 
‘competitiveness’. Such criticism would carry considerable weight if the Committee’s role 
were simply the Millian one of ‘controlling’ and ‘watching’ HMG. However, if the 
Committee’s role is seen instead, as Bagehot says, of letting the sovereign know of the 
problems with its governing, and of alerting the public to particular areas of concern, then 
the Committee’s reports, rather than transcripts of its hearings (as well as HMG’s responses 
to those reports) assume a considerable significance. Nonetheless, all is far from well. What 
the relatively light treatment of Gordon Brown at the hands of a Labour-dominated Select 
Committee indicates in what Tomkins calls a ‘fault line’ in the constitution, blurring the 
distinction between Crown and Parliament.233 
Take, for instance, the problems presented by the second of Stoker’s governance 
propositions: the ‘blurring’ of the respective responsibilities of state and corporate sector. 
These are more than questions of a possible lack of mutual respect, since they also illustrate 
the tendency of one to seize the initiative in order to blame the other for policy failures. The 
‘informing function’ of the Committee is significant, it is contended, in providing a 
                                                 
  For a useful, though dated, examination of the similarities and differences between the UK and 
US committee systems, see Kenneth Bradshaw and David Pring, Parliament and Congress 
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 dispassionate account of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments on either side. The 
‘anti-avoidance theme’ provides an illuminating recent example of this idea in practice. 
When, it its report on the 2005 Pre-Budget Report, the Committee asked HMG to say 
‘whether it now ... [had] any intention to introduce a general anti-avoidance rule 
[GAAR]’,234 the latter’s reply was careful not to accede to the invitation. Instead, it said 
simply that the ‘current approach [i.e. to anti-avoidance] ... [was] sensible, proportionate and 
fair’.235 Conversely, the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs was able, 
with reservations, to commend a ‘modest step’ in the 2007 Finance Bill towards the 
simplification of corporation tax. Whether each of these contrasting responses, in its own 
particular sphere, proves to be the right one, only time will tell. The important point for 
present purposes is that the problem has been highlighted by the Committee (or, in the case 
of the latter) by the Lords Committee, and both its account of the problem, and the 
Chancellor’s response to it, are matters on the effectiveness of which the electorate will 
ultimately pass judgment. This is the paradoxical nature of parliamentary scrutiny, reflecting 
(as it does) the tensions of ‘Crown versus Parliament’. It is the combination of Parliament’s 
support for the Crown (by voting supply), and its opposition to it (through representation).236 
It helps to explain the strength of the two acting together, as the Crown in Parliament, to be 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
This discussion has necessarily been somewhat selective. It has, however, underlined the 
point that the Treasury Committee’s role should properly be seen as an advisory one, rather 
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 than as a ‘policing’ one,237 as helping to construct the story for which the government of the 
day will be held to account. This is what the British constitution is all about. Not the 
safeguarding of ‘liberty’, but the facilitation of ‘constitutional accountability’, the 
accountability of HMG (the Crown) to Parliament.238 To be sure, the Public Accounts 
Committee has a similar role, but within a somewhat different remit; the Treasury 
Committee is the body tasked with advising HMG on the strengths and weaknesses of its 
corporation tax reform measures. The capacity of HMG is enhanced by Parliament’s ability 
to cast light on the potential for domination discussed in the previous part. Clearly, there are 
problems but, overall, the objectives, structure and values of Parliament go a long way to 
enhancing trust a aps because the 
discussion is that of the people’s representatives, rather than that of ‘experts’.  
narrative of the Treasury’s conduct of corporation tax policy, to which the latter can react, 
                                                
nd confidence in corporation tax policy, not least perh
 
H.M. TREASURY AND H.M. REVENUE AND CUSTOMS 
 
Effectiveness, that is, the capacity of a representative institution to advance its political 
objectives, means different things for different institutions. If Parliament’s scrutinising role 
evolved from the bloodshed of the seventeenth century, the function of the relevant 
Department of HMG, what Colin Thain categorises as ‘the constitutional Treasury’, is of 
even more ancient lineage.239 For Parliament, effectiveness means the ability to construct a 
 
237  See Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms’ (1984) 28 American Journal of Political Science 165-179. 
238  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 47. 
239  See Thain, Financial Times, 18 February 2008, 10 (letter); Thain and Christie, n. 112 above, p. 3; 
Martin Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted: From English Constitutional Argument to British 
Constitutional Practice’, in The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form, ed. by Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 27-48, 29.   
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 and on the basis of which, come a General Election, the electorate can make its judgment 
(most likely through the ‘filter’ of the policy’s impact on the UK’s ‘economic 
performance’).240 For the Treasury,241 effectiveness means the capacity to create in the 
minds of the (voting) electorate the impression that the former’s actions (or inactions) matter, 
and that they produce optimal results in terms of the attainment of political objectives. In the 
corporation tax sphere, while Parliament’s task is to identify the problems with corporation 
tax policy, the Treasury must address the ones it considers important, discount unimportant 
ones, and anticipate yet others. Under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, and, as a 
Department whose powers originate in the royal prerogative,242 the Treasury has 
considerable freedom of action in the initiation of policy.243 The prerogative is, as Tomkins 
says,244 the basis of executive power; it is noteworthy for its resilience to supervision by the 
courts.245 Taxation policy is significant, because it is an aspect of the Treasury’s powers that 
is amenable to law, not least because of the constitutional struggles referred to above. Policy 
initiation, however, lies largely beyond the scope of law. ‘We may grant’, Joseph Jacob says, 
tha
                                                
t the prerogative’s boundaries ‘ ... are defined by law and, certainly ... its scope is 
diminishing; but ... [at the centre of government], the rule of law does not operate’.246  
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 The reasons for this freedom of action may owe less to any lust for power, and more to 
some uncomfortable realities. But there is one overarching, ineluctable, difficulty. No-one 
knows, in this changing world, what will happen to-morrow. Or the day after. Or the day 
after that. Yet a government must somehow move through these radical uncertainties, to 
realise its political objectives. This is the fundamental difference, in the corporation tax 
sphere as much as any other, between Parliament and the Crown, between – in the present 
context - the Treasury Committee and the Treasury, between Westminster and Whitehall.247  
In its scrutinising role, Parliament looks over its shoulder; HMG confronts an unknown 
future. The latter does so, moreover, in the knowledge that, however it responds to, or 
anticipates, events, it must retain the trust and confidence of the governed. It is maintained in 
these pages that Machiavelli’s account of the qualities that these uncertainties call forth from 
the sovereign, is as relevant now as ever it was. Machiavelli thought of these uncertainties in 
terms of fortuna,
 
extent of the complex of issues that would be thrown up in what became known as the 
248 the unpredictable woman,249 what Bernard Crick synthesises as that 
‘sudden, aweful [sic] and challenging piling up of ... [economic] factors and contingent 
political events in an unexpected way’.250 Is it to be supposed, for instance, that, so soon 
after his appointment as Chancellor, the Rt Hon. Alistair Darling, MP, could have known the 
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 ‘Northern Rock crisis’?251 In the face of such uncertainties, what the ruler must show, says 
Machiavelli, is virtù. It is not, as Crick again reminds us, goodness as such that is called for, 
but something nearer perhaps to ‘virtuosity’.252 Virtù has many facets, the most notable, as 
already observed, being the facility of prudenza,253 of ‘prudence’. It is not the same as 
having no policy; it is reactive, to be sure, but it is pro-active too, should circumstances 
demand. It is a crucial element in the generation of capacity, of sovereignty. 
If, speaking interpretatively, prudence is the key to understanding the type of policy 
decisions to be discussed in Chapter 3, it becomes important to consider the extent to which 
this seems to be a characteristic of the key decision-makers in the Treasury and HMRC. 
Given the powers residing in individuals, the strength of their personalities, their political 
style, matters, no less than their policies.254 Ministers, says Philip Norton, fall discernibly 
into one (or, more likely, a combination) of a number of different ‘styles’: ‘commanders’, 
‘ideologues’, ‘managers’, ‘agents’, or ‘team players’.255 The fact that they are all, at least at 
the Treasury, elected Members of the lower House, means that their constituents have 
identified in what Thain calls ‘the political Treasury’ some special quality,256 which sets 
them apart from other people. This is one reason why it is important to maintain the 
difference between ministers and civil servants, between those who are elected (literally, the 
‘elite’),257 and those who are not. The elected are, as has long been recognised, an 
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 ‘aristocracy’.258 Labour’s Treasury ministers amply reflect this aristocratic conception, this 
‘principle of distinction’, to which reference has already been made.259 For example, Kitty 
Ussher, MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the very model of a New Labour 
metropolitan intellectual,260 represents the historically economically deprived, and culturally 
and socially diverse, constituency of Burnley and Pendle. Although it is too early to write of 
her ‘style’, her political skills will be tested by her part-responsibility for the 2008 Finance 
Bill. Alistair Darling, MP for Edinburgh South West, is socially and professionally 
distinguished,261 though the representative of a more affluent constituency. At the time of 
writing, his political skills are being tested by reaction to the 2007 Pre-Budget Report and its 
aftermath,262 but most would concede that, on Norton’s typology, he is nearest to a 
‘manager’, albeit a beleaguered one.263 Most importantly, there is the MP (since 1983) for 
Dunfermline East, Gordon Brown, who as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1997 to 2007, 
has dominated the period covered by this study. Brown, working with the former Financial 
Times leader writer and special adviser, Ed Balls,264 transformed a Department which, 
although already (in W.H. Greenleaf’s words) ‘the Department of Departments’, and 
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 ‘basically a ministry of finance’265 has become something more akin to a continental finance 
ministry.266 ‘The Treasury’, Peter Hennessy wrote in 1990, ‘is about money [,] and money is 
a mighty weapon of power.  [...] Knowledge, too, is power and the Treasury has a window 
int
Harrington’s or Francis Bacon’s espousal of the Machiavellian view of the world to 
ap
    
o every ministry and departmental activity across Whitehall’.267 He would have had even 
greater reason to reiterate these words in 2007. 
‘Prudence’ is often associated with Gordon Brown, yet, as discussed in Chapter 1,268 it 
tends not explicitly to be the prudence of Machiavelli.269 This is surprising, the more so 
since, although commentators describe certain elements of prudence, they do not associate 
them directly with Machiavelli’s conception. Thus, Marquand has written of Brown’s ‘often 
infuriating caution’,270 while Jackie Ashley has written that ‘simply to say Brown is cautious 
won’t do. He’s bold, too’;271 and Suzanne Moore, with an interesting mixture of ideas, has 
written of Brown’s ‘sheer nous, cunning, cleverness, realpolitik, whatever you want to call 
it’.272 All this is the more surprising, since there is a strong intellectual heritage of 
Machiavellianism in radical British Protestantism; one has only to think of James 
preciate this.273 It is thus no objection to say that Brown is a ‘son of the Manse’,274 nor to 
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 point to Brown’s ‘deep moral convictions’.275 H.C.G. Matthew, in describing Gladstone’s 
approach to Irish Home Rule, reflects on Gladstone’s command of virtù.276 And this link is 
not an idle one, either; Marquand goes on to make a comparison, in terms of intellectual 
standing, between Brown and Gladstone.277 Finally, and most importantly, it is no objection 
to identify Brown’s prudence exclusively with the prudence described by Adam Smith in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments.278 Brown himself associates prudence, as Simon Lee has 
pointed out, with Smith in a lecture from 2004.279 Brown articulates Smith’s prudence, 
however, as an ideal characteristic.280 It does not, as does Machiavelli’s, seek to describe an 
actual mode of behaviour. ‘[W]e are much beholden to Machiavel and others [Bacon himself 
wrote], that write what men do, and not what they ought to do’.281 What is claimed here is 
that Machiavellian prudence is as essential to corporation tax as to any other area of taxation, 
or public, policy, and that, as Chancellor, Brown has shown himself to be its supreme 
exponent. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Harrington’s Interpretation of his Age (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 
1942), pp. 18-20; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and 
the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 317 and 390; 
ambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 258-260. 
5, 188; Routledge, n. 261 above, pp. 23-25; Robert Peston, 
005), p. 25; William Keegan, The Prudence of Mr 
276 
le from www.treasuryproject.org (accessed 21 February 2008)). 
(1723-1790), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
279 litics and Legacy of Gordon Brown (Oxford: Oneworld, 
280 
281 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 157. 
also Paul Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice and Political 
Power, 1558-1660 (Cambridge: C
274  See Naughtie, n. 249 above, pp. 
Brown’s Britain (London: Short Books, 2
Gordon Brown (Chichester: John Wiley, 2003), p. 20; Tom Bower, Gordon Brown (London: 
HarperCollins, 2004), pp. 5-6.    
275 See Keegan, n. 274 above, p. 128. 
 See Matthew (1995), n. 212 above, p. 237. 
277  See Marquand, n. 270 above, 36; also Thain and Christie, Parliamentary Brief, February 2008, 
21-22, 21 (availab
278 See Adam Smith 
MacFie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 212-217. 
 See Simon Lee, Best for Britain? The Po
2007), pp. 45-47. 
 Ibid., pp. 46-47.  
See Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis, ed. by Arthur Johnston 
 123
 The politicisation of corporation tax issues, something to which the discussion turns in 
Chapter 3, has made the prudential qualities of Treasury ministers282 more important than 
they might have been even a decade ago. To emphasise this requirement is not, however, to 
diminish the importance of Treasury senior civil servants, since (irrespective of Gordon 
Brown’s allegedly ‘Stalinistic’ tendencies),283 it is to be presumed that at the Chancellor’s 
elbow, at the scene of crucial decisions, has been the prudential voice of a team of the 
Treasury’s most gifted public servants. There has, of course, been much unease about the 
‘politicisation’ of the civil service,284 given the need to ensure the accountability of 
individuals employed under the royal prerogative.285 After all, like ministers, civil servants 
exercise the powers of the Crown,286 although, unlike ministers, Parliament does not hold 
civil servants ‘to constitutional account’.287 So there may be good grounds for concern, 
especially since ‘management’, properly understood, is but an aspect of the art and science of 
government,288 and it is management, rather than administration, that characterises the role 
of Thain’s ‘official’ or ‘permanent Treasury’, as part of the contemporary civil service.289 
The point is indeed illustrated better by the Treasury than by any other Department of 
Government. Of all the buildings visible from the London Eye, the Treasury building is an 
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 especially powerful symbol of governance values that are traceable, in one form or another, 
to the development of ‘New Right’ ideas in the second half of the twentieth century.290 
Returning to the Treasury in 2004, the commentator Anthony Sampson noted how a 
corporate boardroom ambience had replaced the curving corridors and peeling linoleum of 
former days.291 Emblematic of this new approach is the person of Nick Macpherson, 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury since August 2005, and successor to Sir Gus 
O’Donnell,292 who was responsible for the O’Donnell Report of 2004,293 which resulted in 
the merging of the former Revenue Departments (the Inland Revenue and Customs and 
Excise),294 as well as the introduction of a new budget, tax and welfare directorate in the 
Treasury,295 which was designed to liaise more closely with the new HMRC.296 
Responsibility for corporation tax reform has thus been shared between the Treasury and 
HMRC,297 the former having specialist corporation tax expertise on the Council of Economic 
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 Advisers,298 and the latter having a designated group of public servants who specialise in 
corporation tax (and value added tax),299 and who are ‘responsible for design, specification 
and providing advice, carrying out technical policy work and liaising with HM Treasury and 
Mi
                        
nisters’.300 Although much criticism has recently been levelled at HMRC, over 
operational matters such as the loss of taxpayer data, this has not been concerned specifically 
with corporate taxation.301 
The need for prudence, whether that of elected ministers or of unelected officials, is 
intrinsic to the circumstances in which political institutions operate. This brings the 
discussion to a point of fundamental importance. The continuing pre-eminence of the 
political institutions whose buildings are visible from the London Eye over those whose 
buildings (even on a clear day) are not: those of the EU. Arguments that the UK has 
somehow ceded sovereignty to a supranational authority are misconceived, both because of 
the vision of sovereignty rehearsed above,302 and because, as Helen Thompson points out, 
‘[t]he Commission, except in competition policy, can only issue regulations and directives on 
the basis of decisions made in the Council of Ministers, and its right to initiate legislation is 
mediated through the largest member-states’.303 Even the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
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 may not, in reality, pose a serious threat to national sovereignty either. This is because, 
despite the ECJ’s energy in ensuring that corporate tax law is consistent with the 
‘fundamental freedoms’ of the European Treaty,304 tax remains a matter of national 
competence. Moreover, as Thompson says, ‘the administration of EU laws remains 
dependent on national judiciaries’,305 and even the ECJ has itself begun to show a sensitivity 
to the dangers to the European enterprise which would be presented by too rigid an 
adherence to its more uncompromising corporate taxation precedents.306 This study does not 
therefore envisage a governance structure of which the EU institutions form either the apex 
or the base.307 What it conceives of instead is the UK as a sovereign state, albeit with 
competences limited by Community law (but also GATT 1994), whose capacity is enhanced, 
rather than depleted, by membership of the EU or WTO.308 This is a return to the second of 
the strands of the chapter referred to above. In such a world, fortuna appears in several 
guises. On the one hand, given the Treasury’s role, she represents the vicissitudes of the 
markets, or the threats of MNCs to leave the national jurisdiction. On the other, she 
represents the unknowable summed up in Timothy Lyons’s reiteration of Melchior 
Wathelet’s rhetorical (and despairing) question: ‘What will the ECJ decide to-morrow?’309 
Despite the ‘legal’ nature of the latter question, its very ‘unpredictability’ makes it 
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 disconcertingly similar to the former one. Only the ability to move quickly, to think quickly, 
to prevent these unknowns from deflecting the overall policy310 - in short, to behave 
pru
e private 
sphere, the other applicable to the ‘political realm’,315 the latter, as Loughlin tells us, being 
the field of operation of public law,316  is so important a part.  
                                                
dentially - is enough to deal with them. Sovereignty is, after all, a ‘generative’ 
conception.311 
Given the necessity for prudence, it is contended that, given the Treasury’s need for 
effectiveness in reaching its twin goals of ‘Raising Trend Growth’ and ‘Promoting Fairness 
and Opportunity for All’,312 the idea that informs all of the values at play is ‘reason of 
state’.313 This point is developed in Chapter 4; it is central to the idea that institutions must 
be effective, in order for them to generate trust and confidence. For the moment, we can note 
that what shapes these values is not ‘morality’ as such, but the ‘advancement of the public 
interest’,314 as that is defined and shaped by ideology, perhaps, but certainly by the 
ideologically motivated sovereign. This might seem a case of ‘double standards’, but it is not 
that. There are only, as Crick says, two sets of standards: one applicable to th
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 Gazing out from the London Eye, at the panorama described at the beginning of the chapter, 
the signs of ‘policy networks’ are, as has been suggested, everywhere apparent. Corporation 
tax
d lead public debate’, but also that they can 
inf
                                                
 reform, in common with other areas of public policy, is so much a matter of involving 
policy networks, that the role and values of such bodies fall to be interpreted next. 
It is important to be clear, however, about exactly the kind of organisation that we are 
here seeking to pinpoint. It is not, as discussed in the previous part, the totality of the 
relevant Departments of State, H.M. Treasury and HMRC, nor is it, as discussed in the third 
part of the chapter, some monolithic notion of the corporate sector as a whole. It is, rather, 
those individuals, or groups of individuals, who ‘mediate’ in the development of corporation 
tax reform proposals, those who deliberate on the ‘concerns of business’ when reforms are 
proposed: civil servants from the Treasury and from HMRC; lawyers; accountants; 
academics; members of think tanks; journalists; and coalitions of producers (most 
significantly the CBI). The importance of these networks, as Stoker points out, is not only 
that they are in a position to ‘interpret an
luence policy, in some cases requiring a united front from their members, to ‘nudge’ 
HMG more in one direction than another.317 
For the writer, the most convincing starting-point for interpreting the role of policy 
networks is again Manin’s dissection of the ‘principles of representative government’. Manin 
is not concerned to offer a complete theory of the principles and values of interest groups in 
the UK’s system of representative democracy. What he is concerned with, however, is the 
role of extra-parliamentary political discussion in such a system. Whatever influence the 
corporate sector may exert in the corporate ambience of Whitehall is mediated by this extra-
 
317  See Hobbes, n. 31 above, p. 375, where the author condemns ‘the great number of Corporations; 
which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of the greater, like wormes in the 
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 parliamentary debate. It is in this context that policy networks fall to be considered. 
Explanation and interpretation of their role has fallen to Rod Rhodes and David Marsh, in a 
penetrating and enduringly persuasive analysis.318 In this part of the chapter, elements of 
each analysis will be used to cast light on the other. Given the involvement in policy 
networks of civil servants, the context of the debate is the accountability of the Crown and its 
servants. There is, as discussed above, no political accountability for civil servants, nor, as 
we shall see, are they subject to any legal accountability by way of judicial review. Instead, 
their position, as individuals employed under the royal prerogative, is governed by a case-
law ‘vicariousness’ principle, and by a number of executive measures falling outside 
parliamentary scrutiny.319 Under the pragmatic Carltona principle,320 a decision of a civil 
servant is, ‘of course, the decision of the minister’,321 Minister and civil servant being 
regarded as ‘legally indistinguishable parts of a single unit, the government Department, 
united together in the service of the Crown’.322 The executive measures include, most 
importantly, the 1995 Civil Service Order in Council,323 and the Civil Service Management 
Code,324 but none of them are subject to judicial or parliamentary scrutiny.325 All present a 
sig
With such accountability problems firmly in mind, Rhodes and Marsh offer an 
interpretation of government/interest group relations that is different from both ‘corporatist’ 
nificant challenge to generating trust and confidence, because they draw attention to the 
variability of the accountability mechanisms applicable to civil servants.     
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 and ‘pluralist’ models.326 In keeping with the objectives of the study, their approach is 
strongly interpretative, emphasising the roles of interest groups in different policy areas,327 
and looking for ‘aggregations of interests’.328 In the corporation tax debate, Rhodes and 
Marsh would accordingly distinguish between a ‘producer network’ (most importantly, here, 
the members of the CBI and the British Bankers’ Association (BBA)) and ‘professional 
networks’, such as the members of the Law Society, of think tanks such as the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS), of the members of the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT)329). To 
the latter they would also add, presumably, the small group of financial journalists who have 
recently followed the ‘politicisation’ of corporation tax issues, most notably Vanessa 
Houlder of the Financial Times.330 What the distinction serves to illustrate is the ‘relative 
stability’ of the professional network, as against that of the producer; the considerable 
reliance of the Treasury and HMRC on the former (if not the latter) ‘to get the technical 
detail right’331 (for instance, in relation to the accounting theme discussed in the present 
study); and the tendency of both to further their own economic interests. Rather interesting in 
this latter context are the Financial Times journalists covering corporate tax reform, since 
they have ceased (as Manin might predict) to take a partisan approach, and instead have 
concentrated on reporting and reflecting the debate.332 Marsh and Rhodes’s new typology 
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 also, however, highlights a stark contrast with the ‘issue networks’,333 such as the Tax 
Justice Network (TJN), and (of a very different ‘stripe’ indeed) the Taxpayers’ Alliance.334 
What characterises these latter two is that, albeit in very different ways, their activities are 
directed at influencing public opinion, having ‘little or no access to government’.335 
                                                
Given that, in Rhodes and Marsh’s analysis, ‘economic and professional interests 
dominate’ in the policy community, they also point to the limited variety of participants in 
professional and producer communities. Thus, although the trades unions tend not to 
contribute to policy debates, other names (those in the professional community) tend to 
recur: among law firms, Slaughter and May (commenting on what has been called in this 
study the European and International theme in corporation tax reform) and McGrigors, on 
the ‘accounting’336 and the ‘compliance and enforcement’ themes, to take just two examples. 
Likewise, among ‘professional services’ firms, we tend to find PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte and KPMG commenting on the ‘European and international’ theme. As for the 
producer networks, no-one would deny the monolithic status of the CBI, ready as Jonathan 
Guthrie has written, to comment if necessary on ‘raindrops racing down a window pane’,337 
but especially on corporate tax policy338 and on all of the themes identified in this study. The 
‘economic and/or professional interests’ of these groups, focussing recurrently on 
corporation tax ‘simplification’, contrast rather vividly with the corporation tax fairness 
issues raised by those such as the accountant, Richard Murphy, and latterly, the academic, 
Sol Picciotto.339 
 
333  See Marsh and Rhodes, n. 119 above, p. 254. 
334  See www.taxpayersalliance.com (accessed 10 September 2007). 
335  See Marsh and Rhodes, n. 119 above, p. 256. 
336  See Collins and Dixon, Tax Journal, 9 April 2007, 6-8. 
337  See Guthrie, Financial Times, 26 April 2007, 15. 
338  See Houlder, Financial Times, 21 October 2004, 3. 
339 See Murphy and Picciotto, Financial Times, 27 September 2007 (letter); also Murphy and 
Christensen, Financial Times, 12 March 2004, 18 (letter). 
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 Reference to the contribution of Murphy and Picciotto reminds us of the aspect of 
personal interactions, in what Marsh and Rhodes take to be a second dimension of policy 
networks: ‘integration’.340 Within the corporation tax policy community (that body that Tiley 
calls ‘tax folk’),341 the same lawyers’ names recur: Stephen Edge, of Slaughter and May; 
Malcolm Gammie, of the tax bar (sometime of Linklaters),342 and Edward Troup (now of the 
Treasury and formerly of Simmons and Simmons).343 Among the accountants, especially 
prominent are, perhaps, John Whiting of PricewaterhouseCoopers; Loughlin Hickey of 
KPMG; and John Cullinane of Deloitte. They are all participants in an almost constant and, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, sophisticated public discussion of the direction in which 
corporation tax reform is going. They are characterised by their longevity as participants in 
the debate, by (with the possible exception of Stephen Edge) their commitment to a 
somewhat Diceyan ideal of corporation tax law, and by values, immanent to their extensive 
writing, well assimilated to the broad policy objectives which corporation tax reform is 
seeking to attain. Gammie is in many ways representative. He writes of the ‘rule of law’ with 
only Dicey beside him,344 and speaks in respectful tones to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs of the familiar and faintly tedious lack of progress on tax 
simplification. Take, for instance, his slant on the decision in the 2007 Budget to abolish 
capital allowances for expenditure on industrial buildings,345 which had been justified on tax 
simplification grounds: 
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 ‘ ... Chairman: [Lord Wakeham] Could I just finish on this with one pretty simple 
question. If the Chancellor were sitting where you are sitting and we said, “Come on, tell 
us about this simplification, because we ain’t heard too much that has been impressive so 
far about simplification” what answer would he give? Why does he think what he has 
done is simplification? 
 
Mr Gammie: To the extent that he has removed allowances for buildings, he has 
simplified the system. There will be a degree of repealed legislation. As I say, companies 
will no longer have to do all the calculations. 
 
... Chairman: That is the main simplification. 
 
Mr Gammie: That seems to me to be the main simplification.’346 
 
The fundamental similarity of the Diceyan approach of tax professionals, well illustrated by 
Gammie’s famous contempt for what Parliament provides in the exercise of its legislative 
function, so long as it is clear about its intentions,347 nonetheless leads them to accept and 
work with the legislative outcomes, however flawed they may find them. With such a 
crushingly united front on the corporation tax policy, it is unsurprising that the chief role of 
the TJN is the undermining of the policy community position. One illustration is Murphy’s 
attempt, in the BBC’s File on Four programme, to move the discussion on transfer pricing 
away from a preoccupation with ‘anti-avoidance’ to the effect of the UK transfer pricing 
provisions on the economies of developing countries.348 
So the corporation tax reform policy community has a tightly integrated and fairly 
constant membership. It also has, as the evidence would lead us to infer, considerable 
intellectual and economic resources. Writing of policy communities in general, Marsh and 
Rhodes contrast what they see as the ‘relationship of exchange’349 that subsists between a 
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 policy community and the relevant Department of HMG, and the contrasting inability of 
issue networks to offer any expertise that HMG is interested in acquiring. For indeed, the 
‘special codes’ on corporate finance350 (a fundamental component of the corporation tax 
code) represent an almost astonishing assimilation of professional expertise to the legislative 
function,351 born no doubt of many a congenial meeting over coffee and biscuits in 
Whitehall.352 Equally, there is evidently no provision in the corporation tax code capable of 
addressing what many would regard as the kind of rank inter-nation inequity353 revealed by 
the File on Four report on transfer pricing. 
The relative lack of financial resources on the issue network side is reflected in its non-
hierarchical organisation. By contrast, as Marsh and Rhodes suggest, policy communities are 
hierarchical and, as such, are (as in the case of the CBI) able to ‘deliver [their] members’. 
More than that, the Law Society and the ICAEW are each in a position to discipline and 
exclude certain or other of their membership. The lack of resources suffered by issue 
networks may not endure, however. Environmental policy is perhaps the classic example of 
an area in which arguments once spoken to electorates over the heads of governments have 
gained some salience in the counsels of policy communities. The same may yet happen with 
corporation tax reform (especially in its international setting). However, this currently seems 
– at the very least – unlikely. 
A criticism that might be made of the foregoing discussion is that, whatever it might 
rightly say about the respective positions of policy network members, it gives undue 
prominence to the TJN, an organisation whose salience is primarily web and media based 
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 and whose public persona has been (until Picciotto recently took up his pen) substantially 
confined to a single individual. If made, the point is possibly well made. The TJN is almost 
unique as an issue network in this policy area, however, and (unlike, possibly, the 
Taxpayers’ Alliance), has a position widely divergent from HMG, as well as (again by 
comparison with the Taxpayers’ Alliance) few if any powerful backers. Indeed, it is in 
relation to power that Marsh and Rhodes find a fourth dimension common to policy 
communities and issue networks. The involvement in the corporation tax reform debate of 
bodies such as the TJN, whilst it has the potential to lift corporation tax reform to a political 
significance comparable to that of – say – climate change, is hampered by the fact that, as 
Marsh and Rhodes point out, the involvement of members in such networks can only ever be 
a ‘zero-sum game’, since the TJN and other issue networks have disparate powers, which 
reflect their ‘unequal resources’, and the ‘unequal access’ of their members.354 With the 
corporation tax reform policy community, however, there is (in Marsh and Rhodes’s words) 
‘a balance of power among members’:355 although the arguments of the CIOT or the Law 
Society may dominate, or although both may on particular issues prevail over HMG (or vice 
versa), their constructive engagement is almost by definition a ‘positive sum game’, since 
that is why the community is found to exist in the first place. This point is well illustrated by 
KPMG’s warning, issued through an article of Houlder’s in the Financial Times,356 that the 
failure of ‘business’ to engage with the arguments raised by the Treasury and HMRC in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
353  See Brian J. Arnold and Michael J. McIntyre, International Tax Primer, 2nd edn (The Hague: 
Kluwer, 2002), p. 4. 
354  See Marsh and Rhodes, n. 119 above, p. 251. 
355 Ibid. 
356  See Houlder, Financial Times, 22 June 2007, 2; Houlder, Financial Times, 20 July 2007, 3. 
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 consultation paper on overseas profits,357 published in June 2007, would likely result in a 
highly disadvantageous settlement as regarded all (corporate sector) interests concerned.358 
For the moment, the biggest challenge to trust and confidence that policy networks 
(especially policy communities) seem to present is that of inadequate accountability. It 
means that the Crown, here Treasury and HMRC civil servants, is free to develop itself by 
self-regulation. Indeed, policy networks are a fine example of how, ‘[i]n the absence of both 
political and legal oversight and accountability, the Crown-as-executive is left free to 
develop and to transform itself, unsupervised and unconstrained’.359 When governance is 
seen as a matter of ‘self-organizing networks’, says Rhodes, the challenge to ‘governability’ 
is that ‘the networks become autonomous and resist central guidance’.360 Governments are 
torn between using the sheer levels of expertise available, and the dangers to trust and 
confidence that such unaccountable advisers may bring with them.    
 
HER MAJESTY’S JUDGES 
 
The role of the judges in the reform of corporation tax is, in a number of respects, an 
anomalous one. Although the Special Commissioners are people who have made 
distinguished careers in the tax law arena,361 most (if not all) of the supreme court judges and 
Law Lords to whom has fallen the task of interpreting corporation tax legislation were not, in 
                                                 
357 H.M. Treasury and HMRC, Taxation of the foreign profits of companies: a discussion document 
(London: H.M. Treasury, 2007). 
358  Some such warning was heeded by the United States National Foreign Trade Council, however 
(see Houlder, Financial Times, 5 October 2007, 2).  
359  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 77. 
360  See R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘The New Governance: Governing without Government’ (1996) XLIV 
Political Studies 652-667, 667. 
361  e.g. Gammie himself (passim), a deputy Special Commissioner since 2002; Graham Aaronson, 
QC, counsel for the taxpayer in, e.g., Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v. Mawson 
(Inspector of Taxes) [2004] UKHL 51; [2005] STC 1: see below. 
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 their days as members of the Bar, specialist tax lawyers.362 Whether, as Tiley implies, this is 
to be regretted,363 is a matter for debate, but it has meant that the attention of judges in 
corporation tax cases – as in other tax cases – has focussed (tacitly, generally) on the 
constitutional and administrative law problems raised. Moreover, although particular judges 
(Lord Brightman,364 for example, and, in another age, Lords Radcliffe and Diplock365) have 
contributed in various capacities to the debate on the specifics of tax reform, the judiciary 
have not generally been involved in the ex ante discussion of corporation tax proposals. 
Instead, the judges’ role has been carefully confined to the more restricted one of statutory 
interpretation, and may yet involve considering individual enacted provisions in hearings for 
judicial review. 
In one sense puzzling, but in others deeply revealing of the tensions in the historical role 
of the higher judiciary, is the distance of the Royal Courts of Justice from Westminster, and 
the presence in the Palace of Westminster of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
(soon to be reconstituted as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom).366 The panorama 
viewed from the London Eye is such as to make the contradictions implied extremely 
apparent. The role of judges in matters of taxation has always been unusually sensitive. In 
                                                 
362  Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe was, however, and he is therefore customarily allocated to revenue 
appeals (see Brice Dickson, ‘The Processing of Appeals in the House of Lords’ (2007) 123 LQR 
571-601, 589-590).  
363  See ‘J.T.’ (John Tiley) [2000] BTR 133. 
364  See David Hope (Lord Hope of Craighead), ‘Voices from the Past – the Law Lords’ Contribution 
to the Legislative Process’ (2007) 123 LQR 547-570, 562, 570, on Lord Brightman’s extensive 
contribution to legislative debate (not only on tax matters); shown, too, in Joint Committee on Tax 
Simplification Bills, 1st Report. Capital Allowances Bill: Minutes of Evidence, 31 January 2001 
(House of Commons Papers, Session 2000-2001, 175-ii) (London: HMSO, 2001), passim. 
365  See the Rt Hon. Sir Kenneth Diplock, ‘The Courts as Legislators’, in The Lawyer and Justice, ed. 
by Brian W. Harvey (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1978), pp. 263-287; Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Profits and Income: Final Report: Presented to Parliament by Command of Her 
Majesty (Chair, Lord Radcliffe) (Cmd 9474) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955); 
Robert Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005), p. 29.  
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 reliance, possibly, on Bacon’s idea of the ‘lions under the throne’,367 and facing a Parliament 
looking for ‘redress of grievances’ as the price of granting taxation to the Crown, Charles I 
had tried to rely on the royal prerogative to levy taxation.368 As might possibly be inferred 
from Tomkins’ essay on the topic,369 this has been at the forefront of the judges’ minds in 
the contemporary closing off of the once extensive-seeming opportunities for challenging tax 
legislation under human rights legislation.370 In between these two historical junctures is a 
body of case law dating (as relevant to the present study) from the late nineteenth century, 
and especially from 1978.371 What we have in this period, as Roger Kerridge says, is a 
notable judicial effort to give meaning to often obscurely-directed and drafted legislative 
provisions, while at the same time avoiding the kinds of constitutional controversies to which 
reference has just been made.372 ‘On the whole’, as Kerridge concludes, the judges, in 
deploying a kind of intuition, ‘are to be congratulated’.373 David Robertson, in his essay on 
the now-iconic income tax case of Pepper v. Hart,374 writes instead of a broad ‘discretion’ 
                                                                                                                                                       
366  Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ss. 23-60, on and after 1 October 2009; see Diana Woodhouse, 
‘The constitutional and political implications of a United Kingdom Supreme Court’ (2004) 24: 1 
and 2 LS 134-155. 
367 See Francis Bacon, ‘Of Judicature’, in The Essays, ed. by John Pitcher (London: Penguin, 1985), 
pp. 222-225, invoking the lions under Solomon’s throne (see 3 Kings, x, 19-20 (Douay Version)). 
368  See W. J. Jones, Politics and the Bench: The Judges and the Origins of the English Civil War 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971). 
369  See Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 67-87. 
370  See, e.g., NAP Holdings UK Ltd v. United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR – Comm Supp CD 114; 
Application No. 13013/87, Wasa Liv Ömsesidigt, Fërsäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse 
and a group of approximately 15,000 individuals v. Sweden (1988) 58 ECHRDR 163. On the 
sensitivity of the judicial/Crown relationship in tax, see Lord Woolf, ‘Tax and Judicial Review’ 
[1993] BTR 219-229. 
371  Surprisingly, the date of the first corporation tax appeal: Willingale (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. 
International Commercial Bank Ltd (1978) 52 TC 242 was decided in February 1978. The most 
recent corporation tax decision of the House of Lords is currently (29 February 2008) Sempra 
Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another 
[2007] UKHL 34; [2007] 3 WLR 354 (although this might more properly regarded as a case on 
restitution).  
372  See Kerridge [2003] BTR 257-264. 
373  Ibid., p. 260. 
374  Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] AC 593.  
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 exercised in the House of Lords,375 but cannot take this much further than to explain the 
exercise of this discretion in terms of a rather selective judicial use of parliamentary 
papers.376 Dicey himself, to be sure, had remarkably little to say about the constitutional 
position of the judiciary.377 What is proposed here is an analysis of the judicial role in 
corporation tax appeals, as a concrete instance of judges carrying out a complementary role 
to that carried out by the Treasury, and by the legislature, in the particular area of corporation 
tax reform. The judges are, in other words, engaging in the ‘political practice’ of public law 
(in this case interpreting corporation tax legislation), and they are doing so in a manner that 
reflects the Hobbesian truth378 that, as Tomkins puts it, ‘the judiciary derives its 
constitutional power ultimately from that of the Crown’.379 Senior judges, he points out (like 
Cabinet ministers) are Privy Councillors,380 and ‘[t]he judicial oath of allegiance is to the 
Crown – not to the constitution, not to the people, and certainly not to Parliament - but to the 
Crown’.381 The truth of this is no doubt the historical reason for the attitude of circumspect 
submission assumed in D.C. Potter’s conclusion on Sharkey v. Wernher that, had the case not 
been decided by the House of Lords, he would have concluded that it was wrong.382 It is also 
apparent, however, in the tendency of judges as late as the 1980s to refer to the taxpayer, not 
                                                 
375  See David Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
Robertson is unusual among political scientists as taking an interest in the judges’ role in 
government (see David Pannick, Judges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 10). 
376  See Robertson, n. 375 above, pp. 160-164. See Sedley [1999] CLJ 627-629, 628 (book review).  
377  See Dicey, n. 52 above, pp. 60, 410.  
378  See Hobbes, n. 31 above, p. 291 (see Loughlin, n. 20 above, p. 152).  
379  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, pp. 54-60, discussing Proclamations (1607) 77 ER 1352; Prohibitions 
del Roy (1611) 77 ER 1342; and In re M. [1994] 1 AC 377. Consistent with the functionalist 
approach taken in this study this approach builds on that of J.A.G. Griffith, in The Politics of the 
Judiciary, 5th edn (London: Fontana, 1997), esp. ch. 9. 
380  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 53. 
381  Ibid. 
382  [1964] BTR 438-443, 439. 
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 as such, but as ‘the subject’.383 More recently, as the enterprise of the EU and its 
implications have become better understood, and especially with the advent of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), the language of ‘state’ and ‘subject’ has been suppressed. 
However, as will shortly become apparent, the political approach that it reflects has come to 
be re-asserted, albeit with much greater subtlety, and to different effect, than in former times. 
The attitude of the contemporary judiciary to taxation statutes is no less prudential, though 
manifested in different circumstances, than that in IRC v. Duke of Westminster.384 
This first broad point can be illustrated by reference to examples within two of the four 
substantive themes referred to at the beginning of the study: Barclays Mercantile v. 
Mawson,385 and Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. William Grant and Sons.386 Each 
of these cases, the latest corporation tax decisions of the House of Lords, involve 
contributions by judges whose approach can be seen, in the sense discussed elsewhere in this 
study, as ‘prudential’, on the particular issue and at the particular historical convergence in 
question. Other examples, reflecting the fact that the UK retains its competence in taxation 
matters, are discussed in Chapter 3. In each case, the judges are enhancing the UK’s tax 
sovereignty by finding a ‘true’, or ‘right’, interpretation, by a prudential method. 
                                                
In the later case, the judgment in which was handed down on 28 March 2007, the question 
(to which the judicial committee gave an affirmative answer) was the highly ‘technical’ one 
of whether the amount of depreciation deducted in calculating a company’s trading profits 
 
383  See, e.g., van den Berghs Ltd v. Clark (Inspector of Taxes) [1935] AC 431, 439 (Lord Macmillan); 
Hochstrasser (Inspector of Taxes) v. Mayes [1960] AC 376, 389 (Viscount Simonds); W.T. 
Ramsay Ltd v. IRC [1982] AC 300, 323C, E (Lord Wilberforce). 
384  Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. His Grace the Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1; Stevens, n. 
365 above, pp. 23-24; Assaf Likhovski, ‘Tax Law and Public Opinion: Explaining IRC v Duke of 
Westminster’, in Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 2, ed. by John Tiley (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007), pp. 183-221.    
385 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v. Mawson (Inspector of Taxes) [2004] UKHL 51; 
[2005] STC 1. 
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 for accounting purposes should exclude depreciation of trading stock. If so, the company’s 
taxable profits for the period would be reduced; if not, they would be increased. It was a 
classic example within the accounting theme of how far ‘profits per accounts’ should be 
aligned with taxable profit for corporation tax purposes. Of the two speeches delivered by 
their Lordships, the one that has attracted the greater degree of comment is that of the 
mercurially talented senior Law Lord, Lord Hoffmann.387 He took a quintessentially 
prudential approach, which left various members of the corporation tax policy community 
reeling,388 before, in a considered note, Graeme MacDonald recognised the elegance of the 
solution, although without describing it in terms as ‘prudential’.389 Indeed, viewed in 
Loughlin’s prism of public law as a ‘political practice’, certain aspects of Lord Hoffmann’s 
speech have a significance different from that ascribed by MacDonald in his extremely 
useful note. Thus, although, as MacDonald comments, ‘many [people] were hoping for some 
guidance from their Lordships ... [on] the relationship between accounting practice and the 
law in computing taxable profits’, Lord Hoffmann wisely avoided fulfilling this hope. It was 
the first time that the House of Lords had considered International Accounting Standards, 
and, in the circumstances, full discussion at this point might not have been entirely helpful. 
Not only might it have closed off future possibilities, but it might draw attention to the 
IASB’s (indirect) influence on the corporation tax base, as on the question of whether, in the 
light of this, the GAAP deviations referred to in FA 1998, s. 42(1), were adequate to 
safeguard the public interest. Secondly, consistent with the delicate constitutionality of the 
judiciary’s role in tax cases, Lord Hoffmann endorsed the comments of Sir John Pennycuick 
                                                                                                                                                       
386  Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. William Grant and Sons Distillers Ltd; Small (Inspector 
of Taxes) v. Mars UK Ltd [2007] UKHL 15; [2007] STC 680. 
387  [2007] UKHL 15; [2007] STC 680, 683a-688a (see Tait, Financial Times Innovative Lawyers 
Report 2007, 6 July 2007, 12-14). 
388  See Collins and Dixon, n. 336 above; Parry-Wingfield, Tax Journal, 28 May 2007, 13-15. 
389  MacDonald [2007] BTR 366-370. 
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 V.-C. in Odeon Associated Theatres v. Jones390 and of Nolan L.J., in Gallagher v. Jones,391 
that there was no room for ‘judge made’ rules on GAAP issues.392 Any modifications of 
GAAP had thus to be made by statute, not by the judges. Whether, as MacDonald wonders, 
the judiciary will ever retreat from this position, is a question of prudence; not accountants’ 
prudence,393 but the Machiavellian prudence discussed above. They may do so; they may 
not. It depends on the context in which the question comes to be considered next time round. 
If the point decided in William Grant suggests a prudential approach to public law issues, 
in an area which might, at first sight, be thought of as merely technical, Barclays Mercantile 
v. Mawson (decided on 25 November 2004) evinces prudence in a more obviously ‘political’ 
area: corporation tax avoidance. Here, the question was whether capital allowances were 
available to a finance lessor (Barclays Mercantile), which had incurred expenditure in a 
complicated series of financing arrangements, the purpose of which – in Tiley’s comments 
on the decision – was not, as such, to avoid tax, but ‘to ensure the bank [Barclays] met the 
capital adequacy rules laid down by the UK banking regulatory authorities’.394 In an answer 
that, whilst technical, had a strong element of policy, their Lordships held that capital 
allowances were available in such circumstances. Just as William Grant was a classic case on 
the calculation of trading profits, Barclays Mercantile might have seemed to be a classic tax 
avoidance case. In declining to treat it as such, and in thereby clarifying the application of 
the Ramsay principle, their Lordships took a highly prudential course. This feature of the 
decision, and hence its public law importance, did not figure in commentaries on the case, 
however. Tiley, for instance, commends the quality of the decision and, like MacDonald on 
                                                 
390 Odeon Associated Theatres Ltd v. Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1971] 2 All ER 407, 414a-b. 
391 Gallagher v. Jones (Inspector of Taxes) and Threlfall v. Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1993] STC 
537, 560c-d.  
392  [2007] UKHL 15; [2007] STC 680, 685f. 
393 See Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting, paras 3.18-3.20 
(available from www.frc.org.uk) (accessed 22 October 2007). 
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 William Grant, describes its prudential aspects without actually characterising them in such 
terms. He likes the way their Lordships eschewed a ‘detailed analysis of the existing case 
law’,395 since ‘the principles are now clear’. All that is necessary, instead, is to read the 
statute: ‘first [says Lord Nicholls] ... decide, on a purposive construction, exactly what 
transaction will answer to the statutory description and secondly, ... decide whether the 
transaction in question does so.396 Tiley wonders whether the House of Lords is nudging 
Parliament towards a GAAR, since, as a result of the decision, it may be that what we have 
now is ‘all the disadvantages of the uncertainty of a GAAR without the protection of an 
advance rulings system, the one thing that makes a GAAR for some workable’.397 Finally, he 
praises their Lordships for reformulating the legal position in a single speech,398 in response 
to the request from Barclays’ counsel, ‘on behalf of the profession’ for ‘definitive 
guidance’.399 All of these comments are characteristic of the practitioner, rather than the 
public lawyer. 
Though the precise contexts were different, both William Grant and Barclays Mercantile 
were cases on statutory interpretation. There is also the question, however, of how prudence 
might shape the response of the judiciary to the judicial review of taxation statutes. This is, 
in Tomkins’ terms, legal rather than political accountability, and in the present context, 
would tend to rely on the illegality ground famously enunciated by Lord Diplock in 1984.400 
Thus far, no corporation tax provision has been considered in a judicial review case, but 
                                                                                                                                                       
394  Tiley [2005] BTR 273-280, 274.  
395  Ibid., p. 277. 
396  [2005] STC 1, 13b. 
397  See Tiley, n. 394 above, p. 280. 
398  Ibid., p. 277. 
399 [2005] STC 1, 11b. 
400  See Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374, 
410F; also Woolf, n. 370 above. 
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 applications (as yet unsuccessful) in relation to other taxes,401 indicate that it remains a real 
possibility. The feasibility of a challenge to a corporation tax provision by judicial review, 
arising through non-compliance with GATT 1994, the European Treaty, or the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), is certainly a constraint on ministers and civil 
servants when deciding to take reform measures forward.402 Suffice it to say that judicial 
review could certainly be used for holding the Treasury to account ex post. What, given the 
absence of a Civil Service Act, is not possible, is the judicial review of the actions and 
decisions of civil servants, since there is as yet no ‘framework of law’ against which to test 
them.403 
Opinions are sharply divided on the legitimacy of accountability through judicial review. 
Lever considers it to be necessary to protect potentially disadvantaged groups;404 Waldron 
argues that it is ‘democratically illegitimate’.405 Either way, the day of a successful challenge 
to corporation tax legislation must be near, not least because it looks more effective than 
political accountability. However, we need, as Tomkins says, to guard against the 
assumption that ‘no constitutional problem is solved unless or until it is judicially solved, 
and that there is no constitutional problem that cannot be successfully solved by the 
                                                 
401  See R. (on the application of Professional Contractors Group Ltd and others) v. IRC [2001] 
EWHC Admin 236; [2001] STC 629 (Burton J.); [2001] EWCA Civ 1945; [2002] STC 165 (CA); 
R. (on the application of British Aggregates Association and others) v. Customs and Excise 
Commissioners [2002] EWHC 926 (Admin); [2002] 2 CMLR 51 (Moses J.); Federation of Tour 
Operators and Others v. Her Majesty’s Treasury and Others [2007] EWHC 2062 (Admin); 
[2007] UKHRR 1210 (Stanley Burnton J.).  
402  See the unsuccessful challenge, subsequently referred to the ECJ under Art 234, European Treaty 
(ex 177), in R. v. H.M. Treasury, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1987] STC 157 
(Macpherson J.); Case 81/87, R. v. H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte 
Daily Mail and General Trust plc. [1988] STC 787 (notice of motion for order of mandamus). 
403  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 77. 
404  See Annabelle Lever, ‘Is Judicial Review Undemocratic?’ [2007] PL 280-298.  
405  See Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 YLJ 1346-1406. 
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 judiciary’.406 Political accountability is more easily squared with the idea of a sovereign state 
than is the legal accountability provided by the judges.  
 
SOME INTERIM OBSERVATIONS 
 
The conclusion of the discussion of the judges’ contribution to corporation tax reform is an 
appropriate point at which to reflect on the links between the main elements of the argument 
so far, and the substance of the discussion to be unfolded in the next chapter. 
What the discussion in Chapter 2 has proposed is that the institutional framework of 
corporation tax reform relies for its effectiveness on two main intersecting tensions, each of 
which are both a general feature of government in the UK, and each of which bring to 
consciousness aspects specific to the context of corporation tax reform. 
The more evident of these tensions in the literature is that between the state, and the 
sovereignty subsisting between it and its subjects, and global economic power and the effect 
on the state’s sovereignty of economic globalisation. Less to the forefront of contemporary 
debate, however, is the tension in the UK’s constitutional arrangements between the Crown 
(here H.M. Treasury and its junior Department, HMRC) and Parliament. In this chapter, 
which has concerned itself with the ex post scrutiny of corporation tax reform, the tension 
between Crown and Parliament has been depicted as one in which H.M. Treasury must use 
all of its prudential skills to confront the contingencies of an uncertain world. Parliament, 
however, with the benefit of hindsight, must use all of the analytical skills of its Members, 
all of its powers of compulsion, to reconstruct what effects this prudential conduct has 
produced and, where appropriate, to alert Treasury ministers to areas where the latter’s 
                                                 
406  See Tomkins, n. 65 above, p. 210; also David Goldberg, QC, ‘Between the Taxpayer and the 
Executive; Law’s Inadequacy; Democracy’s Failure?’ [1996] BTR 9-27. 
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 conduct of policy is producing results that are, in some sense, sub-optimal. Experience shows 
that the Treasury has, over the last decade at least, been much more successful in its 
constitutional task than has the select committee system of the House of Commons. 
It is in the weaknesses of the arrangements just discussed, so critics might say, that the 
dangers of the other main tension, that between the corporate sector and the state, are most 
keenly feared. Suppose that, because of a combination of ‘gaps’ in the accountability 
mechanisms and the economic power of the corporate sector, the cumulative effect of 
apparently prudential decisions by Treasury ministers is not a promotion of the public 
interest, but the furtherance of the particular economic interests of MNCs. Such, with a 
welter of examples has been, albeit from somewhat different premises, the argument of 
George Monbiot.407 In the next chapter, we therefore proceed to interrogate the crisis of trust 
and confidence thereby threatened, in the context of the process by which corporation tax 
reform proposals reach maturity and become law. How can we analyse what the public 
interest in corporation tax reform might be? Does it matter where reform proposals come 
from? Does the breadth and depth of the discussion and deliberation of those affected by 
developments in such a technical area of public law really matter? These and other questions 
form the subject matter of Chapter 3, which, in analysing the ex ante scrutiny of such 
proposals, complements and elaborates the discussion in the present chapter. 
A significant element in what has gone before, besides the deconstruction of the tensions 
between corporations and the state, between Crown and Parliament, has been the 
interrogation of the contribution to these oppositions of the respective roles and values of, on 
the one hand, policy networks, and, on the other, the judiciary. In Chapter 3, against the 
background of the issues uncovered in Chapter 2, we shall be examining the role of policy 
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networks in the various corporation tax reforms of recent decades.408 We shall be recalling, 
too, how the judiciary’s role in this process can be said to have prudentially ‘underpinned’ 
these policy developments. 
Finally, we should emphasise that the type of analysis pursued in these pages is facilitated 
by the idea of public law – including taxation law – as a ‘political practice’, the dominant 
technique in which is prudence. This does not mean, however, that the categories of law and 
politics collapse into one. What it does provide is a convincing analysis of the role of one in 
the context of the other. There is, it is maintained, a consistency between Loughlin’s concept 
of public law as a practice of politics, and Tomkins’ notion of a distinction between the 
political and the legal constitutions. The former is a clear manifestation of Loughlin’s 
‘second order of the political’, while the latter is Loughlin’s ‘third order’, in which political 
values are shaped and prioritised in particular contexts by the logic of effectiveness. 
 
 
407  See George Monbiot, Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain (London: Macmillan, 
2000), passim. 
408  See n. 350 above. 
 Chapter 3 
 





‘It is one thing’, as the expression goes, to ask the reader to imagine the vista presented from 
the London Eye; it is ‘quite another’ to offer a convincing interpretation of the interactions of 
the various institutions in the making of corporation tax policy, of corporation tax law. Yet 
such is what the present chapter seeks to do. Chapter 2 analysed the objectives and values 
with which various institutions and groups of individuals approach the problems of 
corporation tax reform. The aim of that discussion was to demonstrate how far the 
institutional framework contributes to the augmentation of trust and confidence in H.M. 
Government (HMG) in the corporation tax arena. The present chapter sets about the task of 
analysing the extent to which HMG’s management of the different groups and institutions in 
the reform process also augment that trust and confidence.1 The challenge presented by the 
latter endeavour is common to all attempts in law and political theory to show how power is 
consolidated in the policy-making process. 
                                                 
1  See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp. 381-382, ch. 19 (esp. p. 415); John Dunn, ‘Trust and Political 
Agency’, in John Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility: Essays 1981-1989 (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990), pp. 26-44; John Dunn, Locke (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 2; 
Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 126-127; Russell Hardin, ‘Do we want trust in government?’, in Democracy and 
Trust, ed. by Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 22-41; Onora 
O’Neill, A Question of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) (so many questions, 
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 To give an imaginative dimension to the discussion, conceive that it were possible, in 
some Dickensian flight of fancy, to eavesdrop on the proceedings of the various institutional 
personnel and policy communities discussed in the previous chapter. In a lecture theatre in 
Whitehall, we might find, as did a reporter from the Financial Times, one spring morning in 
2006, the head of the home civil service, giving a motivational talk to new civil service 
recruits, on the intrinsically worthwhile nature of a job that involves furthering the public 
interest rather than helping companies to avoid their corporation tax responsibilities.2 Close 
by, one might listen in on a meeting of senior public servants from H.M. Treasury and H.M. 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and various eminent practitioners,3 deliberating over the 
specifics of a new legislative measure. Across the street, in the Palace of Westminster, the 
House of Commons might be debating an anti-avoidance provision (one much further down 
the line of development), while in the chamber of the House of Lords, the judicial committee 
might be handing down a judgment in a corporation tax case.4 Meanwhile, across the River 
Thames, in a glass and steel building of the City of London, a group of tax specialists from 
one of the large City professional services firms might be assessing the likelihood of a 
particular course of action crossing the elusive boundary between ‘tax planning’ and 
unacceptable tax avoidance5 with the senior management of a merchant bank. 
None of this is to suggest that tax avoidance and its regulation is the sole, or even the 
most important, theme in corporation tax reform. Indeed, as we shall see in the unfolding 
discussion, all seven of the themes introduced at the beginning of the study have some 
                                                                                                                                                       
so few answers); Plager, Taxation, 1 December 2005, 227-229 (Loughlin Hickey’s 2005 Hardman 
lecture). 
2  See Cameron, FT Magazine, 8/9 April 2006, 16-20, 16. 
3  See Chapter 2 above, pp. 128-137 (‘Policy Networks’). 
4  See Chapter 2 above, pp. 137-146 (‘Her Majesty’s Judges’). 
5  See, e.g., Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 215 (Ed Balls, MP, Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury); also Houlder, Financial Times, 30 July 2007, 3, referring to ‘the 
waning popularity of tax planning centred on day-to-day transactions’. 
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 greater or lesser part to play. What this imaginative flight of fancy does emphasise, however, 
is the idea that, at any given time, individual reform proposals will be at different stages of 
development. There is no single process of reform, but, instead, various incremental 
measures,6 in support of a broader set of policy objectives. There is, moreover, no single 
decision, but numerous decisions at various different institutional levels.7 
Chapter 2 depicted institutional, group, and even individual objectives and values. In the 
course of introducing the ground to be covered, we remarked on the so-called ‘new 
institutionalism’ of authors such as March and Olsen, Tsebelis and Money, and Weaver and 
Rockman,8 and noted that, if used as an ‘organising perspective’, as suggested by David 
Judge,9 aspects of the new institutionalism might help us to interpret the ways in which 
institutions function, and mutually interact, in the reform of corporation tax. The main 
strands of the discussion in Chapter 2, however, concerned the ways in which the values and 
objectives of the institutions of the state and those of the corporate sector might differ; how, 
given the sovereign status of the Crown in Parliament, it is the Westminster institutions, 
rather than those of the EU, that are sovereign; how, following Loughlin, sovereignty is not 
merely a legal, but a ‘relational’, concept; and how, with some reservations, the objectives 
and values of the different institutions involved in corporation tax reform are indeed such as 
to inspire trust and confidence in their respective spheres. Chapter 2 was therefore about the 
question of what the various institutions bring to the reform process: interests, skill, a 
variable ability to hold HMG to account, etc. The present chapter is about the interaction of 
these institutions in the actual process of reform, on sample issues raised by the subject 
                                                 
6  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, col. 114 (Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP 
Paymaster General). 
7  See Christopher Wales, ‘The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the making of Tax Policy 
in the UK’ [2004] BTR 543-565, 550. 
8  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 23-26. 
9  See Chapter 2 above, n. 29. 
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 matter of the study. However, just as Chapter 2 was concerned with institutional safeguards, 
and the political tensions that tend to make them effective, so Chapter 3 is devoted to the 
ways in which HMG’s approach to corporation tax reform, and the procedural framework 
within which reform takes place, add to, or detract from, the trust and confidence necessary 
to political sovereignty. The focus of Chapter 2, as mentioned in its closing pages, was a 
certain pro active prudence, and its ex post scrutiny: the present chapter is about ex ante 
scrutiny, and the strengths and limitations of the processes within which that scrutiny has its 
place. 
Students of public policy will be aware of the sheer range of theoretical possibilities that 
such an undertaking as the present can open up.10 Indeed, the new institutionalism, a highly 
diluted version of which plays a subsidiary interpretative role in the present study, sets out to 
offer such insights. In Wayne Parsons’ words, each of its distinct variants supplies: 
 
‘ ... a different window or insight into how institutions shape the way in which decision-
making takes place – and, especially in the case of economic institutionalism, how 
institutions ought to be arranged so as to ensure that they function “efficiently” (sic).’11 
 
A different arrangement of institutions is not, as will now be appreciated, the main, or even a 
significant, object of the present inquiry. However, what the study is concerned with, in the 
present chapter, no less than in the previous ones, is power.12 How, in other words, the 
institutions, processes, and outcomes of corporation tax reform augment, rather than 
undermine, the UK’s sovereignty. Everywhere the emphasis is on power, on that understated 
                                                 
10  See Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 247-248. Colin Thain and Ross Christie choose Theodore 
Lowi’s four dimensional analysis (see Colin Thain and Ross Christie, ‘Treasury Power: Past, 
Present and Future’, p. 14, available from www.treasuryproject.org (accessed 22 February 2008); 
Theodore J. Lowi, ‘Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice’ (1972) 32 Public Administration 
Review 298-310).    
11  See Parsons, n. 10 above, p. 324. 
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 – possibly suppressed13 - notion of ‘constituent power’.14 Such, ultimately, is the reason for 
rejecting an analysis of the reform process based on some version of Luhmann’s systems 
theory.15 It is true, as discussed in Chapter 1, that Loughlin suggested in 1992 that 
Luhmann’s ‘sociological theory of law’ might assist in ‘revitalizing’ the ‘functionalist style’ 
in public law.16 By 2003, however, in propounding his ‘pure theory of public law’, he had at 
least postponed that possibility, relegating Luhmann’s contribution to a single point of 
interpretation.17 Loughlin’s reasons, though not explicitly articulated, are not hard to 
decipher. Although Luhmann can explain why a potentially very wide range of policy 
alternatives are in fact narrowed down, he does so through the idea of expectations being 
‘normatively’, not ‘cognitively’, closed.18 Without denying the possibility that this can 
illuminate the role of law in certain public policy areas, the view taken in these pages is that 
this does not allow for the placing at the forefront of the discussion what the ‘pure theory of 
public law’ takes to be the central public law (here corporation tax law) technique: that of 
prudence. Secondly, although, through the orderly ‘structural couplings’ for which 
Luhmann’s theory provides, political influences, no less than other ‘outside’ influences, may 
play their part, as will be seen in a moment, the central contention of this study is not that 
corporation tax law is shaped by normative expectations (as, indeed, it may be), but that the 
theory and values that it embodies are conditioned by the nature and scope of the political 
                                                                                                                                                       
12  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 149-154. 
13  See Martin Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted: From English Constitutional Argument to 
British Constitutional Practice’, in The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form, ed. by Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 27-48.  
14  See Chapter 2 above, n. 53. 
15  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 296-307. 
16  See Chapter 1 above, n. 297; also Martin Loughlin, ‘The Functionalist Style in Public Law’ 
(2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 361-403, 402-403 (referring here, not to Luhmann 
but, to Gunther Teubner). 
17  See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 97n. 
18  See Chapter 1 above, n. 307. 
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 (perhaps we should say, ‘ideological’) consensus at any given time. To anticipate a more 
detailed discussion below, the nature of that consensus has, throughout the period covered by 
the study, been defined with perhaps peculiar clarity. Thirdly, between 1992 and 2003, 
Loughlin’s thought has become increasingly preoccupied with the role of public law in the 
formation and augmentation of constituent power,19 that is, political sovereignty, the ‘power 
to model a state’, in George Lawson’s evocative words.20 So, too, is the present study 
concerned to investigate the role of a particular species of public law – corporation tax law – 
in the modelling of the state of ‘the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’. 
This role must, indeed, be an extremely important one, not just in terms of the revenue raised 
by the tax, but in terms of the system’s ability not to dissuade foreign direct investment, and 
in the manifest ability of the ‘direction’ of corporation tax reform to command the heights of 
public policy debate.21 Fourthly, and finally, although it is not thought appropriate to 
characterise Luhmann’s contribution as mere ‘metaphor’, a possibility suggested by the 
editor of Lloyd,22 his systems theory has to be rejected on the historical and interpretative 
grounds emphasised so greatly throughout the present study. What we are concerned with 
here is not a European or international system,23 but a unique combination of national factors 
at a specific historical juncture. 
                                                 
19  See Loughlin, n. 13 above. 
20  See Chapter 2 above, n. 53. 
21  See, e.g., See Houlder, Financial Times, 23 December 2005, 4; Houlder, Financial Times, 20 June 
2006, 3; Houlder, Financial Times, 6 October 2006, 3; Eaglesham, Financial Times, 10 October 
2006, 4; Houlder, Financial Times, 17 November 2006, 3. The Institute of Directors made a ‘plea’ 
for ‘a “clear statement of intent” on where the corporate tax system … [was] heading … ” in late 
2006 (Houlder, Financial Times, 4 December 2006, 3).  
22  See Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, ed. by M.D.A. Freeman, 7th edn (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2001), pp. 701-702. 
23  See Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, ed. by Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David 
Schiff, and Rosamund Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 12; Michael King and 
Chris Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), pp. 209-211. 
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 So it is, therefore, that the discussion in the present chapter seeks to add a further 
dimension to the discussion in Chapter 2, and in a similar vein. It sets out to present, in Julia 
Black’s words, another ‘view of the cathedral’,24 or at least of the doings of those people 
whose working lives are spent in the buildings so visible from the London Eye. Four similar 
strands to those that ran through Chapter 2 run through the present chapter, although (given 
the concerns of Chapter 3), to a distinct purpose. 
First, the significance of the state’s pre-eminence, or more specifically, the pre-eminence 
of its representative – the Crown in Parliament - in the policy-making process, becomes, not 
its obligation, within the logic of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, to account for the 
success, or failure, of its activities, to a watchful group of parliamentary select committees, 
but its right of legislative initiative,25 in this case, in the corporation tax field. Within the 
logic of the UK’s representative democracy, unlike - so Bernard Manin reminds us - the 
direct democracies of Ancient Greece,26 this power of initiative is unique. Its exercise, or 
non-exercise, under the discretions conferred by the royal prerogative analysed in Chapter 2, 
calls for the qualities of prudence there discussed. Prudence dictates that, in initiating reform 
measures, account be taken of the possibility that the decisions surrounding the move will be 
scrutinised in due course by the Treasury Select Committee. 
Secondly, in Chapter 2, the importance of the sovereign status of the Crown in 
Parliament was seen as its continuing pre-eminence over the institutions of the EU; the idea 
that, in tax matters especially, Westminster, not Brussels, was still the focal point of British 
government.27 This was expressed in terms of the idea that, as regards the European and 
                                                 
24  See Black (1996) 16 OJLS 699-711 (Review Article). 
25  See Thain and Christie, n. 10 above, pp. 7 and 16 (referring to an interview with Lord Turnbull, 
former Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (1998-2003): see Timmins, Financial Times, 20 
March 2007, 1); also Chapter 2 above, n. 283; also Giles, Financial Times, 16 January 2008, 2.  
26  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 15.  
27  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 45 and 308. 
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 international theme in the study, the real questions are not ones of sovereignty, but of 
jurisdiction and competence. A similar point applies in the present chapter. It is that, in 
taking the legislative initiative in particular areas of reform, HMG has first to consider its 
competence to act in that way. This issue needs to be taken into account, not just by HMG in 
initiating reform policies, but by Parliament, especially when amendments are sought to be 
made to legislative proposals. 
The third of the strands running through Chapter 2 was how HMG’s sovereignty in 
corporation tax matters was more than a question of its competence to act. Equally 
importantly, sovereignty in such matters was a question of capacity. It depended on the 
quality of the relationship between state and non-state actors involved in corporation tax 
reform.28 This point remains equally valid in Chapter 3. The generation of trust and 
confidence is no more essential to the ex post scrutiny of policy than it is to the making of 
policy in the first place. This is why, whereas in Chapter 2, generating trust and confidence 
depended on a combination of the prudential qualities of Treasury ministers, and on an 
effective system of ex post accountability, in Chapter 3 it becomes a matter of how HMG 
consolidates its capacity in tabling and developing reform initiatives. The fourth major strand 
in the chapter is therefore the extent to which the process of corporation tax reform augments 
or detracts from trust and confidence in the specific policy area. The need to take action, or 
indeed not to do so, is dictated by a prudential technique, something that may require greater 
or lower levels of consultation, less or more pre-emptive action. Getting the ‘mixture’ wrong 
involves, not just ‘losing the support of business’,29 but, given the purpose of reforming 
corporation tax, damaging the UK’s economic growth in the process. 
                                                 
28  See Chapter 2 above, n. 59. 
29  See, e.g., Eaglesham and Guthrie, Financial Times, 25 January 2008, 4; Willman and Eaglesham, 
Financial Times, 28 January 2008, 9; Willman, Financial Times, 8 February 2008, 3; Parker, 
Financial Times, 12 February 2008, 2; (but see, per contrà, Eaglesham, Financial Times, 14 
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PROCESSES AND INTERACTIONS 
 
This chapter is therefore about the interactions of state and non-state actors, in the reform of 
corporate income tax, in the UK’s developed representative democracy. While 
acknowledging the difficulties of unravelling the two, we are concerned here with the 
effectiveness of the reform process, rather than that of the institutions themselves. What 
characterises the policy area in question is an unusually high level of technical detail. It is 
thus that the first part of the discussion elaborates on the distinction between ‘the technical’ 
and ‘the political’, which was originally set up in Chapter 1.30 Given the orientation in the 
present chapter towards processes, the elaboration of the issues seeks to show how these are 
adapted to a particular view of politics, policy and reform, conditioned by the idiosyncrasies 
of the UK’s representative institutions. The logic of these institutions is, as ever, 
effectiveness, and, through this, their ability to inspire some degree of trust and confidence in 
the measures taken. It is thus that, just as the emphases in the discussion of the institutions, in 
Chapter 2, differed from a ‘Sheffield school’ approach, so also does the main emphasis in the 
present chapter. Chris Hilson’s work, which provided an important inspiration for the present 
study, concentrates on what he calls ‘ex ante accountability’.31 The endorsement of this 
expression is reflected in its use throughout the present study.32 What is crucial, however, is 
that it is used here to rather different effect. ‘Accountability’,33 in Hilson’s portrayal of a 
                                                                                                                                                       
February 2008, 2); Eaglesham, Financial Times, 27 February 2008, 2; Willman, Financial Times, 
29 February 2008, 2. 
30  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 37-43. 
31  See Chris Hilson, Regulating Pollution: A UK and EC Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2000), p. 57.  
32  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 191-192. 
33  See Richard Mulgan, ‘”Accountability”: An Ever-expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public 
Administration 555-573. 
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 particular area of social regulation, is the key legitimating characteristic of the system.34 
What we are saying here is that accountability is a key feature of the process of corporation 
tax reform, but that its legitimating capacity depends on the prudential way in which such ex 
ante accountability, through consultation and deliberation, is used. This depends, in turn, on 
the ‘structural’ strengths and weaknesses incident to the involvement of the corporate sector 
in governance through New Public Management (NPM). 
As suggested above, and as discussed in detail in Chapter 2, NPM envisages particular 
roles for the state, on the one hand, and for the corporate sector, on the other.35 The 
discussion in Chapter 2 examined the arguments both for, and against, the idea that 
corporation tax reform is just one further instance of the domination of the UK’s political 
institutions by MNCs and fund managers based in the City of London. The second part of the 
discussion in Chapter 3 seeks to examine the consequences of the perhaps surprising 
conclusion that, at the present juncture at least, there is some identity of interest between the 
state and these groups. It does so by focussing on the importance of the concept of ‘the 
public interest’ to HMG’s role in tax matters and on the ideological nature of the public 
interest concept. As will be explained, the (problematic) ideology is that economic growth 
can be combined with social justice, that efficiency and fairness can go hand in hand. This is 
the ‘Third Way’ ideology, or at least New Labour’s vision of it, to which brief reference has 
already been made.36 That corporation tax reform has a decisive part to play in this vision 
has been emphasised by HMG on many occasions, although its implications have not been 
fully developed in the literature, either in terms of its implications for issues such as 
                                                 
34  See Hilson, n. 31 above, pp. 57-68 and ch. 5. 
35  See the overview of NPM change in Christopher Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), ch. 7, esp. p. 130 (table). 
36  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 187-189. 
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 corporation tax avoidance (as to which see Chapter 4), or of the problems and opportunities 
thereby presented for the critique of policy. 
The emphasis placed on the ideological nature of the public interest, and on its 
importance in understanding corporation tax reform, has two main implications for the 
present study. First, it helps us to isolate the relevance of economics, as well as the particular 
type of economics involved. On one view, economic values are the only values running 
through corporation tax reform (corporation tax being, as was said elsewhere, a form of 
economic regulation),37 so some clarification of their nature and scope is clearly extremely 
important. What is not regarded as important here, however, is an ‘economistic’, or ‘public 
choice’, view of the motives for, and outcomes of, the actions of the individuals and 
institutions involved in corporation tax reform.38 It is not simply that it is the sphere of 
activity of the economist rather than the public lawyer. It is that, although parties and 
politicians may indeed ‘make excessive promises to win votes’,39 one characteristic of the 
New Labour government after 1997 has been that, given its historically large parliamentary 
majority, it has not generally had ‘to cut deals so as to secure support’,40 nor, in all of the 
examination of the sources involved in the study, is there any obvious sign that an inquiry 
based on the tendency of ‘bureaucrats’ to maximise ‘their own self-interest’41 would be 
justified. This does not rule out criticism of the coherence or consistency of decisions taken 
on other grounds, nor does it obviate the idea that public choice might have a role in other 
                                                 
37  See Chapter 1 above, n. 352. 
38  See Arye L. Hillman, Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of 
Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 6; Richard A. Musgrave and 
Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 5th edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1989), ch. 7; John Tiley, Revenue Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 15. 
39  See Parsons, n. 10 above, p. 307. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
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 areas of policy.42 It is simply to say that, as an analytical tool, its suitability is not borne out, 
or even suggested, by the facts. 
The second main implication of placing emphasis on an ideological view of the public 
interest is the clue that it provides to the nature of the power being wielded in the reform 
process. It is no part of the present discussion to suggest power relations based on any of 
those themes that have proved so enduring in Western political writing. Thus, for instance, 
there is no suggestion that the process of corporation tax reform has proved to be an 
illustration of ‘the power of organized interests’43 (as ‘corporatist’ theories would suggest);44 
of technocrats (since the argument is specifically that whatever levels of technical expertise 
are involved, corporation tax reform raises important political issues);45 or of elites (as C. 
Wright Mills suggested in the America of the 1950s,46 and as Hywel Williams has sought to 
suggest in relation to the Britain of the early years of the twenty-first century).47 The reason 
is that all three, as well as any ‘neo-Marxist’ position we might care to adopt, would portray 
power as a matter of some form of domination.48 Throughout the study, we have been very 
careful to avoid that suggestion. Instead, we seek to portray the policy-making process in the 
                                                 
42  Ibid., pp. 306-323; Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, 
Strategy, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 21-25; also Christopher D. 
Foster and Francis J. Plowden, The State Under Stress: Can the Hollow State be Good 
Government? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996), pp. 33-34. 
43  See Parsons, n. 10 above, pp. 257-262. 
44  On corporatism, see Wyn Grant, Economic Policy in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 
219; Chapter 2 above, n. 325; also Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the 
State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 34-35, 80-83.  
45  See Parsons, n. 10 above, pp. 265-271; also Claudio M. Radaelli, Technocracy in the European 
Union (London: Longman, 1999), pp. 111-112. 
46  See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Steven Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 66 and 76; also 
Parsons, n. 10 above, pp. 265-271. 
47  See Hywel Williams, Britain’s Power Elites: The Rebirth of a Ruling Class (London: Constable, 
2006), pp. 217-226 (xi-xiv). 
48  See Angus Stewart, Theories of Power and Domination: The Politics of Empowerment in Late 
Modernity (London: Sage, 2001), pp. 46-53. 
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 corporation tax field as being a manifestation of the augmentation of constituent power.49 
True it is that corporation tax reform has a strong technical dimension, but, as the public 
prominence of the discussions referred to earlier on demonstrate, its political dimension is no 
less salient. Constituent power is ‘power to’, in Thomas Hobbes’s famous dichotomy, rather 
than ‘power over’.50 So our question is therefore, interpretatively speaking, how is it that, 
despite massive criticism of the length and ‘complexity’ of corporation tax legislation, the 
tax seems to work, that it continues to raise sufficient receipts,51 that there is little evidence 
(if any) that it either discourages inward investment or promotes ‘capital flight’?52 The 
answer, insofar as it can be captured within the dimensions of this work, is that it is through 
prudent decision making, allowing for participation by technically well-informed groups, by 
those affected, and by lobbyists, but which decision-making cannot in the end be dominated 
by them. In case this may seem naive, consider the responses to some key objections. We 
may wish politics to be practised differently, yet what we have is what political history has 
bequeathed us. Economic growth is now the key element in the ‘neo-liberal’ ideological 
consensus.53 The views of George Monbiot,54 Colin Leys,55 and others, to be discussed 
                                                 
49  See Chapter 2 above, nn.20 and 53; also nn. 14 and 19 above (this Chapter). 
50  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 56, 57 and 146. 
51  Corporation tax receipts were sluggish between 2001 and 2004, when they began to rise rather 
steadily: see Giles, Financial Times, 21 October 2004, 3; Daneshkhu, Financial Times, 19 
November 2004, 2; Plender, Financial Times, 17 March 2005, 19; Giles, Financial Times, 19 
August 2005, 3; Giles and Daneshkhu, Financial Times, 27 March 2006, 1; Giles, Financial 
Times, 21 November 2006, 4. There was a ‘sharp decline’ in receipts in autumn 2007 (see 
Rozenberg, Times, 25 September 2007, 44; Strauss and Briscoe, Financial Times, 25 September 
2007, 4; Giles, Financial Times, 21 November 2007, 4). Receipts rallied again, however, in early 
2008 (see Giles, Financial Times, 22 February 2008, 1). 
52  See Ipsos MORI, UK Corporate Taxation and International Competitiveness (London: 
Confederation of British Industry, 2006), Appendix, Section 2; Houlder, Financial Times, 20 June 
2006, 3; Eaglesham, Financial Times, 10 October 2006, 4; Houlder, Financial Times, 17 
November 2006, 3; Willman, Financial Times, 23 March 2007, 3; Houlder, Financial Times, 14 
May 2007, 3. 
53  See John Schwarzmantel, Ideology and Politics (London: Sage, 2008), p. 42. 
54  See George Monbiot, Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain (London: Macmillan, 
2000), passim. 
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 below, may (possibly rightly) suggest another way, but their views represent merely the 
reality of an ideological debate,56 and are not necessarily an accurate interpretation of what 
has actually happened. Corporation tax reform, though it is undoubtedly a highly technical 
undertaking, will be judged by its economic results, and, so far at least, these have been 
remarkably encouraging. 
All of these issues are intended to pave the way, with a little anticipation of the 
conclusions, for the analysis in the third to sixth parts of the discussion. The argument rather 
carefully unfolded in Chapter 2 was that the institutional framework within which 
corporation tax reform takes place is designed to ensure a certain freedom of (prudent) action 
by HMG, subject to close scrutiny (albeit ex post) by Parliament, a scrutiny that, overall, is 
rather successful, although it shines rather an intermittent beam on the taxation of 
companies. The object of the arrangements is the holding of the Crown (in Parliament) to 
account by Parliament. The third to sixth parts of the present discussion apply this historical, 
institutional, logic to the corporation tax reform process, and they do so by taking up the 
division of the tax policy-making process that, basing himself on O’Donnell,57 Christopher 
Wales, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers,58 suggested in a 2004 paper: 
‘initiation’; ‘development’; ‘presentation’ and ‘delivery’.59 The unique value of Wales’s 
paper hardly needs to be underlined. What does need to be emphasised, however, is that, 
although not theorised in such terms, what each of the four stages involves is the need for 
HMG to judge the nature of reform proposals, the timing and extent of consultation, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
55  See Colin Leys, Market-driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest (London: 
Verso, 2001). 
56  See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 173. 
57  See Financing Britain’s Future: Review of the Revenue Departments (Chair, Gus O’Donnell) (Cm 
6163) (London: TSO, 2004).  
58  See David Lipsey, The Secret Treasury (London: Viking, 2000), p. 46. 
59  See Wales, n. 7 above, pp. 549-551. 
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 nature and detail of explanatory material, and the issue of practical guidance on new 
measures. In a word, although Wales does not express it thus, HMG must use different ways 
of behaving ‘prudently’. In the third to sixth parts of the discussion, what this has entailed in 
practice is analysed in detail. Suffice it to say at this stage that, although the fourfold division 
of the process tends to mask the point, the crucial stage is that part of the process, in the 
‘development’ phase, which involves the detailed debating of Finance Bill (FB) clauses by 
the relevant standing committee of the House of Commons. This is the (almost ‘sacred’) 
point at which, by historical necessity, tax legislation is approved by Parliament, the ‘Gothic 
prudence’ of the system. True it is that debate may be short; that consultation may have been 
brief (or even non-existent); that MPs are not (in the main) tax professionals. Within the 
logic of the system, none of these matters is as relevant as the mere fact that the FB clauses 
have been argumentatively scrutinised by the democratically elected representatives of the 
people. The method, in the third to sixth parts of the discussion, is largely to use the 
examples given in Chapter 1, but not there discussed in detail, to illustrate further the three 
‘non-substantive’ themes in corporation tax reform: the consultation, the technical and the 
Departmental themes. Each of these examples in turn concerns aspects of the four 
‘substantive’ themes: accounting, anti-avoidance, compliance and enforcement and European 
and international developments. Augmenting trust and confidence in corporation tax reform 
is more complex, and more widespread, than the casual reader of the newspapers or 
professional journals might imagine.                              
In the light of the choices involved in this approach, including the rejection of an 
interpretation based on systems theory,60 we now need to develop two aspects of the 
discussion originally introduced in Chapter 1: the question of the political dimension to 
                                                 
60  See the Prologue above. 
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 corporation tax reform; and, within the practice of the politics that seeks to manage the 
implications of this political element, the question of the nature and scope of the public 
interest in the reform of corporation tax. 
 
THE ‘POLITICAL’ ELEMENT IN CORPORATION TAX REFORM 
 
In Chapter 1, it was maintained that the reform of corporation tax had, over recent years, 
been transformed from a technical, or technocratic, enterprise, and into a political one.61 By 
way of a preliminary justification for this contention, the discussion in that chapter sought to 
characterise the political nature of the issues thereby raised, mainly in terms of their potential 
to create conflict. In the corporation tax context, this entailed threats of capital flight, 
dissuading inward investment, and scaring fund managers away from the jurisdiction.62 But 
there were potentially other ‘lower level’ antagonisms, too. Hence, for instance, traces of 
conflicts of interest, albeit skilfully averted, were to be found in the textures of the loan 
relationships code,63 and, more generally, in the ability of the economic issues involved in 
corporation tax reform to energise the potential for conflict. In this part of the chapter, we 
need to broaden and deepen those preliminary points in three, interrelated, ways: first, by 
contrasting the conflictual view of ‘the political’ posited so far, with its deliberative 
counterpart, to produce a synthesis suitable for deployment in the rest of the discussion; 
secondly, by pointing up the subtle distinction between politics and ‘policy’, especially the 
idea of ‘reform’ itself; and, thirdly, by illustrating the link between politics and political 
economy, the discipline with which tax policy is customarily most closely associated. 
                                                 
61  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 37-43. 
62  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 146-148.  
63  See Chapter 1 above, n. 130. 
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 An analysis of these three sets of relationships is crucial to an understanding of what the 
public interest in corporation tax reform might be, and to the relationship between (and 
relative significance of) the stages of the reform process identified above. The thread that 
binds them together is the nature of power and how it differs from mere domination. 
 
Ideas of ‘the political’ 
The author has written elsewhere of the different ways in which ‘the concept of the political’ 
has been envisaged over the centuries, and of how these might illuminate the political 
dimension to the reform of corporation tax.64 It is not, therefore, necessary to do more here 
than to reflect on the main aspects of that analysis, and to indicate the issues that are of the 
greatest relevance to the present inquiry. 
First, it is possible to conceive of political issues in two distinct ways.65 On the one hand, 
the Aristotelian mode could be adopted,66 and a political issue could be imagined as one 
which is within the ‘public domain’, and which is subjected to discussion within a ‘set of 
institutions which ... allow space for deliberation, negotiation, [and] the representation of 
interests’.67 This mode is new to the present study, but it has a rather obvious appeal, since it 
seems to offer a correspondence to what we find if we look at the engagements between, say, 
members of policy communities, when reform proposals have been made. It reflects, broadly 
speaking, the assumptions running through Claudio Radaelli’s 1997 and 2003 examinations 
                                                 
64  See John Snape, ‘Corporation Tax Reform – Politics and Public Law’ [2007] BTR 374-404, 382-
389. 
65  See Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Jarle Weigård, Understanding Habermas: Communicative Action 
and Deliberative Democracy (London: Continuum, 2003) pp. 6-9; Andrew Gamble, Politics and 
Fate (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 3-5. 
66  See Aristotle, The Politics, ed. by Stephen Everson (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
1988); also Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. by J.A.K. Thomson, Hugh 
Tredennick and Jonathan Barnes (London: Penguin, 2004).  
67  See Gamble, n. 65 above, p. 3. 
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 of the approach of the European Commission to corporate tax policy in the EU.68 What 
makes the Aristotelian vein rather pallid and unconvincing, however, is its tendency not to 
see political issues as ones involving ‘power, conflict and antagonism’,69 something that the 
tradition of Machiavelli would have us do.70 Given the corporation tax context, however, the 
deliberative dimension might nonetheless be very insightful. Secondly, writers in the 
Aristotelian tradition tend to work in a ‘normative’ mode, rather than an interpretative one. 
The issues of which they speak concern matters as they ought to be rather than as they are.71 
Writers such as Thomas Aquinas,72 Michael Sandel,73 John Rawls,74 and Jürgen 
Habermas,75 although they point us towards a better way of living, are unlikely to be able to 
help us understand the conflictual reality of programmes of legislative reform as 
convincingly as ones such as Machiavelli,76 Hobbes,77 Carl Schmitt,78 and 
                                                 
68  See Claudio M. Radaelli, The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European Union: Knowledge 
and International Policy Agendas (London: Routledge, 1997); Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘The Political 
Economy of EU Direct Tax Policy’, in Contemporary Issues in Taxation Research, ed. by Andy 
Lymer and David Salter (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 145-165. 
69  See Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 9. 
70  See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 423, 491. 
71  The elision that Hume observed: see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. 
Selby-Bigge, 2nd edn by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 469-470.  
72  See St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Volume 28: Law and Political Theory (Ia2æ. 90-97), 
ed. and trans. by T. Gilby, O.P. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1966). The writer would like to 
thank Dr Michael Sutton for drawing Aquinas to his attention in this context. 
73  See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). Sandel seems to have been an important ideological influence on Gordon 
Brown (see Gordon Brown: Moving Britain Forward: Selected Speeches 1997-2006, ed. by Wilf 
Stevenson (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), pp. 145, 272). 
74  See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
75  See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1997). 
76  See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); also Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and trans. by Bernard Crick, Leslie J. 
Walker and Brian Richardson (London: Penguin, 2003) (see Chapter 1 above, nn. 179, 182 and 
190).  
77  See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985); Thomas Hobbes, On 
the Citizen, ed. and trans. by Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
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 (contemporaneously) Chantal Mouffe.79 For the purposes of the present study, we really do 
need to have some such understanding of this reality. This is why, in the author’s view, there 
is a lack of realism to Radaelli’s account of corporate tax reform in the European context. 
Thirdly, the point of deliberating on political issues, in the Aristotelian tradition, is to see 
which side of the argument helps to promote ‘the common interest’,80 the creation of a just 
society. In the Machiavellian tradition, however, although expressions such as ‘the common 
interest’ are used, more frequent are ‘the public interest’ or ‘the public good’,81 expressions 
whose primary focus is not, as such, the just society, but the building up of a powerful 
state.82 Again, for reasons to be discussed in the next part, it is the latter, rather than the 
former, which on balance seems to capture the mainspring of corporation tax reform. Again, 
too, Radaelli does not seem in general to take sufficient account of national interests in his 
account of European corporate tax reform.83 Fourthly, in its emphasis on the state, the 
Machiavellian tradition regards political issues as ones that affect the building up of the state, 
rather than ones that presuppose its existence.84 If corporation tax revenues are taken to be so 
crucial to the UK’s continued prosperity that their loss or diminution would threaten the 
                                                                                                                                                       
78  See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996). 
79  See Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993); also Mouffe, n. 69 above. 
80  See Aristotle (1988), n. 66 above, p. 68. 
81  Different from the concept of ‘public goods’ or ‘common goods’ (see Hume, n. 71 above, p. 539; 
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. by R.H. 
Campbell and A.S. Skinner (textual editor W.B. Todd), 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 
II, pp. 689, 708, 723), both relating back to Hobbes’s jobs of government (see Chapter 1 above, n. 
169); Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, pp. 86ff.; Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (London: 
Yale, 2005), pp. 61-64; O’Donnell, n. 57 above, p. 93; Russell Hardin, David Hume: Moral and 
Political Theorist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 77-78, 121-123. 
82  See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
p. 182; Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, ed. by James Tully (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 133, 175; Machiavelli (2003), n. 76 above, pp. 100-138; 
Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 54-55, 58-67. 
83  But see Radaelli (2003), n. 68 above, p. 148.  
84  See Schmitt, n. 78 above, p. 19; also Gamble, n. 65 above, p. 4. 
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 state’s ‘stability’,85 then the Machiavellian emphasis, at an interpretative level at least, can 
be said to be all the more useful than the Aristotelian one. This is a point, in fact, which even 
Radaelli recognises. Fifthly, as if to underscore the importance of Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’ 
in the Machiavellian tradition, of the ‘ever present possibility of conflict’,86 it places centre 
stage, not the public-private dichotomy essential to Aristotelian thought,87 but the opposition 
of (political) ‘friend’ and (political) ‘foe’.88 As discussed in Chapter 1, it is only necessary to 
reflect on the tone of much public debate in the corporation tax field to see that this latter is 
an essential ingredient in the interpretation of its reform.89 Finally, it does not matter that the 
issues raised by the reform of corporation tax involve some clash of economic interests; 
economic interests, as we have said, are quite capable of energising political issues.90 
In what follows, the idea of corporation tax reform as involving political issues seeks to 
draw on elements of both traditions. First, we accept that all of the interactions discussed in 
the study, between state and corporate sector, and between the corporate sector and the rest 
of society, imply the constant potential for conflict. If we look at the five ‘dilemmas’ of 
corporation tax reform as governance, discussed in Chapter 2, the existence of the strand is 
plain: the involvement of bodies outside HMG itself, such as the European Commission, the 
European Court of Justice (the ECJ) and the International Accounting Standards Board (the 
IASB), suggests the constant possibility of conflict over competences, if not over capacity; 
the existence of influential opinion-formers in the media and in special interest groups 
suggests the constant possibility of sections of the corporate sector being ready to enlist in an 
                                                 
85  See Chapter 4 below. 
86  See Chapter 1 above, n. 139. 
87  See Arendt, n. 82 above, pp. 29 and 31; also Gamble, n. 65 above, pp. 3-5. 
88  See Hobbes (1985), n. 77 above, p. 185; Schmitt, n. 78 above, p. 90 (note by Leo Strauss). 
89  Understated in Radaelli’s brief account of the reform of corporation tax in the 1980s (see Radaelli 
(1997), n. 68 above, pp. 125-136. 
90  See Chapter 1 above, n. 149. 
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 ‘us’ and ‘them’ struggle against HMG,91 especially in the event of some serious failure of 
corporation tax policy; and even the fact of involving policy networks creates the constant 
possibility of conflict over the inclusion of some professional, or producer, networks, to the 
exclusion of others. Secondly, we acknowledge the public and deliberative nature of much of 
the debate on corporation tax reform, although (as the discussion in this chapter will make 
clear), the nature and scope of the deliberative dimension is seriously restricted by British 
ideas of what the ‘art and science of government’ involves. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the constant possibility of conflict encompasses, not just groups within the UK, 
but also the UK, on the one hand, and other EU Member States and the EU institutions, on 
the other.     
What we end up with, therefore, is an idea of the political that owes something to the 
Aristotelian tradition, for sure, but which is defined primarily by the uncomfortable realities 
of the Machiavellian world view. 
 
Politics, policy and reform 
It will be apparent from what has just been said why, in choosing an idea of what Loughlin 
calls ‘the second order of constitutional law’, i.e. the business of politics, this study has opted 
for the (Machiavellian) tradition of politics as the ‘art of government’.92 It is not simply a 
matter of taking a pessimistic view of human relations. This view of politics also commends 
itself because of the representative nature of British government. Governing, in Britain, as 
has been highlighted in Chapter 2, has been seen as a matter of ‘prudence’ at least since 
                                                 
91  A reflection of the (political) ‘friend’ and (political) ‘enemy’ distinction in Schmitt, which Leo 
Strauss regards as characteristic (see Schmitt, n. 78 above, p. 90). 
92  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 31-37.  
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 1688.93 Although, as we shall see in the next part, prudence has a place in the Aristotelian 
tradition of politics,94 it is most closely associated with the tradition of Machiavelli95 and 
Hobbes.96 The rest of the chapter will show how thoroughly this pervasive notion is worked 
through in the UK policy-making process. For the moment, it is necessary only to carve out 
from the notion of prudence the kind of fiscal prudence most closely associated with the Rt 
Hon. Gordon Brown, MP, as Chancellor of the Exchequer. What this study seeks to do is to 
highlight the relationship between fiscal prudence - discussed in the next part of the Chapter 
– and the prudence that is the most essential ‘tool’ in British government. Each consolidates 
the other; a big mistake (possibly Alistair Darling’s mistake) is to confound one with the 
other. 
Some European languages make little, if any, distinction between ‘politics’ and 
‘policy’.97 Even the English of Marlowe98 and of Milton99 seemed not to emphasise such a 
divergence. Modern commentators in English do make a distinction, however.100 In Heclo’s 
words, ‘[a]s commonly used’, policy is ‘usually considered to apply to something “bigger” 
than particular decisions, but “smaller” than general social movements’;101 it is purposeful 
                                                 
93  See George Savile, ‘The Character of a Trimmer’, in The Works of George Savile Marquis of 
Halifax, vol. 1, ed. by Mark N. Brown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 178-249, 187; (see 
Loughlin, n. 17 above, p. 151, on the crucial importance of Savile to English attitudes to 
government); also Chapter 2 above, n. 199. 
94  See Aristotle (2004), n. 66 above, pp. 150-157, 159-166.  
95  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 268-281. 
96  See Hobbes (1985), n. 77 above, p. 169; also Art Vanden Houten, ‘Prudence in Hobbes’s Political 
Philosophy’ (2002) 23 History of Political Thought 266, esp. 267-279. 
97  e.g. French, German or Italian (see Parsons, n. 10 above, pp. 13-14). 
98  See, e.g., Christopher Marlowe, ‘The Jew of Malta’, Act I, Scene 1, line 138; Act I, Scene 2, lines 
160-162, in Doctor Faustus and Other Plays, ed. by David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 256, 262, 454. 
99  See, e.g., John Milton, ‘The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth’, in John 
Milton: The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 330-353, 341.   
100  See, e.g., Blitz, Financial Times, 12 July 2007, 2. 
101  See H. Hugh Heclo, ‘Review Article: Policy Analysis’ (1972) 2 British Journal of Political 
Science 83-108, 84. 
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 (‘policy’ being the antonym of ‘aimlessness’);102 and it is, as Harold Lasswell said, 
‘commonly used to designate the most important choices made … in organized … life … [, 
being] free of many of the undesirable connotations clustered about the word political, which 
is often believed to imply “partisanship” or “corruption”’.103 Parsons puts it well when he 
says that, ‘[t]o have a policy is to have rational reasons or arguments which contain both a 
claim to an understanding of a problem and a solution’.104 Policy, then, is the ‘big picture’, 
the ‘vision’, that vision whose realisation requires the practices, the craft, of politics.105 
Arthur Smithies, writing in 1950, on the death of Joseph Schumpeter, attributed a saying to 
him that explicitly recognises this relationship: 
 
‘Only in a very special sense can we speak of a nation’s policy or policies. In general 
declared policies are nothing but verbalizations of group interests and attitudes that assert 
themselves in the struggle of parties for points in the political game, though every group 
exalts the policies that suit it into eternal principles of a “common good” that is to be 
safeguarded by an imaginary kind of state. Nobody has attained political maturity who 
does not understand that policy is politics. Economists are particularly apt to overlook 
these truths.’106  
 
Policy making, therefore, is quintessentially a prudential activity – quick, clever reactions, 
ones that weigh ends and means, are necessary to keep the ‘vision’ alive.107 
                                                 
102  See Parsons, n. 10 above, p. 13. 
103  See Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Policy Orientation’, in The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments 
in Scope and Method, ed. by Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1951), pp. 3-15, 5. ‘Political’ is used here, of course, in its popular sense, which is excluded 
from the discussion above (for the reasoning, see Snape, n. 64 above, pp. 388-389). 
104  See Parsons, n. 10 above, p. 15; in the tax context, see, e.g., John R. King, ‘Debt and Equity 
Financing’, in Tax Policy Handbook, ed. by Parthasarathi Shome (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1995), 
pp. 158-161.  
105  See Chapter 1 above, n. 156. 
106  See Arthur Smithies, ‘Memorial: Joseph Alois Schumpeter 1883-1950’ (1950) 40: 4 American 
Economic Review 628-648, 644. 
107  See Parsons, n. 10 above, p. 42; Loughlin, n. 17 above, p. 151 (referring to Savile, n. 93 above). 
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 Reform, in turn, is a species of policy making.108 The vastness of the tax reform 
literature109 no doubt owes something to the fact that all public policy issues involving 
taxation are, in an important sense, concerned with tax reform, rather than ‘tax design’.110 
Some of its broad outlines, so far as it relates to the taxation of corporate income, will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Here it is simply necessary to note four distinct, although 
interrelated, points. First, at least so far as its application to corporation tax over the past 15 
years or so is concerned, the fact that reform is incremental, often reactive, in nature. 
Responding to successive ECJ decisions has been an important part of this process.111 So 
incremental has reform been, in fact, that, although many would date the ‘vision’ to a 
consultation document of July 2001,112 intellectually, the case seems far stronger for 
reaching back to the earliest systematic corporation tax consultation, that of 1989, on foreign 
exchange (FOREX) gains and losses.113 Secondly, reform is, by its very nature, never 
finished, a point that has been underlined by Joel Slemrod,114 unconsciously perhaps 
reflecting some thoughts of Michael Oakeshott on ‘reform’ in general.115 Thirdly, whilst all 
reform is difficult to manage, tax reform is perhaps especially so: ‘[o]ne should bear in mind 
[as Machiavelli himself wrote] that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more 
                                                 
108  See Shome, n. 104 above, passim. 
109  See Simon James and Christopher Nobes, The Economics of Taxation: Principles, Policy and 
Practice, 7th edn (Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 285-287; Radaelli (1997), n. 
68 above, p. 55; also Tax Law Design and Drafting, ed. by Victor Thuronyi (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 1996).  
110  See Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, p. 128; also Martin Feldstein, ‘On the Theory of Tax 
Reform’ (1976) 6 Journal of Public Economics 77-104, 90-98. 
111  See Snape, n. 64 above, pp. 397-403; also Frans Vanistendael, ‘The role of the European Court of 
Justice as the supreme judge in tax cases’ [1996] EC Tax Review 114-122, esp. 122. 
112  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, Large Business Taxation: The Government’s strategy 
and corporate tax reforms: A consultation document (London: H.M. Treasury, 2001). See Chapter 
4 below. 
113 See Inland Revenue, Tax Treatment of Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses: A Consultative 
Document (London: Inland Revenue, 1989) (see Chapter 1 above, n. 49). 
114  See Joel Slemrod, ‘The economic impact of the tax reform act of 1986’, in Do Taxes Matter? The 
Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, ed. by Joel Slemrod (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 
p. 1, quoted in Radaelli (1997), n. 68 above, p. 55. 
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 dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer, than to introduce new political 
orders’.116 Finally, it is at least arguable that describing this incremental process as one of 
‘reform’ may not only be misleading, but, if it is, it may damage the political acceptability of 
the measures taken. Most people, unconsciously perhaps, harbour a ‘Burkean’ idea of 
‘reform’ as a process that retains something of the subject matter’s ‘true’ substance.117 What 
has been at work here, as we shall see presently, is, instead, a radical reworking of the nature 
and purposes of the tax. 
 
Politics and political economy 
Finally, the relationship between politics and economics, as Hannah Arendt pointed out,118 
has an oxymoronic quality: the political, on an Aristotelian view, relates to the public space 
(‘the realm of the polis’),119 whereas the economic relates to the private sphere (‘the 
“household” (oikia)’).120 As late as the time of James Mill, economists were comparing the 
economy of a state with that of a household.121 However, although Adam Smith asserted that 
what was ‘prudent’ for a household must, of necessity, be good for a country,122 and 
although economists like to use the imagery even today,123 its use beyond mere metaphor, 
                                                                                                                                                       
115  See Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 55-57. 
116  See Machiavelli, n. 76 above, p. 22. 
117  See Edmund Burke, ‘A Letter to a Noble Lord’, in The Portable Edmund Burke, ed. by Isaac 
Kramnick (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 213-229, 218-219; Francis P. Canavan, S.J., 
The Political Reason of Edmund Burke (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1960), p. 177. 
118  See Arendt, n. 82 above, p. 29. 
119  Ibid., p. 30. 
120  Ibid., p.33. 
121  Ibid., p. 33n, referring to Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic 
Theory, trans. by Paul Streeten (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), pp. 140-143.  
122  See Smith, n. 81 above, I, p. 457. 
123  See Wolf, n. 81 above, p. 77.  
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 said Rousseau, was a mistake.124 In fact, like David Hume, Smith regarded political 
economy as part of politics.125 Indeed, it is Smith’s crucial definition of political economy 
that marks out the designing of taxes as a practice of political economy and thus of politics. 
Political economy, says Smith, is that ‘branch of the science of a statesman or legislator’ 
which relates to providing, not simply ‘a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people’, by 
ensuring that they can ‘provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves’, but also 
supplying ‘the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the publick services’.126 
Political economy therefore includes the art and science of designing taxes, and its use as 
such is supported by Schmitt’s analysis of the relationship between political and other 
phenomena such as economics.127 They do not, contrary to Luhmann and earlier systems 
theorists, run alongside each other, in their own self-constructing ‘environments’.128 Rather, 
the political creates the conditions in which the economic can function,129 and (as mentioned 
above), the economy can provide the energising force behind the political.130 The best way 
of achieving the ends that Smith regarded as desirable is, of course, a matter of ideology, the 
ideology of the ‘public interest’. 
                                                 
124  See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy and The Social Contract, trans. and 
ed. by Christopher Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 3-6 (see Chapter 1 above, 
n. 372).  
125  See Hume, n. 71 above, p. xv; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael 
and A.L. MacFie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 186-187 (see Donald Winch, Adam 
Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), pp. 12-13 (also Myrdal, n. 121 above, p. 143; Arendt, n. 82 above, p. 33n). 
126  See Smith, n. 81 above, I, p. 428. But note changes in usage: see Charles S. Maier, ‘Introduction: 
Political economy and history’, in In search of stability: Explorations in historical political 
economy, ed. by Charles S. Maier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1-16, esp. 
2-6.  
127  See Schmitt, n. 78 above, p. 37.  
128  See Luhmann, n. 23 above, p. 357. 
129  See Schmitt, n. 78 above, p. 88 (note by Leo Strauss); also Hobbes (1985), n. 77 above, p. 186. 
130  See Schmitt, n. 78 above, p. 38 (see Chapter 1 above, n. 149). 
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 THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CORPORATION TAX REFORM 
 
What the public interest in corporation tax reform might be, as distinct from ‘what business 
wants’, has rarely, if ever, entered into the corporation tax reform debates of recent years.131 
Yet some idea of its nature and implications, which goes beyond the political decision as to 
how much of the total ‘tax take’ is required in the first instance from the corporate sector, is 
crucial: first, because, given the concept of politics embraced above, it is essential to the 
conception of corporation tax as public law, to which we shall return in Chapter 4. Secondly, 
because the very idea of the public interest, one whose fortunes have been distinctly 
varied,132 is ideological, not least because of what it says about the relative roles of state and 
corporate sector. And, thirdly, because, in the last decade or so, corporation tax, in common 
with many other areas of law, has been put to work in the service of a particular view of the 
public interest, some elements of which had already been grasped in the work of the 
Thatcher and Major administrations, but which have been developed and articulated most 
fully in the writings of ‘Britain’s most prolific author’,133 erstwhile Chancellor and current 
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. 
 
                                                 
131  But see, e.g., Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt [2003] STC 607, 
627a-b; also COM (2007) 785 final, The application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct 
taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries, 10 December 2007, pp. 2, 3.  
132  For some observations on its historical significance in the tax context, see Carolyn Webber and 
Aaron Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986), pp. 142-147, 296-297, 356-357. 
133  See Anon, Private Eye, No. 1197, 9 November-22 November 2007, 5. 
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 ‘The public interest’ and ‘the common good’ 
‘Let the welfare of the people be the first of laws’, that most famous of Cicero’s injunctions, 
was introduced in Chapter 1: ‘salus populi suprema lex esto’.134 In that discussion, we noted 
the ambiguity of the expression, ‘salus populi’,135 while linking it with Hobbes’ idea that one 
of the fundamental duties of the state was to provide the conditions under which subjects 
could make money honestly,136 and also with what Michael Oakeshott calls the ‘unresolved 
tension’ between the idea that states exist for ‘the promotion of some specified enduring 
interest’,137 or simply to ensure the ‘loyalty’ of subjects to each other.138 If, as is contended 
throughout this study, the purpose (albeit an understated one) of corporation tax is to assist in 
the promotion of the ‘public interest’,139 it is important to reflect briefly on what the idea of 
the public interest may imply that other, apparently similar, concepts, such as ‘the common 
interest’, and, especially, ‘the common good’, may not. 
The first point we can make is that, although the usage is so far from consistent that the 
point may be a misleading generalisation, the public interest is perhaps more closely 
identified with the Machiavellian tradition in political thought than with the Aristotelian one. 
The latter tends to talk about ‘the common interest’, or, possibly, the ‘common good’,140 
rather than about the public interest, the ‘public good’, the ‘general interest’, or the ‘national 
                                                 
134  See Chapter 1 above, n. 164; on ‘welfare’, see Brian Barry, Political Argument: A Reissue with a 
New Introduction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 187-189, 224-225. 
135  Ibid., n. 166. 
136  Ibid., n. 169. 
137  Ibid., n. 400. 
138  Ibid. 
139  See Application No. 21319/93, National and Provincial Building Society and Others v. United 
Kingdom [1997] STC 1466 (ECtHR); see Arendt, n. 82 above, p. 182, on the literal significance of 
‘inter-est’ (also Stewart, n. 48 above, pp. 36-38). 
140  See Milton, n. 99 above, p. 345; Rousseau, n. 124 above, p. 63 (in ‘The Social Contract’); John 
Stuart Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’, in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. 
by John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 255. 
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 interest’.141 Thus, Hannah Arendt draws attention to the fact that Aquinas, writing in the 
Aristotelian tradition, recognised, not a political realm as such, but the common spiritual and 
material interests of individuals, interests whose furtherance was possible only if one of 
those individuals took it upon himself to ‘look out’ for them all.142 Within the same tradition, 
John Finnis describes the common good as: 
 
‘ … a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for 
themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for 
the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or 
negatively) in a community.’143 
 
In doing so, Finnis underestimates the virulence of controversy when he goes on to say that 
‘[t]he common good is a frequent or at least a justified meaning of the phrases “the general 
welfare”144 or “the public interest”.’145 Again, Rawls says that the common good consists of 
‘conditions and … objectives that are … to everyone’s advantage’,146 and ‘[t]he common 
good I think of as certain general conditions that are in an appropriate sense equally to 
everyone’s advantage’.147 
                                                 
141  ‘General interest’ is used in Application No. 13013/87, Wasa Liv Ömsesidigt, Fërsäkringsbolaget 
Valands Pensionsstiftelse and a group of approximately 15,000 individuals v. Sweden (1988) 58 
ECHRDR 163, 187; Application No. 15375/89, Gasus-Dosier-und Fördertechnik GmbH v. 
Netherlands (1995) 20 EHRR 403 (ECtHR), para. 61; see Barry, n. 134 above, p. 203; Adam 
Smith referred to ‘the general interest’ (see Smith, n. 81 above, I, pp. 144, 265, 266, 529; II, p. 
613), Burke ‘the general good [emphasis added]’ (see Edmund Burke, ‘Speech at Mr. Burke’s 
Arrival in Bristol’, in Kramnick, n. 117 above, pp. 155-157, 156). See Gertrude Himmelfarb, The 
Roads to Modernity: The British, French and American Enlightenments (London: Vintage, 2008), 
pp. 56-59. 
142  See Arendt, n. 82 above, p. 35. 
143  See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 155. 
144  See Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, passim, who use this expression. 
145  See Finnis, n. 143 above, p. 156. 
146  See Rawls (1999), n. 74 above, p. 205; see Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007), 
pp. 216-219. 
147  See Rawls (1999), n. 74 above, p. 217. 
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 Machiavelli, by contrast, although he was not entirely consistent, spoke of the public 
good and the public interest.148 More explicitly still, Hobbes (as Rawls himself told his 
students) rejected the idea that ‘people … [had] any agreed notion about what is good … 
[advocating] some agency, some impartial arbitrator or impartial judge, to decide what is in 
the common good’149 and, in doing so, talked about the ‘good of the people’.150 Likewise, 
Samuel Pufendorf held that laws were to ensure that the conduct of citizens served ‘to 
preserve and promote the public good’,151 while, in the famous judicial decision that forms 
the basis of the modern ‘purposive’ tradition in statutory interpretation,152 Sir Edward Coke 
significantly reports the Exchequer barons as speaking of the legislative purpose being ‘pro 
bono publico’, rather than ‘pro summa bonum’.153 
The second point is that the idea of the public interest is more realistic than that of the 
common good, more interpretatively useful, since it is more consonant with the idea of 
representative government than is the idea of the common good, which has a strongly 
deliberative dimension. This is not to say that a political discussion cannot take place in a 
deliberative mode, just that, in reality, many political decisions are taken by the few on 
behalf of the many, without wider deliberation. This is reflected in the point that 
                                                 
148  See Skinner, n. 82 above, p. 85. 
149  See John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. by Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2007), p. 84. 
150  See Loughlin, n. 17 above, p. 141. 
151  See Pufendorf, n. 82 above, p. 133. 
152  See Tiley, n. 38 above, pp. 52-57; also Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 217 
(Ed Balls, MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury) 
153 See Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 ER 637: ‘ … the office of all the Judges is always to make such 
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle 
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add 
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro 
bono publico ((1584) 76 ER 637, 638); see Barry, n. 134 above, p. 202; also Locke, n. 1 above, p. 
377 (see Dunn, n. 1 above, p. 51); Note also idea of ‘public interest law’ (see Rajeev Dhavan, 
‘Whose Law? Whose Interest?’, in Public Interest Law, ed. by Jeremy Cooper and Rajeev Dhavan 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 17-48). 
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 Machiavelli’s prudence is the prudence of the ‘virtuous’ sovereign.154 In the Aristotelian 
tradition, whilst ‘prudence’, as a ‘cardinal virtue’, is an important quality in shaping the 
common good, it is not the province of government alone, but of every individual.155 
Thirdly, the common good, of course, refers to the common good of mankind. It is not, in 
other words, related specifically to the nation state.156 The public interest, by contrast, is an 
interest in the building up of a powerful state, able to defend itself, both economically and 
militarily, against other states. 
Fourthly, the public interest, unlike the common good, has a recognised place in the 
‘welfare economics’ literature, which, in a contemporary and revivified form, has animated 
HMG’s economic policy since 1997.157 This point is made clear in a contribution from 
Richard Musgrave from 1962. Welfare economics, he says, is what economists ‘have to say 
about “the public interest”’.158 Welfare economics is, in other words, about ‘correcting for’ 
economic inefficiencies, which can of course include ‘spillover costs’ (e.g. in the form of 
pollution),159 but they can also include ‘spillover benefits’ (e.g. in the form of technical 
innovations), an idea crucial to New Labour’s ideology of the public interest as the 
                                                 
154  See Chapter 2 above, n. 252.  
155  See Catechism of the Catholic Church, rev. edn (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999), p. 400. 
156  Ibid., pp. 416-419; Bill Jordan invokes a similarly ‘frontier-less’ conception of ‘the common 
good’, although not from a specifically Christian standpoint (see Bill Jordan, The Common Good: 
Citizenship, Morality and Self-Interest (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 174-184). 
157  See, most importantly, H.M. Treasury, Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy: 
Towards Greater Economic Stability, ed. by Ed Balls and Gus O’Donnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002); H.M. Treasury, Microeconomic Reform in Britain: Delivering Opportunities for All, ed. by 
Ed Balls, Joe Grice and Gus O’Donnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
158  See R.A. Musgrave, ‘The Public Interest: Efficiency in the Creation and Maintenance of Material 
Welfare’, in Nomos V: The Public Interest, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 
1962), pp. 107-114; also Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, p. 136 (theory of ‘optimal taxation’ as 
owing much to welfare economics). 
159  Which provides the economic justification for instruments such as pollution taxes: see H.M. 
Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 112 above, para. 1.17; also Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 157 
above, p. 10.  
 179
 furtherance of economic growth160 in combination with ‘societal fairness’. It is a perception 
of the public good that goes beyond ‘Smith’s attempt to reconcile public good with 
individual interest – a problem that for Smith was moral and economic at the same time’.161  
 
The ideological nature of the public interest 
It is one of the central arguments of this study, already heavily underscored, that what has 
sustained corporation tax reform, especially in the decade since 1997, has been its supporting 
role in the advancement of a particular conception of the public interest. Decisions as to the 
levels of taxation to be collected, in the first instance, from the corporate sector,162 are only 
part of that process. Of more importance, analytically speaking, is what conception HMG has 
of the economic and social role of corporation tax. What is unusual, perhaps, is that this 
conception has been set out particularly fully, both by Gordon Brown himself, and by his 
main advisers, and that, to some extent at least, it has even taken a public law form. 
Gordon Brown has consistently referred to the public interest, rather than to the common 
good,163 on various occasions dating back even before 1997. It will be recalled from Chapter 
1 that his view of the public interest – his ideology – has attempted to blend ‘enterprise’ with 
‘fairness’.164 With what success this has been achieved, only time will tell, but it is clearly 
within this framework that the incremental process165 of corporation tax reform must be 
understood. Thus, in a speech of March 2003, he emphasised the close interrelationship of 
                                                 
160  See Diane Coyle, The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why it Matters 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 51; Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, pp. 50-53; 
Joel Slemrod and John Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen’s Guide to the Debate over Taxes, 3rd 
edn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 114-120.  
161  See Don Slater and Fran Tonkiss, Market Society: Markets and Modern Social Theory 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 41; also Himmelfarb, n. 141 above, ch. 2. 
162  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 67-68. 
163  See Brown, n. 73 above, pp. 136-180. 
164  See Chapter 1 above, n. 188; also Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 157 above, p. 6. 
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 efficiency and ‘social justice’, and characterised the role of business tax reform as being to 
support business.166 What he was clearly interested in, as a matter of ideology,167 was 
cementing a certain identity of interest between the state and the corporate sector, such as 
that identified in Chapter 2 above. He said: 
 
‘Britain has a unique opportunity to be, once again, a beacon to the world, advancing 
enterprise and fairness together – a dynamic, vibrant economy that is the first economy in 
the new era of globalisation to match flexibility with fairness and, in doing so, to attain 
the high levels of growth and employment that are the best route to prosperity for all.’168    
 
Since this passage is concerned with building a ‘modern economy’, it sets out some of the 
key intersections in the ideological debate over the public interest in corporation tax reform. 
First, it reflects a clear desire to put British interests first,169 thus reinforcing a public 
interest, rather than a common good, approach to corporation tax policy: ‘[t]he way forward 
[said the Chancellor earlier in the speech] is mutual recognition of national practices[,] not 
harmonised regulations; and tax competition not tax harmonisation’.170 This is an approach 
which, as we shall see, has permeated the European and international theme in corporation 
tax reform. Secondly, in its reference to ‘high levels of growth’,171 the passage underlines the 
                                                                                                                                                       
165  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, col. 114 (Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP, 
Paymaster General). 
166  See Brown, n. 73 above, p. 119. 
167 See Thain and Christie, n. 10 above, p. 11. 
168  See Brown, n. 73 above, p. 135; also Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, pp. 181-188, whose 
ideology is remarkably similar. 
169  But see Murphy and Nagel, n. 56 above, p. 198, n. 7. 
170  See Brown, n. 73 above, p. 118; also Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, col. 112 
(Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP, Paymaster General); also Kitty Ussher, The spectre of tax 
harmonisation (London: Centre for European Reform, 2000), pp. 47-48 (see Chapter 2 above, n. 
260). 
171  See the 1944 White Paper on the independence of the Bank of England (referred to in Brown, n. 
73 above, p. 91). 
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 ideological espousal of the ‘post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory’172 that had gained 
ground since the 1980s. The impact of this theory on the values immanent to the changing 
corporation tax code will be discussed in Chapter 4. For the moment, it is sufficient to note 
that, in macroeconomic terms,173 it has involved putting the conquest of inflation before full 
employment, while in microeconomic terms,174 it has entailed attempting to use the 
corporation tax system to encourage for instance investment in research and development.175  
Ideological conflict, in terms of differing perceptions of the public interest, is the third 
notable feature of the passage above. Hence the emphasis on fairness, and the pairing of 
‘high levels ... [of] employment’ with economic growth. All debates about corporation tax 
reform, especially as they relate to corporation tax avoidance, are about differing conceptions 
of the requirements of fairness, and its prioritisation relative to some version of ‘efficiency’. 
Thus, Philip Gillett is precisely right to regard anti-avoidance measures as involving a 
political calculation,176 since they are fundamentally about HMG’s ability to strike the right 
balance between fairness and efficiency. But there is no jurisprudential reality beyond that, 
no legalistic way of testing whether, and when, an anti-avoidance measure is a step too far. 
So far as those affected are concerned, views on such measures are a matter of personal 
ideologies about the role of the state in creating fairness,177 while, as regards HMG, their 
                                                 
172  See Coyle, n. 160 above, pp. 48-52; also David Coates, Models of Capitalism: Growth and 
Stagnation in the Modern Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 48-49, 265-273. 
173  As redefined: see Balls and O’Donnell, n. 157 above, ch. 1; Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 157 
above, ch. 1 (also see Nigel Lawson (Lord Lawson of Blaby), ‘Changing the Consensus’, in The 
Chancellors’ Tales, ed. by Howard Davies (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 113-146, 115-116 (see 
also pp. viii-ix)). 
174  See Thain and Christie, Parliamentary Brief, February 2008, 21-22, 21 (available from 
www.treasuryproject.org (accessed 21 February 2008)). 
175  See Coyle, n. 160 above, pp. 48-52. 
176  See Houlder, Financial Times, 13 September 2006, 3. 
177  See Gerhart Niemeyer, ‘Public Interest and Private Utility’, in Friedrich (ed.), n. 158 above, pp. 1-
13. 
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 introduction is a matter of political judgment. These are issues to which we shall return in 
Chapter 4. 
In case this sounds something of a truism, it is worth noting a lawyer’s response to a 
public law manifestation of these principles. An important tool in getting the balance right 
between efficiency and fairness is the famous ‘prudence ... for a purpose’,178 already alluded 
to in Chapter 1. As explained subsequently, this is comprehended by, though not coincident 
with, Machiavellian prudence.179 In this context, the obligation in FA 1998, s. 155, for H.M. 
Treasury ‘to prepare and lay before Parliament’ a ‘code for fiscal stability’, is, rightly 
interpreted, of the first importance. We shall have occasion to return to it in Chapter 4. For 
present purposes, however, we need to focus on one aspect of an analysis of section 155 by 
Edward Troup.180 What he questions is the very premise that Gillett correctly acknowledges, 
the way in which the ideas discussed above were reflected in the 1997 Budget Report.181 It 
was there claimed that the ‘tax system should ... be well designed, to meet the objectives of 
the government of the day, without generating undesirable side effects’.182 Troup’s evident 
dismay at the ‘strong implication ... that taxation has a part to play in social and economic 
engineering’183 completely misses the ideological nature of the public interest, as well as the 
conception of public law embraced throughout this study, the latter, it is submitted, being a 
broadly accurate reflection of the reality. Troup also does not seem to appreciate the 
importance of the code to ‘constrained discretion’, the idea that economic policy discretion 
must be available to HMG, but subject to institutional safeguards.184    
                                                 
178  See Chapter 1 above, n. 184. 
179  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 279-280. 
180  See Troup [1998] BTR 490; also Chapter 2 above, n. 124. 
181  See Equipping Britain for our long-term future: Financial Statement and Budget Report July 1997 
(House of Commons Papers, Session 1997-1998, 85) (London: The Stationery Office, 1997). 
182  Ibid., para. 1.68. (Emphasis added.) 
183  See Troup, n. 180 above, p. 491. 
184  See Balls and O’Donnell, n. 157 above, pp. 30-35. 
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 In his review of the stages in the making of taxation policy, Christopher Wales identifies 
the first such stage as ‘policy initiation’. In the rest of the chapter, we seek to show how each 
of these stages has invoked one or more of the seven themes drawn out at the beginning of 
the study. 
 
INITIATING REFORM MEASURES 
 
If what has been said convincingly establishes the premises, much of the writing on the 
process of corporation tax reform is more insightful in certain respects, while being less so in 
others, than might be anticipated. More insightful than might be expected is the fact that it is 
generally willing to accord a rather privileged status to experts in the particular policy area. 
Less insightful, however, is the fact that writing on reform is in general insufficiently 
discriminating as to what different strands of corporation tax reform may require. Two 
documents illustrate the truth of these points. One of them is the paper to which reference 
has already been made,185 in which Wales, with considerable flair, conceives of the 
corporation tax policy process in terms of the four stages considered here. The other is a 
rather austere discussion paper, produced by a working party under the chairmanship of Sir 
Alan Budd,186 and published in 2003 by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).187 The two 
documents are quite different. The value of the former, as has already been mentioned, is that 
it sets out the public views of a long-serving member of Gordon Brown’s Council of 
                                                 
185  See Wales, n. 7 above. 
186  Now provost of Queen’s College, Oxford, Sir Alan Budd was head of the Government Economic 
Service and Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury from 1991 to 1997. 
187  See Tax Law Review Committee, Making Tax Law: Report of a Working Party on the 
Institutional Processes for the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals and for the Enactment of 
Tax Legislation chaired by Sir Alan Budd (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2003).   
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 Economic Advisers.188 Indeed, it was to the offices of Chris Wales, then still a City 
accountant,189 that Ed Balls190 wended his way early on the morning of New Labour’s 
Election victory in 1997. The importance of the latter document is that the working party 
consisted of a distinguished group of tax practitioners, including Malcolm Gammie, QC,191 
Edward Troup192 and John Whiting,193 as well as several academics and parliamentarians. 
That said, the text of the IFS document does bear the unmistakable literary stamp, familiar 
from earlier work on the consultation theme, of the first of the three.194 It goes without 
saying that both documents are extremely valuable in the present context:195 the Wales paper 
because it reflects on the findings of the 2004 O’Donnell Report as they relate to tax policy-
making; the IFS document because it sets out the considered views of some of those 
practitioners who have been most closely involved with the reform of corporation tax.  
The present study concentrates on four reform themes: the greater alignment of 
‘commercial profits’ with ‘taxable profits’, which we have designated ‘the accounting 
theme’; the prevention of unacceptable manipulations of the corporation tax base (designated 
‘the anti-avoidance theme’); the reshaping of the mechanisms for determining and collecting 
the tax due (‘the compliance and enforcement theme’); and, most intriguingly, perhaps, the 
need to react effectively to the activities of international and EU institutions, especially the 
                                                 
188  See Chapter 2 above, n. 298. On the Council of Economic Advisers, see Thain and Christie, n. 10 
above, p. 12. 
189  See Hugh Pym and Nick Kochan, Gordon Brown: The First Year in Power (London: Bloomsbury, 
1998), p. 44; also Lipsey, n. 58 above, p. 126, for Wales’s contribution. 
190  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 16 and 264; Chapter 4 below, n. 199.  
191  See Chapter 1 above, n. 47. 
192 See above. Then still in private practice, as a partner in the City law firm, Simmons and Simmons 
(see Chapter 2 above, n. 124). 
193  See p. 133 above. 
194  Gammie was the working party’s secretary (see the list in Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 
above, p. v). 
195  Older, still interesting, studies include: Ann Robinson and Cedric Sandford, Tax Policy-Making in 
the United Kingdom: A Study of Rationality, Ideology and Politics (London: Heinemann, 1983); 
Michael Rush, ‘Influencing the 1986 Budget’, in Parliament and Pressure Politics, ed. by 
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 ECJ (‘the European and international theme’). A key strand in the present chapter is that 
each of these four themes has invoked subtly different ideas of what prudence requires, and 
that, since prudential decision-making in individual cases cannot be reduced to a formula, 
each of the two documents just mentioned, valuable as they are, underestimates this element 
of spontaneity and contextuality. 
One of the ways in which both documents are less incisive than might be anticipated is in 
their relation of corporate tax reform proposals to the institutions, and also to the processes, 
of representative democracy. In the IFS document, the authorial viewpoint is distorted, 
something that puts the critical emphasis of the work in the wrong place.196 There is also, as 
we shall see, some misunderstanding of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Likewise, 
although the Wales paper has particular strengths, it too makes some fundamental 
constitutional errors, some of which it shares with the IFS document. Overall, there is less 
emphasis on how we reached the present situation, than on how matters might be improved 
for the future. One of the conclusions of the present study is that greater light would be shone 
on the latter if the analysis of the former were somewhat sharpened. 
The initiation of reform proposals, the first of Wales’s four stages, is a useful (and indeed 
logical) place to begin analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the literature of which the 
two documents under discussion are taken as exemplars. Recall the institutional structure 
evoked in Chapter 2 above. There are two cross cutting tensions: between the corporate 
sector and the state, and between the Crown (represented here by H.M. Treasury and its 
junior department(s)),197 and Parliament. These tensions inform the options for initiating 
                                                                                                                                                       
Michael Rush (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Taxation: A 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); and Hood, n 35 above, ch. 6. 
196  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 3.5. 
197  For most of the relevant period, there were two junior departments, the relevant one being the 
Inland Revenue (see Chapter 1 above, p. 13). 
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 reform measures.198 The Crown has considerable freedom of initiative, at least when ‘the 
rules of the game’ are simply recited. In order to act authoritatively, however, as ‘the Crown 
in Parliament’, it must at all times strive for prudence in taking forward the public interest. If 
it acts imprudently, its sovereignty begins to drain away, in part because of the difficulty of 
enforcing party discipline when a measure is brought before the House of Commons, and in 
part because the trust and confidence of the electorate is thereby undermined. The 
relationship between the Commons and opinion outside Parliament is an important one, to 
which we shall return. That such imprudent proposals have not generally figured in 
corporation tax reform (unlike, arguably in other policy areas),199 is an indication that the 
course taken has usually been the right one. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the personal 
qualities of the individuals, the ministers, who hold this major competence, are never more 
important than at the initiation of policy. Prudence, first and foremost, is about the weighing 
of ends and means,200 the end defined by the ideology of the public interest that the 
governing party has embraced (in our case, a combination of efficiency and fairness), and the 
means by the choice of measures (including corporation tax measures) needed to bring this 
about. As Manin says, if our system is viewed as something nearer to ‘audience democracy’ 
than to ‘party democracy’,201 the apparent ‘aptitude’ of the responsible minister ‘for making 
good decisions’202 is all-important. More difficult to believe now he is Prime Minister, but 
                                                 
198  The Treasury’s role as a policy initiator has been lamented by Lord Turnbull, who was Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury from 1998 to 2002 (see Timmins, Financial Times, 20 March 2007, 1). 
Thain and Christie date this policy role to the Southgate review of 1994 (see Fundamental Review 
of H M Treasury’s Running Costs: A report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Sir Colin 
Southgate et al. (London: no named publisher, 1994), p. 86: Thain and Christie, n. 10 above, p. 12.    
199  e.g., possibly, anti-terrorism legislation, or educational reform. 
200  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 34-35; Smith, n. 125 above, p. 216 (quoted in Chapter 5 below, n. 32); 
(see Winch, n. 125 above, p. 159). 
201  Already touched on at Chapter 2 above, nn. 203-204. 
202  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 221. 
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 certainly as Chancellor, Gordon Brown had this quality in abundance, just as his successor, 
Alistair Darling, seems to lack it.203 
The fact that, in the UK’s representative democracy, it is HMG, and not anyone else, 
which has the right of policy initiative,204 places a particularly heavy accent on the coherence 
and consistency of the corporation tax policy choices embodied in each of the four 
substantive themes referred to above. Wales writes: 
 
‘Policy initiation requires a particular blend of skills and knowledge. It requires an 
understanding of macro and micro-economic policy205 and the key elements that 
underpin the government’s strategy. It requires a deep understanding of the tax system, 
an understanding of how the system functions and where it is dysfunctional; and it 
requires an appreciation of how policy change might be engineered to reduce the risks 
that change itself can create.’206  
 
The need for rigorous rationality in policy initiation can be underlined all the more forcefully 
by taking account of four further factors. First, the point that, theoretically, the system places 
absolute discretion over the initiation of proposals in the hands of ministers of the Crown, 
there being no doctrine of mandate and recall in a representative system, and no binding 
electoral pledges in the UK system.207 Secondly, the fact that it is perfectly legitimate, in a 
representative system, for the choice of one reform proposal rather than another to lie with 
the relevant minister, on the advice of her civil servants (and, possibly, her policy adviser(s)), 
and for that decision to be made behind closed doors.208 This applies both to ‘strategic 
                                                 
203  See, e.g., Anon, Financial Times, 25 January 2008, 12 (editorial); Parker, Financial Times, 12 
February 2008, 2; Parker, Financial Times, 13 February 2008, 2.  
204  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 6.3; for sources of proposals in the 1980s, 
see Leonard Beighton, ‘Tax Policy and Management: The Role of the Inland Revenue’ (1987) 8 
FS 1-16, 5-6.  
205  [See Balls and O’Donnell, n. 157 above; Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 157 above.] 
206  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 549 (a most Machiavellian passage!). 
207  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 163.  
208  Ibid., p. 167. This reflects Benedetto Croce’s point about the ‘aristocratic’ nature of modern 
government (see Benedetto Croce, ‘Elements of Politics’, in Politics and Morals, trans by 
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 policy’ (big) choices and to (smaller) decisions involved in ‘policy maintenance’,209 
although, as Wales perceptively points out, ‘[t]he corporate tax reform programme is a prime 
example of strategic policy that has swept up a range of maintenance issues’.210 Thirdly, a 
point of relevance to the New Labour government, the fact that a conference resolution of 
1907 gave the leaders of the Parliamentary Labour Party the competence to decide on the 
priorities between different policy options.211 Fourthly, the fact that, as Wales points out, one 
of the consequences of the merger of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise has been 
that the ‘strategic policy advice’ of civil servants will be ‘single-sourced’.212 ‘A future 
Chancellor [Wales writes] may well regret having had her sources of advice narrowed to 
such an extent’.213 In the light of these four observations, and with the public interest as the 
starting point, we can reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of the initiatives behind each 
of the four substantive reform themes. 
Although the accounting theme ranges across at least three main areas (the use of GAAP 
under FA 1998, s. 42, the special codes on corporate finance, and the treatment of 
intangibles), the decision to proceed in each case was prudential because of its consistency 
with New Labour’s ideology of the public interest. We shall return to a much fuller analysis 
of these points in Chapter 4. For the moment, however, we simply need to point out that, 
whatever the temptations to act differently, there was in each case a clear commitment to the 
free market. For example, in its fundamental reaffirmation in 2002 of the Conservatives’ 
approach in 1993, 1994 and 1996, HMG acknowledged that the pre-1996 corporation tax 
                                                                                                                                                       
Salvatore J. Castiglione (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1946), pp. 7-43, 17-18; Loughlin, n. 
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 treatment of corporate debt was both anomalous214 and helped to create tax avoidance 
opportunities,215 as well as the fact that there had been no serviceable law on the tax 
treatment of FOREX216 or financial instruments,217 leaving the vacuum to be filled by 
GAAP, which already had a conceptual framework for such items.218 Specifically, the 2002 
reaffirmation of the essentials of the loan relationships code was a reflection of an 
ideological commitment to the continued facilitation of the ‘gilt strips’ market219 and, more 
importantly (though less commented on), to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI),220 
something which Gordon Brown has always strongly affirmed to be in the public interest.221 
Initiation, or reaffirmation, of the policy in each of these cases was the prudent course, not 
least because a barely-noted effect of the introduction of the loan relationships code in 1996 
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 had been a broadening out of the tax base.222 Imprudent, given New Labour’s commitment 
to the market, would have been the suggestion, which was actually referred to at the 
Committee Stage of the FOREX code in 1993,223 that a ‘Tobin tax’224 would be the 
appropriate means of taxing transactions in currencies. It was not that such an innovation 
would have been bad in itself (in fact, there were arguments for it under an economic policy 
designed to tackle ‘spillover costs’).225 It was simply that it would not have been seen as 
consistent with New Labour’s developing ideology of the public interest. 
                                                
A similar kind of prudence, although to subtly different ends, was the touchstone for the 
measures making up the compliance and enforcement theme in the present study. The great 
strength of the introduction of corporation tax self-assessment (CTSA) in FA 1998,226 was 
that the bringing-in of quarterly interim payments of corporation tax could be taken as the 
quid pro quo for the abolition of what by the late 1990s had become the much resented 
advance corporation tax (ACT).227 This ‘up front’ payment of corporation tax had been a key 
feature of the tax since it was remodelled in 1972.228 Because there was a cap on the amount 
of ACT that could be set against ‘mainstream corporation tax’,229 and because overseas tax 
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forex stability (London: Fabian Society, 1993), pp. 18-22; Leys, n. 55 above, p. 27; Barry 
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(Chapter 2, n. 181 above) was a member of the Select Committee.    
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 on foreign dividends had to be relieved before ACT,230 many companies by the time of its 
abolition were carrying ‘ACT mountains’. So, whilst it was a risky strategy to begin a 
process of introducing interim corporation tax payments under CTSA, it was obviously the 
right one.231 Not only was criticism reasonably muted232 (the problem of ‘shadow’ ACT 
possibly apart),233 but CTSA has remained one of the more ‘stable’ components of the 
corporation tax code. 
As we shall see, the most recent manifestations of the European and international theme 
have involved the need to react effectively to the potential for disruption resulting from a 
number of high-profile decisions of the ECJ. In such cases, policy choices are of course very 
limited, but, again, a convincing case could be made, given the public interest imperative, for 
(as has happened) preferring the risk of challenge under Community law to the certainty of 
leakage from the corporation tax base. The need for such effective reactions is not the only 
relevance of the European and international theme, however. The 1980s saw a growing 
literature produced by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the 
OECD) on the arguments for, and against, marrying tax and accounting.234 Against this 
background, it became quite easy for HMG to argue that the public interest was best served 
by initiating reform measures based on the ‘policy transfer’ involved in adopting these ideas.  
None of the three themes just discussed can be said to present particularly serious 
problems for the somewhat secretive process of corporation tax policy initiation within the 
                                                 
230  See ICTA 1988, s. 797(4)(a); see Chris Whitehouse, Loraine Watson, Lakshmi Narain and Natalie 
Lee, Revenue Law – principles and practice, 18th edn (Croydon: Butterworths Tolley, 2000), para. 
[33.44]; the problem had been mitigated by FA 1994, s. 138 and Sched. 16, but it was still a real 
one (ibid., paras [33.46]-[33.70]).   
231  Given the impact on pensions of the withdrawal of ‘payable’ ACT credits, it was also an 
illustration of how, in a contest between efficiency and fairness, efficiency would tend to win. 
232  See Lipsey, n. 58 above, p. 130. 
233 See Chris Whitehouse, Lakshmi Narain, Loraine Watson and Natalie Lee, Revenue Law – 
principles and practice, 19th edn (Croydon: Tolley Lexis Nexis, 2001), paras [33.76]-[33.100]. 
 192
 UK’s representative institutions. Their logic, if not their precise form, commends itself on 
the terms discussed above. The same cannot be said, unfortunately, for the anti-avoidance 
theme. Initiating measures that could be avoided by opportunistic corporation tax planning 
must logically be done in secret, that is, without prior consultation.235 The acceptability of 
such measures over the long term, if not when they are announced, depends on the care with 
which they are explained, argued, adjusted and justified,236 as well as on the number and 
range - cumulatively speaking – of the measures involved. Of all the tests for the prudential 
conduct of corporation tax reform, none has proved more difficult for HMG to manage. An 
illustration is provided, indeed, by the fairly cursory way in which HMG announced 
measures to prevent deals in ‘overseas losses’ following the ECJ’s decision in Marks and 
Spencer.237 The challenge has been all the greater because the impetus for a number of 
corporation tax anti-avoidance measures, as Chapter 4 will show, has been, at the very least, 
a highly contestable one. 
If the absence of the recognition of the need for prudence, and of the constraints of 
representative democracy more generally, is a weakness of the corporation tax reform 
literature, a considerable strength is its (largely tacit) recognition of the relative roles of 
expertise and debate in such a system. This touches on issues to be further developed in the 
next section about the role of Parliament in a representative democracy. Its importance here 
is what it says about the role of experts in such a system. Although the writer would disagree 
with the central proposition of the IFS discussion paper, that Parliament should have greater 
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 resources and more time to scrutinise tax legislation earlier,238 he would endorse the 
assumption that the drafting of legislative proposals is a matter for experts in consultation 
with those affected. Likewise, the need for strong expertise in tax policy making is a constant 
refrain in the Wales paper.239 The reason is that all that representative government requires is 
for legislative proposals to be subjected to ‘argumentative scrutiny’.240 This is not, as is 
sometimes claimed, ‘rule by experts’; it does not amount to a technocracy.241 Moreover, 
HMG, as the initiator of corporation tax legislation, knows that its actions will be subject to 
‘the retrospective judgment’ of the electorate, and this ‘counts in … [its] deliberations’.242 
‘Prudence dictates … that … [HMG act] now in preparation for that day of popular 
judgment.’243 It is rational for HMG to get advice on such technical matters. That is what 
prudent people, prudent governors, do. Overall, it might be that, because of this, in the 
corporation tax area at least, the governance issues discussed in Chapter 2 are more prudent 
than problematic. If so, it follows that much soul-searching in the governance literature 
might be misplaced. We consider this next. So, too, might be the yearning in both the IFS 
document and Wales’s paper for what each call ‘effective [parliamentary] scrutiny’ of 
legislative texts.244 Moreover, to anticipate Chapter 4 slightly, the prudential element is 
evidence that ‘liberal normativism’245 cannot help us to understand how public law develops 
in the UK. 
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 DEVELOPING THE MEASURES 
 
Having taken matters thus far, it is useful to reiterate the basis of the interaction of Crown 
and Parliament in the process of corporation tax reform. Hobbes’s point, it will be recalled, 
was that ‘LEVIATHAN’,246 in our day the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland’, is external to the people. It is the ‘Mortall God, to which wee owe under the 
Immortall God, our peace and defence’,247 and HMG is its representative.248 It is not 
Parliament that is the sovereign, but HMG, and HMG is the Crown in Parliament.249 All of 
this is apparent, not from Dicey, but from the close analysis to which Martin Loughlin has 
subjected the historical material, especially Hobbes.250 To extrapolate Loughlin’s analysis a 
little, HMG retains its sovereignty so long as it continues to make prudent decisions in the 
public interest. Such decisions do not always have to work; they do not always have to be 
effective. When accounts come to be rendered, however, they have to be found to have been 
the prudent, or most prudent, decision, in the public interest, at the relevant time. It is not the 
people who are, in a general sense, sovereign.251 They become sovereign, however, when 
they re-elect or dismiss the governing party at a General Election, the regularity of which is 
one of a small number of principles that, for three centuries, have been a constant feature of 
representative government.252 
It might be wondered why we need to underscore these points at this juncture. The reason 
is that they help to give a shape and a significance to the development stage of corporation 
tax reform proposals, especially as regards the true role of Parliament in the process. Since 
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 the IFS document concentrates on only one aspect of the development stage, that of 
‘parliamentary scrutiny’, admittedly with some regard to what we have called ‘the 
consultation theme’, we need to turn to Wales’s characterisation of the second stage 
elements. Policy development is the stage of the widest scope, since it is made up (he says) 
of ‘the entire process of translating the [policy] vision into law’.253 Given the preoccupations 
of the present study, therefore, it is about how the prudence of the initial decision to proceed 
with a particular course of action needs to be replicated in the prudence of public servants, 
either working alone or in co-operation with Treasury ministers. As someone with 
considerable experience of the demands of the development stage on the individuals 
involved,254 Wales’s points are particularly important, and we need to subject the most 
relevant ones to rather close analysis. Before doing so, however, we need to emphasise the 
link between the prudence of politicians and officials in managing tax proposals in our time, 
and the prudence of the architects of the institutional framework within which they operate. 
Montesquieu wrote of the English system as being a ‘fine system’, albeit one that ‘was found 
in the forests’.255 ‘[T]he [forests] … of Germania, that is, [rejoins Manin] which had also 
given birth to “Gothic” customs and the feudal system’.256 The English system has what 
James Harrington called ‘the Gothic prudence’,257 a strength born of experience and of 
history, and with a logic of its own. There have been changes since the eighteenth century, to 
be sure, but - as Chapter 2 has shown - the British system is still fundamentally that which 
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 was created in the bloodshed of the seventeenth- and early eighteenth centuries.258 These 
points are not merely quaint or eccentric. They provide the logic by which all proposals, 
including those of the IFS and of Wales, in this context and in a functionalist mode, must be 
judged. Without a strong sense of history, we cannot make sense of Treasury policy, as 
Thain and Christie emphasise.259 This point is especially applicable, perhaps, to the IFS 
proposals, which lack a certain historical sensitivity. It also applies to Wales’s, however, 
since, although his analysis of the Treasury’s role, and the functions of the old ‘Revenue 
Departments’, reflects a keen awareness of how that part of HMG works, his discussion of 
the role of Parliament quickly dissolves into the kind of platitudes set out so fully in the IFS 
document. 
Drawing on his experience at the centre of the corporate tax reform process, to Chris 
Wales, the development stage has a particular aura, and it makes exacting and specific 
demands, especially on expertise. It is not intended here to set up a black-and-white contrast 
between his paper and the IFS document, but there is, it seems to the writer, an 
insightfulness, and a truth, about this part of Wales’s discussion, which makes parts of the 
IFS document seem at best naïve, and at worst, ideologically highly charged. Wales first 
identifies the importance of discussions between senior Treasury and HMRC civil servants 
and Treasury ministers (and also, presumably, special advisers) about translating the 
ideological vision into policy materials.260 It is to be inferred that there is some overlap, 
some inter-fertilisation here, with the policy initiation stage, although, in Wales’s typology, 
this first part of the development stage makes particular demands, both on the ministers 
involved, and especially on the officials. The demands on civil servants become particularly 
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 prominent in what Wales identifies as ‘the iterative process with the ministerial team[,] to 
consider how the proposals fit with the government’s broader policy objectives’.261 The key 
passage is as follows: 
     
‘ … [T]he policy development process requires a very broad range of skills. It requires an 
understanding that spans the vision and the detail; to identify how the vision can be made 
to work within the framework of the existing system and to see where further change will 
be needed to allow the old and the new to work effectively together. It requires the skills 
of the analysts and statisticians to take the detailed proposals and assess their effect on 
behaviour and yield and, of course, a system that traps the necessary information and 
allows it to be manipulated to identify and quantify the effects of change.’262 
 
Every part of this extract demands our closest attention in the context of the present study. 
This is not only because it demonstrates an analytical subtlety far beyond the somewhat 
‘box-like’ assumptions on which the IFS document relies. It is unnecessary to highlight, but 
we should certainly note, Wales’s encapsulation of the Machiavellian prudence in 
emphasising the need for skills that can comprehend the ‘vision’ and ‘the detail’. What the 
opening words of the extract disclose, however, is more than this, since Wales writes of ‘the 
vision’ and its being put to work within the existing system. Although Samuel Brittan and 
others might want to be spared ‘the vision thing’,263 Wales emphasises, in a way which is 
almost completely absent from the IFS discussion, the fact that what is undertaken here is the 
use of the corporation tax system to bring about a specific (democratically sanctioned) 
conception of the public interest. Supreme technical ability is needed to achieve this, but it is 
a political, not a technocratic, project. It is about harnessing a mass of technical material to 
an agreed political end. This point is drawn out particularly strikingly where Wales stresses 
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 the importance of technical skill in making ‘the vision’ work within the ‘existing system’, 
and seeing where further change will be needed. Building on New Labour’s ideological 
construct of the public interest, Chapter 4 will demonstrate in detail how radical New 
Labour’s plans for the corporation tax system have been. The accounting theme, for 
example, has had an important role in this process, as too has the anti-avoidance theme. 
Suffice it to say, for the moment, that it has been radical in intent and, it seems, in effect. 
This may be the reason why Wales refers to the ‘effect’ of policies ‘on behaviour’. 
Making ‘the vision’ work within ‘the existing system’ is something rather poorly 
understood by those who comment on tax reform in general and on the need for simplicity in 
the system in particular. This is not simply a matter of issues such as the formal constraints 
on competence imposed by GATT 1994/WTO and/or the Community law. One of many 
memorable points made by Murphy and Nagel, in The Myth of Ownership,264 one to which 
we shall return, is that tax policy is never about ‘tax design’, it is always about reform, 
because it always has to take account of the existing system. In placing emphasis on the 
history, this study seeks to reflect an understanding of this insight. What Murphy and Nagel 
do not say, however, is that reform creates avoidance opportunities, something that has 
encouraged governments to hold back from large-scale reform of their tax systems.265 
Secondly, to the extent that radical political change must for all these good reasons be 
accommodated within existing institutional and conceptual structures, ‘complexity’ is 
inevitable. Only lack of change, lack of intervention, makes things simple. This is why 
‘simplification’ arguments have often come from ‘minimum-statists’ on the libertarian Right 
of politics.266 
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 In relation to the foregoing extract from Wales’s paper, we might finally draw attention, 
again harking back to Murphy and Nagel, to the emphasis in the last part of the extract on the 
importance of information in weighing ends and means. Murphy and Nagel rightly speak, in 
an engaging phrase, of ‘large empirical uncertainties about the economic consequences of 
[the] different choices’267 involved in tax policy-making. That is not, however, to deny the 
importance of such information as there is. This strand is drawn out by Wales in his 
reference to ‘the skills of the analysts and statisticians’,268 whose findings are so important 
(in the prudential mode) in the weighing of ends and means. John McEldowney has written 
persuasively about the contribution to the development of public law of ‘the statistical 
movement’,269 and we may note in passing the link between ‘political arithmetick’270 and 
political economy on which rests, in a sense, the whole matter of the present study. It is in 
this part of the corporation tax policy development process, in the weighing of ends and 
means, however, that statistical work comes into its own. 
The end towards which statistical information and modelling techniques, and, indeed, the 
technique of prudence, are directed, of course, is effectiveness.271 All the corporate tax 
reform proposals in the world are nothing if they do not work towards the realisation of the 
vision of the public interest that the governing party has put before the electorate at the 
General Election. It is this (Wales’s reference to making ‘the old and the new … work 
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 effectively together’) that encapsulates the significance of the remaining elements in ‘policy 
development’. These are the importance of effective parliamentary liaison, and (rather less 
prominent in Wales than in the IFS document) consultation. The need for Treasury and 
HMRC to work effectively with ‘Parliamentary counsel[,] to ensure that the legislation, 
when enacted, will achieve the policy intent’,272 ‘the handling of the Parliamentary process 
itself[,] and the provision of support for ministers in the House’,273 is something the analysis 
of which we shall defer until we consider the role of Parliament in the development stage. As 
to consultation, however, this does require some close consideration at the present juncture. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the relativity, the contextuality, of its importance to 
effectiveness, and, secondly, its significance as a locus for the ‘governance dilemmas’ 
already examined. 
Wales does not ‘major’ on the consultation theme, although he does acknowledge the 
special nature of the ‘presentational skills’ involved in ‘a formal process of public 
consultation’.274 Gammie, if he was indeed responsible for drafting the findings of the IFS 
working party, does do so, however, and in the process evinces a slight change of position 
from his earlier work on the importance of consultation. The IFS document promulgates the 
view that the emphasis on consultation places Parliament too far back in the process, and that 
proposals are too far down the line by the time they reach the House of Commons.275 As will 
be shown below, this seems to betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the constitutional 
role of Parliament. The IFS document laments most of all a lack of ‘uniformity’ in the 
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 consultation process,276 but, in a slightly obscure passage, also concedes that consultation 
periods and forms need to be ‘tailored’.277 We shall return to the constitutional 
misunderstanding presently. But there is also a failure to appreciate that the only reason for 
consultation is prudence, to make provisions work effectively, and that effectiveness might 
actually require less consultation in some cases, and more in others. 
The former point, which is related to the governance point to be discussed in a moment, is 
in a way acknowledged, because the IFS is interested in making tax legislation work better, 
although (arguably) with insufficient emphasis on its political purpose. The latter point, 
however, is elided. Given that the watchword is ‘prudence’, how best to attain the political 
end, the reform project in question might not be such as to lend itself to consultation. If we 
consider the issues raised by the accounting theme, or, indeed, by the compliance and 
enforcement theme, or the technical theme, what is prudent is the building up of a broad base 
of support over a long period of time, in an atmosphere of as much transparency as supports 
the public interest.278 All of the initiatives in these three reform themes have been successful 
(some, like CTSA, conspicuously so),279 and this broad, deep, form of consultation, being 
prudent in the circumstances, has worked. The examples given in Chapter 1 above illustrate 
this. In other cases, however, especially those involving anti-avoidance measures, the 
activities that HMG seeks to curtail will be the province of opportunists, for whom 
transparency would merely make matters easier.280 In such cases, prudence declares for no 
consultation, effectiveness requiring swift action. Not all cases are easy to judge, however. 
The current Chancellor’s capital gains tax reform is an indication of how spectacularly 
                                                 
276  Ibid., para. 3.3. 
277  Ibid., paras 3.4, 5.2. 
278  See Lipsey, n. 58 above, p. 88. 
279 See Giles, Financial Times, 21 October 2005, 3. 
280  Especially, perhaps, non-residents. 
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 situations can be misjudged, and there is some evidence281 that a similar lack of prudence 
was to be detected in the abolition (without consultation) of industrial buildings 
allowances282 under Alistair Darling’s predecessor. 
Failing to match the length and depth of consultation to the prudential requirements of the 
situation is only part of the way in which the discussion in the IFS document is skewed. 
Prudence has a part to play in another area, although it is a slightly different one. We have 
touched briefly on this point at the end of the previous section. The consultation stage, it is 
suggested, is the point at which the five ‘governance dilemmas’ discussed in Chapter 2 come 
into play. The reasoning in an individual case might go as follows. H.M. Treasury might 
approve of what, say, the International Accounting Standards Board (the IASB) has to say 
about profits measurement, and it might be convenient to translate it into tax law, but the 
(informed) electorate might not approve if they knew the influence of this non-elected, 
relatively unaccountable body. The matter probably will not become important, provided 
there is no risk, and there is unlikely to be if it legislates to modify the IASB’s rules where 
necessary.283 H.M. Treasury might, in the process of adopting this solution, become over-
reliant on the accountancy profession, but, if it listens to them, H.M. Treasury might gain 
their influential support. To do so, H.M. Treasury will have to work within a policy network, 
but, again, in a relatively low-risk policy area, so the unaccountability of some of the 
individuals involved is probably not overly important. There is some risk, nonetheless, that 
any added technical complexity might discredit the policy, but in an already complex area, 
this is unlikely to make much difference. At each stage, as Manin might infer, the questions 
are: is the decision a prudent one, and is it in the public interest? If not, on either count, and 
                                                 
281  See Houlder, n. 212 above. 
282  See FA 2007, s. 36. 
283  See FA 1998, s. 42. 
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 there are serious consequences, HMG’s credibility will be affected. Such must be the 
considerations going through the mind of the minister signing a - usually very brief - 
regulatory impact assessment (the RIA), once the process of consultation on corporation tax 
reform measures is complete. 
The part of the development stage to which Wales gives the least detailed consideration 
(and one that O’Donnell did not consider) is the one that is weakest in Wales’s analysis, 
namely the role of Parliament in the development stage. Much more consideration is given to 
this by the IFS, however. This is also weak, and for generally similar reasons. The yardstick 
of strength or weakness here is not the prudence of today’s decision-makers, nor yet of some 
exogenous norm, but the prudence of the ages: the prudence that was found ‘in the forests of 
Germany’. Before exploring this issue in detail, we should refer to the fact that Wales places 
much more emphasis than does the IFS on the contribution of effective mutual 
understanding, and close co-operation, between officials in the relevant department, and 
parliamentary counsel,284 both in terms of the drafting of instructions to counsel, and their 
interpretation.285 The IFS has nothing complimentary to say about the drafting of tax 
legislation. Secondly, Wales obliquely pays tribute to the accumulated experience (in 2004) 
of the Treasury ministers.286 The IFS makes no mention of them. But anyone who has read 
the contributions to Standing Committee debates by the minister involved (Conservative as 
well as Labour) would be impressed by the intellectual grasp of people who do not always 
have legal training,287 and on the effectiveness of the public servants briefing them.               
                                                 
284  See Terence Daintith and Alan Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and 
Internal Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 221; also Cabinet Office, n. 268 
above, pp. 237-238. 
285  See Wales, n. 7 above, pp. 557-558. 
286  Ibid., p. 560; also Thain and Christie, Parliamentary Brief, February 2008, 21-22, 22 (available 
from www.treasuryproject.org (accessed 21 February 2008)). 
287  The Treasury Ministers ‘sacked’ in 2007, on Gordon Brown’s taking office as Prime Minister, had 
considerable combined experience, all having been long-serving. Dawn Primarolo, in Lipsey’s 
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 The first of the ways in which both Wales’s contribution, and that of the IFS, 
underestimates the constitutional theory, is in relation to the ‘effective [parliamentary] 
scrutiny’ of legislation. Wales thinks it is ‘weak’;288 the IFS, chancing its arm, claims that 
‘the House of Commons fails to scrutinise the rules (if not the levels) of taxation in any real 
sense at all’.289 Within the logic of the system, it has to be said that neither comment is 
justified. It is not simply the fact that in each parliamentary session for the last decade many 
columns of Hansard have been devoted to FB debate.290 It is, more importantly, that 
representative democracy requires only that legislative proposals be subject to 
‘argumentative scrutiny’.291 More fully, what representative democracy insists on is that ‘no 
measure can be adopted unless a majority deems it justified after argumentative scrutiny’.292 
Although the IFS deprecates both the nature and the scope of argument in the Commons, not 
to say the ‘scrutiny’, involved, Wales obviously regards FB debates as a significant 
challenge to the ministers and public servants involved, because he earlier emphasises the 
gruelling nature of the exchanges: 
 
‘In our Parliament’s confrontational process, the officials involved [i.e. civil servants 
advising ministers] need to be able to identify the issues that the Opposition are likely to 
target and prepare and provide appropriate briefing and support. … [T]his is a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                       
words (see n. 58 above), ‘a former left-winger who looks and sounds like a faintly flustered 
Sunday-school teacher’ was nonetheless a ‘safe pair of hands’ (ibid., p. 25) and ‘bore the bulk of 
the burden’ of ‘tax responsibilities’ as Paymaster General (ibid., p. 126) throughout most of the 
period covered by this study. 
288  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 563. 
289  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 2.4. 
290  Statistics on the length of standing committee debates on FBs in Hansard are striking: FB 1997, 
nine sittings, 509 cols; F(No. 2)B 1998, 23 sittings, 1063 cols; FB 1999, 19 sittings, 787 cols; FB 
2000, 26 sittings, 1051 cols; FB 2001, seven sittings, 221 cols; FB 2002, 16 sittings, 579 cols; FB 
2003, 15 sittings, 633 cols; FB 2004, 21 sittings, 777 cols; FB 2005, eight sittings, 319 cols; F(No. 
2)B 2005, 21 sittings, 785 cols; FB 2007, 14 sittings, 525 cols. It would not therefore be correct to 
say that there is no scrutiny of FB clauses. 
291  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 191. 
292  Ibid. 
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 linking policy objectives to detail. Technical analysis on its own is not sufficient and 
neither is pure policy advice.’293 
 
As Manin says, the ‘English aristocrats and French lawyers’294 who invented representative 
government, ‘certainly did not confuse a parliament with a learned society’.295 Occasionally, 
it is true, debate seems somewhat perfunctory, but often (such as in the case of the Standing 
Committee debate on the FB 1998 measures on CTSA),296 this is explained by the context 
(there, the continuing legislative euphoria following the 1997 landslide election victory). 
More frequently, as in the case of the Standing Committee proceedings on the F(No. 2)B 
2005297 clauses on the intra-Community surrender of group losses, both the knowledge and 
engagement of the participants rather impresses.298 More of a problem, little underscored in 
the literature, is the use of the ‘guillotine’ to curtail debate,299 but the institution itself 
recognises this as an expedient, which is why the occasions on which the ‘guillotine’ is used 
are carefully minuted.300 
The crux of the matter appears, as Manin explains, in the following words of Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyes, who explains why the will of the majority in Parliament is an expression of 
the public interest: 
 
‘Without doubt the general interest301 is nothing if it is not the interest of someone: it is 
that particular interest that is common to the greatest number of voters. From this comes 
the necessity of the competition of opinions.’302 
                                                 
293  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 550. 
294  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 234. 
295  Ibid., p. 190. 
296  See Hansard HC Standing Committee E, 9 June 1998, cols 704-712. 
297  F(No. 2)B 2005 became FA 2006. 
298  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, May 16, 2006, cols 159-179. 
299  See S.O.s, Nos 83, 83A-83I; see Erskine May’s Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and 
Usage of Parliament, ed. by Sir William McKay et al., 23rd edn (London: LexisNexis UK, 2004), 
pp. 466-481; also Ferrier [2003] Conv. 346-347. 
300  See House of Commons Information Office Factsheet P10, Programming of Government Bills 
(London: UK Parliament, 2004), available from www.parliament.uk (accessed 4 April 2008). 
301  [See n. 141 above.] 
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The point only needs to be read for its importance to be clear. ‘Public decision’ is the result 
of ‘trial by discussion’, plus ‘majority consent’.303 For Manin, it means that: 
  
‘(1) parliamentary debate does not constitute a disinterested activity, oriented solely by 
the search for the truth, but a process that aims to identify the interest common to the 
greatest number,304 and (2) the general interest, unlike Rousseau’s “general will”,305 does 
not transcend particular interests and is not of a different nature than [sic] them.’306  
 
To similar effect had been the conclusion of John Locke, in the seventeenth century,307 and 
Jeremy Waldron in the twentieth.308 If the idea of the sanctity of argumentative scrutiny 
indeed reflects the logic of the system, then few of the arguments put forward by the IFS 
seem relevant: that the House of Commons lacks the time to scrutinise FBs adequately; that 
it lacks the ‘inclination’ to do so; and (most perversely) that it lacks the requisite 
‘expertise’.309 If it is objected, even in the face of so many pages of Hansard devoted to 
debating corporation tax reform proposals, that scrutiny is nonetheless inadequate, it is 
necessary to turn only to John Stuart Mill. Mill, in Manin’s analysis: 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
302  See Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes, Vues sur les moyens d’exécution dont les représentants de la 
France pourront disposer en 1789 (Paris: anonymous publisher, 1789), p. 92 (quoted in Manin, n. 
1 above, p. 188); also Burke, n. 141 above, p. 156 (see Manin, n. 1 above, p. 187n). 
303  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 190. 
304  [See Arendt, nn. 82 and 139 above, on the significance of ‘inter-est’; also Barry, n. 134 above, ch. 
10.] 
305  For Rousseau, ‘the general will’ was ‘the first principle of the public economy and the 
fundamental rule of government’ (see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy 
and The Social Contract, trans. and ed. by Christopher Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), p. 9 (in ‘Discourse on Political Economy’), 73-74 (in ‘The Social Contract’). Rousseau 
deplored (England’s) representative government: ibid., p. 127.    
306 See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 188n. 
307  Ibid., p. 189n, quoting Locke, n. 1 above, pp. 331-332. 
308  See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
ch. 4. 
309  See also Wales, n. 7 above, p. 563; also Isaac, n. 235 above, p. 224-225. But it is not expertise that 
qualifies an MP. 
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 ‘ … suggested that propositions of laws [sic] be drafted by a commission of experts 
appointed by the Crown and then brought before Parliament only for discussion and 
approval. He even went so far as to deny Parliament the right to amend the commission’s 
propositions in the course of discussion. Mill wrote: “[The bill] once framed, however, 
Parliament should have no power to alter the measure, but only to pass or reject it; or, if 
partially disapproved of, remit it back to the Commission for reconsideration.” According 
to Mill, the principal function of the debating body should be to grant or withhold “the 
final seal of national assent” after a public exchange of arguments, not to conceive and 
formulate legislative measures.’310  
 
This obviously contrasts with the IFS’s disapproval of legislative proposals being brought 
before Parliament as ‘faits accomplis’,311 and it sits ill, too, with its rather dogmatic assertion 
that ‘consultation is not and should not become a substitute for Parliamentary scrutiny’.312 It 
does, however, fit well with the kind of debate referred to above, on the surrender of losses 
between EU Member States, and the Marks and Spencer litigation that had just been before 
Park J. in the Chancery Division.313 There, Mark Hoban, MP,314 made a carefully analytical 
and measured contribution to the debate, and even the Opposition backbench disagreement 
on the point of principle315 is a vivid illustration of the ‘argumentative scrutiny’ that 
representative democracy requires.316 
That first group of arguments mounted by both Wales and the IFS is about the nature and 
extent of Parliamentary scrutiny. Both go on to argue that each aspect would be facilitated by 
the allocation of greater resources to this aspect. Wales advocates the introduction of an 
‘adaptation’ of the US Congressional Budget Office, which provides ‘the Congress with the 
objective, timely, non-partisan analyses needed for economic and budget decisions’,317 
                                                 
310  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 191, quoting Mill, n. 140 above, pp. 203-467, 280 and 283. 
311  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 3.8. 
312  Ibid., para. 3.9. 
313  See Snape, n. 64 above, pp. 399-400. 
314  Fareham, Conservative. 
315  See Snape, n. 64 above, pp. 395-396. 
316  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, May 16, 2006, cols 159-179. 
317  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 563, quoting the Congressional Budget Office’s Mission Statement, 
available from: www. cbo.gov/aboutcbo/factsheet.shtml (accessed 18 March 2008). 
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 suggesting that ‘it would surely improve the process of scrutiny that tax proposals undergo in 
Parliament’.318 Somewhat less ambitiously, the IFS argues for more resources, including the 
institution of a new select committee, and a ‘team’ to work on ‘tax structure’.319 There is, 
however, an historical and logical objection to these superficially sensible suggestions. 
Unlike ‘the US Congress, Parliament is not the forum of public discussion. Each party is 
grouped around a leading figure, and each parliamentary party votes in a disciplined manner 
in support of its leader’.320 In short, therefore, sensible as it sounds, this suggestion ignores 
the significance of the (still crucial) concept of party discipline. 
If, on this historical and interpretative basis, Wales and the IFS are wrong on each of the 
foregoing questions, then perhaps a third argument, somewhat common to both, might stand 
further analysis. Wales offers for consideration the idea that the House of Lords could 
perhaps undertake ‘a greater level of scrutiny’ of FBs, arguing that ‘the problem of a lack of 
effective scrutiny of tax law proposals in the Commons has been compounded by the 
convention that the House of Lords has a very limited role in relation to Finance Bills’.321 On 
this point, the IFS is rather more cautious: it suggests that a joint committee of Lords and 
Commons ‘would not infringe the current prerogatives of the House of Commons in tax 
legislation’,322 but goes on to suggest that, even if such a committee was constituted solely 
from the House of Commons, this ‘would not prevent the House of Lords establishing its 
own Committee on Taxation’.323 The problem, however, is that the House of Lords is not 
                                                 
318  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 564. 
319  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, paras 1.4, 6.2 and 7.6.  
320  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 231. 
321  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 564. 
322  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 6.3. 
323  Ibid., para. 6.5. 
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 elected.324 Election (that is, representation) is the quid pro quo for taxation, not taxation 
expertise. In this light, it is encouraging that the rather obfuscatorily named House of Lords 
Select Committee on Economic Affairs325 has encountered difficulties in enlisting co-
operation from officials on tax matters, and rather surprising that Wales should find this state 
of affairs so unsatisfactory.326 He may be right that ‘a reformed House of Lords might be in a 
position to make a stronger claim’,327 but this too would depend on the Lords being an 
elected representative assembly.328 Furthermore, it is a little disingenuous for the IFS to 
suggest that the taxation sub-committee of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs might provide some kind of antecedent for its proposed committee.329 The 
Lords Committee, as its name suggests, is a Select Committee and, as such, is concerned 
only with the ex post scrutiny of tax legislation.330 
Wales puts one other argument that, did it not illustrate so well Loughlin’s point that 
sovereignty is not competence alone, but constituent power (competence enlarged by 
capacity),331 we might put aside. Although he does not make it a large part of his argument, 
Wales makes the point that ‘in the last twenty years, there have been very few Finance Bills 
that meet all the requirements of the definition as [sic] a money bill.332 So, in reality, if the 
House of Lords had wanted to intervene in FB debates, it would probably have been able to 
                                                 
324  Except in the limited sense provided for by the House of Lords Act 1999 (see Ministry of Justice, 
The Governance of Britain (Cm 7170) (London: TSO, 2007), p. 41); see Eaglesham, Financial 
Times, 20 July 2007, 2. 
325  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 206 and 346. 
326  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 564. 
327  Ibid., p. 564. 
328  See Ministry of Justice, n. 324 above, p. 42. 
329  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 6.5. 
330  See Chapter 2 above, n. 206. 
331  Ibid., nn. 49-54. 
332  See Parliament Act 1911 (as amended by Parliament Act 1949), s. 1(2) (see O. Hood Phillips & 
Jackson: Constitutional and Administrative Law, ed. by Paul Jackson and Patricia Leopold, 8th 
edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001), para. 8-034); see Erskine May, n. 299 above, pp. 928-
931. 
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 do so’.333 Even allowing that the premise is true, the reader who has followed the argument 
of the study so far will appreciate that precisely the opposite is the case. In theory, the House 
of Lords might have been able to intervene. ‘[I]n reality’, any such intervention might have 
precipitated the abolition of the Chamber. 
What the present writer finds so strange in both the Wales and the IFS accounts is that 
both betray a fundamental unwillingness to entrust tax legislation to the House of Commons, 
and a commensurate willingness (without any obvious basis, especially not an historical one) 
to enlist the help of the House of Lords. This, combined with the Lords’ difficulties in 
establishing a legitimate claim to interfere, not just in corporate taxation matters, but in tax 
matters generally, would explain both Gammie’s demeanour, already noted, before the 
Lords’ Economic Affairs Committee,334 and the Committee’s own fulsome appreciation of 
his contribution to their deliberations.335 Distinguished and influential as Gammie is, it is 
very difficult to understand the foundations of his sympathies on this question. The same 
comment applies to Wales’s views on the Lords’ role. What we see in the debates on the FBs 
is democracy in action. Or, more accurately (and rather significantly), representative 
democracy in action. The right of elected representatives of the people to argue about matters 
of taxation applies even, perhaps especially, to corporate taxation.                  
 
PRESENTATION OF REFORM MEASURES 
 
With the conclusions of the previous section in mind, it is possible to make some relatively 
brief comments on Wales’s own rather concise treatment of the third and fourth stages of the 
                                                 
333  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 564. 
334  See Chapter 2 above, n. 346. 
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 reform process. ‘[A] significant omission’, in Wales’s view, from the O’Donnell Report, was 
its failure to identify ‘policy presentation as an important part of the [reform] process’.336 In 
practice, the presentation of reform measures, allowing (as it does) for ‘a more detailed 
engagement between officials and those affected by the new policy’, has been a common 
feature of the reform process ‘over the last few years’.337 
Perceptively, Wales sees both the Pre-Budget Report (PBR), and the Budget Report 
itself, not as part of the legislative process, but as part of the process, the ‘political’ process, 
of presenting reform proposals to the electorate.338 It is certainly possible to infer that one 
effect of combining successive announcements of increases in economic growth with 
publishing decisions on corporate tax reform, has been that the former has energised the 
latter. In other words, that the combined announcements on either occasion are a crucial way 
of building up HMG’s capacity in relation to taxation policy. Whilst the IFS document takes 
the PBR as the start of the legislative process,339 Wales’s analysis of its significance as a 
presentational one therefore seems the more persuasive. It also, somewhat paradoxically, 
squares with the more general idea that Parliament is not ‘a learned society’.340 Wales is 
surely right, too, in his premise as to the administrative significance of the presentation stage. 
In terms of the requirements of representative government, confronting the electorate with 
the legislation itself has a crucial importance. Manin regards the interaction of Parliament 
with the world outside as being a function of whether our current system is viewed primarily 
                                                                                                                                                       
335  House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 4th Report. The Finance Bill 2007, 
Volume II: Evidence (House of Lords Papers, Session 2006-2007, 121) (London: TSO, 2007), p. 
5.  
336  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 548. 
337  Ibid., p. 550. 
338  Ibid.; see also Lipsey, n. 58 above, ch. 7 (esp. pp. 120, 130). 
339  See Tax Law Review Committee, n. 187 above, para. 4.1.  
340  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 190. 
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 as a ‘party democracy’, or as an ‘audience democracy’.341 If the former, then there is a sense 
in which the law is ‘handed down’ to the people most closely affected by the reform measure 
in question. If the latter, then, ‘[t]he extra-parliamentary voice of the people … made … 
more peaceful and rendered commonplace’,342 there is a sense in which it is ‘passed across 
the table’. As already suggested, the UK’s system now has features both of ‘party 
democracy’ and ‘audience democracy’, and much may depend on the potential for conflict 
suggested by the measures in question. Measures within the anti-avoidance theme, especially 
when previously unannounced, fall into the former category, with matters in the accounting 
theme falling into the latter. It would be tempting to push the point too far but, as will 
become apparent from the next chapter, to the extent that anti-avoidance measures purport to 
further a particular, and contentious, concept of fairness, they bear the hallmark of party 
democracy, one that is held up for inspection by a constituency more used to being treated 
with a degree of respect.    
In either case, judging what prudence requires, in terms of ‘a more detailed engagement 
between officials and … [taxpayers]’, or ‘ministerial visits and speeches’,343 is clearly of 
crucial importance. It may be a prudence of a lesser scope, involving conversation and 
dialogue, but it too has the objective of advancing the public interest.  
 
DELIVERY OF REFORM MEASURES 
 
With this final stage in the evolution of corporate tax reform measures, the spotlight falls, in 
administrative terms, exclusively on the contribution of the junior Department to H.M. 
                                                 
341  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 203-204.  
342  See Manin, n. 1 above, p. 231. 
343  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 550. 
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 Treasury, HMRC. We are here edging towards the parameters of the study, but we can 
nonetheless comment usefully on one or two aspects.  
An experiential and practical stage,344 the chief element here is ‘the issue of detailed 
guidance for taxpayers and the revenue department’s own network’.345 It is therefore where 
the technical theme comes into its own, but it may also involve, as Wales mentions, ‘audit 
and investigation’ in the case of a new anti-avoidance measure.346 Furthering the public 
interest, as sanctioned by Parliament, can indeed be the only justification for time spent in 
audit, or in settling HMRC guidance documents, and without which, it is to be suspected, the 
system would not work. It sill involves management, though, and with this a certain 
prudence, since it entails engaging with the practising tax profession. Delivery involves 
myriad prudential calculations about the priorities and interests of professional society (who, 
after all, have mortgages and school fees to pay),347 as well as the standing of the legal and 
accountancy professions in society. The former is the subject of a considerable literature; the 
taxation context of the latter is beginning to be noted.348 Tax professionals’ expertise is at 
one and the same time useful to the Department, and mystifying to people in general. The 
professionals themselves, though often despised at a societal level, are valued by those who 
understand what they do. These factors together are the raw materials of prudential 
calculation. 
                                                 
344  Ibid., p. 551. 
345  Ibid. 
346  See Wales, n. 7 above, p. 551. 
347  See Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 (London: Routledge, 
1989), pp. 457, 461-462 (1960s to 1980s); Harold Perkin, The Third Revolution: Professional 
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348  See Erica Stary, ‘The March of the Tax Profession’ [2006] BTR 249-266. 
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 We might finally note that, although the fourth stage is largely the province of HMRC, 
the judiciary’s role, in interpreting and applying corporate tax legislation to specific cases, 
can most usefully be considered in this light. The importance of judicial prudence in this area 
has already been discussed in detail,349 and the writer has analysed elsewhere its crucial role 
in sustaining a consistent vision of the public interest in particular (and rare) cases where the 
ECJ (but not, at the relevant time, Parliament) has had an opportunity to intervene.350 There 
is no need here to rehearse the details of William Grant351 or Barclays Mercantile,352 in the 
House of Lords, or Marks and Spencer before Park J.353 or the Court of Appeal.354 What 
each decision demonstrates, however, is a clear grasp, on the judges’ part no less than that of 





We are now at the stage of the analysis of ‘theory’ and ‘values’ in the reform of corporation 
tax, to make some important interpretative connections. Specifically, it is possible to overlay 
Chapter 2’s examination of institutional claims to trust and confidence with aspects of the 
current chapter’s discussion of how the process of reforming corporation tax may inspire 
these essential elements of sovereignty in the corporation tax context. 
                                                 
349  See Chapter 2 above, pp. 137-146. 
350  See Snape, n. 64 above, pp. 399-400. 
351 See  Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. William Grant and Sons Distillers Ltd; Small 
(Inspector of Taxes) v. Mars UK Ltd [2007] UKHL 15; [2007] STC 680. 
352  See Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v. Mawson (Inspector of Taxes) [2004] UKHL 51; 
[2005] STC 1. 
353  See Marks and Spencer plc. v. Halsey (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] EWHC 811 (Ch); [2006] STC 
1235 (Park J.). 
354 See [2007] EWCA Civ 117; [2007] 2 CMLR 21. 
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 Just as the physical manifestations of the institutions involved in corporation tax reform 
might present themselves vividly to the interested observer, especially in the spring sunshine, 
so the ways in which they interact in the reform process remain, by comparison, rather dark. 
Various, generic, explanations are possible, an obvious one being a Luhmannian systems 
theory analysis. In the preceding pages, however, we have sought to find the thread of an 
historically informed interpretation, based on the idea of corporation tax law as a species of 
‘political jurisprudence’.355 From such a perspective, it has been essential to uncover what 
the ‘political’ element in the reform of corporation tax might be. This chapter has sought to 
characterise that element, in a word, as ‘conflict’, or at least as the constant potential for 
conflict, and, following Loughlin, the policy-making process has been portrayed as being, to 
a very high degree, a demanding process of managing conflict, in the intellectual tradition of 
Hobbes and of Machiavelli. And it has done so in the context of the seven themes introduced 
at the beginning of the study. It is thus that, in examining the values immanent to the 
corporation tax base, in Chapter 4, we may expect to find, as mentioned in Chapter 1, ‘signs 
of conflict averted’, in the very textures of the corporation tax code itself. It is thus, too, as 
Chapter 4 explains, that we can expect to find values, not of a distinctively ‘legal’ nature 
(except to the extent that they live within the rules and exceptions embodied in the 
corporation tax code itself), but of a political kind, in the sense delineated above. 
If we can expect the corporation tax base to be characterised by the skilful prioritisation of 
political values, we can anticipate, too, that it will embody a particular vision, or visions, of 
the public interest. Chapter 3 has sought to show that, understated as it is in debates on 
corporation tax reform, the importance of the public interest is heavily underscored by the 
present study’s conception of corporation tax law as a type of ‘political practice’, as that term 
                                                 
355  See Loughlin, n. 17 above, p. 134. 
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 is applied to public law in general, in Loughlin’s functionalist account of what public law 
involves. Chapter 4 will therefore illustrate, in cumulative fashion, how the corporation tax 
base embodies a particular ideology of the relationship between state and corporate sector. 
Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate tellingly how, within the kind of functionalist 
critique undertaken in this study, public law can embody no public interest separate from 
political choices. Whilst it is certainly possible to argue that things should not be falling out 
in this way, it cannot sensibly be contended that the existing state of affairs represents a 
domination of government by the corporate sector. There is not, in any sensible interpretative 
sense, a ‘corporate takeover of Britain’.356 What there is, instead, is an ideological consensus 
in which strong economic growth is a core element, perhaps the main element, of the public 
interest. 
The truth of the idea that the shape of the corporation tax base represents conscious 
political choices, and that it is a reasonably accurate depiction of the contribution of the 
corporate sector to the UK’s representative democracy, is illustrated both by the stages of the 
reform process analysed in the current chapter, and by the values disclosed by the 
corporation tax code itself. This is because the four stages described by Wales, and their 
prudential management, embody an idea of the appropriate role of corporate taxation within 
the UK’s representative democracy. 
Imagine a picture projected onto a screen, and built up in stages, by the use of images on 
transparent slides. Placed over the insights offered in Chapter 2, to build up a picture of the 
corporation tax system of which Chapter 4 forms the final layer, Chapter 3 has sought to 
illuminate exactly why it is that, despite political controversies, the system still has the 
capacity to inspire a high degree of trust and confidence. It is therefore quite misleading to 
                                                 
356  See Chapter 2 above, n. 407.  
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opine, as William E. Simon once did, that ‘the nation should have a tax system which looks 
like someone designed it on purpose’.357 There is not one purpose, but many; and they are 
worthy of respect as the outcomes of conscious political choices, of prudential decisions in a 
complex world.      
 
 
357  See David F. Bradford et al., Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, 2nd edn (Arlington, Va.: Tax 
Analysts, 1984).  
 Chapter 4 
 





At the end of the previous stage of the discussion, the reader was asked to imagine each 
chapter of the study as if it were a transparent slide, on which were depicted successive 
aspects of a progressively fuller interpretation of the material. Each ‘slide’, it is hoped, has 
added some greater light or shade, or some subtler, some more delicately etched, detail, to an 
ever more finished picture. This fourth chapter, which forms the picture’s ‘top layer’, is 
concerned with the theory and values immanent to the corporation tax base, or to the 
corporation tax code, at a particular point in its recent history.1 We take ‘the corporation tax 
code’, a deceptively tidy expression, to refer (as elsewhere in the study) to non-statutory 
material, as well as to the legislative texts themselves.2 
In characterising the subject matter in this way, these two terms, ‘the code’, and ‘the 
base’, although capable of signifying rather different concepts, are alike in at least one 
significant respect: to the extent that the corporation tax base – what is, and what is not, 
taxed – is constructed by the legislative code (and constitutional expectations insist that this 
will be the case),3 then, rationally, the theory and values immanent to one will correspond to 
                                                 
1  i.e. 29 February 2008. 
2  Consolidated in, e.g., The Red Book, ed by Loughlin G. Hickey and David Milne, 6 vols 
(Kingston-upon-Thames: Wolters Kluwer, 2007): see Chapter 2 above, n. 8. 
3  See Chapter 1 above, n. 337; Chapter 2 above, nn. 197-200. 
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 those immanent to the other. However, without relying on an explicit distinction between 
substance and form, there is still considerable merit in concentrating for certain purposes on 
the code, on the printed page, on the form taken by the constitutive elements of corporation 
tax. This is because much discussion of the reform of the tax has concentrated on the 
volume, on the changeability, and on the extreme ‘complexity’, of corporation tax 
legislation. 
Whilst the reader is urged to engage with the pictorial element in the discussion, such an 
intellectual embrace should be mindful of one, crucial, point: the fleetingness of the picture 
presented. The discussion in Chapter 3 has illustrated how, following the logic of prudential 
government, much corporation tax reform is reactive. Here, in Chapter 4, it is necessary to 
bring out the fast moving, electronic, and often ‘closed’ nature of the economic activities the 
aggregate gains on which the system seeks to tax.4 All relevant commentaries give 
prominence to the speed of financial markets in general, and the pace of change in the City 
of London’s markets in particular.5 It is the work of moments, for instance, for Layna 
Mosley’s Goldman Sachs-based bond trader or the fund manager working at Fidelity, sitting 
in front of her computer screen, to allocate investments to one jurisdiction rather than to 
                                                 
4  See ICTA 1988, ss. 15 (Schedule A) and, more importantly, 18 (Schedule D); generally, see Ken 
Messere, Flip de Kam and Christopher Heady, Tax Policy: Theory and Practice in OECD 
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 115-117; on radical reform, see Stephen 
R. Bond, ‘Levelling up or levelling down? Some reflections on the ACE and CBIT proposals, and 
the future of the corporate tax base’, in Taxing Capital Income in the European Union: Issues and 
Options for Reform, ed. by Sijbren Cnossen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 161-
179, 172-175.  
5  See, e.g., Mike Buckle and John Thompson, The UK Financial System: Theory and Practice, 4th 
edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 149-151 (‘electronic trading’); William 
M. Clarke, How the City of London Works: An Introduction to its Financial Markets, 6th edn 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2004), pp. 12, 120-125; David Kynaston, The City of London, vol. 
IV: A Club No More, 1945-2000 (London: Chatto and Windus, 2001), ch. 22; Richard Roberts, 
The City: A Guide to London’s Global Financial Centre (London: Profile, 2004), ch. 3; William 
E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), pp. 5, 159-164. 
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 another.6 Not only that, but she has an increasing range of financial instruments at her 
disposal for hedging against investment risks.7 More generally, however, we know that 
multinational corporations (MNCs) have the capability, if commercial considerations so 
dictate, to move operations relatively quickly from one country to another, and that they, too, 
can hedge in ever more elaborate ways against currency and interest rate risks. Thus, in 
looking for the theory and values immanent to the corporation tax code, we need to be 
mindful of the dimension of impermanence, occasioned by the need to respond to a rapidly 
changing financial and commercial reality. Indeed, it is possible to assert with some cogency 
that a tax that relies so fundamentally on concepts of ‘residence’, ‘source’, and ‘profits’, is 
uniquely vulnerable, in a world of instantaneous, or at least very rapid, investment decisions, 
and largely without exchange controls.8 
If impermanence is, paradoxically, the one constant feature of the corporation tax code, 
so too is what the code says about how taxation legislation consolidates political power, that 
is, sovereignty,9 in this particular area of public policy. An important question in what 
follows is therefore how, despite the charges of change and of complexity, corporation tax 
legislation remains effective, and the ways in which, for the most part, it continues to 
command trust and confidence from those affected by it. Equally important, however, are the 
ways in which certain features of the code tend to undermine that trust and confidence. 
Recent debates on corporation tax reform have understandably tended to focus on the latter 
rather than on the former. 
                                                 
6  See Layna Mosley, Global Capital and National Governments (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p. 25; see Chapter 2 above, n. 174. 
7  See Buckle and Thompson, n. 5 above, chs 13 and 14; Clarke, n. 5 above, ch. 13; Roberts, n. 5 
above, p. 73. 
8  See H.M. Treasury, Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy: Towards Greater 
Economic Stability, ed. by Ed Balls and Gus O’Donnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 35; also 
Bond, n. 4 above, pp. 171-172. 
9  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 47-57. 
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 What Chapter 3 depicted was the ongoing, dynamic, interaction of the institutions whose 
objectives and values had been discussed in Chapter 2. Shaping the discussion in this way 
has allowed the emergence of some important, evolving, conclusions about the way that 
power – constituent power – is consolidated within this system of taxation. First, that the 
tensions between the corporate sector and the state have been managed in the context of a 
government whose ideology places a high premium on the importance of the corporate sector 
in promoting the public interest, and whose commercial success is in itself part of that public 
interest. Chapter 3 afforded various examples of this process. One, particularly telling, 
example, was HMG’s refusal, after 1997, to reshape the foreign exchange (FOREX) rules to 
reflect the idea of the Tobin tax, a prospect which Alistair Darling, MP, had himself alluded 
to in Opposition, when the accounting-based FB 1993 provisions had reached the Committee 
Stage. The present chapter, in offering a snapshot of the main values in the corporation tax 
code at a particular historical juncture, shows how this ideology is reflected across the code 
as a whole, and how the politically contentious mixture of efficiency and fairness 
significantly contributes to dissatisfaction with the code. Secondly, Chapters 2 and 3 have 
shown that the premium placed on the co-operation of the corporate sector has underlined the 
managerial, that is to say, the governance, dimension to HMG’s approach to corporation tax 
reform. Statecraft of this kind has been well illustrated by the use of policy communities to 
take the reform process forward. Chapter 4 seeks to show how, within the corporation tax 
code itself, there is much evidence of this managerial approach. A major example, already 
referred to in various connections, is the use of accounting terminology and concepts, in the 
drafting of the special codes on the tax treatment of corporate finance. Thirdly, Chapters 2 
and 3 have shown that, although this governing ideology, and this managerial approach, each 
present certain challenges to the structure of the UK’s representative institutions, they also 
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 display to advantage the historical strengths of those institutions. Despite the ‘gaps’ in the 
possibilities for bringing responsible individuals before the House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee, and, despite the only intermittent beam that the Committee is able to bring 
to bear on corporation tax, some important initiatives have nonetheless been scrutinised 
fairly effectively. Furthermore, as Chapter 3 has shown, the debate on individual reform 
measures is both fuller and, within the logic of the institutional structure of representative 
government in the UK, more effective than some (especially, perhaps, corporate tax lawyers) 
may lead us to believe. 
Our task in Chapter 4, therefore, is to analyse the theory of, and the main values 
immanent to, the corporation tax code produced by the institutions and the processes 
analysed earlier in the study. The theory is, as ever, about effectiveness, about prudence. 
Although much has been said on different aspects of this already, we shall build later on, on 
one or two points, as they relate to the theory. For the moment, we should briefly return to 
the values immanent to the code. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that the present study accepts that certain values are 
‘immanent’ to corporation tax law. They are political, not ‘rule of law’ values, and they are 
to be discerned by close examination of the legislative texts and policy documents, bringing 
to bear a sense of historical awareness, an acute sense of what is coherent, what is non-
contradictory, and what is consistent.10 This is Loughlin’s critical method, based on Isaiah 
Berlin,11 and traceable ultimately to the immanent critique of G.W.F. Hegel:12 
 
                                                 
10  See Chapter 1 above, p. 68. 
11  See Isaiah Berlin, ‘Does political theory still exist?’, in The Proper Study of Mankind: An 
Anthology of Essays, ed. by Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp. 59-
90, 76. 
 223
 ‘Immanent critique [says Loughlin] stems from a philosophical idealism which tries to 
examine experience in a coherent and comprehensive manner in order to reveal the logic 
and rationality immanent in this experience ... truth always lies ahead; at any moment it is 
immanent but never realised.’13 
 
We are looking, therefore, for how the practice of corporation tax law, as embodied in the 
corporation tax code, and given the overwhelming need for effectiveness (something 
discussed below) shapes and prioritises, in particular cases, the values immanent to this area 
of law. As Loughlin says, elsewhere, we are therefore developing an ‘explanatory 
framework’, with a view to revealing ‘the value of assumptions, the causal relations and the 
dominant features’ of corporation tax law as a political practice.14 
Different aspects of the same four strands as those that occurred in previous chapters 
therefore appear in Chapter 4. Thus, rather than HMG’s liability to account for the success or 
failure of its corporation tax reform measures, and instead of HMG’s right of legislative 
initiative, we are concerned with how, and how far, the corporation tax code reflects the 
state’s pre-eminence. Secondly, we are interested, not in the formal constraints on 
corporation tax reform spelt out in the European Treaty, but in how the corporation tax code 
and its accompanying policy statements, reveals an intergovernmentalist15 view of the 
relationship of the UK’s corporation tax base with those of the rest of Europe, and also with 
those of OECD and GATT 1994/WTO members. Thirdly, we are concerned, not with how 
                                                                                                                                                       
12  See Dudley Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 71-73; 
Martin Loughlin (1988) 51 MLR 531-548 (‘Review Article’), p. 533, quoting Berlin, n. 11 above, 
p. 76; also Chapter 2 above, n. 72. 
13  See Loughlin, n. 12 above, pp. 533-534, quoting Hegel’s Philosophy of History; this is different, 
he points out, from the immanent critique developed by the Frankfurt school (ibid., pp. 535-536).  
14  See Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 35; 
also Martin Loughlin, ‘Theory and Values in Public Law: An Interpretation’ [2005] PL 48-66, 59. 
15  See Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 
2000), ch. 1; John Snape, ‘Corporation Tax Reform – Politics and Public Law’ [2007] BTR 374-
404, passim; Michelle Cini, ‘Intergovernmentalism’, in European Union Politics, ed. by Michelle 
Cini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 93-108; Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 
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 the processes of reform augment or detract from confidence in the tax, but with the role of 
the code in mediating the relationship between HMG and the corporate sector, and possibly 
with society more widely. The final strand, therefore, in the discussion is the extent to which 
the form and content of the corporation tax code militates in favour of, or against, its 
effectiveness.   
 
ECONOMICS, REALISM AND POLITICS 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to develop the implications of the idea that it is the public 
law status of the corporation tax code that dictates its constant propensity for change, its 
complexity, and the prioritisation of the political values within it. Given the nature and role 
of public law, as ‘a set of practices concerned with the establishment, maintenance and 
regulation of the activity of governing the state’,16 whose ‘even handedness’ helps to ‘create 
intimacy, shape identity, generate trust, and strengthen allegiance’,17 it would indeed be 
surprising if corporation tax law did not respond to the commercial and financial 
developments sketched out above.18 It is the contention of this study that much, if not most, 
of the scholarly writing on corporation tax, fails, for one reason or another, to take sufficient 
account of this point. Some reference was made to this state of affairs in Chapter 1 above, 
                                                                                                                                                       
16 May 2006, col. 166 (Mark Hoban, MP (Fareham, Conservative)) and col. 167 (Rob Marris, MP 
(Wolverhampton South-West, Labour)); also Rifkind, Financial Times, 13 December, 2006, 15.   
16  See Loughlin (2005), n. 14 above, p. 58; see Chapter 1 above, n. 317. 
17  See Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Law: the Third Order of the Political’, in Public Law in a 
Multi-Layered Constitution, ed. by Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 27-51, 40-41; see Chapter 1 above, n. 325. 
18  See Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 216 (Ed Balls, MP, Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury); also the Rt Hon. Gordon Brown’s Foreword to H.M. Treasury and 
Inland Revenue, Large Business Taxation: The Government’s strategy and corporate tax reforms: 
A consultation document (London: H.M. Treasury, 2001). 
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 where it was contended that the theoretical discussion of corporation tax tends primarily to 
be of an economic nature.19 
To redress the imbalance somewhat, the chapter unfolds in a sequence designed to 
illustrate the importance of recognising the public law nature of the corporation tax code; the 
implications of this for the code’s ‘complexity’ and ‘instability’; and the consequences of its 
public law nature for the values that the corporation tax code embodies, and their 
prioritisation in particular areas. It is therefore important to be clear, both about the nature of 
the economics learning on corporation tax, and the strengths and limitations that it presents 
for the issues under consideration in the chapter. 
The first, possibly the most important, point, to be made about the economic analysis of 
corporation tax, is that it has a strongly ‘normative’ character. This comment might seem 
surprising to an economist of taxation. James and Nobes, for example, in their classic study, 
say, when discussing fairness in taxation, that economists ‘are inclined to leave the definition 
of equity to others’, since they ‘are trained from an early age to steer clear of normative 
arguments’.20 Two points can be made about this claim. First, that the term ‘normative’ is 
not, as it is in the present study, set up in disjunction with ‘functionalist’.21 James and Nobes 
may not, in other words, have thought through the possible range of connotations of the term 
that they are invoking. Secondly, and more importantly, there are grounds for believing that, 
try as they might, economists do think in normative terms when they write about taxation.22 
Normativism in the study of public law, and as used in this study, is ‘rooted in a belief in the 
                                                 
19  See Chapter 1 above, n. 94. 
20  See Simon James and Christopher Nobes, The Economics of Taxation: Principles, Policy and 
Practice, 7th edn (Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2000), p. 78. 
21  See Chapter 1 above, n. 274. 
22  See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p. 136. 
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 ideal of the separation of powers and in the need to subordinate government to law’.23 In 
economics, as in public law, at least as far as its liberal variant is concerned, one of the chief 
advocates of normativism has been F.A. Hayek.24 In the study of economics, Gunnar Myrdal 
has associated it with the making of unwarranted assumptions about what taxation should 
and should not seek to achieve.25 Allowing for the vintage of Myrdal’s work, and also for the 
intellectual tradition to which it belongs,26 we may nonetheless concede that he has a point.27 
These judgments are unwarranted in the sense that they are neither the outcome of an 
ideological struggle, nor are they based on intense empirical observation of the incidence of 
taxes.28 What they have in common with the normative tradition in public law is that they 
clearly separate economics from both the politics and the law disciplines, and close off a 
more profound, distinctively political, debate, about what the tax system is actually for. 
There are many examples of such attempts.29 So, in 1978 and 1982 respectively, the Meade 
Committee30 and the authors of the Green Paper on corporation tax reform,31 each wondered 
whether bringing in a ‘flow-of-funds’ corporation tax would make taxing corporate profits 
                                                 
23  See Chapter 1 above, n. 270. 
24  See Chapter 1 above, n. 263. 
25  See Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, trans. by Paul 
Streeten (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), ch. 7. 
26  It is referred to with approval by Hannah Arendt (in The Human Condition, 2nd edn (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 44n), and his work more generally by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, in History of Economic Analysis, ed. by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 1173. 
27  See Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, Economic analysis and moral philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 211-220. 
28  See Myrdal, n. 25 above, pp. 185-186; also Greenspan’s engaging idea of Adam Smith’s lucky 
guess (see Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (London: Allen 
Lane, 2007), pp. 262-263). 
29  See John Tiley, Revenue Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 815-823.  
30  See The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee chaired by Professor 
J.E. Meade, ed. by J.E. Meade (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), ch. 12. 
31  See Corporation Tax: Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Command 
of Her Majesty January 1982 (Cmnd 8456) (London: HMSO, 1982), ch. 7. 
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 more neutral. Again, in 1991, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)32 suggested improving 
neutrality by the making of an ‘allowance for corporate equity’ (an ACE)33 in the taxation of 
corporate profits.34 Even now, a working group of the European Commission is considering 
the advantages of a ‘common consolidated corporate tax base’ (a CCCTB) for Europe. 
Intellectual feats though each of these are, they do not help us to interpret the process of 
corporation tax reform. At the very most, they tend to betray the ideological stance of their 
progenitors, a point to which we return below. 
The second point that might be made about the economic analysis of corporation tax is 
that it lacks a certain realism, a charge that can certainly not be levelled against the 
interpretative turn in political writing. It is impossible to illustrate this point more vividly 
than by reference, not to academic writing, but to the rich and illuminating memoirs of Lord 
Lawson of Blaby, who, as the Rt Hon. Nigel Lawson, MP, was Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in the early years of the Thatcher administration, and who had been responsible for 
commissioning the 1982 Green Paper referred to above. He describes how, whilst admiring 
the intellectual beauty of its recommendations, he had contemplated with horror the political 
consequences of proceeding down that line: 
 
‘We [Lawson and Arthur, later Lord, Cockfield]35 looked into the theoretically attractive 
switch from an income tax to an expenditure tax system, and had a long session with 
                                                 
32  See Institute for Fiscal Studies, Commentary No. 26, Equity for Companies: A Corporation Tax 
for the 1990s: A Report of the IFS Capital Taxes Group chaired by Malcolm Gammie (London, 
1991), developing arguments made in Michael Devereux and Harold Freeman, ‘A General Neutral 
Profits Tax’ (1991) 12:3 FS 1-15. 
33  See John R. King, ‘Debt and Equity Financing’, in Tax Policy Handbook, ed. by Parthasarathi 
Shome (Washington, DC: IMF, 1995), pp. 158-161, 161; also Bond, n. 4 above, passim.   
34  See Bond, n. 4 above, pp. 164-169. 
35  Cockfield was a distinguished official, who had been a Commissioner of Inland Revenue between 
1951-1952, and who eventually became an EC Commissioner, before quarrelling with Margaret 
Thatcher (see Nigel Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London: Bantam 
Press, 1992), pp. 17, 22, 31, 35-36, 336, 894-898; WW; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street 
Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 547). 
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 Professor James Meade, its foremost exponent, but (in my view rightly) shrank from the 
upheaval and practical problems that would have been involved.’36 
 
Lawson, in many respects an extremely successful practitioner of the ‘art and science of 
government’, collides beautifully in this extract with the ‘Aristotelian’ mindset of the 
economist, the mentality Lady Thatcher so famously resented in the Whitehall civil 
service.37 There is no need to elaborate further on this here; suffice it to say that, insofar as 
they pinpoint the gulf ‘[b]etween the idea [a]nd the reality’,38 the cleavage between the 
Aristotelian and the Platonic view of politics,39 Lawson’s comments remain as relevant 
today as they were in the 1980s. 
                                                
The third point that we can make about the economics writing is that, as an enterprise of 
political economy, the very technicality of corporation tax reform tends to remove its 
difficulties from public debate, despite the fact that, as shown in Chapter 3, the most 
important corporation tax issues are eminently political.40 To the extent that corporation tax 
reform thereby becomes the province of experts, of technocrats,41 it is a neat illustration of 
the range and importance of the issues that, given the involvement of policy networks, and 
the vagaries of the Select Committee system, are outside effective parliamentary scrutiny. It 
is not necessary to develop this point here, since the accountability issues raised have already 
been discussed.42 All that it is necessary to affirm at this stage is that the inaccessibility of 
 
36  See Lawson, n. 35 above, p. 17 (also 344-345). 
37  See Thatcher, n. 35 above, p. 46 (although Thatcher does not herself identify this mindset as 
‘Aristotelian’). 
38  See T.S. Eliot, ‘The Hollow Men’, in Collected Poems 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 
1974), pp. 91-92. 
39  See Cleinias’s recognition of the potential for strife, and the legislator’s response, in the state of 
Crete (Plato, The Laws, ed. by Trevor Saunders (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 5-6 (discussed in 
Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 34n). 
40  See Chapter 3 above, p. 164; also Snape, n. 15 above, p. 382. 
41  See Chapter 3 above, n. 241. 
42  See Chapters 2 (ex post) and 3 (ex ante) above. 
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 the relevant policy material, together with its potentially influential nature, can hardly be 
regarded as a contribution to prudential governance. 
The final point is linked to the point made above about the normative nature of much of 
the economics writing. It is also, so far as it draws in questions of legislative simplicity, 
relevant to the concerns about ‘complexity’, ‘instability’ and ‘the rule of law’ discussed 
below. This is part at least of the point made by Jürgen Habermas, that, once policy issues 
become characterised as ones of political economy, ‘the category of law ... [loses] its central 
role in theoretical analysis’.43 Although this may serve as a lament for scholars whose ‘home 
discipline’ is law, it is much more important than this, for two reasons: first, it means that the 
usefulness of the economics literature for the lawyer is diminished by its understatement of 
the crucial importance of law; and, secondly, which is a related point, it involves 
assumptions about the nature of law, and of legal studies, which, in the light of trends in 
public law scholarship, are increasingly unjustifiable. 
Aspects of each of these four points inform the developing discussion in the present 
chapter. Our attention turns first to the expansion, in the light of these comments, of elements 
of the theory of public law, as it relates to corporate taxation. This is a fuller examination of 
why the values of the corporation tax code are political values, and why, and how, the code 
must be analysed as a manifestation of a ‘political practice’. The discussion is illustrated by 
reference to a number of cases in which the public law nature of the judicial technique in tax 
law cases has been in evidence. The issues are related to, and shaped by, the governance 
issues raised in Chapter 2, and the portrayal of the political dimension to corporation tax 
reform offered in Chapter 3. What it is sought to stress is the theory of effectiveness, and the 
paramount status of the technique of prudence. 
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 From an elaboration of the public law nature of the corporation tax code in the first part of 
the chapter, the second part moves to a consideration of the implications of this 
characterisation of corporation tax law for what is ubiquitously, but inaccurately, referred to 
as ‘the rule of law’. The contention here is that much of the debate on corporation tax reform 
misses the significance of legitimate divergences of opinion on the nature and consequences 
of ‘the rule of law’,44 and the implications of this for ‘complexity’ in the code, as well as for 
perceptions of its ‘instability’. Unless we move beyond these outdated and unrealistic, 
Hayekian, preconceptions, it is argued, we shall never properly be able to understand what is 
going on, nor assess the viability of routes to improvement. 
The foregoing lays the groundwork for the extended discussion of the values immanent to 
the changing corporation tax code, in the third and final part of the chapter. This consists of 
extended, and complementary, analyses of the values of efficiency and fairness. What vision 
of each of these terms does the code embody? How far are these values and their 
prioritisation a reflection of the institutions and processes discussed in Chapters 2 and 3? 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the concepts thus deployed? Why, despite 
everything, do they seem in reality, just now, to be fairly robust? As a basis for shedding 
light on these issues, in the rest of the third part of the chapter, there is an extended 
discussion of the importance of a theory of effectiveness in giving shape and content to the 
values themselves. 
We continue, therefore, by building outwards the implications of the idea of corporation 
tax as public law, with the aims suggested above firmly in mind.        
 
                                                                                                                                                       
43  See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. by William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1997), p. 45. 
44  See Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v. Inland Revenue Commissioners and the Attorney 
General [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] STC 1, 41h-42c (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). 
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 FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC LAW NATURE OF CORPORATION TAX 
 
Previous chapters have emphasised that, properly understood, corporation tax law is to be 
seen as a form of public law. The truth of this contention is apparent, not only from the fact 
that taxation in general is the exercise of one of the most fundamental ‘prerogatives of the 
state’,45 but also from the essentially political nature of the issues with which it has, as a 
‘practice of politics’, to contend. In the next several pages, it is sought to justify the 
importance of this argument in understanding the textures of the corporation tax code itself, 
especially in the light of the nineteenth and twentieth century hostility of English lawyers46 
and political philosophers47 to any distinction between public and private law.48 In making 
out this justification, we follow Loughlin’s discussion of public law ‘method’,49 reflecting on 
the specific implications of that method for the reform of corporation tax law. 
First and foremost, the corporation tax code is more than a highly detailed, and extremely 
complicated, collection of what Loughlin refers to as ‘the edicts of the supreme authority in 
the state’.50 It is that, of course, since, as was mentioned above, it is, like all effective UK tax 
legislation, a manifestation of the pre-eminence of the state, and its representative, the Crown 
in Parliament (i.e. HMG). ‘Juridification’,51 what Loughlin calls (drawing on Habermas) ‘the 
                                                 
45  See Chapter 2 above, n. 43. The judges of the Council of Europe have evidently read their Bodin 
(see Ferrazzini v. Italy [2001] STC 1314); Oliver, QC, evidently has not (see N. Ali and S. Begum 
and Others v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2002] VATDT No. 17681). 
46  Most famously, of course, Dicey and Lord Hewart: see A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution, ed. by E.C.S. Wade, 10th edn (London: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 202-
203; the Rt. Hon. Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929), chs 3 
and 4.  
47  See Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 151. 
48  See Chapter 1 above, pp. 38-39. 
49  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, ch. 8. 
50  Ibid., p. 131. 
51  Ibid. 
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 tendency to conceptualize extensive spheres of public life in legal terms’,52 will not help us 
to see what this extra dimension might be, since it underestimates ‘the social dimension’ of 
the ‘normative authority’53 contained within the highly detailed prescriptions of the code. 
Neither, Loughlin would argue, will certain reactions to juridification, namely the (liberal) 
normativism of Habermas and of Dworkin,54 help us to identify this additional quality. Each 
of these (albeit for very different reasons) underestimates the distinctiveness of public law, 
and is ‘unable to supply critical standards against which governmental action is to be 
measured’.55 It is, we may infer, the Aristotelian impetus behind Habermas and Dworkin that 
so limits their interpretative potential when confronted with legislation such as the 
corporation tax code.56 No, instead, the code must be analysed for what it is, as ‘an aspect of 
political practice’, part of the ‘third order of the political’.57 The corporation tax code is an 
expression, in other words, of HMG’s sovereignty, its tax sovereignty, the term being used, 
not in the sense of competence only, but in its fullest, ‘generative’, sense,58 sovereignty as 
‘capacity’, as ‘constituent power’.59 Viewed thus, at any one stage in its detailed 
development, the corporation tax code marks out, with great precision and exactitude, the 
exercise of the sovereign power of HMG in taxing corporate income. 
                                                 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid. 
54  This does not however preclude Freedman’s use of Dworkinian analysis in the context of a 
‘GANTIP’ (see Judith Freedman, ‘Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General 
Anti-Avoidance Principle’ [2004] BTR 332-357). 
55  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 132. 
56  But see John F. Avery Jones, ‘Tax Law: Rules or Principles?’ [1996] BTR 580-600; John Prebble, 
‘Should Tax Legislation be Written from a Principles and Purpose Point of View or a Precise and 
Detailed Point of View?’ [1998] BTR 112-123; also Chapter 3 above, n. 245. 
57  Hence the present writer’s comment that corporation tax reform solutions are matters of 
constitutional law (see Snape, n. 15 above, p. 379). 
58  See Chapter 2 above, n. 50. 
59  Ibid., n. 53. 
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 Secondly,60 the corporation tax code must, in the light of the foregoing, be viewed as 
‘political jurisprudence’.61 This might seem worrying, as it might suggest few, if any, 
limitations on what the code might come to contain. This is the ‘paradox’ to which Loughlin, 
finding its origins in Jean Bodin,62 attaches fundamental weight, however: ‘it is precisely 
because limits are disabling, that they are enabling’,63 or, to put it another way, ‘authority is 
enhanced when competence is limited’.64 Loughlin draws strength from Stephen Holmes’s 
analogy with grammar – grammatical rules enable greater clarity of expression, not less. 
Thus, if we look at the corporation tax code as a whole, we can draw at least three related 
conclusions about its status as ‘political jurisprudence’. First, especially as it consists of 
primary legislation, which has been tested in the fora analysed in Chapter 3 (i.e. expert 
discussion in policy communities, and ‘argumentative scrutiny’ by elected representatives of 
the people), it reflects the enabling power of constraint or, perhaps, restraint: ‘[P]rohibition 
on taxation without consultation’ is specifically identified by Holmes as a hallmark of the 
enabling power of institutional restraint.65 We can, without doing violence to the idea, read 
‘consultation’ here as encompassing, not only the consultation of Parliament, but the 
consultation of experts prior to the parliamentary stage. That is why Malcolm Gammie was 
absolutely right to focus on the absence of proper consultation (in appropriate circumstances, 
at least) as a major problem with tax measures of the 1980s.66 Secondly, however, we can 
draw contrasting conclusions about those parts of the code which result from the conferring 
on H.M. Treasury of wide delegated powers, or measures that, even though they appear in 
                                                 
60  We are here following the structure of Loughlin’s argument on ‘method’ (Loughlin, n. 39 above, 
p. 134). 
61  Ibid. 
62  Ibid., p. 137. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid., p. 138. 
65  Quoted in Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 137. 
66  See Chapter 1 above, n. 48. 
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 primary legislation, were not subject to full consultation before Parliament argued over them, 
in circumstances such that it would have been prudent so to do. The 1965 introduction of 
corporation tax itself provides interesting material for consideration, so far as this last point 
is concerned. Would it have been more prudent for the then Labour government to have 
consulted widely on its introduction,67 or was the prudent course the ‘Crippsian’68 one that 
was actually taken?69 Difficult as it is to reconstruct the circumstances of the decision,70 it is 
interesting to note that we are fast approaching the point at which every major structural 
feature of the 1965 tax has been reconstructed, albeit over four decades. Thirdly, although 
this is a point to which we return later in the chapter, with the code viewed as political 
jurisprudence, the complicated and detailed plethora of reliefs and exemptions begins to look 
as though they reflect what is politically possible, and desirable, in the furtherance of 
government policy. 
With this concept of the corporation tax code in mind (as ‘political jurisprudence’), we 
can consider further the conception of law, and the purpose of law, that the code therefore 
embodies.71 First, it is an idea of law explicitly as a means of ‘advancing the public 
interest’.72 Full discussion of how the code seeks to do this is reserved to the last part of the 
chapter. For the moment, it is enough to recall the discussion of the public interest in Chapter 
3, and especially the idea that the promotion of the public good will be ideological (indeed, 
that it has been); that the pursuit of an ideology can be an entirely legitimate objective for 
law; and that much of the disagreement about the pros and cons of corporation tax reform 
                                                 
67  Ibid. 
68  i.e. Sir Stafford Cripps (see Loughlin, n. 14 above, p. 236); Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version: The 
Life of Sir Stafford Cripps 1889-1952 (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 57-61. 
69  Ferrier (see Chapter 3 above, n. 299) states that FB 1965 was debated on the floor of the House. 
70  But see Kynaston, n. 5 above, pp. 300-301, 304, 307, 311-312; also Richard Holt, Second 
Amongst Equals: Chancellors of the Exchequer since the Second World War (London: Profile 
Books, 2002), pp. 14-15.   
71  We are here still following Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 140. 
 235
 fails to take proper account of this point. Secondly, the code enshrines an idea of law as what 
is created by the state (or its representative), that is, by ‘those forms and institutions that 
establish and regulate the exercise of governmental authority’,73 and which create 
‘conditions for maintaining state authority’.74 The corporation tax code is thus the creation of 
the person differentiated from other persons because it is instituted ‘precisely for the purpose 
of creating law’;75 of an established set of procedures, which help to create trust and 
security;76 and, as Bodin says, of the state’s unique and nearly fundamental prerogative, the 
right to raise taxes.77 
                                                                                                                                                      
To recapitulate. We can say, even before we begin to look for the values immanent to the 
code, that the corporation tax code is a precise indicator of the boundaries of the sovereign 
power of the state to tax corporate income. Secondly, that, as such, the code is an example of 
political jurisprudence, whose strength is drawn, paradoxically, from the constraints under 
which it constantly evolves. Thirdly, that, as political jurisprudence, it is designed to further 
the public interest, as that idea is conceived of by ‘the government of the day’.78 Fourthly, 
that it has been promulgated through established channels, a point the full significance of 
which will become apparent when we consider the code’s relationship with ‘the rule of law’. 
Finally, that the code represents the unique and basic power of the state, the power of levying 
taxes. This leaves for consideration the relevance of the final component in Loughlin’s 
depiction of public law method: the technique of public law that the corporation tax code 
 
72  Ibid., pp. 140-141, although he does not use the expression ‘the public interest’. 
73  Ibid., p. 141. 
74  Ibid. 
75  See Chapter 2 above, n. 36. 
76  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 142. 
77  See Chapter 2 above, n. 43. 
78  An expression also used by Gammie (see Malcolm Gammie, ‘The Process of Fiscal Reform in the 
United Kingdom’ [1989] BTR 252-264, 253).  
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 illustrates.79 In this study, we shall avoid detailed consideration of a possible fifth stage in 
the method, which is the code’s relationship with morality. It is not simply that the code is an 
example (albeit a monumental one) of economic regulation. More fundamentally, it is that 
the political conditions managed by the code, and, within them, the economic conditions,80 
are themselves the basis of ‘moral life’.81 We here put aside the idea of the primacy of 
morality in Rawls and in Dworkin on the basis that misunderstands the reality of politics.82 
This final point about the nature of the corporation tax code, what it says about the 
techniques of public law, is its role in managing that ‘brokenness’,83 that potential for 
conflict which, throughout the study, has been taken to characterise ‘the concept of the 
political’.84 In Chapter 3, this was related to the potential for conflict that arises out of the 
five dilemmas of governance identified in Chapter 2.85 These are potential conflicts between 
HMG and the corporate sector; between HMG and other EU Member States (as well as the 
EU institutions); and between conflicting interests within the corporate sector itself. Since 
there is ‘no authoritative morality’ through which these conflicts, or potential conflicts, can 
be resolved (neither Dworkin nor Rawls is in a position to help much here), we cannot 
expect to find either moral values, or a moral ordering of values, within the code. Instead, we 
find that the theory running through the code is ‘reason of state’,86 and that its method is 
prudence,87 albeit in juristic form. Given the objectives and values of the institutions 
                                                 
79  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, pp. 148-152. 
80  See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), p. 88 (note by Leo Strauss). 
81  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 145; see Chapter 1 above, nn. 252 and 287; Chapter 3 above, nn. 74 
and 149 (Rawls); Chapter 1 above, nn. 283 and 358; n. 54 above, this chapter (Dworkin). 
82  Ibid., p. 147. 
83  Ibid., p. 148. 
84  See Chapter 3 above, pp. 177-178. 
85  See Chapter 2 above, pp. 99-112. 
86  Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
87  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 149. 
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 discussed in Chapter 2, as well as the logic of the reform process itself (in Chapter 3), neither 
point should be in any way surprising. 
The idea of ‘reason of state’ being ‘the reason of’ the corporation tax code88 may strike 
the reader as ‘un-British’.89 Yet, as Loughlin shows, reason of state is the underlying idea of 
one of the foundational documents of British government, the Bill of Rights of 1689. The 
ban on ‘the levying of money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of prerogative 
without grant of Parliament’90 is itself, as has already been emphasised, a prudential one. 
This predisposition to prudence runs through, not just the corporation tax code itself, but 
also, as indicated in Chapter 2, the way in which the judiciary (also obliged to be prudent)91 
interpret its injunctions, sometimes (one infers), disingenuously, or even in ignorance of the 
label. The juristic prudence of the code is the subject matter of the next part of the 
discussion, and, by extension, the rest of the chapter as well. 
At the level of judicial activity, we may note the following points. First, the existence of 
the well-known exclusion of the securing of the ‘payment of taxes or other contributions’ 
from the right to possession of property under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), Protocol 1, Article 1, reinforces the prudential nature of judicial reasoning in cases 
that might involve challenges to reform measures;92 however, even if some future case were 
to fall outside the exception, Loughlin’s notion of rights as the ‘positivization’ of ‘political 
                                                 
88  Ibid., p. 151. 
89  See Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v. Inland Revenue Commissioners and the Attorney 
General [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] STC 1, 41h-42c (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). 
90  See Chapter 1 above, n. 337. 
91  See Chapter 2 above, pp. 151-152. 
92  See, albeit in different contexts, Application No. 13013/87, Wasa Liv Ömsesidigt, 
Fërsäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse and a group of approximately 15,000 individuals v. 
Sweden (1988) 58 ECHRDR 163; Application No. 21319/93, National and Provincial Building 
Society and Others v. United Kingdom [1997] STC 1466 (ECtHR) (civil claim originating in tax is 
a civil right within ECHR, Art 6); Eagerpath Ltd v. Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) [2001] STC 26.  
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 claims’93 would mean that the reasoning would still have to be of a prudential kind, since 
human rights adjudication itself involves ruling on political norms.94 Falling outside the 
exception in Protocol, Article 1, is not an escape from the political into a reassuringly certain 
realm of law. Secondly, European judges seem much better at understanding the public law 
nature of the taxation function than are certain of their English counterparts.95 Thirdly, 
although the outer limits of the public law nature of taxation need still to be fully charted,96 
cases clearly of a public law nature show much evidence of judges using a prudential 
technique.97 Finally, as recent cases on claiming repayment of tax paid under a mistake of 
law, and on the nature of interest awards illustrate, a prudential approach may require the 
application of private law principles, especially where the amounts in question can be 
quantified.98 These cases might possibly be regarded as contributing to marking out the 
boundaries of the public law of taxation. The better view, it is argued, is that the use of 
private law principles is itself a prudential response to a public law problem,99 since it tends 
to augment trust and confidence, not merely in the judiciary, but also in the 
‘creditworthiness’ of the state itself.100           
                                                 
93  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, pp. 125, 130. 
94  Ibid., p. 162. 
95  Contrast Ferrazzini v. Italy [2001] STC 1314 (ECtHR) and Application No. 73053/01, Jussila v. 
Finland (2006) 9 ITL Rep 662, with N. Ali and S. Begum and Others v. Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise [2002] VATDT No. 17681 (Stephen Oliver, QC (Chairman)), as yet 
unreported. 
96  See Lord Woolf, ‘Tax and Judicial Review’ [1993] BTR 219-229; Ian Saunders, Taxation: 
Judicial Review and Other Remedies (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996), pp. 103-106, 153-155.   
97  See Case C-446/03, Marks and Spencer plc. v. Halsey (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) [2006] 1 CMLR 
18; [2006] EWHC 811; [2006] STC 1235 (Park J.); affirmed [2007] EWCA Civ 117; [2007] 2 
CMLR 21; Revenue and Customs Commissioners v. William Grant and Sons Distillers Ltd; Small 
(Inspector of Taxes) v. Mars UK Ltd [2007] UKHL 15; [2007] STC 680; and Barclays Mercantile 
Business Finance Ltd v. Mawson (Inspector of Taxes) [2004] UKHL 51; [2005] STC 1.  
98  See Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v. Inland Revenue Commissioners and the Attorney 
General [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] STC 1; Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. 
Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another [2007] UKHL 34; [2007] 3 WLR 354. 
99  i.e. in that it applies ‘private law’ principles. 
100  As in the foundational constitutional law case of John Entick v. Nathan Carrington and others 
(1765) 95 ER 807 (Court of King’s Bench). 
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‘COMPLEXITY’ AND ‘INSTABILITY’ IN THE CORPORATION TAX CODE 
 
If the characterisation of the corporation tax code in the terms just invoked is maintainable, 
then there are important consequences for the significance of current political debates over 
the ‘complexity’ and the ‘instability’ of the code. Such debates tend to be framed by 
reference to ‘the rule of law’, so we next need to consider what the implications of ‘the rule 
of law’, if any, may be for the idea of the corporation tax code as political jurisprudence. 
John Cullinane, writing in the Financial Times, in April 2006, set out the key elements of 
the current debate with particular clarity.101 His contribution, though brief, merits serious 
consideration, since it appeared in what has become one of the leading fora for tax policy, 
and it comes from the pen of a leading member of the corporation tax policy community.102 
Cullinane’s ‘hammering on the doors of representative government’, to adapt Bernard 
Manin’s phraseology, is thus apt to carry particular resonance. The corporation tax code,103 
he says, is ‘complicated’ (for instance, because there are still many exceptions to the 
accounting theme); it is ‘unclear’ (among the exceptions to accounting treatment for 
corporation tax purposes are research and development allowances and reliefs,104 and these 
are notoriously difficult to apply to individual cases); and, finally, the code (like its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions) is subject to frequent, and often retrospective, change. 
What is wrong with each of these tendencies, says Cullinane, is that they run contrary to 
‘the rule of law, the ‘idea’ of which is, apparently, that ‘people and businesses know where 
                                                 
101  See Cullinane, Financial Times, 20 April 2006, 11; also Cullinane, Taxation, 11 May 2006, 147-
150. 
102  See Chapter 2 above, p. 133. Cullinane was, at the time of writing the article, deputy president of 
the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT), and is now its president. 
103  In fact, Cullinane refers to ‘tax’ in general, but it is clear from the context that corporation tax is 
intended. 
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 they stand and can make decisions accordingly’.105 What is needed is a ‘return’ to the ‘rule 
of law’, something which would, he argues, have very specific consequences for the 
corporation tax code: the augmentation of what has in this study been called ‘the accounting 
theme’ (marrying ‘taxable profits’ with ‘profits per accounts’); assessing more accurately the 
costs that businesses will have to bear in order to comply with reforms to the code (which 
would include, presumably, reducing its ‘complexity’); and, finally, ‘keeping the rules as 
stable and comprehensive as possible’. 
If the view of the corporation tax code presented in this study commends itself to the 
reader, it will be apparent that, while Cullinane’s conclusions might be maintainable, his 
reasoning certainly is not. This is because the characteristics that he attributes to ‘the rule of 
law’ are at best contentious, and because his conclusions are nonetheless supportable within 
a conception of corporation tax law as a ‘political practice’, as ‘political jurisprudence’. The 
second part of this statement is discussed under the second and third sub-headings below. 
What we need to consider next is the contentious nature of ‘the rule of law’. 
 
‘The rule of law’ 
Judith Shklar,106 the elegance of whose argument is vastly underestimated both by Brian 
Tamanaha,107 in his recent monograph, and by Lord Bingham, in a lecture at Cambridge in 
2006,108 centres the rule of law on Montesquieu, and its significance on (in this case) the 
corporation tax code’s origins in the well-established institutions and processes through 
                                                                                                                                                       
104  See below in this chapter. 
105  See Cullinane (April 2006), n. 101 above. 
106  Shklar, who died in 1992, was a powerful commentator on the relationship of politics and law.  
107  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 59. 
108  See Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ [2007] CLJ 67-85, 67. 
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 which taxation law in the UK is created.109 The historical and interpretative nature of 
Shklar’s analysis makes it essential to a functionalist view of the corporation tax code as 
political jurisprudence. 
Montesquieu, says Shklar, provides the rule of law with its later historical signification, as 
‘the rule of institutions’, the earlier (fatally circumscribed and much-abused) one being 
Aristotle’s ‘rule of reason’.110 Cullinane’s aspirations for the corporation tax code coincide 
with neither of these, but with Lon Fuller’s post-Hayekian,111 Aristotle-twisting view of the 
‘rule of law’,112 Fuller maintaining that, in accordance with ‘the rule of law’, law must be 
inter alia ‘clear’, ‘enduring’, and ‘promulgated’. As Shklar says, acidly: ‘as a legal ideal for 
us there is little either to accept or reject in this conventional list of lawyerly aspirations’.113 
Although Fuller does not say in what kind of society such characteristics might obtain,114 
they could be compatible even with a ‘repressive and irrational government’.115 What 
Montesquieu offers is an analysis of the rule of law as protection from ‘the fear of violence, 
the insecurity of arbitrary government and the discrimination of injustice’.116 In describing 
the English system of the eighteenth century, Montesquieu conceived of the rule of law as a 
means of ensuring, via institutional controls, the personal security of the individual.117 As 
                                                 
109  See Judith Shklar, ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’, in The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology?, 
ed. by A.C. Hutchinson and P. Monahan (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), pp. 1-16. 
110  Ibid., p. 5; see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. and trans. by J.A.K. Thomson, Hugh 
Tredennick and Jonathan Barnes (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 187-189, 215-216 (see Martin 
Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 69-71, 183-184). 
111  Ibid., p. 7 (‘no social end in view’). 
112  See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. edn (London: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 46-
91 (the eight ‘desiderata that make up the internal morality of the law’, ibid., p. 81). 
113  See Shklar, n. 109 above, p. 13. 
114  Shklar describes Fuller’s notion of the ‘rule of law’ as ‘political and historical fantasizing’ (ibid., 
p. 14). 
115  See Shklar, n. 109 above, p. 13. 
116  Ibid., p. 16; see Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. 
by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 156-166. 
117  See Shklar, n. 109 above, p. 4. 
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 E.P. Thompson concluded,118 ‘England was not [in the eighteenth century] a gulag society[,] 
and its political classes had to some degree shackled themselves’.119 That was the method of 
prudence;120 the foundation of the very system, analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, which is, in 
our own days, producing the corporation tax code.121 
                                                
If this is right, the significance of the rule of law to the corporation tax code is simply that 
it is the product of those institutions and processes discussed in previous chapters. This has 
already been identified as a characteristic of political jurisprudence.122 What it means is that 
the corporation tax code, in all its ‘instability’ and ‘complexity’, is a vivid illustration of 
Loughlin’s point, closely aligned to Shklar’s (via Montesquieu), that the rule of law, in this 
system, means no more (but, equally importantly, no less) than ‘that authority can only be 
wielded through recognized legal forms and that the legal machinery of the state exists to 
ensure the compliance of office-holders with these forms …’.123 
So, if Cullinane is wrong about the premises, but supportable, possibly, in his 
conclusions, what is the true significance of ‘complexity’ and ‘instability’ in the corporation 
tax code itself? 
 
118  See E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Penguin, 1990), 
pp. 258-269. 
119  See Shklar, n. 109 above, p. 5. 
120  See Chapter 3 above, n. 93; also Mark N. Brown, ‘The Character of a Trimmer’, in The Works of 
George Savile Marquis of Halifax, vol. 1, ed. by Mark N. Brown (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), pp. 33-68.    
121  See Loughlin, n. 110 above, pp. 183-185. 
122  See above in this chapter. 
123  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, pp. 132-133 (this might be what Lord Bingham (see n. 108 above) is 
saying, albeit indirectly, in reference to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005). 
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 ‘Complexity’ 
Cullinane pinpoints the ‘complexity’ of the corporation tax code as one of its most 
undesirable characteristics,124 and, as discussed, grounds this argument in the requirements 
of a version of ‘the rule of law’. Are we therefore to conclude, with Tiley, that the 
corporation tax code, along with the rest of UK taxation law, is merely a ‘shambles’,125 or, 
that its ‘complexity’ denotes something more?126 Certainly much of the political debate on 
corporation tax is currently focussing on the phenomenon of ‘complexity’.127 A report 
sponsored by the Confederation of British Industry (the CBI), and published in 2006, refers 
to the perception, on the part of its members, of hitherto undreamt-of levels of 
‘complexity’.128 These political debates ascribe the significance of ‘complexity’, not to a 
breach of ‘the rule of law’, but to international ‘competitiveness’ issues, although as Martin 
Wolf129 and Samuel Brittan130 would insist, this is properly to be regarded, not as 
‘competitiveness’ between states, but between individual firms in different states. The 
argument maintained in the present study is that, given the institutional and procedural 
                                                 
124  The complaint has often been made about UK taxation law in general: see Great Western Railway 
Company v. Bater (Surveyor of Taxes) (1922) 8 TC 231, 255 (Lord Wrenbury); Hubert Monroe, 
QC, Intolerable Inquisition? Reflections on the Law of Tax (London: Stevens, 1981), pp. 23-24; 
Maurice Parry-Wingfield, ‘The Chicken or the Egg?’ [2000] BTR 597-601, 598; on the need for 
simplicity, see Meade, n. 30 above, pp. 18-21.     
125  See Tiley, n. 29 above, p. 49. 
126  Rather like (which is not an original point), Oliver Cromwell’s description of English real 
property law as an ‘ungodly jumble’, i.e. as law whose ‘values’ are ‘ungodly’ (quoted, e.g., in J.H. 
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edn (London: Butterworths, 2002), p. 289). 
127 See Houlder, Financial Times, 24 March 2006, 2; also ‘Memorandum submitted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales’, in House of Commons Treasury Committee, 5th 
Report. The 2007 Budget, Volume II: Oral and written evidence (House of Commons Papers, 
Session 2006-2007, 389) (London: TSO, 2007), pp. Ev 61-63, Ev 62. 
128  See Ipsos MORI, UK Corporate Taxation and International Competitiveness (London: 
Confederation of British Industry, 2006), 2 (see Snape, n. 15 above, p. 383). 
129  See Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (London: Yale, 2005), pp. 80-81. 
130  See Brittan, Financial Times, 31 August 2007, 11. 
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 background, and, given the status of corporation tax law as public law, such ‘complexity’ is 
unavoidable.131 The most we can say is that it can be more or less prudently managed. 
With ‘complexity’, we are not talking about the sheer technical intricacy of issues that 
thereby become difficult to relate to the democratic process,132 nor about the ‘complexity’ of  
‘complexity science’, with its tendency to describe opaquely what might be rendered 
realistically.133 We are talking instead about the ‘complexity’ that has often resulted from the 
need to make corporation tax legislation effective.134 The ‘complexity’ of all tax legislation 
arises from the prudential need to make difficult decisions and careful distinctions between 
situations.135 Three types of distinction have a particularly important part to play in the 
corporation tax code. First, there is the need to devise provisions suitable for a wide range of 
different service industries, ones as diverse as banking and life assurance.136 Secondly, there 
is the need to maintain fairness in the system, by combating tax avoidance, a process that 
needs to address the difficulties exacerbated by the historically ‘literal’ approach of the 
judges to the difficulties of interpreting parts of the corporation tax code.137 Thirdly, there is 
                                                 
131  See Deborah L. Paul, ‘The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental 
Tax Reform Achieve?’ (1997) 76 North Carolina Law Review 151-221; also Hansard HC Public 
Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 215 (Ed Balls, MP, Economic Secretary to the Treasury). 
132  See Danilo Zolo, Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach, trans. by David McKie 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, 
and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). 
133  See Elizabeth McMillan, Complexity, Organizations and Change (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 
25-28. 
134  Although not always: see Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, cols 118-119 (Rt 
Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP, Paymaster General); the need for effectiveness is ‘glossed’ in the Tax 
Law Review Committee’s, Making Tax Law: Report of a Working Party on the Institutional 
Processes for the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals and for the Enactment of Tax 
Legislation chaired by Sir Alan Budd (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2003), para. 8.2. 
135  See John Prebble, ‘Why is Tax Law Incomprehensible?’ [1994] BTR 380-393; Joel Slemrod and 
John Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen’s Guide to the Debate over Taxes, 3rd edn (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 163-172; on casuistry and the importance of drawing distinctions ‘in 
kind’ when state-building, see Loughlin, n. 39 above, pp. 131 and 152.   
136  See Monroe, n. 124 above, p. 23. On the life assurance industry, see H.M. Treasury, 
Microeconomic Reform in Britain: Delivering Opportunities for All, ed. by Ed Balls, Joe Grice 
and Gus O’Donnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 278.  
137  See Monroe, n. 124 above, p. 32. 
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 the need prudently to address the legitimate concerns of interest groups over corporation tax 
reform measures, particularly within the corporate sector.138 It may be that current 
difficulties over the capital allowances ‘simplification’ in relation to industrial buildings 
illustrate the antithesis of this, the ‘complexity’ of effectiveness, with a relatively new 
phenomenon, the ‘simplicity’ of ineffectiveness. Perhaps this was what Oliver Wendell 
Holmes meant in saying: ‘I do not care about the simplicity that lies this side of 
complexity’.139 
The logic of the statutory response to each of these three areas of difficulty has been 
prudence, that is, juristic prudence. Such a reading of the suggestions in the tax 
simplification literature may put the current ‘complexity’ of the corporation tax code, as well 
as the feasibility of the proposed solutions,140 in a more realistic perspective. What is ironic 
is that the prudential nature of the Tax Law Rewrite may be being undermined, both by the 
volume of the rewritten legislation, and by the impression of vastness created by its 
operation alongside the legislative texts that it will eventually replace.141 
 
                                                 
138  Ibid., pp. 31, 34. 
139  Quoted in Southern, Tax Journal, 23 November 1995, 6-9, 8. 
140 Most importantly, the Tax Law Rewrite (see Chapter 1 above, n. 88); see FA 1995, s. 160 (a ‘one-
off’ measure only); Inland Revenue, The Path to Tax Simplification: A background paper 
(London: HMSO, 1995), assessed in David Salter, ‘Pre-Parliamentary Procedure, Consultation 
and the Tax Law Rewrite’ (1997) 16 CJQ 294-299, and David Salter, ‘Towards a Parliamentary 
Procedure for the Tax Law Rewrite’ (1998) 19 Stat LR 65-79. Specifically on the corporation tax 
rewrite, see Houlder, Financial Times, 25 February 2008, 4. 
141  See Houlder, Financial Times, 24 March 2006, 2; Houlder, Financial Times, 8 November 2006, 4; 
Houlder, Financial Times, 15 August 2007, 3, citing the following numbers as the ‘average 
number’ of pages in FBs since the early 1980s: ‘153 in 1980-84; 209 in 1985-89; 266 in 1990-94; 
312 in 1995-99 and 463 in 2000-07’; H.M. Treasury, Meeting the aspirations of the British 
people: 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review October 2007 (Cm 7227) 
(London: TSO, 2007), paras 4.49-4.53; also Malcolm Gammie, ‘Tax Simplification’, in The IFS 
Green Budget: January 2008, ed. by Robert Chote, Carl Emmerson, David Miles and Jonathan 
Shaw (London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2007), pp. 260-267, who seems to have lost much 
of his appetite for rewritten tax legislation. 
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 ‘Instability’ 
Of the criticisms made by Cullinane (and indeed by others), the charge of ‘instability’ in the 
corporation tax code needs particularly careful consideration. Again, we need to decide what 
its significance is, once we have excluded it from the conception of the ‘rule of law’ chosen 
as relevant to the present study. 
The first, perhaps the most important, point, is the need to highlight the long-standing, 
almost instinctive, hold on the Western imagination that the idea of ‘stability’ has. John 
Pocock relates how, when once the reality of a post-classical city republic had emerged in 
fifteenth century Italy, writers (of whom Machiavelli is only the most well-known) fell to 
wondering how, having come into existence, such an institution might meet its end.142 La 
stabilità, keeping the ‘ship of state’ afloat and on course, was as important to its constituent 
policies as to the enterprise as a whole. Some proximate sense of ‘stability’, it is suggested, 
pervades discussions on the need for stability in laws, but especially in economic growth. 
When Chancellors of the Exchequer, most notably the Rt Hon. Gordon Brown, MP, talk 
about ‘economic stability’, this is the kind of imagery that they seem to invoke. Tax, 
moreover, has an important role in economic stabilisation.143 
In artificially unpicking economic from legal considerations, however, we need to 
distinguish carefully between a concrete notion of the role of taxation in general in economic 
‘stabilisation’,144 and more imaginative notions of the city on the sea. Reference has already 
been made to Edward Troup’s critique of the 1998 Code for Fiscal Stability. In the course of 
                                                 
142  See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 99-103.  
143  See Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), pp. 5-6; Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, 
Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 5th edn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), pp. 11-13; H.M. 
Treasury and Inland Revenue, Corporation Tax Reform: A Consultation Document (London: 
Inland Revenue, 2003), para. 1.11. 
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 his commentary, he commends the (then) newly elected Labour government for its formal 
commitment to ‘the worthy, if slightly Calvinistic aims, of “transparency, stability, 
responsibility, fairness and efficiency”’.145 However, Troup is careful to emphasise that, 
despite its name, the Code relates to the ‘key principles to the formulation and 
implementation of – (a) fiscal policy, and (b) policy for the management of the National 
Debt’.146 It is about ‘Government borrowing (i.e. the excess of spending over taxation)’, in 
other words, not about tax levels per se, and certainly not about the ‘stability’ of tax 
legislation.147 Without mentioning the technique of prudence, Troup nonetheless 
acknowledges that no government would commit itself to stasis in this way. Does this mean 
that the corporation tax code is inherently ‘unstable’, therefore? 
Well, no, not necessarily. ‘Stability’ is an important element in prudential governance. We 
can see this from Hobbes’s acceptance that the purpose of the ‘art and science of 
government’ is the need for men ‘to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting 
edifice’,148 with the penalty of failure, one might say of ‘imprudence’, being destruction: 
 
‘[F]or want, both of the art of making fit Lawes, to square their actions by, and also of 
humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present 
greatnesse to be taken off, they149 cannot without the help of a very able Architect,150 be 
                                                                                                                                                       
144  See Plowden Report, Control of Public Expenditure 1961 (Cmnd 1432), para. 10; James and 
Nobes, n. 20 above, ch. 6. 
145  See FA 1998, s. 155(2); H.M. Treasury, The Code for Fiscal Stability, 1998 (available from 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk (accessed 10 December 2007)). 
146  See FA 1998, s. 155(1). 
147  See Troup [1998] BTR 490, 491. 
148  See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 363 (see 
Loughlin, n. 39 above, pp. 140-141). 
149  [i.e. ‘men … at last weary of irregular jostling, and hewing one another …’ (Hobbes, n. 148 
above, p. 363.] 
150 See D.M. Palliser, The Age of Elizabeth: England under the later Tudors 1547-1603 (London: 
Longman, 1983), p. 369, on ‘architects’ before Sir Christopher Wren. 
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 compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, 
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.’151 
 
Although Hobbes is speaking here both of the state and of the particular laws it creates, we 
may conclude that prudence is the essential technique in the framing of such laws. Stability 
is a prudential quality, no doubt. There is a recognition of this in the commitment to ‘stability 
of direction in legislation’, over the long term, in the corporation tax policy documents.152 
Given an objective of economic growth, prudential lawmaking will require stability in laws, 
to encourage investment.153 Hence, Cullinane is right to advocate ‘keeping the rules as stable 
… as possible’, but the reason is prudence, rather than the ‘rule of law’. The use of the 
phrase ‘stable … as possible’ indeed acknowledges that absolute stability may not always be 
realisable. A Conservative MP spoke well in pointing out, when the provisions of the ‘loan 
relationships’ code were under consideration in Standing Committee, in February 1996, that 
tax law was subject to ‘evolutionary development’: ‘[i]t is constantly necessary [he said] to 
revise, amend, improve and bring up to date the corpus of tax law’.154 
None of this is to underplay the economic importance of stability.155 We return to this 
point once we have considered the significance of a theory of effectiveness in shaping the 
values contained in the corporation tax code itself.  
                                                 
151  See Hobbes, n. 148 above, p. 363 (see Loughlin, n. 39 above, pp. 140-141).  
152  See, e.g., H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.3; Sanger, Tax Adviser, April 
2002, 12. 
153  See Meade, n. 30 above, p. 21; also H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.13. 
154  See Hansard HC Standing Committee E, 29 February 1996, col. 596 (Nigel Forman, MP 
(Carshalton and Wallington, Conservative)). 
155  See Musgrave and Musgrave, n. 143 above, ch. 30, pp. 531-532; James and Nobes, n. 20 above, 
ch. 6; Balls and O’Donnell, n. 8 above, ch. 1; Colin Thain, ‘Economic Policy’, in Developments in 
British Politics 6, ed. by Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 219-237; Colin Thain, ‘Economic Policy’, in Developments 
in British Public Policy, ed. by Peter Dorey (Cambridge: Sage, 2005), pp. 24-45.  
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 THE PRIORITISATION OF POLITICAL VALUES IN THE CORPORATION TAX CODE 
 
The reader should, by this stage in the chapter, be persuaded that most theoretical discussions 
of the current state of corporate taxation have little, if any, interpretative value. This is not, of 
course, to deny their normative usefulness, or their undoubted intellectual rigour. What it 
does assert, however, is that arguments for reform that do not explicitly address the deep 
implications of the public law nature of the corporation tax code, or that do not recognise the 
political significance of its complexity, are to some greater or lesser extent inadequate, in 
interpretative terms. The present study is not, of course, concerned with constructing a 
normative theory, but it is appropriate to stress that any such theory would be much the 
stronger for building on robust interpretative foundations. 
 These points made, we are now in a position to etch in the final details of the picture that 
this study seeks to create. They are concerned with the reality: what ‘configuration’ of theory 
and values have the institutions and processes discussed in previous chapters in fact helped 
to create? What are the strengths and weaknesses of that structure? And how is it that such 
weaknesses as there are, are nonetheless outweighed, for the present at least, by the system’s 
strengths? 
We continue by referring to two, roughly contemporaneous, theoretical pieces, which 
help to underline the stance taken in the study as a whole. The former is part of Loughlin’s 
‘archaeological’ labours on the origins of modern public law;156 the latter is from Sol 
Picciotto’s work on the establishment of a social, economic and political context for the 
‘principles’ of the taxation of international business.157 What Loughlin is at pains to point 
                                                 
156  See Loughlin (1992), n. 14 above. 
157  Sol Picciotto, International Business Taxation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), p. 83. 
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 out, an idea to which brief reference has already been made,158 is that Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations,159 which is nearly always referred to in theoretical discussions of 
taxation,160 is not, properly understood, to be read as laying down a series of exogenous 
‘norms’ about what taxes and tax systems should, or should not, do. If so, the much quoted 
‘canons of taxation’,161 would provide no clue as to the weight to be attached to one canon, 
relative to that to be attached to the others, either generally, or in a particular case. Instead, 
the canons, as indeed Smith’s work as a whole, should be regarded as a ‘manual’, albeit a 
highly sophisticated one, of the ‘science of legislation’.162 These are the points that the 
legislator (‘the prince’) needs to bear in mind, Smith is saying, if he or she is to create a tax 
(system) that will work.163 It is not that taxes, or tax systems, which fail to reflect some or all 
of these principles, are in some sense immoral, or ‘unfair’, or ‘bad’. Rather, it is simply that 
they will tend not to work; they will create resentment, and damage the economy, and, in 
damaging the economy, they will fail to raise the funds that the prince needs to create the 
                                                 
158  See Chapter 1 above, n. 260.  
159  See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. by R.H. 
Campbell and A.S. Skinner (textual editor W.B. Todd), 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 
160  But, interestingly, not in Meade, n. 30 above. 
161  See Smith, n. 159 above, II, pp. 825-828: ‘All nations have endeavoured, to the best of their 
judgment, to render their taxes as equal as they could contrive; as certain, as convenient to the 
contributor, both in the time and in the mode of payment, and, in proportion to the revenue which 
they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to the people’ (p. 827). This had been prefigured 
in Smith’s earlier (1766), Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. by R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael and P.G. 
Stein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 530-535; in part, by a work attributed to Henry Home 
(Lord Kames) (1696-1782), the slightly earlier Sketches of the History of Man (Edinburgh: 
Creech, 1774), vol. 1, pp. 474-481; and, in part, by Montesquieu, n. 116 above (see Smith, n. 159 
above, II, 827n). Adam Smith’s ‘four maxims or principles’ are revisited in John Stuart Mill’s, 
Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism, ed. by Jonathan Riley (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 167-169. 
162  See Loughlin (1992), n. 14 above, p. 4; Donald Winch, ‘Adam Smith’s “enduring particular 
result”: a political and cosmopolitan perspective’, in Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political 
Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. by Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 253-269; Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay 
in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), esp. p. 159. 
163  Ibid.; Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London: 
Penguin, 2000), pp. 188ff; Montesquieu, n. 161 above. 
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 conditions to sustain his Scottish Enlightenment conception of ‘the public good’.164 This 
prudential logic of effectiveness is what, in turn, provides the ‘grammar’, which shapes the 
‘vocabulary’,165 which the canons of taxation contain. As Smith says, it is by the non-
observance of ‘some one or other’ of the canons ‘that taxes are frequently so much more 
burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign’.166 The instrumental and 
prudential spirit in which the canons are laid down was well understood by John Stuart Mill, 
in his Principles of Political Economy,167 and, later on, by the Whitehall civil servant, Sir 
Josiah Stamp,168 in his remarkable Principles of Taxation.169 This understanding was, 
however, rather less apparent in the justly famous 1978 Meade Committee Report,170 and 
also in the rather fatuous arrogance171 of the 10 ‘tenets’ advanced by the various contributors 
to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales’s Pathways to Tax Reform of 
2000.172 
It is in the prudential Smithian vein just described, although without explicit reference to 
Smith’s canons, that Picciotto has delineated, albeit briefly, the implications of ideas such as 
                                                 
164  Ibid., pp. 394-396; also Don Slater and Fran Tonkiss, Market Society: Markets and Modern Social 
Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 41-43 (see Chapter 3 above, n. 161, in relation to the 
‘public good’ as ‘harmony’ of self-interests). 
165  See Chapter 1 above, n. 329. 
166  See Smith, n. 159 above, II, p. 827. 
167  See Mill, n. 161 above. 
168  Stamp was killed in an air raid in 1941 (see Rosamund Thomas, The British Philosophy of 
Administration: A comparison of British and American ideas 1900-1939 (Cambridge: Centre for 
Business and Public Sector Ethics, 1989), p. 251. 
169  See Sir Josiah Stamp, The Fundamental Principles of Taxation in the Light of Modern 
Developments (The Newmarch Lectures for 1919) (London: Macmillan and Co., 1921), esp. ch. 4; 
also A.C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, 3rd edn (London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 40-45, esp. p. 
43.  
170  See Meade, n. 30 above, p. 23, which is rather vague on what is the most important practical 
question (see also Cedric Sandford, The Economics of Public Finance: An Economic Analysis of 
Government Expenditure and Revenue in the United Kingdom, 4th edn (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1992), p. 112-113, which is similarly vague on this point. 
171  See Michael Oakeshott, ‘Rationalism in politics’, in Rationalism in politics and other essays 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), pp. 5-42, esp. 15-16. 
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 those just discussed, for the legitimacy of taxes and tax systems. Independently of 
Loughlin’s interpretation of Smith, but also in 1992, Picciotto draws out some strikingly 
similar conclusions to those of Loughlin.173 He emphasises, as does Loughlin in relation to 
public law generally,174 the point that tax law is a practical art, the ‘overriding aim’ of which 
is ‘effectiveness’, an aim that will be frustrated, as it is in relation to other forms of 
regulation, if a system lacks ‘fairness’: 
 
‘Taxation is not an abstract exercise in political or economic philosophy, but a practical 
matter of raising state finance for the public good. The overriding aim is therefore 
effectiveness, which must be predicted, based on estimations of the patterns of 
compliance, non-compliance and avoidance. It is in this sense that the question of 
legitimacy is central to the evaluation of taxation, as well as other types of legal 
regulation of economic activity.175 Legitimacy in this sense combines the interrelated 
issues of equity and effectiveness. To the extent that a regulatory system lacks fairness it 
fails in political acceptability, and will also tend to fail in effectiveness as enforcement 
becomes difficult and non-compliance grows. Equally, a system which has problems of 
enforceability and therefore of effectiveness will tend to lose political acceptability.’176 
  
Note the similarity to Loughlin’s position here. First, although Picciotto does not relate the 
practical art of taxation to the ‘power of practical reason’ that is prudence,177 the idea of tax 
legislation as a ‘practice’ is surely implied.178 Secondly, Picciotto places the emphasis on 
‘effectiveness’. Unlike in the ‘Sheffield school’179 scheme of things, where ‘effectiveness’ is 
                                                                                                                                                       
172  See Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Towards a better tax system: 
Practical consideration of the ten tenets (London: ICAEW, 2000); also Sandford, n. 170 above, p. 
112. 
173  See Picciotto, n. 157 above, p. 83. 
174  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, esp. pp. 148-152, 163. 
175 [See Chapter 1 above, n. 352; also Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, p. 162 (‘tax legislation is, in 
general, distinct from expenditure legislation’).] 
176  See Picciotto, n. 157 above, p. 83. 
177  See Chapter 1 above, n. 182. 
178  See above in this chapter, pp. 243-244. 
179  See Chapter 1 above, n. 115. 
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 presented as a ‘rule of law value’ along with all the others,180 in Picciotto’s summation, as in 
Loughlin’s ‘pure theory of public law’,181 effectiveness is not merely an immanent value, but 
the theory that shapes and prioritises such values in particular situations. Thirdly, and finally, 
like Loughlin, Picciotto sees the significance of tax fairness, not as some absolute quality, 
but as a value the presence of which makes a tax the more likely to succeed, and the absence 
of which will tend to undermine its effectiveness. 
The intellectual strand common to both Loughlin’s portrayal of ‘the science of 
legislation’, and to Picciotto’s summation of the demands of tax policy-making is, of course, 
the need for tax policy to be effective.182 That effectiveness has to be judged by reference to 
what the first ‘Brown Budget’, that of July 1997, referred to as ‘the objectives of the 
government of the day’.183 What shapes these objectives, and their relationship to a 
particular view of the ‘public interest’ has already been discussed in Chapter 3. The only 
point that we need to underscore at this late stage in the study is the analogous position of 
‘the prince’, in Smith’s world-view, and the Crown in Parliament in the depiction of the 
British constitution in the present study.184 Both are ‘the sovereign’, but the sovereignty that 
subsists in the relationship of government and governed depends, in the world of today, on 
the maintenance of trust and confidence between the two. This, in turn, depends on 
constantly prudential political choices. To say it is about ‘trade-offs’ between values, as 
                                                 
  See, e.g., Chris Hilson, Regulating Pollution: A UK and EC Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 180
2000), pp. 127-129. 
181  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, ch. 9. 
182  This does, of course, have an administrative dimension, which is outside the scope of the study: 
see Christopher Wales, ‘The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the making of Tax Policy 
in the UK’ [2004] BTR 543-565, 548. 
183  See n. 78 above (also Chapter 1 above, n. 380; Chapter 3 above, n. 181); Equipping Britain for 
our long-term future: Financial Statement and Budget Report July 1997 (House of Commons 
don: The Stationery Office, 1997), para. 1.68. Papers, Session 1997-1998, 85) (Lon
184  See Chapter 2 above, nn. 35 and 52. 
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 Troup expresses it,185 gets somewhere near, but this is too leaden an expression for 
conveying what is essentially a quicksilver ability.186 What is clear, in corporation tax more 
perhaps than any other area of taxation policy, is that HMG’s ability to make prudential 
decisions, to ‘deserve’ the trust and confidence of the electorate, is enhanced by the 
relatively low salience of the tax. In coolly analytical terms, it is indeed the mass of 
individuals that eventually bears the burden of corporation tax.187 In politics, however, that is 
mu
 anti-avoidance legislation and its implications for the concept of ‘fairness’ in 
taxation. 
ch less important than the fact that the tax is initially laid on the companies themselves.188 
Two main consequences flow from these observations, consequences that are of the first 
importance to the study as a whole. First, that the values immanent to the corporation tax 
code at any particular moment, and the way in which they appear to have been prioritised, 
reflect, not only the view of the public interest taken by the current administration, but also 
the public interest ideology of previous ones. Thus, we might say, do legislative codes 
proclaim their histories. Secondly, it is necessary to be extremely sceptical of certain types of 
adverse, especially ‘journalistic’ and other ‘professional’, criticism of the current state of 
corporate taxation. When people disagree about corporation tax reform, they do so, not by 
reference to some ‘objective’ reality, but by reference to their own (often tacit) perceptions 
of the public interest, that is to say by reference to their own political, or ideological, 
viewpoints. In other words, they are arguing about the values themselves, possibly, and 
certainly about their prioritisation. No-where is this phenomenon more apparent than in 
relation to
                                                 
185  See Troup, n. 147 above, p. 491.  
187
and o er 
186 See Chapter 2 above, n. 252. 
  See Kay, Financial Times, 25 October 2005, 19; John Kay and Jadu Sen, ‘The Comparative 
Burden of Business Taxation’ (1983) 4:3 FS 23-28, 23); also Malcolm Gammie, ‘Reforming 
Corporate Taxation: An Evaluation of the United States Treasury Integration Proposals th
onal Context – Part 1’ [1992] BTR 148-173, 149.  Corporate Tax Systems in an Internati
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 We can explore the implications of the propositions just advanced by unravelling the main 
values which are most obvious from the corporation tax code, as it is currently framed: 
efficiency and fairness. Not only do nations want to be wealthier, it is the duty of 
governments, if not to make them wealthier, to create the conditions under which they can 
become so.189 Convincing the UK’s electorate, both of the promising nature of its ideology, 
and of its ability to formulate and implement policies to enhance national wealth, through 
‘credible socialism’,190 has been the present government’s priority since 1997. By the time of 
the New Labour landslide in the early summer of that year, the traditional party of the Left, 
had, through a combination of miscalculation and dogmatism, been away from the ‘corridors 
of power’ for the best part of two decades.191 ‘To be socialist and at the same time credible’, 
to repeat the aspiration voiced by Gordon Brown in a 1997 speech,192 was New Labour’s 
solution to (‘Old’) Labour’s long absence from government.193 The implications of these 
ideas for tax reform were expressed thus in the July 1997 Budget report: 
 
‘It is essential that tax policy is based on clear principles. These are to encourage work, 
savings and investment, and fairness. A tax system should also be well designed, to meet 
the objectives of the government of the day,194 without generating undesirable side 
effects; it must keep taxpayers’ compliance costs to a minimum; it should avoid the less 
well off bearing an unfair burden; and attention must be paid to any implications for the 
United Kingdom’s international competitiveness.’195 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
188  See Snape, n. 15 above, pp. 403-404. 
189  See Chapter 1 above, n. 169, referring to Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, ed. and trans. by 
Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 144; 
also Smith, n. 159 above, I, p. 428 (see Chapter 3 above, n. 126).  
190  See Chapter 1 above, n. 187. 
191  See William Keegan, The Prudence of Mr Gordon Brown (Chichester: John Wiley, 2003), chs 2-
3. 
192  See Chapter 1 above, n. 187; see Colin Thain and Ross Christie, ‘Treasury Power: Past, Present 
and Future’, p. 11, available from www.treasuryproject.org (accessed 22 February 2008).   
193  See Gordon Brown, Fabian Pamphlet 563: Fair Is Efficient – a socialist agenda for fairness 
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 The corporation tax code, as will become apparent, has been a crucial instrument in the 
achievement of these two objectives, ‘credible’ policies and ‘socialist’ values. Within its 
intricate provisions, we can trace the uneasy reconciliations that giving effect to the two 
objectives sometimes involve. In this part of the discussion, we shall be concentrating on the 
‘credibility’ dimension, which, for reasons also to become apparent, is in essence a question 
of efficiency. In the next section, the emphasis will be on what we might, albeit rather 
crudely, think of as the ‘socialist’ component, the value of fairness. The untangling of the 
values in this way is not entirely satisfactory, since there is much interpenetration,196 but it is 
nonetheless maintainable,197 and it highlights the substantial differences immanent to each. 
 
Efficiency 
That HMG places considerable emphasis on efficiency in corporate taxation is everywhere 
apparent in the policy documents. The fullest statement of its importance, although not the 
earliest, appears in two substantial volumes,198 in which Ed Balls199 and Gus O’Donnell,200 
two individuals very closely associated with corporation tax reform, set out HMG’s 
economic policy objectives, and the place of efficiency within them. The background is the 
distinction, already alluded to,201 between macroeconomic and microeconomic policy. We 
have already seen how, in the hands of Balls and O’Donnell, macroeconomic policy is about 
keeping inflation steady, at very low levels, ‘over the long term’, to generate ‘high and stable 
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 levels of growth and employment’.202 With such stability as the goal of macroeconomic 
policy, the conditions are created under which the second and third ‘pillars’ of economic 
policy, ‘tackling the supply-side barriers to growth and delivering employment and economic 
opportunities for all’,203 can be worked on too. Reforming corporation tax, as well as other 
areas of taxation, is part of the second pillar, the ‘tackling’ of ‘supply-side barriers to 
growth’, but it also has implications for the third. It is a key example of the post-1997 role of 
H.M. Treasury as an economics ministry.204 
Curtailing ‘supply-side barriers to growth’ means, in the case of the corporation tax code, 
using it to assist ‘firms [to] reach their full potential’,205 that is, making the tax more 
efficient. However, as we shall see, this is not simply the efficiency of the fourth of Smith’s 
‘canons of taxation’. What we have, in 2008, is a corporation tax code that has had 
provisions shorn from it which are seen to been inconsistent with enhancing efficiency; older 
provisions which are consistent with that objective retained; and new provisions introduced 
that are designed to enhance efficiency. Three of the themes introduced at the beginning of 
the study are efficiency themes in this sense. First, the accounting theme, reflected in the 
large areas of the code now based on accounting practice. Secondly, the European and 
international theme, which is illustrated by those features of the code (mainly relating to the 
availability of reliefs within corporate groups) that reflect the principles of the European 
Treaty and GATT 1994, as well as the ‘best practice’ disseminated by the OECD.206 Thirdly, 
the compliance and enforcement theme, which, for the purpose of the study, is taken to be 
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 embodied in the rules on corporation tax self-assessment (CTSA). How each of these reflect 
the circumstances of their introduction, and the extent to which they are consistent, or 
inconsistent, with their proffered objective, will be addressed later in the discussion. For the 
moment, it is just necessary to return to the policy documents on corporation tax reform, and 
to relate the ideas they contain to economic thinking more generally. 
The efficiency imperative within the code, according to Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, and 
the need thereby to address ‘market failures’, is driven by one crucial factor, already 
discussed at some length: the need to ‘make … [markets] work better in the public 
interest’.207 ‘Markets are [as they re-emphasise] a powerful means of advancing the public 
interest’,208 and this is reflected in the four ‘major microeconomic goals’ set out by Balls, 
Grice and O’Donnell, in what is essentially a highly detailed explanation of New Labour’s 
microeconomic policy. Two of these goals relate to ‘high quality public services’ delivery, 
and to the maintaining of unprecedentedly high levels of employment. Whilst generally 
relevant, in the sense that the code’s effectiveness impacts directly on these goals, the two of 
most importance here are ‘building a fair society’, discussed below in conjunction with 
fairness, and, what we need to consider next, ‘raising the sustainable rate of UK productivity 
growth’.209 
The key word in the microeconomic goal of raising ‘productivity growth’ is 
‘sustainability’, the idea that it can be achieved consistently over the long term. Although 
this is a use of the expression ‘sustainability’ that environmentalists deplore, it focuses 
attention on two key implications of the goal: the need to favour competition, so as to 
encourage innovation and creativity, and the need to eliminate ‘market failures’. 
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 To the extent, therefore, that the corporation tax code lacks any element of protectionism, 
in the form of tax subsidies, it is reflecting one aspect of efficiency. The UK’s membership 
of the EU and GATT 1994/WTO, are major drivers for this, and we shall have occasion to 
return to it below. It is not merely the absence of tax subsidies that can be seen to reflect this 
ideal of efficiency, however. Insofar as the code promotes, or at least does not undermine, 
either access to capital, or the ‘free mobility of capital and labour’,210 it can also be said to 
disclose this particular vision of efficiency. Again, we shall return to this later in the 
discussion. Both of these manifestations of efficiency are illustrations of HMG’s perception 
that its role ‘is not only to support but [to] positively enhance markets in the public 
interest’.211 The ideas underlying these elements are also contained in three policy 
‘orientation documents’, as they might be called: Large Business Taxation: The 
Government’s strategy and corporate tax reforms: A consultation document, which appeared 
in July 2001;212 Reform of Corporation Tax: A Consultation Document, published in August 
2002;213 and Corporation Tax Reform: A Consultation Document, published exactly a year 
later, in August 2003.214 The 2001 document emphasises that the corporation tax code needs 
to contribute ‘to creating the best possible location for investment’, that it must embody rates 
of tax which are ‘as low as possible’, and that it must reflect ‘the realities of the modern 
business environment’.215 On this footing, ‘[t]he key principles for corporate tax reform are’ 
                                                                                                                                                       
209  Ibid., p. 7. 
210  Ibid., p. 8. 
211  Ibid. 
212  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above. 
213  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, Reform of Corporation Tax: A Consultation Document 
(London: Inland Revenue, 2002). 
214  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 143 above. 
215  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.5. 
 260
 fairness (discussed below) and ‘competitiveness’.216 Increasing efficiency enhances 
competitiveness, as the document goes on to make clear: 
 
‘[T]o create the best possible location for investment, the tax system should complement 
business competitiveness, not stifle it [it reads]. This means: removing tax distortions, 
facilitating decision-making that is driven by commercial factors, rather than by tax 
considerations. Businesses, not government, are best placed to judge how to operate and 
structure themselves.’217 
 
Rather, therefore, than taking a doctrinaire stance, the 2001 document confronts ‘head on’ 
the fact ‘that multinational businesses are likely to increase in importance’,218 and, in an 
oblique reference to Nigel Lawson’s corporation tax reforms of the 1980s,219 emphasises 
how the world has moved on since then.220 This being so, it is ‘fair tax competition’ between 
countries that will allow ‘business to exploit real commercial opportunities’.221 Key to this 
are the maintenance of ‘a low rate, broad base system’, and the better alignment of 
commercial profits and tax profits.222 However, it also involves the removal from the code of 
‘outdated and ineffective restrictions’,223 as illustrated, for instance, by the deletion of certain 
restrictions on ‘the transfer of assets and the use of tax losses within multinational 
groups’,224 and the abolition of withholding tax on interest payments.225 
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 Besides removing distortions, the elimination of ‘market failures’ is also detectable in the 
code. According to Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, these exist ‘when the competitive outcome 
of markets is not efficient from the point of view of the economy as a whole’.226 In the 2001 
document, the 1999 removal from the corporation tax code of the obligation to pay advance 
corporation tax (ACT), and its replacement by payments of corporation tax on account, 
under CTSA, is seen as one example of the removal of distortion,227 while the introduction 
of ‘a new research and development (R&D) tax credit228 … aimed at encouraging innovation 
by large companies in recognition of the wider benefits to the economy that flow from R&D 
expenditure’,229 is a way to remedy a significant ‘market failure’.230 
It will be appreciated from all of this that a particular, highly developed, idea of 
efficiency runs as a key value through the corporation tax code. Before examining the 
accounting theme and the European and international theme in more detail, as offering 
specific examples, it is important to locate these features of the code, if only briefly, in 
economic thinking more generally, and to spell out some implications for this highly 
complex public law example of economic regulation. 
If we try to match the idea of efficiency as just outlined with Smith’s four ‘canons’, 
albeit as filtered through Meade, we find mainly divergences. Smith, in his fourth ‘canon’, 
famously related efficiency – tax efficiency – to the yield from the tax. A prince would not 
be prudent to impose an unprofitable tax, one which required ‘a great number of officers’,231 
or which subjected people over-much ‘to the frequent visits, and … odious examination of 
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 the tax-gatherers’,232 or which, in the language of today, imposed an ‘excess burden of 
taxation’,233 because it was such as to ‘obstruct the industry of the people’.234 No, he should 
rather ensure that: 
 
‘[e]very tax … be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the 
people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the publick treasury of the 
state.235 
 
Allowing for the fact that the policy documents speak of the need for corporation tax, like all 
taxes, to ‘raise sufficient revenue for the Government to fund public services and to service 
debt’,236 and without entering here into speculation, in an area of ‘large empirical 
uncertainties’,237 on how far corporation tax may impose unduly high administrative costs 
(for HMG)238 and compliance costs (for the corporate sector),239 it is plain that something 
more significant is contained in the corporation tax code than either Smith or Meade can 
capture. It is true that neutrality, as an aspect of efficiency,240 is a guiding principle of the 
code, since the idea that commercial, not tax, considerations should drive corporate decision-
making, is a recurrent theme.241 Nonetheless, it is not a complete description. 
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 What is missing from, not only Smith’s conception of efficiency, but also from most 
contemporary assessments of New Labour’s public interest view of corporate tax policy, is 
an appreciation of the impact on the corporation tax code of the burgeoning, in the 1980s, of 
‘post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory’.242 Some specific implications of this will be 
examined later in the discussion. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that, at the pen of its 
main exponents, Robert Barro,243 Robert Lucas,244 and Paul Romer,245 it offers a way of 
understanding how nations get wealthier. As explained and contextualised by Diane Coyle, it 
goes beyond Smith’s classical assessment of growth as the result of the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market,246 and beyond Robert Solow’s247 idea that ‘the growth of outputs depends on the 
growth of inputs, and on how effectively these inputs are used’.248 This is because, rather 
than regarding technical innovation and the increase of ‘human capital’ as exogenous to 
growth, post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory requires them to be factored in (‘made 
endogenous’).249 The idea is that human capital (Lucas and Barro) and ‘technology and the 
process of innovation’ (Romer), once ‘endogenized’,250 can be shown to create positive 
‘spillovers’ that contribute to growth: ‘the same bit of knowledge [as Coyle explains] can be 
used repeatedly without being used up; and one bit becomes the foundation for the next’.251 
The obvious link to the corporation tax code is with the introduction of research and 
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 development credits,252 but, as we shall see, its influence is more pervasive than this. With 
Gordon Brown having been taunted for it,253 and Barro himself having been satirised by the 
former Conservative Chancellor, the Rt Hon. Kenneth Clarke, MP, it is hardly surprising that 
‘new growth theory’ has not figured more prominently in discussions of corporation tax 
reform, even though O’Donnell and Balls expressly recognise its influence.254 
It is thus easy to see how the corporation tax code might be a scene of conflict or 
potential conflict. It is not now a creature of classical, nor yet neoclassical, political economy 
(as before New Labour came to power, arguably, it was). It has become an instrument of 
post-neoclassical political economy. It is, as such, a vast regulatory instrument, an economic 
instrument255 for encouraging growth. Efficiency here is not, as such, about creating a 
profitable tax; it is about economic efficiency more generally, efficiency in output. The 
corporation tax code is a scene of conflict, therefore, because it has been put to work in the 
service of economic growth, as part of a project to mould and sustain output.256 It is not 
simply seeking to collect the fruits of growth. Once again is the truth of Carl Schmitt’s 
analysis being demonstrated: the political precedes and underlies the economic, and the 
economic energises the political.257 
We can develop these points if we look at their implications for the accounting theme, 
and the European and international theme, incidentally nodding in the direction of 
compliance and enforcement. Compliance and enforcement is not a big part of this study, but 
we need to include it because it underpins the others. It has both a classical significance (in 
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 helping to make the tax profitable) and a (post-) neoclassical one, in representing the 
removal from the system of the distortions caused by ACT.258 More than this, however, we 
need not say. 
The same is not true, however, for those parts of the corporation tax code that seek to 
marry tax law and accounting practice, or that seek to support the neutrality of the system in 
European and international markets. There are at least three different strands to the 
accounting theme, and their introduction in Chapter 1 sought to isolate them as follows: the 
two (formerly three) ‘distinct but overlapping, independent but interdependent’, separate but 
integrated,259 special codes on corporate finance; the use, in calculating trading profits under 
Schedule D, Case I, of generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP); and the assimilation, 
in broad terms, of the taxation treatment of intangibles, including intellectual property, to 
their accounting treatment. 
The most general of these three, the corporation tax code’s co-option of GAAP in the 
calculation of trading profits, serves as a way of putting the other two in context. The essence 
of what is at stake here is as follows. Generally accepted accounting practice helps to shape 
the corporation tax base because section 42(1), FA 1998, as amended first by FA 2004,260 
and then by Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006),261 requires trading profits to be ‘computed in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting practice’. For the purposes of the kind of 
company or corporate group covered by the present study, this will be the International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) already encountered in the context of Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners v. William Grant and Sons,262 since these have been compulsory for listed 
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 companies since January 2005.263 However, section 42(1) goes on to provide that calculation 
in accordance with GAAP is ‘subject to any adjustment required or authorised by law’,264 the 
very proviso which, in William Grant, Lord Hoffmann declined to take as giving a green 
light to introduce further ‘judge-made rules’ into the interpretation of the code.265 
Section 42 indicates the extent to which the corporation tax code now favours efficiency, 
and invites comment on the prudence of its salience. Its attractiveness is acknowledged by 
Judith Freedman who, while referring to the assumptions in the 2002 and 2003 policy 
documents, does not expressly make the link with new growth theory.266 Balls, Grice and 
O’Donnell explicitly make the point that ‘better aligning taxable and commercial profits’267 
is an important way of turning the ideal of neutrality (‘that decision-making is driven by 
commercial factors rather than by tax considerations’)268 into reality. Freedman herself 
points out, elsewhere, that ‘aligning taxable and commercial profits’ had been one of a small 
number of early business tax aspirations professed by New Labour prior to its General 
Election victory in 1997.269 The contention in the present study is that, if the depiction of the 
corporation tax code as public law, as a political practice, is maintainable, then it is easy to 
see why a number of the key arguments against alignment (including, possibly, Freedman’s 
own), have been so readily discounted in the fabric of the code itself. For instance, one 
objection is that using the tax system to create incentives is somehow inconsistent with 
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 aligning commercial and taxable profits.270 That may be so, but it is clear from the policy 
documents that alignment is consistent with a policy that relies on incentivisation, and, 
moreover, all that Balls, Grice and O’Donnell argue for is ‘better’ alignment, not complete 
alignment. The system of capital allowances on plant and machinery, for example, after 
consultation, has been retained. Furthermore, if HMG regards the corporation tax system as 
creating only a ‘conventional’ set of property rights, as is argued in the next section, one of 
the other main objections to alignment, its importation into the code of accountants’ 
discretion,271 will seem much less important. Much more compelling will be arguments from 
efficiency, and the idea that the very fact of complete alignment would, given the function of 
accounts, create a major disincentive to depressing profits for tax purposes. 
In considering the parts of the code devoted to intellectual property and other 
intangibles,272 on the one hand, and corporate finance, on the other, it is important to 
recognise that, although efficiency is again to the fore, they raise important issues additional 
to those raised by section 42. This is because, whilst section 42 relates only to the calculation 
of trading profits, leaving untouched the distinction between income and capital (including 
capital allowances),273 the special codes cut through it, completely assimilating capital and 
income.274 An important, though little-noted consequence of this, as David Southern says 
(speaking only of the special codes on corporate finance) is that, in the areas to which the 
special codes relate, the corporation tax base has been changed from profits to expenditure, 
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 as in the case of VAT.275 The reason, as Southern trenchantly points out, is that ‘[a]ny 
measure of income requires that capital be maintained’,276 something which occurs only if an 
‘accounts based approach’ does not (inconsistently) try to assimilate capital to income. 
Efficiency is evidently seen as so important in these parts of the code that it is preferred to 
consistency. 
Discussion of the impact of the special codes on the corporation tax base, and our focus 
on the latter, takes us back to the role of efficiency in the European and international theme. 
This involves an exploration of the uneasy boundary between the public interest as the 
furthering of economic growth, through membership of the EU and GATT 1994/WTO,277 
and the public interest as the protection of the national tax base. The latter touches on 
fairness issues, and one of its specific applications, in relation to transfer pricing, is therefore 
discussed below. We can approach the relevant issues in stages, by moving from the limited 
legislative intervention by EU institutions countenanced by the UK, to the highly prudential 
embodiment in the corporation tax code of the consequences of the various ‘milestone’ 
decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
The limited legislative impact on the UK’s corporation tax base of the five directives278 
so far adopted has often been noted.279 They are reflected in the now long-standing 
amendments to the corporation tax code, in the code’s provisions on corporate 
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 reconstructions, intra group dividends, and interest and royalty payments.280 Adopting the 
analysis used throughout the study, it can be seen that these various manifestations of EU 
public law281 represent, as incorporated in the corporation tax code, the outer limits of 
prudent legislative endeavour on matters specifically involving Community law and 
(corporate) taxation. We have to remember that even the Lisbon Treaty contains no mandate 
for direct tax harmonisation,282 and that what energises and makes the rights and obligations 
spelt out in these fragmentary pieces of paper real, are the successive judgments of HMG as 
to where the UK’s national interest lies, and the temporally limited acceptance by the British 
public that HMG has balanced the relevant ends and means correctly. That some, especially 
those perhaps of a technocratic or Aristotelian frame of mind,283 find this disappointing,284 
goes without saying. Prudence may require a new approach, in the public interest, in due 
course. For the moment, however, it stands for the (often rather uncomfortable) reality. The 
reality can be observed both at the level of the practice of politics, as in Gordon Brown’s 
idea that the public interest is served, not by tax harmonisation, but by free and open (i.e. 
‘fair’) tax competition, and also at the level of theory, or at least at the level of those theories 
likely to be translated into practice. Unless even the optional adoption of the proposed 
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) can convincingly be shown to serve the 
                                                 
280  See, e.g., TCGA 1992, Chapter 2 (ss. 126-140G) (‘Reorganisation of Share Capital, Conversion of 
Securities, etc.’). 
281  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 210 and 211. 
282  See A guide to the Treaty of Lisbon: European Union insight January 2008, available from 
www.lawsociety.org.uk (accessed 17 March 2008). 
283  See Claudio M. Radaelli, The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European Union: Knowledge 
and International Policy Agendas (London: Routledge, 1997) (see Chapter 1 above, n. 127; 
Chapter 3 above, n. 68); Claudio M. Radaelli, Technocracy in the European Union (London: 
Longman, 1999) (see Chapter 1 above, n. 198; Chapter 2 above, n. 45; Chapter 3 above, n. 241); 
Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘The Political Economy of EU Direct Tax Policy’, in Contemporary Issues 
in Taxation Research, ed. by Andy Lymer and David Salter (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2003), pp. 145-165 (see Chapter 1 above, n. 199; Chapter 3 above, n. 68). 
284  See, e.g., Stephens, Financial Times, 15 January 2008, 17. 
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 British national interest,285 it has no chance of becoming a reality as far as the UK is 
concerned. 
The legislative interventions just discussed (actual or proposed) reflect the efficiency 
value in the code in different ways. They have tended to become and remain realities only 
insofar as they have assisted HMG in its professed aim of using the EU to enhance 
competition and promote innovation, in the push for a ‘sustainable’ rise in ‘the rate of UK 
productivity growth’.286 This is why, despite HMG’s wariness of the EU, the occasional 
arguments made in favour of export subsidies for small manufacturers287 (whatever technical 
possibilities may arise under state aid law or WTO subsidies rules) remain thoroughly out-
with the mainstream of political and economic debate.288 
It is in the context of the legislative impasse illustrated by the corporate tax directives 
that the balance between efficiency and the protection of the tax base, embodied in the 
code’s responses to ECJ decisions, should be considered. Whatever else may be said, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the ECJ’s activity in this area is seen in either Whitehall or 
Westminster as anything other than a source of apprehension and irritation. The prudential 
nature of the response, both of HMG and of the judiciary, to the Marks and Spencer and 
Cadbury Schweppes rulings, has already been referred to in Chapter 3.289 It is only necessary 
here to draw out two further points. First, as already suggested, the provisions of the code 
                                                 
285  See Chapter 3 above, n. 72. 
286  See Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 136 above, p. 8. 
287  An idea that occasionally forms the subject matter of radio interviews with managing directors of 
small engineering companies around Budget time. 
288  See, notoriously, the US Foreign Sales Corporation scheme (noted by Minder and Alden, 
Financial Times, 1-2 October 2005, 7; Beattie and Minder, Financial Times, 14 February 2006, 
6); for background, see Raymond H.C. Luja, ‘WTO Agreements versus the EC Fiscal Aid 
Regime: Impact on Direct Taxation’ (1999) 27 Intertax 207-225, 212-216; Yarif Brauner, 
‘National Report The United States’, in WTO and Direct Taxation, ed. by Michael Lang, Judith 
Herdin and Ines Hofbauer (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2005), pp. 727-760; for the UK’s situation, 
see Caroline Väljemark, ‘National Report United Kingdom’, ibid., pp. 685-725.  
289  See Chapter 3 above, nn. 349-353.  
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 designed to embody ECJ decisions on the European Treaty’s ‘fundamental freedoms’ trace a 
delicate boundary between efficiency and, as will be seen below, a species of fairness 
customarily referred to as ‘inter-nation equity’. Secondly, this being so, the solutions that 
they embody will always be contentious, the more so since they temper the opportunities 
offered by the single market with a concern for the integrity of the UK’s corporate tax base, a 
compromise usually manifested by the prudent and studiously lawful nature of the relevant 
legislative conditions.290 
The foregoing should leave us with a sense both of the dream and of the reality. Before 
taking up the threads of fairness, it is therefore appropriate to take stock. Efficiency, in the 
corporation tax code, is clearly the motor of fairness. Balls, Grice and O’Donnell sum this up 
thus: 
 
‘ … [T]he Government has … sought to promote, on the one hand, competition, 
innovation, and the enterprise economy, and on the other hand, a modern welfare state 
and world class public services as the routes to an efficient and fair Britain in which 
individuals can realise their potential.’291        
 
This, of course, is an ideology. What it suggests, however, is not simply that fairness has a 
political dimension, something we would expect, but that efficiency does so too. In the 
context of this ideology, the efficiency value embedded in the corporation tax code is not 
simply a technical, or technocratic, one. Were the code still to be in its pre-1993 shape,292 
such an argument might wash, but now in 2008 the code has been transformed. No, the 
particular idea of efficiency that it both embodies, and is intended to serve, is, potentially at 
least, highly conflictual. It is not simply the efficiency of a tax that, within the fourth of 
                                                 
290  See Snape, n. 15 above, p. 404n. 
291  See Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 136 above, pp. 5-6. 
292  i.e. the date the FOREX rules were introduced under the Conservative Government of the Rt Hon. 
John Major, MP.  
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 Smith’s ‘canons’, is profitable to the sovereign. Instead, it is the efficiency of what might be 
envisaged as an attempt to create a vast economic instrument for increasing output over the 
long haul. That there has been massive economic growth since 1997 no one could seriously 
deny293 and, although it is impossible to link the corporation tax code directly with that 
process, the informing idea of the code is certainly broadly consistent with it. The 
inconsistency may lie in its inevitable ‘complexity’. Conclusive judgments are difficult, but 
it may be that the use of the code as a regulatory instrument has put the satisfaction of 
Smith’s fourth ‘canon’ very difficult to realise. The fact that the code seems to work is an 
indication that the particular balance that it strikes continues, for all its ‘complexity’, to 
reflect a measure of constituent power. With this in mind, we need to ask what the fairness 
value can be said to add to this analysis. 
 
Fairness 
If we read closely into the corporation tax code, and compare certain provisions with the 
relevant policy statements, we find that each contains a highly particularised conception of 
fairness. More obviously than efficiency, fairness can be seen as one of W.B. Gallie’s 
‘essentially contested concepts’,294 in William Connolly’s words, a concept that describes a 
‘valued’ state of affairs, which ‘involves reference to several dimensions’, and enables 
people ‘to interpret even … shared values differently as new and unforeseen situations 
arise’.295 Not ‘radically confused’, but a concept whose ‘original exemplar’ has an ‘authority 
                                                 
293  See Brittan, Financial Times, 23 March 2007, 15. 
294  See W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955-1956) 56 Aristotelian Society 
(Proceedings) 167-198. 
295  See William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 
10. 
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 … acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept’,296 fairness in the corporation tax 
context needs to be very carefully situated.    
It is the first task of this part of the discussion to isolate the characteristics of the idea in 
this context, and to situate them relative to ideas of fairness that are ubiquitous in the 
taxation literature.297 That this will give us a clearer sense of this, the second main value 
immanent to the code, goes without saying. What it will also do, however, is to enable us to 
reflect, as with efficiency, on how the use of the idea has been shaped by the institutions and 
processes discussed in previous chapters. Such conclusions as we are able to draw on this 
question will in turn enable us to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the fairness 
immanent to the corporation tax code, and, as with efficiency, to suggest why, despite 
concerns over its ‘complexity’ and its ‘instability’, the code has so far proved effective. 
Corporation tax policy documents have contained a consistent statement of the 
constituent elements of fairness ever since the present government took office in 1997. The 
tensely prepared Budget report, of July that year,298 placed fairness in the context of the 
various dimensions of efficiency discussed above. As will be recalled, encouraging fairness 
was one of the ‘clear principles’ on which tax policy in general had to be based,299 and it 
meant that the tax system ‘should avoid the less well off bearing an unfair burden’.300 
Recalling the discussion in Chapter 3 above,301 it will be noted that these statements were 
clearly central to the ideology of the public interest that the incoming New Labour 
government espoused. Fairness is a value, ‘essentially contested’ though it may be, and it is 
                                                 
296  See Gallie, n. 294 above, p. 180; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
297  See James and Nobes, n. 20 above, ch. 5; Musgrave, n. 143 above, p. 160. 
298  See House of Commons Papers, Session 1997-1998, 85, n. 183 above; see Chapter 1 above, n. 
380; see Hugh Pym and Nick Kochan, Gordon Brown: The First Year in Power (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1998), pp. 54-58, ch. 5.  
299  See House of Commons Papers, Session 1997-1998, 85, n. 183 above, para. 1.68. 
300  Ibid., paras 1.66-1.69. 
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 at least as important as efficiency. Its ‘contestedness’ means, however, that how it applies to 
particular situations may not, however, be self-evident. Its importance is apparent, too, from 
the reform documents of 2001, 2002 and 2003, already discussed in the efficiency context.302 
In the 2001 document, HMG fleshed out this earlier statement of the importance of fairness, 
again relative to that of efficiency. Fairness had two functions, one of which was that of 
‘ensuring [that] individual businesses pay their fair share of tax in relation to their 
commercial profits and compete on a level playing field’.303 Stripping away the metaphor, 
and replacing it with something like ‘without unfair advantage’, deciding what is fair in this 
context plainly involves a process of comparing a company’s commercial profit level with 
the amount of corporation tax that it is paying, and, possibly, of comparing those tax levels 
with other, similar, companies. The other function of fairness disclosed by the 2001 
document, one framed in specifically (welfare) economics terminology, was that of utilising 
corporation tax ‘to correct market failures that impose wider costs on society’,304 always 
provided of course that ‘the tax system is the best policy instrument’305 for this purpose. 
Conceived in terms of these two functions, fairness was viewed as being on a par with 
efficiency as a value shaping the corporation tax code. These formulae were repeated in 
relation to the specific reform proposals contained in the 2002 document and (by reference) 
the 2003 document.306 
For anyone familiar with the theoretical literature, these recurrent formulations of 
fairness present certain rather surprising features. First, they make only implicit reference to 
                                                                                                                                                       
301  See pp. 193-197 above. 
302  See nn. 18, 213 and 143 above. 
303  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.7. 
304  Ibid.; also Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 136 above, p. 6. 
305  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.7; also Wales, n. 182 above, p. 549. 
306  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 213 above, para. 1.5; also H.M. Treasury and Inland 
Revenue, n. 143 above, para. 1.4. 
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 those long-established components of fairness, ‘vertical equity’ and ‘horizontal equity’.307 In 
the hands of Smith (read as argued in the earlier part of the chapter), who based his argument 
on Hobbes,308 Locke and Pufendorf,309 fairness – or ‘equality’ in taxation  - is encapsulated 
by the ‘benefit principle’,310 which was subsequently taken up by Hayek311 and rendered 
thus by Smith himself: 
                                                
 
‘The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, 
as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to 
the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.’312 
 
What Smith was postulating here, of course, was the prudential need for a ruler to ensure, so 
far as it could, not necessarily that taxpayers contribute according to their ‘ability to pay’,313 
but that they ‘contribute in proportion to the benefit they derive from government’.314 
Although the benefit principle is reflected to a degree in the 2001 policy document’s second 
‘principle’, the need to ‘ensure fairness between all stakeholders in the UK economy, so all 
sections make a fair contribution to the future of the UK’,315 it is not as prominent as the 
need to combat tax avoidance. The ‘brokenness’ of the fairness concept, its ‘essentially 
 
307  See, especially, Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, ch. 2; Musgrave and Musgrave, n. 143 above, ch. 
13.  
308  See Hobbes, n. 148 above, pp. 386-387; Dudley Jackson, ‘Thomas Hobbes’ Theory of Taxation’ 
(1973) 21 Political Studies 175-182, 176-177. 
309  See Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 2nd edn (Princeton, N.J.: 
American Economic Association, 1908); Musgrave, n. 143 above, pp. 61-68; Murphy and Nagel, 
n. 22 above, pp. 192-193. On Seligman, see Ann Mumford, Taxing Culture: Towards a theory of 
tax collection law (Aldershot: Ashgate Dartmouth, 2002), ch. 3.  
310  But see Jane Frecknall Hughes, ‘The Concept of Taxation and the Age of Enlightenment’, in 
Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 2, ed. by John Tiley (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 
pp. 253-286, quoting D.P. O’Brien, The Classical Economists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 
241.    
311  See F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), pp. 315-
316 (see Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, pp. 192-193).  
312  See Smith, n. 159 above, II, p. 825. 
313  See Mill, n. 161 above, pp. 169-187; but see Pigou, n. 169 above, pp. 43-44. 
314  See Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, p. 16. 
315  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.4.  
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 contested’ nature, is thus easily illustrated. Even on the Left it is ‘contested’, since it is a 
substitution for the sharply progressive levels of personal income tax that R.H. Tawney had 
thought that fairness – or, in his word, ‘equality’ – required.316 The startling contrasts still 
reported by the IFS as to inequality in the UK ensure that the argument on the Left will 
continue.317  
Secondly, the concept of fairness invoked in the corporation tax policy documents 
suggests an idea, not of tax fairness as such, but of the role of corporation tax in creating a 
fairer society.318 The discussion in Chapter 3 illustrated how HMG views corporation tax 
reform as a means of advancing the public interest. In assessing the fairness implications of 
the role thereby assigned to the tax, it is argued here that the ideology that corporation tax 
serves owes much to the analysis of taxation in general set forth in Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel’s, The Myth of Ownership.319 When we first encountered Murphy and 
Nagel’s work in Chapter 1, it was to place the accent on their notion of the ‘conventionality 
of property’, and to ascribe the work to the ‘liberal normativist’ tradition of Rawls and 
Dworkin.320 Here, we need to stress the work’s emphasis on taxation as the key instrument in 
distributive justice, or ‘political morality’,321 and to show its practical realisation of a 
‘conventional’ idea of property, ‘as what is created by the tax system, rather than what is 
disturbed or encroached on’322 by it. Indeed, Murphy and Nagel’s concluding chapter could 
almost have served as a normative ‘blueprint’ for income tax policy under the Brown 
                                                 
316  See R.H. Tawney, Equality, 4th edn (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952), pp. 165-167. 
317  See Mike Brewer, Alissa Goodman, Michal Myck, Jonathan Shaw and Andrew Shephard (eds), 
Poverty and inequality in Britain: 2004 (London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2004), pp. 9-22; 
Mike Brewer, Luke Sibieta and Liam Wren-Lewis, Racing away? Income inequality and the 
evolution of high incomes (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008); Giles, Financial Times, 18 
January 2008, 3. 
318  See Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 136 above, p. 7. 
319  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
320  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 364 and 365. 
321  This term is being used here in a ‘Dworkinian’ sense (see Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, p. 12). 
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 Chancellorship.323 The apparent correspondence may also reflect something of Gordon 
Brown’s well-known predilection for Rawls’s thought324 and for American political (and 
also economic) theory in general.325 The idiosyncrasies of the reality are perhaps a neat 
illustration of the limitations of the political morality of Rawls and Dworkin in practice.326 
What we have in the code, therefore, is a fairness that is contentious, that seems to place a 
greater emphasis on anti-avoidance that on ‘progressivity’, and that relies on the 
‘conventionality’ of property to implement a version of societal fairness,327 rather than tax 
fairness as such. Illustrations of the last of these points, admittedly a particularly 
controversial one, will be examined in a moment. 
In the corporation tax policy documents of 2001 to 2003, the conception of fairness as 
societal fairness, along the lines just analysed, is thus closely aligned with the curtailment of 
corporation tax avoidance. This is significant because, in Murphy and Nagel’s account, the 
impact on fairness of tax avoidance is barely touched on. Part of the reason for the omission 
may be that Murphy and Nagel’s discussion does not specifically address corporation tax 
issues, and corporation tax in the UK is the area in which anti-avoidance measures have 
become particularly prevalent. ‘Countering artificial328 tax avoidance in the UK corporate 
tax environment will remain a priority’,329 the 2001 document promised, and, although 
                                                                                                                                                       
322  Ibid., p. 175. 
323  Ibid., pp. 181-188. 
324  See Robert Peston, Brown’s Britain (London: Short Books, 2005), p. 30, who recounts Gordon 
Brown’s fondness for Rawls’s ‘”maximin” rule’ (see Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality, 
enlarged edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 22-23). 
325  See Simon Lee, Best for Britain? The Politics and Legacy of Gordon Brown (Oxford: Oneworld, 
2007), pp. 55-56 (Sandel’s ‘moral limits of markets’: see Chapter 3 above, n. 73); also Keegan, n. 
191 above, pp. 12-13; Pym and Kochan, n. 298 above, pp. 98 (Reich), 113 (Reich (‘the Third 
Way’) and Summers); Brown, n. 202 above, pp. 145, 272 (Sandel) and 84 (Greenspan). 
326  See above, n. 58. 
327  See Balls, Grice and O’Donnell, n. 136 above, p. 7. 
328  See the use of the expression ‘fictitious or artificial transaction’, in F(No. 2)A 1915, s. 44(3) 
(noted by Southern, n. 275 above, p. 490), a criminalising measure relating to excess profits duty. 
329  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 18 above, para. 1.20. 
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 similarly forthright general statements do not appear in the 2002 or 2003 documents, the 
importance of anti-avoidance legislation to fairness does.330 The result of the emphasis on 
corporation tax anti-avoidance measures in the pursuit of fairness is that this is what, in the 
real world of representative institutions and corporate power, and allowing for adjustments in 
the name of prudence, a ‘Rawlsian’ distributive justice might look like. There is a strong 
sense of tax law as ‘moulding’ a fairer society, rather than of it as something with which the 
unwary may be unfortunate enough to collide.331  
                                                
With these points in mind, we turn to four aspects of the corporation tax code that, at the 
beginning of the study, we used to exemplify what has been called ‘the anti-avoidance 
theme’ in corporation tax reform.332 These elements address four types of problem, each of 
which is an almost inevitable consequence of a tax that uses corporate profits as its base,333 
and which relies on the time-honoured distinction between ‘income and chargeable gains’.334 
The first, second and fourth measures deal with attempts to manipulate deductions from the 
corporation tax base, while the third addresses attempts to allocate profits between 
companies in a group. 
First, there is the broad ‘general anti-avoidance rule’, which, since 2002, has been 
common to each of the special codes on the tax treatment of loan relationships, FOREX and 
financial instruments.335 The well known ‘paragraph 13’ prevents deductions which are 
attributable to ‘unallowable purposes’,336 and, so far as it concerns loan relationships, it 
 
330  See H.M. Treasury and Inland Revenue, n. 213 above, paras 1.5 and 1.6; also H.M. Treasury and 
Inland Revenue, n. 143 above, para. 1.4. 
331  See Shklar, n. 109 above, p. 7; also Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ 
(2002) 22 OJLS 157-175. 
332  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 27-36. 
333  Ibid., n. 9; see ICTA 1988, s. 8(1). 
334  See ICTA 1988, s. 6(4)(a). 
335  See Chapter 1 above, n. 23. 
336  Ibid., n. 30. 
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 states that deductions337 are to be disregarded to the extent that, ‘on a just and reasonable 
apportionment, [they are] … attributable to … [an] unallowable purpose’.338 An 
‘unallowable purpose’, meanwhile, is one ‘which is not amongst the business or other 
commercial purposes of the company’.339 This wording has a number of features that, prior 
to its introduction, were, if not unprecedented, then certainly unusual.340 The novelty lay in 
HMRC’s competence to make a ‘just and reasonable apportionment’ of the deductions, and 
in the competence given to the judges to define the outer limits of an ‘unallowable purpose’. 
The positing of the rule, as we have seen, provoked a reaction that, given the concept of 
fairness explained above, seems predictable.341 Even today, Bramwell hints at the difficulties 
of interpretation that the rule presents;342 Ghosh and Johnson assert that it ‘has caused, since 
its inception, inevitable uncertainty and controversy’;343 and Southern considers it to be of 
‘limited [practical] application’, given its ‘inherent limitations and … the law of diminishing 
returns’.344 A Tory backbencher, Mark Field, MP,345 whose early training was as a City 
solicitor, neatly linked these uncertainty concerns to the idea of fairness reflected in 
paragraph 13, as well as to the ideological difference implied, when the rule was confirmed 
and extended in 2002: 
 
‘The City of London is an important financial centre and a centre of invisible earnings for 
this country. I have a philosophical concern that a feeling exists that taxes must be raised, 
                                                 
337  Called ‘debits’ in the legislation (see FA 1996, Sched 9, para. 13(1)). 
338  See FA 1996, Sched. 9, para 13(1). 
339  See FA 1996, Sched. 9, para. 13(2). 
340  See Southern, n. 275 above, pp. 490-491; also Hole [1996] BTR 347-358, 355-356. 
341  The original FB 1996 draft clauses, which became FA 1996, Sched. 9, para 13(1), referred to 
companies becoming parties to transactions ‘otherwise than in good faith’ (see Edge, Tax Journal, 
14 December 1995, 4-5, 4).  
342  See Bramwell, n. 225 above, para. A3.9.  
343  See Julian Ghosh and Ian Johnson, Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivatives (London: 
Butterworths LexisNexis, 1999), para. [6.31]. 
344  See Southern, n. 275 above, p. 498. 
345  Cities of London and Westminster, Conservative. 
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 and that banks and other financial institution [sic] must go about their business ensuring 
that they pay a fair amount of tax; it is somehow seen as illegitimate to avoid tax and 
utilise the tax system. The idea that financial institutions should be willing to take 
everything on the chin and not use the system to their benefit is a matter of concern.’346   
 
In the same debate, Ruth Kelly, MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury,347 reiterated 
the values underlying paragraph 13, as well as the ideological gulf: 
 
‘I do not for a moment share the philosophical doubts of the hon. Member for Cities of 
London and Westminster about the legitimacy of raising a fair share of taxation from 
particular individuals or companies. I take the principled view, which I think is shared on 
the Labour Benches, that we should create a level playing field where everyone pays a fair 
share of tax. That is what the clause is designed to do.’348  
 
Paragraph 13 is thus one of those provisions that highlight especially clearly both the 
ideology, and the configuration of power, immanent to the corporation tax code. The 
alignment of parties in the House of Commons, as well as its institutional organisation, have, 
in other words, given the corporation tax code a strong undertow of societal fairness. It 
seems, moreover, that paragraph 13 applies this idea to loan relationships in a way that 
reflects a ‘conventional’ view of property, and that, in so doing, tax law is being put to work 
to mould a fairer society. People may disagree about what fairness requires, but that is not 
relevant here. What is relevant is that the institutions of representative democracy have 
accorded it a particular nature and scope, and, in doing so, have recognised that property 
rights are ‘conventional’ rather than ‘moral’ or ‘natural’.349 That a loan relationship may not 
be caught by paragraph 13 is not quite a case of being, in Walton J.’s aphorism, ‘untaxed by 
                                                 
346  See Hansard HC Standing Committee F, 11 June 2002, col. 323. 
347  See Chapter 1 above, n. 24. 
348  See Hansard HC Standing Committee F, 11 June 2002, col. 325. 
349  See Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, p. 175 (see Chapter 1 above, n. 363); also Loughlin, n. 39 
above, ch. 7, on rights generally. 
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 concession’,350 but the conceptualisation of tax law embodied in paragraph 13 is equally not 
the Diceyan view of tax law implicit in the MP for London and Westminster’s comments.  
The wording of paragraph 13 has hardly ever been judicially tested,351 but, when the testing 
comes, judges will have competence to remould the property rights created by a loan 
relationship. The extent to which they calculate that they have the capacity so to do remains 
to be seen. 
Deductions from the corporation tax base have been restricted, too, under an entirely 
separate provision, introduced in 2003, which applies to contributions to employee trusts.352 
This provision is rather less well known than paragraph 13, but it highlights an equally 
important point, and its existence highlights that not all of the anti-avoidance measures in the 
code raise anti-avoidance issues as controversial as those of paragraph 13. Schedule 24 to FA 
2003353 prevents a company from making a deduction from its profits when, without there 
being a receipt by the employee, the company makes a contribution to an employee benefit 
trust (an EBT).354 In doing so, Schedule 24 removes a corporation tax avoidance 
opportunity, by denying the company a deduction until the employee is actually paid. The 
corporation tax treatment of contributions to EBTs is thereby ‘squared’ with the situation 
when the employee is remunerated directly. The issue had arisen because contributions to 
EBTs had been used to remunerate the directors of Dextra Accessories/Phones 4U, including 
                                                 
350  See Vestey and Others v. IRC [1979] Ch. 177 (‘one should be taxed by law, and not be untaxed by 
concession’ ([1979] Ch. 177, 197 (Walton J.)); also Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 
2007, cols 212-213 (Mark Hoban, MP (Fareham, Conservative)); also Chartered Institute of 
Taxation, Taxed by Law, Untaxed by Concession (London: CIOT, 2005). A later Vestey case, in 
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351  But see Prudential plc v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners, analysed by Ghosh and Johnson, 
n. 343 above, paras. [6.121]-[6.140] (discussing now repealed FA 1994, s. 168A and similar 
wording (see FA 2002, ss. 83(2), 141 and Sched. 40)).  
352  See Chapter 1 above, n. 31. 
353  See FA 2003, s. 143. 
354  FA 2003, Sched. 24, para. 9(1), uses ‘employee benefit scheme’, which includes a trust. 
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 its founder, John Caudwell,355 and the Special Commissioners had held that the technique 
was not frustrated by FA 1989, s. 43(11).356 Schedule 24 to FA 2003 was HMG’s response 
to Dextra Accessories’ success before the Special Commissioners, and it pre-dated HMG’s 
subsequent successful appeal to the House of Lords.357 Lord Hoffmann, delivering the only 
full speech, encapsulated the prudence of both the Law Lords’ unanimous decision, and 
HMG’s own legislative response: 
                                                
 
‘ … [T]here would be other anomalies in the construction favoured by the Special 
Commissioners …. By setting up a trust such as this, the taxpayer could achieve 
immediate deductibility of payments into the trust and postpone indefinitely the liability 
of employees to tax on the emoluments for which, in part, the money was eventually 
applied. That would enable the purpose of section 43 to be easily frustrated.’358              
 
The logic of this point seems to have eluded the author of a short article in the Tax 
Journal,359 Jonathan Levy, who had advised the taxpayer in the litigation. He wrote of the 
continuing ‘uncertainty’ that the Law Lords’ decision presented, and, somewhat 
idiosyncratically, concluded that ‘taxpayers and their advisers cannot ignore the detrimental 
effect that arrangements which are perceived as being aggressive can have on the courts’. 
Understandable as it is, this comment is surely wide of the mark. The response of H.M. 
Treasury to the Special Commissioners’ decision, and the Law Lords’ attitude on appeal, 
were each prudent responses. It was not even necessary for the judges or the Department to 
resort to casuistry,360 or to adopt the kind of ‘conventional’ attitude to property rights 
 
355  See Chapter 2 above, n. 110. 
356  Now superseded by a new FA 1989, s. 43, as inserted by ITEPA 2003, Sched. 6, para. 157. 
357  See Macdonald (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dextra Accessories Ltd and Others [2005] UKHL 
47; [2005] STC 1111. 
358  [2005] STC 1111, para. 21. 
359  See Levy, Tax Journal, 25 July 2005, 9-11.  
360  See Loughlin, n. 39 above, p. 152. On casuistry, see H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the 
World, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 352-353n; on ‘casuistry’ in tax law, 
see, e.g., Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Scottish and Newcastle Breweries Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 
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 discussed above. The Paymaster General, the Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP, using familiar 
imagery,361 spoke of Schedule 24, FA 2003, as a ‘measure [which] levels the playing field 
between employers who remunerate employees direct and those who do so through third 
parties’. What the judges were doing in Macdonald v. Dextra Accessories was to underline 
the prudence of the approach taken by HMG. Even the Opposition took this view, in its 
tabled amendments concentrating on points of detail only. ‘Let it be placed on the record’, 
said Stephen O’Brien, MP,362 somewhat portentously, ‘that there is no attempt to undermine 
the major thrust of the Government’s policy on anti-avoidance’.363 
If the two sets of provisions discussed so far illustrate ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ approaches to 
fairness, the major remodelling of the transfer pricing rules in 2004 may mark out a middle 
ground.364 The idea of these provisions is to prevent profits or losses from being allocated to 
different parts of domestic or international groups (i.e. MNCs), in such a way as to enable 
group members to take advantage of differences in tax rates.365 Since the measures relate 
solely to corporate groups, they can raise fairness issues not necessarily highlighted by the 
two measures discussed above. The two sets of measures already discussed relate to fairness 
as between taxpayers and groups of taxpayers. The transfer pricing rules have this function, 
to be sure, but they also address the question of fairness between states.366 The amendments 
                                                                                                                                                       
322, 325 (Lord Wilberforce); Lingfield Park (1991) Ltd v. Shove [2004] EWCA Civ 391, para. 4, 
unreported (Mummery L.J.). 
361  See Ruth Kelly, n. 348 above. 
362  Eddisbury, Conservative. 
363  See Hansard HC Standing Committee B, 12 June 2003, col. 542. 
364  See Chapter 1 above, n. 32. 
365  See Tiley, n. 29 above, p. 892. 
366  See Plender, Financial Times, 21 July 2004, 1; Plender, Financial Times, 21 July 2004, 15; 
Plender and Simons, Financial Times, 22 July 2004, 15; Brian J. Arnold and Michael J. McIntyre, 
International Tax Primer, 2nd edn (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), ch. 4; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 6; Picciotto, n. 157 above, ch. 8; Angharad Miller and 
Lynne Oats, Principles of International Taxation (Haywards Heath: Tottel Publishing, 2006), ch. 
14. 
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 made by FA 2004367 to Schedule 28AA, ICTA 1988, combine the corporation tax thin 
capitalisation regime with the provisions on transfer pricing,368 and apply the expanded rules 
both to transactions across borders and to ones within the UK.369 Subject to exceptions for 
‘dormant companies’370 and ‘small and medium sized enterprises’,371 goods transferred, and 
services provided (including loans made), between group companies are therefore treated as 
being in return for an ‘arm’s length’ price.372 Although, in extending the rules to transactions 
between UK-resident companies, HMG was seeking to make the rules conformable to 
Community law,373 one of their main justifications was again that of fairness. This type of 
fairness is generally referred to as ‘inter-nation equity’,374 but it is perhaps better thought of 
as being a still further implication of the benefit principle. It will be recalled that the second 
fundamental principle of corporation tax is that non-resident companies are taxed only on the 
profits of a ‘permanent establishment’ in the UK.375 The non-resident is taxed in the UK, so 
it was once judicially stated, because of the protection that its UK possessions receive under 
UK law.376 When FB 2004 was at Committee stage, the Paymaster General made a similar 
point in maintaining that: ‘[t]he rules are vital to ensure that business, especially 
multinationals, are taxed fairly in respect of their activities in the United Kingdom’.377 Not 
only that, in fact, but ‘[t]ransfer pricing regulations and rules are about insuring and 
                                                 
367  See FA 2004, ss. 30-37 and Sched. 5. 
368  See ICTA 1988, Sched. 28AA, paras 1A-1B, 6, 7 and 14 (1) (as expanded by FA 2004, ss. 34-36).  
369  See ICTA 1988, Sched. 28AA, para. 5. 
370  See ICTA 1988, Sched. 28AA, para. 5A (added by FA 2004, s. 31(3)). 
371  See ICTA 1988, Sched. 28AA, para.5B (added by FA 2004, s. 31(4)). 
372  See ICTA 1988, Sched. 28AA, para. 1(1). 
373  See Chapter 1 above, n. 44 (Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v. 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] 2 CMLR 31, para. AG84 (Advocate General 
Geelhoed).) 
374  See Arnold and McIntyre, n. 366 above, p. 4; also Picciotto, n. 157 above, pp. 65-68, 82-83; Roy 
Rohatgi, Basic International Taxation, 2nd edn, vol. 1 (Richmond: Richmond Law and Tax, 2005), 
p. 23. 
375  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 4-5. 
376  See Whitney v. C.I.R. [1926] AC 37, 54 (Lord Wrenbury).  
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 protecting the corporate tax base of this country’.378 This kind of fairness is not so much 
about the innovative shaping, but the protecting, of the public interest, ‘the national 
interest’,379 which means protecting the UK tax base. ‘As a Minister, [said the Paymaster 
General] I am not prepared to allow the Exchequer risk that goes with … [allowing MNCs] 
‘to reduce taxable profits in the UK’.380 This is, of course, an impeccably correct statement 
of HMG’s duties in the matter. The conception of fairness being played out in this part of the 
code is thus, possibly, not so much a reflection of an ideology of the public interest, as an 
illustration of the duties of HMG in protecting the tax base.381 The distinction may be a 
slender one, but the problem raises issues common to the Community law issues discussed in 
Chapter 3. Prudential advancement of the public interest, in cases involving cross-border 
transactions, requires particular vigilance against the depredations of non-residents.382 
With the transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules seeking to forestall the erosion of 
the corporation tax base, by preventing the allocation of income profits among group 
companies, we turn finally to attempts to manipulate capital profits. This possibility arises 
because chargeable gains for an accounting period consist of chargeable gains minus 
allowable losses.383 It is met by the four ‘targeted anti-avoidance rules’384 (TAARs) brought 
                                                                                                                                                       
377  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, col. 111 (Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP). 
378  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, col. 112. 
379  See Chapter 3 above, p. 183. 
380  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 11 May 2004, col. 120. 
381  On this basis, Murphy’s criticisms may be misconceived: see BBC File on Four, 2007. 
‘Companies “looting” a continent’. Radio, BBC Radio 4. 29 July. (Transcript available from 
www.bbc.co.uk.) See Chapter 2 above, n. 346. 
382  The virulence of the controversy over the income tax treatment of non-remitted income of resident 
but non-domiciled individuals may reflect something of this: see, e.g., Anon, Financial Times, 8 
February 2008, 12 (editorial); Willman, Financial Times, 9-10 February 2008, 2. 
383  See TCGA 1992, s. 2(2)(a). 
384  See David F. Williams, ‘Avoidance through the creation and use of capital losses by companies’ 
[2006] BTR 23-33, 23-24. 
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 in by FA 2006,385 then further strengthened in FA 2007,386 which are intended to block the 
inappropriate ‘creation and use of corporate capital losses’.387 The spur to each of these 
measures was HMG’s analysis of information gathered under the disclosure regime 
introduced in 2004.388 The first TAAR389 dramatically excludes from the scope of the term 
‘allowable loss’ a loss that accrues to a company pursuant to390 arrangements whose 
purpose, or main purpose, ‘is to secure a tax advantage’.391 The idea with this TAAR, as the 
Paymaster General explained in Standing Committee in May 2006, was to block ‘tax relief 
for capital losses where their existence or amount has been contrived, that is, where the 
losses that arise do not reflect commercial reality’.392 
The second and third TAARs393 seek to shore up what Bramwell calls ‘structural 
weaknesses’394 in TCGA 1992, Sched. 7A, some of which had been evident to HMG since at 
least 1998.395 The second TAAR appears in TCGA 1992, s. 184A, and restricts the buying of 
losses, while the third TAAR (which appears in section 184B, TCGA 1992) curbs the buying 
of gains. It is the latter that illustrates the piquant sophistication of tax avoidance schemes in 
this area. Bramwell illustrates the point by showing how, absent the second TAAR, a 
company that owned an asset with an unrealised loss might be advised to buy a company that 
owned an asset with an unrealised gain, the former transferring the ‘loss asset’ to the latter, 
                                                 
385  FA 2006 was debated as F(No. 2)B 2005, but the clause numbers of the Bill usefully correspond 
to the section numbers of FA 2006. 
386  See FA 2007, s. 32. See Chapter 1 above, n. 36. 
387  See Chapter 1 above, n. 36. 
388  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 29 and 35. 
389  FA 2007, s. 27 extended the first TAAR to all chargeable persons, FA 2006, s. 69 having applied 
only to companies.  
390  TCGA 1992, s. 16A (inserted by FA 2007, s. 27, which repealed FA 2006, s. 69 (see FA 2007, s. 
27(6))). 
391  TCGA 1992, s. 16A(1)(b). 
392  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 23 May 2006, col. 313 (Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP). 
393  See FA 2006, s. 70. 
394  See Bramwell, n. 225 above, para. D9.1.1. 
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 which would then sell both assets and set the loss against the gain for corporation tax 
purposes.396 What the second and third TAARs state is that using losses is blocked in any 
case where a company is purchased mainly, or indeed wholly, ‘to secure a tax advantage’.397 
That they have been successful in this was attested to by the Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury in the debates on FB 2007.398 The second and third TAARs are mirror images of 
each other, but the fourth, which appears in TCGA 1992, ss. 184G-I,399 is quite distinct, and 
aims actually to shape further legislative development. 
The fourth TAAR, innovative as it was, was another response to information that HMRC 
had received under the disclosure regime. Briefly, if ‘the main purpose’400 of ‘arrangements’ 
into which a company enters, is to transform an income profit into a chargeable gain, so that 
the gain can be reduced by available losses, the use of the losses to reduce the gain is 
denied.401 The novelty consists partly in the fact that HMRC may issue a notice informing 
the company of the block on the deduction,402 and partly in the fact that, as already 
suggested, ‘[u]nlike the other measures being introduced as part of this package[,] this rule 
primarily provides protection against future schemes’.403 The main safeguard for taxpayers is 
that HMRC may ‘issue the notice [only] when it [reasonably believes] … that the conditions 
of the clause [are] … met; … [and] companies need not be concerned by the provisions [of 
                                                                                                                                                       
395  i.e. when what was TCGA 1992, Sched. 7AA was introduced (Sched. 7AA repealed by FA 2006, 
s. 70(2), which inserted TCGA 1992, s. 184F(4)).    
396  See Bramwell, n. 225 above, para. D9.1.4. 
397  See TCGA 1992, ss. 184A(1)(c) and 184B(1)(c) (see Bramwell, n. 225 above, para. D9.1.1); also 
Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 23 May 2006, col. 332 (Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP). 
398  See Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, cols 215, 222, 223 (Ed Balls, MP).  
399  As inserted by FA 2006, s. 71. 
400  See TCGA 1992, s. 184G(5) (added by FA 2006, s. 71(1)). 
401  See TCGA 1992, s. 184G(7) (added by FA 2006, s. 71(1)). 
402  See TCGA 1992, s. 184G(6) (added by FA 2006, s. 71(1)). 
403  See H.M. Revenue and Customs, HMRC Guidance: Avoidance through the creation and use of 
capital losses by companies, 27 July 2006 (available from www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 28 July 
2006)), para. 72; also  H.M. Revenue and Customs, HMRC Guidance: Capital Gains Tax - 
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 the TAAR] unless they receive a notice’.404 An explanation is offered by the technical 
guidance: 
 
‘HMRC is aware that a large amount of unused capital losses is potentially available to 
companies, and this fact, combined with experience to date, suggest [sic] that there is 
likely to be increased activity in this area. This poses a significant risk not only to 
corporation tax on future capital gains, but also to corporation tax on companies’ income 
profits.’405                         
 
In line with the approach taken in this study, these safeguards may be seen as a prudent 
recognition of the need for HMG to augment its constituent power. Given the objective of 
encouraging fairness, there is a certain prudence in the four TAARs, since they are certainly 
consistent, not only as between themselves, but also with other anti-avoidance measures. As 
David F. Williams points out, they each use ‘a tax avoidance motive test’, just like paragraph 
13 discussed above, and like other anti-avoidance measures in FA 2002.406 They are 
examples of ‘evidence-based’ policy making; they are not ‘stabs in the dark’. All four 
TAARs, as the Paymaster General pointed out in Standing Committee, ‘result from 
information specifically provided under the disclosure regime and are specifically targeted to 
deal with that’.407 They reflect, in other words, the prudence of the process analysed in 
Chapter 3, and a democratically sanctioned configuration of values. Given the ideology of 
fairness discussed above, and given the public interest, it is difficult to argue with them.408 
Ministers are right to be sceptical of the kind of criticism levelled in Standing Committee 
                                                                                                                                                       
Avoidance through the creation and use of capital losses, 19 July 2007 (available from 
www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 17 February 2008)). 
404  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 23 May 2006, col. 334 (Rt Hon. Dawn Primarolo, MP). 
405  See H.M. Revenue and Customs, HMRC Guidance: Avoidance through the creation and use of 
capital losses by companies, 27 July 2006 (available from www.hmrc.gov.uk (accessed 28 July 
2006)). 
406  See FA 2002, Sched. 26, paras 23 and 24; also FA 2002, Sched. 29, para. 111. 
407  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 23 May 2006, col. 313. 
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 debates. It is necessary, too, to be sceptical about allegations of uncertainty. The provisions 
are certainly intricate, but it is revealing that Bramwell is able to state the legal position on 
each of the four TAARs with great clarity.409  
‘Between the idea/ And the reality … ’, so Eliot wrote, ‘Falls the Shadow’.410 Whether 
he was thinking of Hegel in writing these words, or about Hegel’s immanent critique, we 
would prefer not to say, but it might be an image for what has been attempted here. 
Comparing the ideal of fairness in corporation tax, as it appears from the policy documents, 
with the intricate and evolving reality, is complex, yet it yields significant insights. The first 
of these has come from confronting the ‘brokenness’ of fairness as a concept. Disagreements 
about its application to specific situations prevail, both on the Left, and between Left and 
Right. Although there has been a certain consensus about the need for anti-avoidance 
measures in each of the areas examined, simmering below the surface has been a 
disagreement about whether HMG’s approach to avoidance has been a fair one. The 
Opposition attack on the measures imported to the code since 1997 has tended to be situated 
on the intersection of fairness and certainty.411 Most of their criticism has been concerned 
with the ‘unfairness’ of companies not knowing for sure whether or not they fall within the 
scope of the new anti-avoidance provisions, or by invoking a form of procedural unfairness. 
As is evident, the code contains ambitious direct or indirect attempts to help bring about a 
fairer distribution of benefits and burdens in society, so HMG and Opposition are often, 
perhaps inevitably, talking past each other when fairness (anti-avoidance) issues are raised. 
                                                                                                                                                       
408  See Hansard HC Standing Committee A, 23 May 2006, col. 315 (Paul Goodman, MP (Wycombe, 
Conservative)). 
409  See Bramwell, n. 225 above, section D9.1; hence, possibly, the success that HMG has claimed for 
these provisions: see Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 223 (Ed Balls, MP, 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury). 
410  See n. 38 above. 
411  See above in this chapter. 
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 One consequence of this, as a National Audit Office (NAO) report of 2007412 has indicated, 
is that both sides (not to mention academics)413 have missed the impact of corporation tax 
reform for more traditional notions of ‘vertical equity’414 and ‘horizontal equity’.415 
Reporting on the NAO’s findings, in August 2007, the Financial Times calculated that, given 
the availability of certain types of relief to only some areas of the corporate sector, the oil 
and gas industries, banks and insurance companies had had to assume a disproportionate 
share of the overall corporation tax burden.416 Seven per cent. of the 700 companies within 
the jurisdiction of HMRC’s Large Business Service, so the Financial Times reported, ‘paid 
67 per cent of the tax [i.e. due from the 700] while about 220 paid none and another 210 each 
paid less than £10m’.417 Could it be that, since the unfairness has not been felt by the 
governing party’s wider constituency, prudence enables its significance to be 
dow
                                                
nplayed?418 
Secondly, a comparison of the ideal, as set out in the policy documents, and the reality, 
reveals a fundamentally different perspective as between HMG and the Opposition, not only 
as to the role of the corporation tax code, but also as to the nature of corporation tax law 
itself. Moreover, to the extent that the attitude of the professional members of policy 
networks involved in this policy area reflects the Opposition view, their arguments, far from 
being merely technical, have a political significance. The nub of the issue is the fact that, as 
contended throughout this study, corporation tax reform represents, on a comprehensive 
scale, a harnessing of public law, not just to map out the limits of the permissible, but to 
 
412  See National Audit Office, HM Revenue & Customs: Management of large business Corporation 
Tax (House of Commons Papers, Session 2006-2007, 614) (London: The Stationery Office, 2007). 
413  See Houlder, Financial Times, 28 August 2007, 1 (‘It is certainly surprising’ (Michael Devereux, 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)). 
414  See Murphy and Nagel, n. 22 above, pp. 13-16. 
415  Ibid., pp. 37-39.  
416  See Houlder, n. 413 above; also Houlder, Financial Times, 25 February 2008, 4. 
417  See Houlder, Financial Times, 28 August 2007, 1. 
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 mould the relations between corporate sector and the state, to promote a specific ideological 
view of the public interest.419 Except to the extent that it is part of the system of rule, this 
development is the actualisation of the functionalist tenets of public law study.420 It follows 
that criticism of HMG’s approach needs to be carefully weighed. Much of the criticism 
follows from an inability to interpret the reality,421 an unwillingness to forsake normative 
intellectual positions. Thus, when the CIOT, or the CBI, criticises tax legislation for its 
‘complexity’, their argument is valid as far as it goes. What is important, however, is to 
recognise it for what it is. It represents a political position as to the role of law in the state 
that is fundamentally different from that taken up by HMG.422 Criticism of complexity is not 
ne
                                                                                                                                                      
utral, nor is it merely technical.423 
It is thus that, with great respect to Philip Baker, QC,424 who argues otherwise, there is 
indeed a ‘principle of equality’ in UK tax law, or at least a ‘principle of fairness’. It is, 
however, not a legal principle, much less a ‘rule of law value’, but an ‘essentially contested 
concept’. It is fairness as conceived of in the highly specific terms discussed above, a 
principle of the political jurisprudence that is the corporation tax code. It is ‘high’ on anti-
avoidance and, as the recent NAO report has shown, ‘low’ on ‘traditional’ ideas of ‘vertical 
equity’ and ‘horizontal equity’. The NAO report demonstrates the consequences for 
companies. Those for individuals are more strident, shocking even,425 and illustrate the fact 
 
418 See Anon, Private Eye, No. 1204, 22 February-6 March 2008, 28. 
419  See Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 222 (Ed Balls, MP, Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury). 
420  See Loughlin, n. 14 above, chs 6 and 10.  
421  See Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 224 (Mark Hoban, MP (Fareham, 
Conservative)). 
422  See, e.g., Tax Law Review Committee, n. 134 above, para. 8.2. 
423  See Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, cols 215-216 (Ed Balls, MP, Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury); also Houlder, Financial Times, 15 August 2007, 3. 
424  See Chapter 1 above, n. 113. 
425 See Institute for Fiscal Studies (2004) and (2007), n. 317 above; Giles, Ibid; Robert Peston, Who 
Runs Britain? (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2008), pp. 3, 7-8.  
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 that despite the anti-avoidance provisions, prudence declares so often, not for fairness, but 
for efficiency. What is most important, and too often elided, is the idea that the situation is 





ls for further reform, have to take account of this, much 
und
expressed as follows. First, that the public law nature of the corporation tax code strongly 
 
 
If readers have been willing to assent to the arguments developed in this study, what will 
have emerged is a somewhat novel, and, it is hoped, a realistic interpretation of the theory 
and values that have been at work in corporation tax reform, over the past 15 years or so. 
Some may, to be sure, find the picture presented a rather disturbing one. Most, it 
l see in it a persuasive depiction of a hitherto somewhat under-theorised reality. 
We may, therefore, feel some trepidation in spelling out, and reflecting on, the study’s 
core conclusions. Given the complex, and layered, nature of the discussion, these are set out 
in detail in the final chapter. We can conveniently anticipate some of theme here, however. 
What the corporation tax code represents is a pattern of values that, though not perhaps 
ideally laid out, reflect a consensus around the imperative of economic growth, around the 
importance of fairness, and, in the code’s shifting nature and constant change, a series of 
more or less prudential responses to the contingencies of an uncertain world. All criticisms 
of the code, and all proposa
erestimated, proposition.  
If such a view of the UK’s current system of corporation tax is correct, it has a number of 
rather startling - and unfashionable - implications, some of which might perhaps be 
 293
 suggests the practical impossibility of a more ‘durable’, or less complex, reality. What the 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury said, at the Committee Stage of FB 2007, is revealing: 
 
‘The hon. Gentleman might want to reflect a little more on the reality of tax policy 
making before he gives us another of his lectures on complexity … [T]he global corporate 
tax system has become very complex. Many skilled and ingenious people are coming up 
with complex ways to avoid tax, and the Government must counter the resulting 
complexity.’426 
 
If this is the case, then many of the simplification arguments are, as we might say, ‘so much 
chaff’; there is no qualitative or quantitative difference between corporation tax legislation 
and any other area of economic or social regulation. Secondly, arguments about corporation 
tax are not merely ‘political’; they are also ideological. If the former assertion springs from 
the political nature of the values immanent to the code, the latter arises from the ideological 
nature of the idea of the public interest itself. Prioritisations of efficiency and fairness, 
however delicate, might, in truth, amount to nothing less than a manifestation of the role of 
the state in the moulding of the public interest, of the level of the tax burden to be laid, in the 
first instance at least, on the corporate sector. Anti-avoidance measures with therefore 
provoke controversy, not just because of their tendency to increase the complexity and 
volume of the legislation, but also because of disagreements about the role of the state in 
shaping the public interest. The corporate sector has traditionally been keen on the idea of 
efficiency in the public interest, less so on the role of fairness. Given the political consensus, 
it is difficult to see a way out of complexity – certainly not by the conferring of a wide 
judicial discretion, and possibly not by introducing a general anti-avoidance rule either. 
                                                 
426 See Hansard HC Public Bill Committee, 17 May 2007, col. 216 (Ed Balls, MP). This was a 
response to an interjection from Brooks Newmark, MP (Braintree, Conservative). 
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Thirdly, given the ideological nature of the prioritisation of efficiency and fairness, 
sustaining the corporation tax code is, above all, an enterprise of Machiavellian prudence. If 
politics is really about governing, then, in the UK’s representative democracy, it is about 
management too. The world is too uncertain, London’s financial markets at once too fragile, 
and too valuable to the present ideological consensus, for matters to be otherwise.  
 





The purpose of this study has been to offer an interpretation of the main themes in Britain’s 
reform of its corporation tax law. Since this is an interpretative project, the objective has not, 
in the main, been to proffer solutions, but to identify issues and the prospects for a 
constructive discussion in the future. The conclusion of the study, in essence, is that many of 
the criticisms of commentators in this area are at worst historically naïve, and at best 
expressions of rival ideological positions. 
The implication of the arguments presented in this study is not that the difficulties of 
reforming corporation tax are inevitable or insurmountable. Rather, it is that the challenges 
of reform, whilst undeniable, can be understood only by an approach that emphasises the 
need for prudent management, and for a consistent and coherent view of the public interest. 
These imperatives must shape the kind of criticisms made of the corporation tax code, if 
future discussion is to be meaningful. 
 
‘THEORY’ AND ‘VALUES’ 
 
The principal inspiration for the study has been the idea that traditional discussions of 
corporate tax reform have failed to capture important theoretical issues. The absence of a 
theoretical dimension is worrying, since corporation tax is gradually being separated out 
from income tax, and its reform has long been developing a momentum of its own. Seven 
 296
 main themes have been discernible in UK corporate tax reform since the early 1990s: ‘the 
accounting theme’;1 ‘the anti-avoidance theme’;2 ‘the compliance and enforcement theme’;3 
‘the European and international theme’;4 ‘the consultation theme’;5 ‘the technical theme’;6 
and ‘the Departmental theme’.7 The research for this study began as an examination of the 
interaction of the accounting theme with the last three themes, with only subsidiary reference 
to anti-avoidance and to European and international influences. However, as the research 
progressed and legislative changes gathered momentum, it became easier to justify the 
inclusion of the anti-avoidance and the European and international themes than their 
exclusion. And since one common thread in the increased prominence of these themes, 
especially since 2004, has been the protection of the corporation tax base, it seemed only 
appropriate to include a compliance and enforcement theme. The seven themes, due no doubt 
to the volume and complexity of the statutory material, are largely untheorised. Such theory 
as exists on corporation tax treats it as an enterprise of classical political economy. But tax is, 
first and foremost, public law, and the purpose of this study has been to interpret the themes 
in accordance with an innovative public law vision. 
Corporation tax reform has become a political arena. It is political in the sense that it 
discloses a constant possibility of conflict (what Martin Loughlin calls the ‘first order of the 
political’).8 The possibility is usually manifested by corporate sector threats to leave the 
jurisdiction. Conflict is usually averted through the practice of politics, the ‘handling’ or 
                                                 
1  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 13-26. 
2  Ibid., nn. 27-36. 
3  Ibid., n. 37. 
4  Ibid., nn. 38-45. 
5  Ibid., nn. 46-65. 
6  Ibid., nn. 66-71. 
7  Ibid., nn. 72-83. 
8  See Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Law: the Third Order of the Political’, in Public Law in a 
Multi-Layered Constitution, ed. by Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2003), pp. 27-51, 31. 
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 ‘managing’ of that potential conflict, sometimes in a slightly ‘guileful’ manner. This latter is 
what Loughlin refers to as the ‘second order of the political’.9 Thus, as public law, 
corporation tax legislation is symbolised, not by ‘some slim constitutive document’,10 but by 
the practitioner’s loose-leaf encyclopaedias referred to throughout this study.11 A view of the 
British constitution that regarded it as configuration of values, albeit one subject to constant 
re-adjustment, might help us to offer insights into why what is contained within these tomes 
actually works. The ‘rule of law values’ of the Sheffield school12 will not do for this 
purpose, but ‘political values’, shaped by theory, as envisaged in Loughlin’s account, might. 
                                                
What Loughlin supplies is the key to a ‘functionalist’ and ‘interpretative’ approach to 
public law. Functionalism, as distinct from normativism, focuses ‘upon law’s regulatory and 
facilitative functions’, is ‘oriented to aims and objectives[,] and adopts an instrumentalist 
social policy approach’.13 An interpretative approach enables us to avoid the positivist 
mistake of attempting to keep ‘fact’ and ‘value’ separate from each other. It also enables a 
measure of historical sensitivity; the testing of solutions adopted for their non-contradiction, 
their consistency and their coherence; and an understanding of the role of law relative to the 
business of government generally. 
In the light of all this, Loughlin says, public law can be recognised as ‘the third order of 
the political’.14 It is about governance, or government, and it should be ‘even-handed’ and 
free from manipulation by wielders of power. The more successful public law is in 
 
9  Ibid. 
10  See Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 241. 
11  Ibid. See Taxation of Companies and Company Reconstructions, ed. by Richard Bramwell, Alun 
James, Mike Hardwick and John Lindsay, 8th edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2002); also 
Julian Ghosh and Ian Johnson, Taxation of Loan Relationships and Derivatives (London: 
Butterworths LexisNexis, 1999). 
12  See Ian Harden and Norman Lewis, The Noble Lie: The British constitution and the rule of law 
(London: Hutchinson, 1986). 
13  See Loughlin, n. 10 above, p. 60. 
14  See Loughlin, n. 8 above, pp. 40-42. 
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 promoting consistent, coherent and non-contradictory solutions, which reconcile often 
disparate political values, towards a clear end, the greater legitimacy those solutions will 
have. Thus, corporation tax reforms must reflect both political values and the relative 
importance of those values in the particular field. Since there is still very little constitutional 
law on UK taxation, anyone seeking to understand the significance of the various themes in 
corporation tax reform must embark on a much more broadly-based inquiry than tax law 
scholarship has hitherto provided. The present study has applied the ‘functionalist’ and 
‘interpretative’ technique referred to above. A key element in the argument has been to 
conceive of corporation tax as similar to any other type of economic regulation. Corporation 
tax is concerned, not only with raising revenue in a way that is both fair and efficient, but 
also with promoting growth in the UK economy. In the particular context of taxation, the 
approach is assisted by Murphy and Nagel’s inquiry into the legitimacy of taxation 
generally,15 a strategy which involves accepting the ‘conventional’, rather than any 
supposedly ‘absolute’, status of property rights which, on Murphy and Nagel’s view, are 
‘created’, not ‘disturbed’, by a system of taxation.16 
The discussion in Chapters 2 to 4 unfolded in three distinct, but interrelated, stages. The 
common strand in the analysis was our preoccupation with uncovering the ‘aims’ and 
‘objectives’ of corporation tax law as part of a tax system designed to facilitate the aims of 
economic policy more generally. Documents from four specimen Budgets enable us to infer 
that the reform of corporation tax has the objective of producing a tax that raises certain 
levels of revenue, to be sure, but that is also designed to promote economic growth, as well 
as greater fairness in society. 
                                                 
15  See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
16  See Chapter 1 above, nn. 361-367. 
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 In line with this approach, Chapter 2 began a three-stage examination of corporation tax 
reform, considering the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional framework within 
which it has been taking place. 
 
ACTORS ‘IN CONCERT’ 
 
The discussion in Chapter 2 emphasised the fact that the relevant institutions of H.M. 
Government (HMG) and the corporate sector operate in close geographical proximity. Four 
strands were recurrent in this discussion. First, the idea that the state (i.e. the UK), although a 
fictitious person, is fundamentally different from other fictitious persons, such as 
corporations, since it exists ‘precisely for the purpose of creating law’.17 Secondly, that, 
especially in the light of taxation’s exclusion from the UK’s ‘transfer of jurisdiction and 
competence’ to the institutions of the EU, the UK remains a sovereign state.18 Thirdly, that 
sovereignty is, in Loughlin’s word, ‘relational’:19 HMG’s competence in corporation tax 
policy depends on its capacity, and that depends on the quality of the relationship between 
the state and the corporate sector. Finally, that the quality of this relationship relies in turn on 
the ways in which objectives, structures and values augment or detract from the creation of 
trust and confidence in this particular area of public policy. 
Governance, the idea that informs the relationship between state and corporate sector, 
may either strengthen or detract from the sovereign authority of the state in corporation tax 
reform. The very notion of governance presupposes practices that present specific challenges 
                                                 
17  See Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 60.  
18  Ibid., p. 94. 
19  Ibid., pp. 83-86. 
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 to the effectiveness of representative institutions: a perceived lack of legitimacy;20 possible 
blame-shifting by those ‘in a position to interpret and lead public debate’, if policies 
misfire;21 the unintended and undesirable consequences of policies of reform;22 
accountability problems created by ‘policy networks’;23 and, finally the consequences of 
failure,24 the most striking example in this area being the legendary ‘complexity’ of 
corporation tax law. The extent to which each of these five issues – either alone or in 
combination - augment, or detract from, HMG’s sovereignty in tax matters depends, first, on 
the extent to which the objectives and values of state and corporate sector institutions 
complement or oppose each other; and, secondly, on the effectiveness of representative 
institutions in addressing significant divergences between them. 
Chapter 2 viewed the matching or opposition of the objectives and values of state and 
corporate sector in terms of five propositions: firstly, widespread agreement that the state and 
its sovereignty is being transformed by the effects of economic globalisation; secondly, that 
this transformation can be viewed as enabling for the nation state, a point which involves 
making a distinction between power as domination and ‘power as action in concert’;25 
thirdly, that the interests of the state and the corporate sector (especially multinational 
corporations) may be found in some measure to coincide; fourthly, that, if the foregoing 
points seem worrying, there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that a level of 
social responsibility by the corporate sector, far from being a cynical ‘add on’ in their 
financial statements, is perhaps essential to their economic prosperity; and, finally, that 
                                                 
20  See Gerry Stoker, ‘Governance as theory: five propositions’ (1998) 50 International Social 
Science Journal, 17-28, 20.  
21  Ibid., p. 22. 
22  Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
23  Ibid., p. 23. 
24  Ibid., p. 24. 
25  See Angus Stewart, Theories of Power and Domination: The Politics of Empowerment in Late 
Modernity (London: Sage, 2001), p. 6. 
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 governments can draw on experience - there have been many predictions of capital flight 
from the UK but, thus far at least, little realisation of it. 
Although it might be reassuring to find some identity of interest between state and non-
state institutions, it would be even more pleasing to think that the state’s institutions could 
deal effectively with significant divergences. The capacity of the UK’s political institutions 
in this respect centres on H.M. Treasury and HMRC, as well as on the effectiveness of 
Parliament in following their activities. However, effectiveness means different things to 
different institutions. For Parliament, effectiveness resides in its scrutinising powers, in its 
ability to hold HMG to account for the latter’s corporation tax measures. For H.M. Treasury 
and HMRC, however, effectiveness means an ability to confront unexpected combinations of 
economic events in such a way as to maintain appropriate levels of corporation tax revenue. 
The discussion in Chapter 2 accepted Tomkins’ interpretation of the ‘separation of powers’ 
in the British constitution as being a separation, not of the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary, but of the Crown, on the one hand, and Parliament, on the other.26 The enterprise 
of the British constitution is to ensure the accountability of the Crown to Parliament.27 
Viewed in this light, the effectiveness of Parliament in building up trust and confidence in 
corporation tax reform lies in its ability, via the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee, to create a convincing and authoritative narrative of the strengths and 
weaknesses of corporation tax reform measures. This is what, in this particular context, the 
concept of ‘accountability’ entails. It is the construction of the record that provides the basis 
on which, in due course, the electorate will confirm or dismiss the governing party. Although 
this system of scrutiny has strengths, it also has weaknesses. The effectiveness of H.M. 
Treasury and HMRC in building up trust and confidence in HMG’s corporation tax reform 
                                                 
26  Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 44. 
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 measures resides in the prudential qualities of Treasury ministers and civil servants. 
Parliament looks over its shoulder; HMG faces an unknown future. This is prudence, not as 
an Aristotelian virtue, but as an essential, pragmatic, tool in the art and science of 
government, of governing through governance. Part of that art is to ensure that the UK’s 
sovereignty in corporation tax matters is enhanced, rather than depleted, by its membership 
of the EU. 
The opposition in the British constitution of Crown and Parliament, and their combined 
strength when, as the Crown in Parliament, they act together, gave rise to the final two 
segments of the analysis in Chapter 2: the nature of the contributions to corporation tax 
reform of the policy networks referred to above, and of the judiciary. Policy networks, it will 
be recalled, cover both ‘policy communities’, and ‘issue networks’.28 Policy communities 
are characterised by their close integration in the policy making process; issue networks by 
their exclusion from the policy making process. It is thus that the reason for policy 
communities presenting accountability problems becomes obvious. If corporation tax 
reforms fail, and we want to know why, we may not be in a position to find out from those 
members of policy communities, the civil servants, most closely involved with HMG itself. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Two key points about the role and values of the judges in corporation tax reform were 
made in Chapter 2. One of them related to their constitutional position. This was that they are 
positioned much more closely to the Crown than to Parliament.29 Indeed, the role of senior 
judges has strong similarities to that of senior politicians.30 Whilst, in former times, this may 
have led judges to approach the interpretation of tax legislation in a manner calculated to 
 
27  Ibid., p. 46. 
28  See David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond 
Typology’, in Policy Networks in British Government, ed. by David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 249-268. 
29  See Tomkins, n. 26 above, p. 53. 
30  Ibid. 
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 reinforce a particular political position, in our own time it seems to have forced them to a 
careful reappraisal of their constitutional position in relation to taxation matters. Recent 
decisions of the House of Lords have disclosed a particular form of prudence, in which the 
public interest seems to be considered best served by leaving the formulation of tax law rules 
to the legislature, in conjunction with the experts. 
 
PRUDENCE IN THE REFORM PROCESS 
 
How, then, do the stages in which corporation tax reform takes place augment or detract 
from the state’s capacity in this particular policy area? The answer, in a word, is ‘prudence’, 
and Chapter 3 sought to show what prudence has required in relation to the four substantive 
themes of the study: accounting; anti-avoidance; compliance and enforcement; and the 
impact of European and international developments. The study contends that current 
arguments over the state of corporate tax legislation strongly underline the need for 
prudential management of corporation tax reform. The significance of this point is 
inextricably bound up in our acceptance of the idea that, in tax as elsewhere, prudence is the 
indispensable skill of the legislator. This in turn relies on the functionalist style of 
corporation tax law scholarship, one that recognises the public law nature of corporation tax, 
and which embraces the idea of public law as a practice of politics. 
The prudence of the former Chancellor, the Rt Hon. Gordon Brown, MP, has of course 
been legendary. What Gordon Brown knows, however, as a student of Adam Smith, and 
what we have been in a position to infer, by reading Smith in his eighteenth century context, 
is that prudence has a highly specific, though elusive, significance in relation to the art and 
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 science of government. Smith wrote ‘of the value of prudence in a legislator’, so Donald 
Winch has written, ‘in terms that Machiavelli himself might have approved of’:31 
 
‘We talk of the prudence of the great general, of the great statesman, of the great 
legislator. Prudence is, in all these cases, combined with many greater and more splendid 
virtues, with valour, with extensive and strong benevolence, with a sacred regard to the 
rules of justice, and all these supported by a proper degree of self-command. This 
superior prudence, when carried to the highest degree of perfection, necessarily supposes 
the art, the talent, and the habit or disposition of acting with the most perfect propriety in 
every possible circumstance and situation … It is the best head joined to the best heart. It 
is the most perfect wisdom combined with the most perfect virtue.’32  
 
The commonplace idea of prudence in a financial, in one might say an ‘Aristotelian’, sense, 
has certainly been part of Gordon Brown’s political vocabulary. The use of prudence in this 
financial sense does not, however, preclude its use in a legislative, or Machiavellian, sense. 
This is because the legislative sense of prudence rests on a view of Smith’s greatest work, 
not simply as a classic of economic liberalism, but as part of a political theory, of the art and 
science of government.  
In order to illustrate the role of prudence in augmenting the state’s capacity in corporation 
tax reform, it was necessary to isolate, first, three aspects of the ‘political’ dimension to the 
policy area. What is prudential depends, to some extent at least, on what the political aspect 
of corporation tax reform is taken to be; on what politics is thought to consist of, considered 
in relation to the adjacent notions of ‘policy’ and ‘reform’; and, finally, on the relationship 
between politics and political economy. Chapter 3 offered the following main reflections on 
each of these factors: that, as mentioned above, the political status of corporation tax reform 
derives from its constant conflictual (whether within the UK or within the EU as a whole), 
                                                 
31  See Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 159. 
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 and also because it has a strongly deliberative dimension; that, managing this potential and 
harnessing deliberation, in line with a particular policy, is the business of the politics of 
corporation tax reform; and that ‘reform’ may be a misnomer, unless it is understood as the 
creation of a new tax, or at least as a tax with newly-defined political objectives. An 
understanding of these points is important because it shows that effective policy making 
depends in part on the skills with which the policy is kept ‘on track’, and in part on 
communicating the nature and objectives of reform to those affected by it. This last point is 
crucial to the relationship between politics and political economy. Following Carl Schmitt,33 
the study holds that the economics of designing taxes is sustained by the political; it does not 
run alongside it. It is a matter of ideology, as indeed is the concept of the public interest 
itself. This, again, is in line with Smith’s view of political economy as that ‘branch of the 
science of a statesman or legislator’ which relates to providing, not simply ‘a plentiful 
revenue or subsistence for the people’, by ensuring that they can ‘provide such a revenue or 
subsistence for themselves’, but also supplying ‘the state or commonwealth with a revenue 
sufficient for the publick services’.34 
Though under-discussed in the literature, it is plain from both the public pronouncements 
of the former Chancellor, and from the reform measures themselves, examined in Chapters 3 
and 4, that the direction of reform has been informed by a particular ideology of the public 
interest. This ideology has been conceived of slightly differently from ‘the common good’, 
                                                                                                                                                       
32  See Adam Smith (1723-1790), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
MacFie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 216; see Simon Lee, Best for Britain? The Politics 
and Legacy of Gordon Brown (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), pp. 45-47. 
33  See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), p. 88 (note by Leo Strauss). 
34  See Adam Smith (1723-1790), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
ed. by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (textual editor W.B. Todd), 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976), I, p. 428. But note changes in usage: see Charles S. Maier, ‘Introduction: Political 
economy and history’, in In search of stability: Explorations in historical political economy, ed. 
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 since, within a ‘welfare economics’ framework, it has drawn attention to HMRC’s duty to 
make prudent decisions to combine efficiency with fairness in economic policy; to put the 
interests of the UK first; and to put the tax system to work in the service of the vision of 
strong economic growth tempered by social justice. Interestingly, lawyers (although not 
other commentators) have either ignored this ideological dimension, or refused to recognise 
that it is a legitimate objective of corporation tax reform, as the practice of a particular type 
of public law designed ‘to meet the objectives of the government of the day’.35 
The necessity for HMG to make prudent decisions in the public interest is nowhere more 
apparent than in relation to the initiation of reform proposals. This stems from the need for 
HMG to maintain its sovereignty. Wide ministerial discretion in policy initiation, combined 
with the secrecy properly involved in choosing between alternatives, means that initiatives 
will be closely examined by those outside HMG itself. Corporation tax reform proposals 
usually pass this test. The fact that legislative proposals are well advanced when they are 
presented for argumentative scrutiny in the Commons is entirely compatible with a 
representative democracy. This is why we need to be aware of the true role, historically 
speaking, of Parliament, in developing corporation tax reform measures. It comes at the end 
of a multifaceted stage in the process, one that requires the close interaction of public 
servants with ministers (in clarifying policy objectives), as well as with the public (in terms 
of public consultation on measures). Chapter 3 contended that this process of consultation, 
research and drafting was all that was required, constitutionally speaking, before proposals 
were put before the representative assembly. The arguments mounted by Christopher 
                                                                                                                                                       
by Charles S. Maier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1-16, esp. 2-6; also 
Chapter 1 above, n. 94.  
35  See Chapter 3 above, n. 127. 
 307
 Wales,36 and by the Institute for Fiscal Studies,37 about ‘effective [parliamentary] scrutiny’ 
fail to recognise the true role of Parliament in a representative democracy. Finance Bill 
debates do much better than either commentator is willing to recognise in fulfilling the 
requirement that legislative proposals be subject to ‘argumentative scrutiny’.38 
If the true role of Parliament in a representative democracy is to subject legislative 
provisions to ‘argumentative scrutiny’, and this is a facet of the ‘Gothic prudence’ adverted 
to by James Harrington,39 prudence is required also from those involved in presenting the 
resulting legislation to the electorate. Wales is right to criticise O’Donnell for omitting this 
stage from his picture of the legislative process since, especially when the most contentious 
measures are ‘handed down’ (usually in relation to the anti-avoidance theme), much skill is 
required in explaining and justifying them to those affected. The prudence involved in 
judging the appropriate level of engagement, in explaining and justifying measures to the 
electorate, has a continuation in the delivery of the measures themselves. This, too, involves 
prudential calculation, the careful weighing of ends and means.40 It also has its counterpart 
in the role of the judiciary. This was discussed much earlier in the study.41 The judges’ role, 
in ‘delivering’ corporation tax reforms, is much noted but little understood. Judges are much 
better at making prudential decisions in the public interest, when it comes to tax cases, than 
is often realised.   
                                                 
36  See Christopher Wales, ‘The Implications of the O’Donnell Review for the making of Tax Policy 
in the UK’ [2004] BTR 543-565. 
37  See Tax Law Review Committee, Making Tax Law: Report of a Working Party on the 
Institutional Processes for the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Tax Proposals and for the Enactment of 
Tax Legislation chaired by Sir Alan Budd (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2003). 
38  See Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 191; also Chapter 3 above, n. 290. 
39  See Manin, n. 38 above, quoting James Harrington’s ‘The Prerogative of Popular Government’, in 
The Political Works of James Harrington, ed. by J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), pp. 389-499, 477. 
40  See Chapter 3 above, n. 347. 
41  See Chapter 2 above, pp. 137-146.  
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CORPORATION TAX AS ‘POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE’ 
 
The discussion of the reform process suggests that, at any one time, the boundaries of the 
corporation tax base are a very good barometer of the UK’s sovereignty in taxing corporate 
income. Redolent as it is of questions of sovereignty, the code should be regarded as political 
jurisprudence, the strength of which is drawn (paradoxically) from the constraints under 
which it has been created. It is a case, not of ‘Prometheus unbound’ but rather, of Odysseus 
tied to the mast.42 The fact that it ranks as political jurisprudence means that it is entirely 
appropriate for the corporation tax code to be designed to further the ideological objectives 
of ‘the government of the day’. It also means that the code transcends morality; indeed, it 
helps to create the conditions under which morality is possible.43 Finally, it is clear both 
from the code itself, and from the approach of the judges to interpreting its provisions, that 
the dominant theory of the corporation tax code is ‘reason of state’, and the chief technique 
of the code is a juristic prudence. 
                                                
This juristic prudence has implications for arguments about the ‘complexity’ and 
‘instability’ of the corporation tax code. Neither of these is relevant to the concept of the rule 
of law as it inheres to political jurisprudence. Montesquieu’s rule of law, ‘freedom from 
fear’44 (as taken up by E.P. Thompson)45 refers only to ‘the rule of institutions’. As stated 
 
42  See Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 109-110, 178-201 (see Loughlin, n. 17 above, pp. 113 and 
137).  
43  See Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-
wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 186. 
44  See Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. by Anne 
M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), pp. 156-166. 
45  See E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (London: Penguin, 1990), 
pp. 258-269. 
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 above, the corporation tax code, ‘complex’ and unstable’ though it may be, is undeniably the 
product of such a rule. This does not necessarily endow ‘instability’ and ‘complexity’ with 
the cloak of virtue, however. Levels and degrees of either quality are subject to prudential 
rule. Prudential rule may require a degree of complexity in certain circumstances (e.g. to 
ensure fairness), but not in others. Likewise, prudence may require stability in some 
circumstances, but not in others. Prudence means different things at different times, if trust 
and confidence in HMG is to be maintained, and even augmented. So we come to the crux of 
the matter. Given that the corporation tax code, as public law, is a form of political 
jurisprudence, and that the prudential technique demands, not simplicity and stability in the 
name of ‘the rule of law’, but the prudential management of complexity and of change, we 
consider the actualisation of the prudential technique in the code itself. 
The snapshot offered in the latter stages of Chapter 4 should be imagined as a glimpse of 
the state of affairs on any day when the processes analysed in Chapter 3 are in motion. The 
dominant rationale at work, as carefully explained by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers 
including Adam Smith, is that of effectiveness, the realisation, if only from day to day, of the 
prince’s conception of the public interest. Although Smith died well over a century before 
the UK became a democratic state, he did live in an era of modern representative institutions, 
so it is not too great a leap, instead of thinking of some perception of ‘the common good’ in 
the mind of an eighteenth century monarch, to think of the ideology of a governing party in 
possession of a significant Parliamentary majority. Effectiveness, as Winch and others have 
shown, is linked in Smith’s writing with a certain Machiavellian prudence,46 which, in 
corporate tax policy at least, places considerable powers of initiative in the hands of the 
                                                 
46  See Winch, n. 31 above, passim; Loughlin, n. 10 above, ch. 1; Loughlin, n. 17 above, ch. 8; Roy 
Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2000), 
pp. 188-189. 
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 UK’s representative institutions. Prudence in the advancement of the public interest is what, 
it is proposed, gives HMG sovereignty in corporation tax matters. This is so, as long as the 
prudential conduct of policy continues, whatever restrictions (relatively few, in fact) have 
been placed on its competence by Community law, including the European Court of Justice’s 
(the ECJ’s) interpretation of the impact on corporate taxation of ‘the fundamental freedoms’ 
of the European Treaty. 
So, if we have to elaborate on what prudence might mean in the conduct of corporation 
tax reform might mean, what can we say? Everything, it is suggested, turns on the ability of 
HMG to enlist the reform of corporate taxation in the maintaining of a state of affairs that 
bears some plausible relationship to its ideology. Ideologies are sometimes depicted as 
having a certain purity, something that in the minds of some would exclude the economy-
driven New Labour enterprise.47 The view taken here is that the vision of combining 
economic growth with social justice is indeed an ideology. Its status, its perceived flaws, are 
not part of the inquiry. Keeping the vision credible, maintaining trust and confidence, needs 
‘quick footwork’,48 we might say prudence, at every turn, in a complex and uncertain world. 
The electorate is always ready to enforce a government’s duty to make the people richer. 
Seen in this light, the values of efficiency realised, if only in part, in the corporation tax 
code, assume their proper proportions. Making the code more efficient, as Chapter 4 has 
shown, has meant shaping the code to reflect ever more closely the imperatives of post-
neoclassical endogenous growth theory. Whether in its closer alignment of taxable profits 
with commercial profits, in its enhancement of relief for borrowing costs, in its maintenance 
of generous relief for exchange differences, or in the provision of wide relief for intangibles, 
                                                 
47  But not in the mind of Adam Smith: see Porter, n. 46 above, pp. 394-396. 
48  See the comment of the former Conservative Chancellor, Ken Clarke, about Alistair Darling’s 
response to the Northern Rock crisis (‘He was too slow; a bit wooden … ’: see Parker, Thal 
Larsen, Giles and Saigol, Financial Times, 19 September 2007, 3). 
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 the corporation tax code might, without exaggeration, be viewed as a vast economic 
instrument in the service of growth. Achieving fairness, by contrast, has meant recognising 
and confronting what is a highly contentious idea, to some extent re-imagining tax law as 
creating only ‘conventional’ rights, and prudentially managing the relationship of fairness 
with efficiency. Neither efficiency nor fairness prevails; no conclusive relationship exists 
between them. Only effectiveness matters, because things change. The effective balancing of 
efficiency and fairness depends on what is prudential at any given moment, since 
augmenting trust and confidence is all-important. 
It would, of course, be rash to predict how all this might end. The incremental process of 
reform is ongoing. It might be wrecked on the rocks of unforeseen economic contingencies. 
Rather less likely, it might be destroyed by a reaction to the economic inequalities to which it 
seems to have contributed. What is clear is that only prudent management, in the public 
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